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ABSTRACT 
This thesis, based on empirical evidence and documentary analysis, critically evaluates the 
systems under the regulatory oversight of the Royal Thai Police (RTP), the Office of the 
Ombudsman, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-
Corruption Commission (NACC) in respect of the handling of police complaints. 
Comparisons will be drawn from the system under the control of the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC) in England and Wales in order to provide alternative 
perspectives to the Thai police complaints system. 
This thesis proposes a civilian control model of a police complaints system as a key 
reform measure to instill public confidence in the handling of complaints in Thailand. 
Additional measures ranging from sufficient power and resources, complainants‘ 
involvement, securing transparency and maintaining police faith in the system are also 
recommended to enhance the proposed system. 
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CHAPTER 1: POLICE MALPRACTICE AND                                                                   
THE COMPLAINTS SYSTEMS IN THAILAND 
I. Introduction 
This thesis aims to examine critically, and propose reforms to, the existing systems for 
handling complaints against the police in Thailand. The thesis begins with this 
introductory chapter which is divided into six different sections. 
In section two, the background to police malpractice in Thailand is discussed. The 
discussion begins with the opinion polls which have been conducted to chart the level of 
public confidence in the Thai police. This is followed by an analysis of the connection 
between the police and human rights situations in Thailand. All of this will provide 
readers with some basic understanding of how serious police malpractice in Thailand is. In 
section three, a short history of the Thai police force and its current organisational 
structure is presented alongside a concise analysis of the relationship between politics and 
the police; all of this will provide a basis for discussion of the political dimension of much 
police malpractice in Thailand. In section four, the institutional arrangements of the 
independent complaints authorities namely the Office of the Ombudsman, the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption Commission 
(NACC) is explained.  Then, the nature and limitations of the functions of each complaints 
body under review of this research is highlighted in section five. Finally, an overview of 
what this research project involves is presented in section six.  
II. Background to Police Malpractice in Thailand  
In 2007, an opinion poll on reforms to the police administration in Thailand was carried 
out, partly, to explore public perceptions concerning the performance of the police. The 
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findings, as presented in Table 1.1, highlighted that, 87.1 per cent of respondents, more 
often than not, viewed the police as submissive to influential politicians; 77.3 per cent felt 
that the police adopt discriminatory practices when dealing with people; 72.1 per cent 
claimed that the police are involved with extortion and bribery; 67.5 per cent believed that 
[some] police officers associate themselves with position-buying [during an annual 
reshuffle]; notably, only 28.3 per cent felt that the police treat people equally according to 
the principles of human rights.1    
Table 1.1: Public perception of the Thai police 
Rank Popular views on performance of the police Percentage 
1 Being submissive to influential politicians 87.1 
2 Showing discrimination against people 77.3 
3 Resorting to extortion and bribery 72.1 
4 Involving themselves in buying the post 67.5 
5 Being friendly and sociable  46.6 
6 Being reliable  32.7 
7 Promptly arriving at the scene of crime 28.4 
8 Treating people fairly in line with the principles of human rights  28.3 
9 
The police have given members of the public the opportunity to 
participate in performance appraisal of themselves   
27.4 
 
In December 2014, another opinion poll was conducted to gather Thai people‘s views on 
police reforms. The results showed that only 15.92 per cent of respondents said they had 
confidence in the Thai police whilst 55.28 of them agreed that there should be a 
replacement for the current governing bodies of the Thai police force to ensure that greater 
                                                          
1
 The ABAC Social Innovation in Management and Business Analysis, ‗Public Poll for Views on Structural 
Reform of the Police Work: A Study of the People in Bangkok and Neighboring Cities and the Police 
Serving Nationwide‘ (as cited in The Minutes of the Special Meeting of the National Assembly 65/2550 on 
the National Police Bill (21 November 2007) 153-156) [in Thai]. 
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transparency in the force could be secured.2 Whilst the figures from the 2007 and 2014 
opinion polls all reflected that the majority Thai population was deeply distrustful of the 
police, a comparison of these two periods also interestingly indicated that there was a 
16.78 per cent reduction in the level of public confidence in the police over that seven year 
period.3  
We can see that the survey evidence indicates a serious problem of police malpractice and 
non-respect for the human rights of Thai people, much of which appears to be linked to 
high-level political concerns. In addition to the opinion surveys, it has been widely 
acknowledged for some 30 years at national and international levels that certain parts of 
the Thai police community have acquired considerable notoriety for brutality and abuse of 
power.4 Substantiated by a series of studies and reports,5 more often than not the police are 
also the prime suspects of the country‘s most sensational crimes including the Blue 
Diamond Affair and the forced disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit.6 In the following 
section, we will begin to examine the extent to which the Thai police manage to accord 
with the existing frameworks for human rights protection in Thailand.  
                                                          
2
 ‗NIDA Poll Showed the People Agreed with the Proposal for Police Reforms‘ ( as cited in Daily News 
(Bangkok, 21 December 2014) <http://www.dailynews.co.th/politics/288853>accessed 9 January 2015) [in 
Thai].     
3
 Note that, in the 2007 poll, 32.7 per cent of respondent said that the police are reliable whilst, in the 2014 
poll only 15.92 per cent of respondent pointed out that they had confidence in the police.  
4
 Asian Human Rights Commission, ‗Thailand: Police Reforms Mean Command Responsibility‘ (Statement) 
(14 December 2006) AS-313-2006.   
5
 See, for example, Kasemsarn Chotchakornpant, Preeda Sataworn and Prasert  Patanaponpaiboon, ‗A Study 
of Preventative Measures to Combat Abuse of Power: The Case of Abuse of Police Power‘ (NACC 2009) 
[in Thai]; see also, Asian Legal Resource Centre, ‗Rule of Law versus Rule of Lords in Thailand‘ (2005) 4 
Article 2, 1.    
6
 ‗The Thai Police: A Law unto Themselves‘ Economist (London, 17 April 2008) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/11058580> accessed 20 May 2015. The Blue Diamond Affair is an 
unresolved crime involving police corruption, serial killings and worsening diplomatic relations between 
Thailand and Saudi Arabia; see, Mehan A. McClincy, ‗A Blue Thai Affair: The Blue Diamond Affair‘s 
Illustration of the Royal Thai Police Force‘s Standards of Corruption‘ (2012) 1 Penn St JL & Int'l Aff 182; 
Andrew Marshall, ‗The curse of the blue diamond‘ Thomson Reuters Foundation (22 September 2010) 
<http://www.trust.org/item/20100922171500-nipvs/?source=search> accessed 5 February 2014. See also, 
text accompanying n 13 for the case of Somchai Neelapaijit.  
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Thai Police in the Human Rights Era 
As part of the global community, Thailand has associated itself with an international trend 
of upholding human rights principles; for example, it is a signatory to the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT). 7  The Thai constitutional structure places the government and its 
agencies under a duty to ensure that people‘s rights will be defended. Section 27 of the 
2007 Constitution, for example, specifies that:8 
Rights and liberties recognised by this Constitution expressly, by 
implication or by decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be protected 
and directly binding on the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, 
Courts, constitutional organs and State agencies in enacting, applying 
and interpreting laws.   
Even though people‘s rights are protected in legal principle, the reality shows that, too 
often, these legally protected rights are violated, especially at the hands of the police who 
are supposed to uphold them in the first place. The NHRC research illustrated that there 
had been 109 complaints cases of human rights abuses filed to the NHRC between 2002 
and 2009. The examination into these cases found that there were 11 factors that 
influenced the police to commit malpractice. 9 The five most serious factors driving the 
police to violate people‘s rights are as follows:10 
                                                          
7
 UN OHCHR, ‗Status of Ratification Indicative Dashboard: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)‘ <http://indicators.ohchr.org/> accessed 19 July 
2015. See also, National Human Rights Commission, ‗International Obligations‘ (NHRC) 
<http://www.nhrc.or.th/en/International_Obligations.php> accessed 19 July 2015.  
8
 Pinai Nanakorn (tr), Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007 (Bureau of Committee 3, the Secretariat 
of the House of Representatives, Thailand 2007). The Constitution will, hereinafter, referred to as the 
―Constitution‖. Note that the English version of the 2007 Constitution translated by Pinai Nanakorn is used 
throughout this thesis.  
9
 Sunya Buachareon, Chakrapong Vivatvanit and Kraiwut Wattanasin, ‗The Reasons for the Police to 
Violate Human Rights in Criminal Justice System‘ (NHRC 2011) III [in Thai].  
10
 ibid. Note that there may be more than one factor for human rights violations that become the cause for 
one complaint. For example, the complaint case no. 111/2549 (shown in the above research report) was 
found to have been connected with two factors for violations of human rights.     
 
 
Page 5 of 367 
 
 Chart 1.1: Contributing factors in police malpractice  
 
The pie chart highlights that ‗getting drunk with power‘ is the most influential factor, with 
57 out of 109 cases of this nature. Next in importance are ‗police irresponsibility (or ‗lack 
of conscience‘) during the investigation and interrogation‘ as the factor underlying human 
rights abuses in 48 and 33 complaints respectively. The NHRC has commissioned further 
research to explore the attitudes of the Thai police towards enforcing law and order. This 
showed that the police, especially those who are commissioned officers, saw themselves 
as having a sound understanding of human rights.11 The same research that looked into the 
factors behind police malpractice revealed, however, that 79 out of 109 human rights 
violation cases (72.48 per cent) had been committed by commissioned officers.12 
                                                          
11
 Sunee Kanyajit, Patchara Sinloyma and Pemika Sanitpod, The Attitudes of Police Officers on Law 
Enforcement and the Protection of People’s Rights in the Criminal Justice System (Stage 1) (NHRC 2011) 
95-96 [in Thai].  
12
 Buachareon and others (n 9) 71. In Thailand, a commissioned officer is normally an officer who has 
graduated from the Royal Police Cadet Academy (RPCA) and tends to hold a higher rank in the police force 
such as the position of a police captain and upwards, whilst a non-commissioned officer is an officer who 
holds a lower rank in the police force such as a sergeant and is, in most circumstances, a front-line officer. 
10 
22 
33 
48 
57 
Failure to recognise
professional ethics
Lack of understanding about
relevant legislation,
regulations and orders
Lack of conscience in
investigating cases and in
gathering evidence
Lack of conscience in
interrogating
Being drunk with power
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Speaking in an open seminar on ‗Police and the Expectation of Thai Society‘ organised by 
the Commission of Police Administration Development, Angkana Neelapaijit highlighted 
the following:13 
In any society where justice doesn‘t exist, it is difficult that [such a] 
society will become peaceful. What the people expect from the 
performance of the police is not so difficult for them to achieve. But how 
can we make the police see the people as a friend rather than a foe? How 
can the learning and teaching system of the Royal Thai Police foster the 
culture of love for fellow men rather than love for people wearing the 
same colour uniform? And how can [the police] protect the people rather 
than themselves?14      
The above remarks arguably sum up the popular mood as ―the police department [force] is 
hated and despised by all people outside of it‖;15 notably, the police also recognise this 
very fact.16 Interestingly, on the day of his appointment in 2014 as Thailand‘s police chief, 
Police General Somyot Poompanmoung said that ―he would do his best to make people 
love the police [again]‖.17  
On 25
th
 November 2014, after just a month serving as the National Police Chief, Somyot 
gave a press conference announcing the arrest of Police Lieutenant General Pongpat 
                                                          
13
 Angkana Neelapaijit is the wife of the late Somchai Neelapaijit whom was supposedly kidnapped, and 
presumably murdered, by the police after having fought against them in court on behalf of many Muslims in 
the insurgency-prone areas in Thailand; see Kingsley Abbott and Sirikarn Charoensiri, ‗Ten Years without 
Truth: Somchai Neelapaijit and Enforced Disappearance in Thailand‘ (ICJ 2014); Amnesty International, 
‗Thailand: 10 Years on, Find Truth and Justice for Family of Somchai Neelapaijit‘ (Report) (12 March 2014) 
AI-Index ASA 39/001/2014. See also, Ukrist Pathmanand, ‗Thaksin‘s Achilles‘ Heel: The Failure of 
Hawkish Approaches in the Thai South‘ (2007) 38 Critical Asian Studies 73; Amnesty International, 
‗Thailand: Torture in the Southern Counter-Insurgency‘ (Report) (13 January 2009) AI-Index ASA 
39/001/2009. Note that the Commission of Police Administration Development has now been defunct.  
14
 Kittipong Kittayarak, A Seminar Report on Police and the Expectation of Thai Society (the Secretariat of 
the Commission of Police Administration Development 2007) 41 [in Thai]. 
15
 AHRC (n 4). 
16
 For example, the police inspector given an interview for this research pointed out to me that the police 
know full well that most people dislike them.   
17
 ‗Somyot Gets National Police Chief Job in Unanimous Vote‘ The Nation (Bangkok, 21 August 2014) 
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Somyot-gets-national-police-chief-job-in-unanimous-
30241396.html> accessed 20 May 2015.  
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Chayapan, the then head of Central Investigation Bureau (CIB) and six other colleagues of 
his for bribery, extortion, money laundering, and oil smuggling.18 More importantly, the 
former head of the CIB was also charged with insults to the monarchy since he had 
claimed close ties as an uncle of the Thai Prince‘s wife (now ex-wife) as part of 
committing all the aforementioned crimes.19 Pongpat admitted all the charges.20  Somyot, 
who is now retired,21 had this remarkable achievement to his credit. For many Thais, it was 
astonishing to see a powerful police officer like Pongpat being caught by the police 
themselves 22  but it is arguable that his case is exceptional as in many other cases 
substantial progress in establishing the truth where the police were alleged to have 
committed disciplinary or criminal offences has yet to be achieved.  
For example, the investigation into the killings in 2014 of two British nationals on Koh 
Tao, an island in Southern Thailand, raised doubts about a cover-up since the accused, two 
Burmese workers, complained that they were forced to confess under duress. The father of 
one of the defendants informed the media that: 
The [police] interrogators told them [the accused] to confess to the crime, 
and threatened to cut off their limbs, put them in a bag, and dump them 
in a river if they did not.23         
                                                          
18
 Associated Press, ‗Thai Police‘s Internal Investigation into Corruption Widens Following Arrests‘ The 
Guardian (London, 25 November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/25/thai-senior-
police-officer-corruption-charges> accessed 5 March 2015.  
19
 Jocelyn Gecker, ‗Thai Intelligence Chief Jailed on Corruption Charges Owned Rolex Watches and 
Vintage Wine Costing $4,000 a Bottle‘, Independent (London, 5 March 2015). 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/thai-intelligence-chief-jailed-on-corruption-charges-
owned-rolex-watches-and-vintage-wine-costing-10089115.html> accessed 6 March 2015.  
20
 AP (n 18). 
21
 Pol. Gen. Somyot Poompanmoung‘s term in office was between 1st October 2014 and 31st August 2015. 
22
 Gecker (n 19). 
23
 Peter Walker, ‗Koh Tao‘s Dark Side: Dangers of Island Where Britons Were Murdered‘ Guardian (23 
November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/23/briton-thailand-murder-hannah-
witheridge-david-miller-mystery-mafia-fear> accessed 2 February 2015.  
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The RTP, again, failed to investigate the complaints about death threats and torture. At the 
time of this writing the accused are now standing trial, according to their testimonies, they 
still insist that they were threatened by the police and that their confession was extracted 
by torture.24  
It should be noted that none of the complaints systems analysed in subsequent chapters of 
this thesis have played a crucial role in addressing high-profile cases such as those noted 
above.  
Russell has rightly pointed out that one of the channels intended to resolve tensions 
between the police and citizens is the procedure by which the latter are allowed to 
complain against the former. 25  In the following sections we will start looking at the 
existing institutional arrangements of the police watchdog bodies in Thailand. First, 
however, it is important to provide a brief sketch of how the Thai police itself have 
developed historically.  
III. Thailand and the Royal Thai Police 
The aim of this section is to provide readers with some knowledge about Thailand and its 
police force. It begins with some key facts about Thailand, most important of which are 
the country‘s constitutional arrangements and the current political situation. It then lays 
some foundations of the history of the Thai police and its modern form – the Royal Thai 
Police (RTP). This will help illuminate the close proximity between police and politics in 
Thailand. 
                                                          
24
 Philip Sherwell, ‗Suspect in British Backpacker Murder Trial Describes Thai 'Police Torture'‘ The 
Telegraph (Koh Samui, 2 September 2015) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/11838501/Suspect-in-British-backpacker-
murder-trial-describes-police-torture.html> accessed 12 October 2015. See also, ch 4. 
25
 Ken Russell, Complaints against the Police: A Sociological View (Milltak 1985) 2.  
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A Short Introduction to Thailand 
Thailand (officially the ‗Kingdom of Thailand‘) is the only country in the region to have 
avoided colonial rule. 26  Thailand has a written constitution and according to its 
constitutional framework, Thailand is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy. The elected prime minister serves as the head of government whilst the king 
acts as head of state.27  
Thailand has a unitary and centralised government which controls and implements 
national policy.28 As regards its legislative body, the Thai parliament is bicameral as it is 
comprised of two separate assemblies namely the Senate and the House of Representatives 
discharging their responsibilities to pass the law of the land. 29  Even though the 
constitutional system in Thailand adheres to the principle of the separation of executive, 
legislative and judiciary powers, it should be noted that the executive and legislative 
powers are not totally separate from one another in practice. The heart of the matter is that 
the Prime Minister must be a Member of Parliament in accordance with the constitution, 
and he or she is normally the leader or at least a member of the ruling party.30 The judicial 
power is more obviously separate. The judicial system has independent administration; the 
court of justice, in particular, enforces its own regulations as to recruitment, promotion, 
increase of salaries, and the dismissal of judicial personnel.31 
                                                          
26
 Douglas A. Phillips, Thailand (Charles F. Gritzner (ed), Chelsea House Publisher 2007) 24.  
27
 Constitution (n 8) ss 2, 3. 
28
 Rinn-Sup Shinn, ‗Government and Politics‘ in Barbara Leitch LePoer (ed), Thailand: A Country Study 
(Library of Congress 1987) 186. 
29
 Constitution (n 8) s 88. 
30
 ibid ss 171, 172. 
31
 ibid s 220. 
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Thailand has so far experienced 19 (real and attempted) military coups32 since the end of 
an absolute monarchy in 1932.33 The most recent and important ones were the coups in 
2006 and in 2014, triggered by decades of political unrest. 34 The 2006 coup undermined 
the 1997 Constitution or the so called ‗the People‘s Charter‘ 35  which had completely 
transformed Thailand‘s democracy to become more participatory, accountable and 
transparent. Indeed, it introduced a proper system of checks and balances for the first time 
in the country‘s history.36 The latest coup in 2014 ripped apart the 2007 Constitution and 
brought Thailand once more under military rule. In late 2014, the military government 
selected an expert panel to draft a new constitution. 37  However, many aspects of 
constitutional arrangements under the 2007 Constitution have been preserved whilst a new 
constitution is still in the drafting process.38 For example, under the National Council for 
Peace and Order no.11/2557, a number of watchdog bodies including the Office of the 
Ombudsman, the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), and the National Anti-
Corruption Commission (NACC) etc. are still discharging their duties albeit with some 
                                                          
32
 Kate Hodal, ‗Thailand Army Chief Confirms Military Coup and Suspends Constitution‘ The Guardian 
(Bangkok, 22 May 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/22/thailand-army-chief-
announces-military-coup> accessed 19 July 2014.  
33
 Chris Baker and Pasuk Phongpaichit, A History of Thailand (3rd edn, CUP 2014) 117-118. 
34
 ‗Thailand Country Profile‘ BBC (London, 28 August 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
15581957> accessed 30 December 2015. 
35
 Kittipong Kittayarak, ‗The Thai Constitution of 1997 and its Implication on Criminal Justice Reform‘ 
(120
th
 International Senior Seminar: Effective Administration of the Police and the Prosecution in Criminal 
Justice, Tokyo, February 2003) <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/ pages/RMS/No60.htm> accessed 31 
December 2013. 
36
 Peter Leyland, ‗The Ombudsman Principles in Thailand‘ (2007) 2 JCL 137, 137-139. 
37
 Amy Sawitta Lefevre and Panarat Thepgumpanat, ‗Thai Junta Picks Panel to Write Constitution after 
Draft Rejected‘ Reuters (Bangkok, 5 October 2015) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/05/us-
thailand-politics-idUSKCN0RZ0EB20151005> accessed 15 October 2015.  
38
 ‗Thailand's Controversial Draft Constitution Explained‘ BBC (6 September 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk  
/news/world-asia-34149522> accessed 19 November 2015.  
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limits. 39  It should be noted that the analysis of this thesis is based on the statutory 
framework laid down in the 2007 Constitution. 
A History of the Thai Police  
The Thai police entity is generally regarded as having been officially founded in 1455 
during the Ayutthaya kingship.40 The role of an ancient policeman was solely associated 
with royal protection which was deemed as an extraordinary mission.41 Over the following 
centuries, the structure of the police authority became more sophisticated whilst the police 
service became subject to a more formal style of management.42 The Thai police service 
was drastically reformed in the late 19
th
 century (from 1860 onwards) during a time when 
a radical overhaul of public administration in Thailand was introduced. 43 In 1890, for 
instance, the son of King Rama V – Krom Phra Narasuan Vorarid, who was renowned for 
being a repository of ideas about modern policing as he had previously served as the 
Siamese (Thai) Ambassador to London and saw the evolution of policing in England, was 
designated to accomplish the police reform.44 Owing to the experience of the prince in 
England, it is unsurprising that the evolution of policing which was initiated in the city of 
Bangkok would follow the model of the British constabulary.45 The application of the 
British police model prompted improvements to the Thai police service, principally in the 
                                                          
39
 National Council for Peace and Order no.11/2557. Note that the National Council for Peace and Order 
(NCPO) is a body of the military junta.  
40
 Pratueng Thaniyaphol, ‗Thai police: The Guardian of the Land, the King and the People‘ (2006) 3 RUJ 13, 
13 [in Thai]. 
41
 Eric James Haanstad, ‗Constructing Order through Chaos: A State Ethnography of the Thai Police‘ (PhD 
thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison 2008) 48.  
42
 ibid 48-52. 
43
 Prayong Temchavala and Ruedej Kirdvichai, ‗The Reform in the Organisational Structure and Working 
System of the Thai Police‘ (The Secretariat of the Senate 2005) 52 [in Thai]. 
44
 Krisanaphong Poothakool, ‗The Royal Thai Police, 2006-2011: Five Years without Reform‘ (PhD thesis, 
University of Aberdeen 2012) 20. 
45
 ibid. 
 
 
Page 12 of 367 
 
aspect of the gathering of evidence and crime recording;46 The Thai police continued to 
evolve when the absolute monarchy came to an end in 1932.  
Following the dawn of the democratic era in Thailand, the roles of the Thai police had 
changed somewhat dramatically. The motto appearing on the Thai police cap badge, 
which reads ―Pitak Sandti Raat‖, meaning ―guarding peace and people‖, shows that the 
duties of the modern police are not limited to only safeguarding the monarchy but also to 
relieve distress and promote contentment for the people.47 However, since the beginning of 
the post-absolute monarchy, Thailand has repeatedly been engulfed by the usurpation of 
political power by the military establishment. Thus, it was not that easy for the Thai police 
to perform their duties properly. During the time of Field Marshal Pleak Pibunsongkram 
as the Prime Minister (1938-1944 and 1948-1957), for instance, the police were mainly 
exploited to suppress political opponents.48  
We can understand from the history of the Thai police that, from the outset, the police 
authority was established and designed primarily to safeguard and to extend the power of 
the rulers.49 Even though the administration of the police force and the nature of the 
service might have been changed every now and again after the dissolution of the absolute 
monarchy, it is apparent that the function of the Thai police, still, was to ―impose central 
authority rather than afford community protection‖.50 In the following sub-section, we will 
see how the evolution of the Thai police in terms of being the machinery for the central 
government was deeply ingrained in the police community. 
                                                          
46
 ibid 14-15. 
47
 Thaniyaphol (n 40) 1. 
48
 Haanstad (n 41) 59-60. 
49
 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsigh Piriyarangsan, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand (Silkworm 
Books 1994) 114-115. 
50
 ibid. 
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The Modern Police Organisation – the Royal Thai Police  
In consequence of the 1997 Constitution, the Thai police organisation was once again 
subjected to a fundamental reform. The reform of the Thai police was a subject of 
vigorous and wide-ranging debate shortly after the Constitution came into effect. 51 People 
viewed the Police Bureau as a rotten barrel containing bad apples. The Thai police were 
seen to be incompetent and politically partisan since their organisation lacked a clear 
direction that connected with public services and, on many occasions, the police 
organisation had proved to be very much under the influence of political factions for 
political gains. 52  In addition, the Police Bureau became a cumbersome and over-
complicated department which could no longer be effective; hence, the organisational 
reform for the Police Bureau introduced in 1998.53  
In the light of public concern over political influence upon the police, it was proposed that 
the Police Bureau should operate away from the Ministry of Interior.54 The core concept of 
separating the Police Bureau from the Interior Minister‘s influence was that this would 
enable a greater degree of independence for the police organisation; 55  eliminate the 
patronage system in the Thai police organisation;56 and lower the level of seriousness of 
police misconduct. 57  Further national debate on the status of the police organisation 
following the separation from the Ministry of Interior ensued. One proposal was that the 
police organisation should be transferred to be under the direction and control of the 
                                                          
51
 Kittayarak ‗The Thai Constitution of 1997‘ (n 35). The 1997 Constitution is generally called ―the People‘s 
Charter‖ for the reason that it was a participatory constitution that Thailand had ever had.   
52
 Porntep Prasirtpum, ‗A Study on Administrators‘ Attitude toward Restructuring of the Royal Thai Police‘ 
(MBA thesis, Ramkhamheang University 1999) 2-9 [in Thai]. During which time the Thai police 
organisation was answerable to the Minister of Interior. 
53
 ibid. 
54
 Poothakool (n 44) 36.  
55
 Prasirtpum (n 52) 2-9. 
56
 Amorn Wanichwiwatana, ‗The 1998 Thai Police Reform: A Study of the Persistence of Institutional 
Corruption‘ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 2004) 36. See the discussion about the patronage system 
within the Thai police in ch 3. 
57
 ibid 37. 
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Ministry of Justice which was also subjected to considerable reform at the same period of 
time.58 However, the idea was dismissed on the basis that the Ministry of Justice would not 
be able to shoulder an onerous burden of managing the Police Bureau, an organisation 
with more than 200,000 officers.59 In consequence, the Police Bureau was later transferred 
to be under direct command of the Prime Minister instead. This prompted a number of 
subsequent changes in respect of organisational structure and image.60 In the wake of these 
reforms, the police organisation had its name changed from the Police Bureau to the 
‗Royal Thai Police‘ (RTP) to accord with its new image as being a national body. In 
addition, it rearranged the positions and the chain of command by having a Police 
Commissioner as the head of the organisation instead of a director general to correspond 
with the organisational changes.61  
It took a few years before the relatively sparse pieces of legislation in relation to the police 
administration would be agglomerated into a single and comprehensive regulation – the 
National Police Act (NPA).62 Under the legal framework established by the NPA, the RTP 
has the Office of the Commissioner General (OCG) as its headquarters where a decision-
making process, implementation of policies, a chain of command and disciplinary control 
centre around the direction and control of the Commissioner.63 With the total number of 
204,678 men and women serving as police officers (as of 2013),64 the RTP divides its 
agencies into many divisions. The most important ones in terms of crime prevention are 
the Metropolitan Police Bureau which has its paramount responsibility for suppressing 
                                                          
58
 Kittayarak ‗The Thai Constitution of 1997‘ (n 35). 
59
 ibid. 
60
 Prasirtpum (n 52) 9. 
61
 ibid. 
62
 Temchavala and Kirdvichai (n 43) 54. 
63
 National Police Act 2004, s 6. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗NPA‘. 
64
 Royal Thai Police, ‗The Total Number of Serving Officers‘ <http://pdd.police.go.th/page/data_page.htm> 
accessed 10 March 2013.   
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crime and maintaining law and order in the city of Bangkok, and nine other Provincial 
Police Divisions preventing crime and keeping public order in each region nationwide.65 
According to the NPA, the Office of Board of the Royal Thai Police (OBRTP) and the 
Office of the Police Commission (OPC) are the two important agencies having oversight 
of the RTP‘s administration.66 The Board is presided over by the Prime Minister as one of 
the ex officio members. It has the primary mission to formulate policies in relation to the 
responsibilities of the police. In addition, it also has a remit to monitor and command the 
RTP to conform with the government policies, cabinet resolution and other relevant 
regulations.67 Nonetheless, what appears to be of paramount importance for the OBRTP is 
its authority over the selection process of the senior police officer whom the Prime 
Minister nominates to assume the position 
of the Commissioner General.68 The OPC, 
of which the Prime Minister is also the 
chair, has the remit of handling the 
administrative work in the RTP such as 
human resources, training programmes, 
welfare and disciplinary action (see figure 
1).69  
Arguably, the objective of reforming the 
police organisation in Thailand was not 
                                                          
65
 Royal Thai Police, ‗Internal Agencies‘ <http://www.royalthaipolice.go.th/agencies_under.php> accessed 
10 March 2014. 
66
 NPA (n 63) ss 16, 30.             
67
 ibid s 16. 
68
 ibid s 18. 
69
 ibid s 30. 
Figure 1: The Organisational Structure of the RTP 
Source: Phongthon Thanyasiri, ‗The Public 
Participation in Police Administration‘ (DPhil 
Thesis, Mahidol University 2002) 45. 
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achieved. The structural and administrative changes, not least the fact that the interior 
minister as the superior of the Thai police has now been replaced by the Prime Minister, 
did not separate the police from politics. The 1998 reform merely gave the appearance that 
the police organisation had improved where it actually had not. 
Interviews conducted for ‗a research project examining the 1998 reform of the police‘ 
confirmed this, as illustrated by the following quotes: 
Despite the reform we will still lack the trust and confidence of the 
public. As long as this attitude remains we can‘t police effectively. Often 
the higher ranks just do things as a media stunt, such as going to slum 
areas with TV cameras and having a crack-down on crime. But this only 
lasts a few days and then everything goes back to the way it was. I can‘t 
blame the public if they don‘t trust us.70 
The reform was simply a political manoeuvre for the politicians and 
high-ranking officers to fulfill their needs. The police could detach itself 
from the Ministry of Interior while the politicians could claim that the 
reform was their masterpiece.71 
The interviews suggest that the 1998 reform was unsuccessful in terms of solving the 
perennial issues of corruption and political interference, which is not surprising given that 
it left untouched the root causes of the aforesaid problems.     
The above historical analysis of the Thai police demonstrates that since its inception the 
police institution was designed to be a part of the machinery to help the rulers preserve 
their political power. Successive reforms did little more than re-arrange power amongst 
the political class and did not in any way encourage the police to become more loyal to the 
law and the people. It is worth pointing out that certain aspects of the history of the Thai 
                                                          
70
 Wanichwiwatana (n 56) 84. 
71
 ibid 79. 
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police have shaped the police community and led to violations of human rights. Referring 
back to the above study on the factors underlying police malpractice in Thailand, the 
findings show that a sizable proportion of the police was drunk with power (see Chart 1.1); 
this is arguably because the police force is closely connected with the central authority. In 
the Thai context, many people stand in awe of those who are in power by which I mean 
they both admire and are afraid of them. Thai people are certainly in awe of the police.72 
Many police officers in Thailand are well aware of this which I would argue feeds into 
their perception of themselves as being superior to ordinary people. This in turn leads to 
abuse of power. The work of Wanichwiwatana reflected this as he indicated that: 
During observations at the police stations and on the patrol I frequently 
saw the police behave in an over-authoritarian way when stopping, 
questioning and searching members of the public.73    
This is why the mechanisms for providing remedial solutions when conflicts between the 
police and the people arise are of great importance.  
IV. Independent Complaints Authorities 
The promulgation of the 1997 Constitution brought about the emergence of many 
watchdog bodies; amongst them are the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Human 
Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). 
These bodies were tasked with the missions to hold the executive branch accountable in 
                                                          
72
 Kittayarak, Police and the Expectation of Thai Society (n 14) 36. 
73
 Wanichwiwatana (n 56) 85. My interviews with a number of police officers left me with the clear 
impression that many police officers see themselves as a powerful force in Thai society. For example, many 
of them talked [off record] about the way in which they exercise their power in order to obtain cooperation 
from  indigenous peoples and in doing so demonstrated a mindset that they see themselves as being superior 
to the common people.     
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various dimensions. 74  The Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC have managed to 
survive the coups and are therefore still playing a crucial role in the checks and balances 
system including in handling police complaints in Thailand. To come to grips with the 
above authorities, we will now outline the history and institutional arrangements of each 
of them. 
The Office of the Ombudsman 
Leyland has underlined that ―the primary reason…, for introducing an ombudsman was 
not to provide a remedy for routine administrative shortcomings, but to provide another 
weapon to combat the endemic corruption associated with Thailand‘s central and local 
government‖.75 Despite that, the role of the Ombudsman in addressing routine complaints 
against government wrongdoing has also proven to be important to ordinary members of 
the public in Thailand.  
Paragraphs 1, 5 and 6, section 242 of the 2007 Constitution prescribed the elements of the 
Ombudsman and members‘ term in office as follows: 
There shall be three Ombudsmen appointed, by the King with the advice 
of the Senate… 
Ombudsmen shall hold office for a term of six years as from the date of 
their appointment by the King and shall serve for only one term.. 
There shall be the Office of [the] Ombudsmen as an independent agency, 
with autonomy in personnel administration, budgeting and other 
activities, as provided by law. 
When it comes to the matters of jurisdiction, paragraph 1(1) and (2), section 244 of the 
Constitution prescribes that: 
                                                          
74
 Peter Leyland, ‗Thailand‘s Constitutional Watchdogs: Dobermans, Bloodhounds or Lapdogs‘ (2007) 2 
JCL 151, 153. 
75
 ibid 141. 
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Ombudsmen have the powers and duties as follows: 
(1) to consider and inquire into the complaint for fact-findings in the 
following cases: 
(a) failure to perform in compliance with the law or performance 
beyond powers and duties as provided by the law of a Government 
official, an official or employee of a Government agency, a State 
agency, a State enterprise or a local government organisation;  
(b) performance of or omission to perform duties of a Government 
official, an official or employee of a Government agency, a State 
agency, a State enterprise or a local government organisation, 
which unjustly causes injury to the complainant or the public, 
whether such act is lawful or not; 
(2) to take action in connection with ethics of holders of political 
positions and State officials under section 279 paragraph 3 and section 
280; 
The above arrangements show that the Ombudsman has as its main statutory responsibility 
to handle complaints against state officials on grounds of action or inaction that 
perpetuates injustice. In addition, the remit of the Ombudsman under the Constitution also 
covers the matters of professional ethics of state officials; for instance, it has dealt with a 
high profile case of one of the former Metropolitan Police Commanders in 2013 (see 
chapter 4).   
The National Human Rights Commission   
The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC)‘s functions are concerned with 
promoting human rights, including handling and reporting violations and suggesting 
general reform measures to the government and/or relevant authorities. According to 
paragraphs 1, 4 and 6, section 256 of the 2007 Constitution: 
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The National Human Rights Commission consists of the President and 
six other members appointed, by the King with the advice of the 
Senate… 
The members of the National Human Rights Commission shall hold 
office for a term of six years as from the date of their appointment by the 
King and shall serve for only one term. 
There shall be [the] Office of the National Human Rights Commission, 
with autonomy in personnel administration, budgeting and other 
activities as provided by law. 
In dealing with human rights issues, paragraph 1 (1) and (4) of section 257 authorises the 
NHRC: 
(1) to examine and report the commission or omission of acts which 
violate human rights or which do not comply with obligations under 
international treaties to which Thailand is a party, and propose 
appropriate remedial measures to persons or agencies committing or 
omitting such acts for taking action. In the case where it appears that no 
action has been taken as proposed, the Commission shall report it to the 
National Assembly for further proceeding; 
(4) to file a lawsuit to the Court of Justice on behalf of the injured person 
when a request is made by the injured person and it is deemed 
appropriate to find a solution to violation of human rights vis-à-vis the 
public at large, as provided by law; 
These institutional arrangements point to the fact that the NHRC does not just deal with 
complaints but may also act on behalf of the complainants in court. Whilst this has proven 
helpful for individual complainants (especially those who are vulnerable) it is important to 
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recognise that the NHRC will represent the complainants in court only when it is of the 
view that the legal action will lead to the benefit of the society as a whole.76  
The National Anti-Corruption Commission  
Having been established as a leading corruption fighter, the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission (NACC), within the framework of the Constitution, was thrust into ―the role 
of a specialist criminal investigatory body‖.77 The structure of the NACC was specified as 
follows: 
The National Counter [Anti-] Corruption Commission consists of the 
President and eight other members appointed by the King with the advice 
of the Senate.78 
Members of the National Counter [Anti-] Corruption Commission shall 
hold office for a term of nine years as from the date of their appointment 
by the King and shall serve for only one term.79 
The National Counter [Anti-] Corruption Commission shall have its 
independent secretariat, with the Secretary-General of the National 
Counter Corruption Commission as the superior responsible directly to 
the President of the National Counter [Anti-] Corruption Commission.80 
There shall be [the] Office of the National Counter [Anti-] Corruption 
Commission, with autonomy in personnel administration, budgeting and 
other activities as provided by law.81 
The jurisdiction of the NACC encompasses political and administrative areas. It 
investigates allegations of corruption and unusual wealth;82 also, it verifies asset disclosure 
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80
 ibid s 251 para 1. 
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of those holding political positions.83 Last but not least, the NACC also has the remit to do 
the following according to section 250 (3) of the Constitution: 
(3) to inquire and decide whether State officials, from high-ranking 
executives or Government officials holding positions of Director or its 
equivalent upwards, have become unusually wealthy or have committed 
an offence of corruption, malfeasance in office or malfeasance in judicial 
office, and take action against State officials or Government officials 
holding lower positions, who have committed offences in conspiracy 
with the aforesaid holders of positions or with persons holding political 
positions… 
It can be seen that the NACC has formidable investigatory powers that enable it to look 
into a wide-range of cases involving government wrongdoing. Nevertheless, the 
Commission no longer shoulders the burden of dealing with complaints about corruption 
and malfeasance in office alone because some power was devolved to the Public Sector 
Anti-Corruption Commission (PACC) in 2008. 84  The devolution of power has 
consequently made the handling of police complaints involving corruption and misconduct 
a shared responsibility between the NACC and the PACC. To draw a clear line of 
responsibility between the two bodies, the NACC Declaration lays out police complaints 
that fall within its purview are the ones relating to misconduct allegedly perpetrated by:85 
[A] Superintendent or an investigating officer in the advisory level 
and other levels upwards; 
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This means complaints against the police holding a superintendent or of a higher rank such 
as the police chief need to be registered with the NACC whilst those made against officers 
whose ranks are lower than a superintendent will be handled by the PACC. 
V. The Statutory Functions of the Complaints Bodies and their Capacity to Handle 
Police Complaints 
In the interest of clear understanding, this section is devoted to a discussion of the 
functions of each complaints agency under review of this research and their capacity when 
handling police complaints. 
Within the framework of the NPA, the RTP discharges its main function as a crime fighter 
where it has the power to investigate crime and commence criminal proceedings.86 It is 
indeed the sole authority in Thailand possessing the power to deal with everyday crime (eg, 
crimes against the person and/or property). The RTP is also tasked with maintaining good 
discipline in the force and a complaints system is run internally to support the fulfilment of 
this task.87 As a complaints authority, the police are capable of investigating disciplinary 
offences in parallel to criminal offences.88 Following the investigation, the police authority 
is able to take disciplinary action against the officer involved provided disciplinary 
offences have been identified; also, it has the power to institute criminal proceedings if 
there is an indication that the officer involved may have committed criminal offences (see 
in-depth discussion in chapter 3). 89  
In the previous section, we saw that the constitutional arrangements for the Thai 
Ombudsman indicate that the key function of the Ombudsman is to tackle 
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maladministration. 90  Regarding the handling of police complaints, the Ombudsman is 
given the power to inquire into complaints to find whether action or inaction by any 
individual police officers and/or police authorities inflicts harm and/or damage or 
perpetrates injustice to an individual or the public. 91 However, distinctions need to be 
recognised between inquiring into complaints to identify defects in public administration 
and investigating criminal offences intended for prosecution in the criminal courts. 
Therefore, it should be noted from the outset that the Ombudsman of Thailand can neither 
exercise the power to instigate disciplinary proceedings nor can it assume the 
responsibility of initiating criminal proceedings during or following its inquiry (see further 
discussion in chapter 4). Interestingly, the inability of the Thai Ombudsman in relation to 
disciplinary and criminal processes distinguishes it from the ombudsmen of Sweden and 
Finland, from which the institution of the ombudsman emanated, as both of those bodies 
are capable of taking disciplinary action and/or pressing criminal charges against the 
alleged culprit.92  
As part of the oversight mechanisms of Thailand, the NHRC has its main function of 
defending and promoting human rights and exercises a number of legal powers in doing 
so.93 As for its capacity as a police watchdog, the NHRC, like the Ombudsman, merely 
inquires into complaints to determine if the officers involved have violated people‘s rights 
— but does not to seek to indicate, specifically, any disciplinary and/or criminal offences. 
Subsequent to the inquiry, therefore, the NHRC does not have the remit to commence 
disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings against the alleged wrongdoer (see chapter 4). 
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The fact that the NHRC does not have this function in relation to disciplinary and/or 
criminal procedures seems to reinforce Harding‘s conclusion that the Commission had 
been created out of a political compromise since, similar to the notion previously adopted 
by governments of many other Asian nations, 94  human rights norms were originally 
regarded by certain quarters in Thai society (especially the traditional establishment) as 
alien to Thai values; as a result, the Commission‘s power has been restricted to ensure that  
national security and traditional values would not be hampered.95  
According to the Thai constitution, the NACC is seemingly a formidable force.96 As noted 
above, the NACC‘s functions extend beyond fighting corruption to include addressing 
malfeasance in public office.97 To fulfil its function, the NACC is capable of undertaking 
an investigation into complaints about corruption and malfeasance in office directed at 
identifying disciplinary and/or criminal wrongdoings; crucially, the NACC commissioners 
and investigating officers are regarded by law as law enforcement personnel according to 
the Thai Criminal Procedure Code and this means that they are authorised to exercise 
‗police powers‘ (eg, arrest and/or detention powers) during the investigation into 
complaints.98 This shows that the NACC‘s jurisdiction covers certain areas of criminality 
even though it does not tackle everyday crime like the police do. Upon the completion of 
its investigation, the NACC has the power to instruct the police to pursue disciplinary 
action providing disciplinary offences have been identified; in addition, it also has the 
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power to instigate criminal proceedings against the alleged culprit if there is an indication 
of criminal wrongdoings (see chapter 4).99   
As this research aims to gain some inspiration from the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission (IPCC) of England and Wales (see below, the Scope of the study),100 it is 
important to also explain the function and the role of the IPCC in handling police 
complaints. The IPCC discharges its function as a specialist police watchdog tackling 
police malpractice throughout England and Wales.101 The IPCC has a wide range of powers 
akin to that of the police when they investigate police complaints; the powers include 
arrest, search and surveillance powers to name but a few.102 On the completion of the 
investigation, the IPCC has the power to direct the police to take disciplinary action 
against the wrongdoer; in the meantime, it is also capable of referring the investigation 
report to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) for further criminal proceedings (see 
chapters 4 and 5).103 
The above discussion sets out the functions of each complaints body in question and the 
powers each of them have when dealing with complaints against the police. This paves the 
way for readers to understand the subsequent analysis contained within the rest of this 
thesis of the different complaints systems from two distinct jurisdictions.         
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VI. An Overview of the Research 
This research is concerned with the handling of police complaints in Thailand. Harrison 
and Cunneen underline that:104 
If citizens are to have confidence in the police service as a whole, they 
must feel that when they complain about individual instances of police 
misconduct their allegations will be investigated thoroughly and 
impartially.  
Considering the level and nature of police malpractice in Thailand, the importance of Thai 
society having an effective system for dealing with police malpractice and complaints 
against the police is unquestionable. This research will critically examine the mechanisms 
for handling complaints against the police in Thailand. The examination centres around the 
internal system of the police themselves and the three independent complaints systems 
described in section four above. In order to consider the effectiveness of these systems 
from an appropriately critical standpoint, reference will be made to international standards 
for the handling of police complaints.  
Research Question 
To investigate the Thai police complaints system, the overarching research question is 
therefore formulated as follows:                  
To what extent does the operation of the Thai system of handling 
complaints against the police correspond to international standards laid 
down for this form of police accountability? 
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Following on from the overarching question are the following related questions:      
1) How are the Thai systems supposed to work? 
2) How do they actually work in practice? 
3) Do the systems (in theory or practice) correspond with institutional 
arrangements for the handling of police complaints called for by 
international standards? 
4) What could be changed to make them correspond with such standards? 
5) Could the Thai systems draw inspiration from the English model (the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission)?105 
Answers for all of these questions can be found in each subsequent chapter of this thesis.  
Aims and Objectives 
1. To describe and provide evidence in relation to the current situation of 
police complaints as a form of police accountability in Thailand; 
2. To analyse how the complaints mechanisms under the regulatory 
oversight of the RTP, the NACC, the NHRC and the Ombudsman, 
actually work in practice; 
3. To understand whether the foregoing mechanisms, in theory or 
practice, correspond with the institutional arrangements for handling 
police complaints called for by international standards;  
4. To suggest any possible changes that could be made to the Thai 
complaints mechanisms in order for them to correspond with 
international standards (drawing inspiration from the UK model where 
appropriate). 
The Scope of the Study 
In Thailand, there are many mechanisms for dealing with police complaints ranging from 
the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) or the Crime Suppression Division (CSD) as the 
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internal ones; the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) (answerable to the Ministry of 
Justice, Thailand) as the external one; and the Ombudsman, the NACC and the NHRC as 
the independent ones that would-be complainants may seek to register their complaints 
with.106  
This research confines its attention to the internal system under the control of the RTP and 
the independent systems of the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC. The RTP system 
is significant in this study as it shows the arrangements that the police use for dealing with 
complaints against themselves. We will need to consider whether those arrangements are 
effective for tackling abuse within the police force. It is also important to examine the 
mechanisms of the independent bodies in order to understand whether and how the 
element of independence enhances the effectiveness and impartiality of the handling of 
complaints. Although the NACC has devolved some power to the PACC since 2008, the 
latter will not be examined in this research. The reasons are, first and foremost, it is not an 
independent body;107 in addition, it has very much the same arrangements as the NACC. 
Therefore, the study of the NACC proves sufficient for our understanding. 
It should be noted that England has made successive attempts to improve its own police 
complaints system over the last four decades, generating much debate and research.108 This 
study accordingly draws inspiration (where appropriate) from the English complaints 
system, now under the regulatory oversight of the Independent Police Complaints 
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Commission (IPCC). The study concludes by proposing reforms designed to ensure the 
better handling of complaints against the police in Thailand. 
The Significance of the Research 
The significance of this proposed research project can be claimed to be profound. This 
project constitutes trailblazing social research that investigates fully the major, existing 
police complaints mechanisms in Thailand to see how they actually work and to identify if 
there is any room for improvements. To do so, the criteria for an effective mechanism for 
handling complaints against the police laid down by the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (UNODC); the principles distilled from the caselaw of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR); and the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions 
(the Paris Principles) will be used for benchmarking the systems under review in order to 
help us understand the Thai police complaints system from a wider perspective. The 
findings of this study will offer fresh insights into the police complaints mechanisms in 
Thailand. Moreover, the findings can help raise public awareness of the issues around the 
major, existing complaints mechanisms in Thailand and thus contribute to creating the 
right political environment in which fundamental reform of the police complaints 
mechanisms could finally be introduced. 
The Organisation of the Thesis 
Chapter two relates to research design and methodology. The discussion in this chapter 
includes the overall research strategy, the methods adopted in this research, sampling, the 
conduct of the research fieldwork, potential ethical issues and limitations of the research.    
Chapter three discusses the scale of police misconduct in Thailand and the root causes of it. 
It also critically evaluates the internal complaints systems of the RTP at local and national 
levels to see if they are sufficiently effective against police malpractice. 
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Chapter four examines the systems under the regulatory oversight of the Ombudsman, the 
NHRC and the NACC. The study aims to investigate if these systems are effective in 
handling complaints against the police and also identify any outstanding problems. In 
addition, the theory of regulatory capture will be adopted as the conceptual framework to 
assess whether their systems are truly independent. 
Chapter five lays out the criteria for an effective mechanism for handling police complaints 
outlined by the UNODC; the principles from the caselaw of the ECtHR; and the Paris 
Principles, and examines whether the Ombudsman, the NHRC, the NACC and the RTP 
satisfy these international standards on a police complaints system. The IPCC will also be 
used as a benchmark in order to provide some new perspectives on the Thai system. 
Chapter six considers a package of reforms measures that would improve the current 
system in Thailand. 
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CHAPTER 2: RESEARCH DESIGN 
I. Introduction 
Research design is crucial because it functions as a ―blueprint of research‖1 that ―deals 
primarily with aim, purposes, intentions and plans within the practical constraints of 
location, time, money and availability of staff‖. 2  Research design therefore enables 
researchers to construct a logical plan to identify what questions to study, what data is 
required, and how an analysis can be done. Having research design in place will ultimately 
ensure that researchers are able to use the evidence obtained to answer the initial research 
question as clearly as they possibly can.3 In the following sections, we will document key 
elements of the research design relevant to this research-based thesis. To do so, this 
chapter begins by explaining how the proposed design works to achieve the aims and 
objectives of the project. We will then discuss research methodology including methods 
and sampling to demonstrate the practicality of this research. Ethical issues, research 
access, and difficulties encountered during the fieldwork are then examined. The 
approaches taken for analysing the data in this research will be underlined in the final part 
of this chapter.       
II. Proposed Design 
The aims of this research involve critique of the existing systems for handling police 
complaints in Thailand thus necessitating a thorough investigation into each of them. 
Equally important for the study of a fragmented police complaints system, such as exists 
in Thailand, is to make a comparison between each element in order to comprehend the 
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issues around the handling of complaints as a whole. This means that the research design 
might be labelled as, ‗a critical study with an element of comparison‘. At the core of this 
proposed design frame is a critical examination of the systems under the control of the 
Royal Thai Police (RTP), the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC). The 
function of this design is threefold: to identify key features of each complaints system in 
terms of its organisational structures, statutory powers and the procedures for complaints, 
to highlight and compare how these systems operate in practice, and to assess the 
unresolved issues around the handling of police complaints.  
Within social research, it is arguable that ―thinking without comparison is unthinkable‖.4 
When the surrounding social realities are observed partially by social scientists, a 
comparison between the selected phenomenon for observation and other social phenomena 
is always a choice to be made equivocally or unequivocally; as a result, ―thinking in 
comparative terms is inherent in social research‖. 5  Hence, this research project also 
includes an element of comparison in order to develop a holistic perspective and gain new 
inspirations when it comes to proposing reforms for the complaints systems in Thailand. 
Ragin pointed out that ‗comparative study‘ can be commonly understandable as a study of 
comparable data. 6  This brings us to one of the most fundamental questions in a 
comparative study which is the comparability of units of analysis. In what respect and to 
what extent are the complaints systems overseen by the RTP, the Ombudsman, the NHRC 
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and the NACC really comparable? To draw a useful comparison, a balance between units 
of analysis is required to a certain degree. To put it simply, although it is not always 
possible for researchers to select the objects of comparison that are equally comparable, it 
is also inadvisable to compare the objects indiscriminately not least those extremely 
different from one another. In the context of police complaints in Thailand, the systems 
overseen by the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC, whilst they undoubtedly have 
different priorities and responsibilities, were all established by the same constitution with 
a common purpose of becoming the systems for checks and balances and are similarly 
running independent complaints systems; from this angle, they are legitimately 
comparable. On the contrary, the complaints system overseen by the RTP is not 
comparable to the external ones because; first, the main functions of the RTP and the 
external complaints authorities are entirely different (see chapter 1); in addition, the RTP 
complaints system comprises a non-independent closed disciplinary process based on 
loose procedures (see figures 3 and 4 in chapter 3), even if the comparison between them 
was to be made, the knowledge gain from this would be slight at best.  
Turning now to international comparisons, these allow researchers to examine a wide 
range of solutions for tackling common problems and/or to evaluate the transferability of 
police complaints handling policies not least from the countries perceived to have operated 
a more progressive system. In the past four decades, England has instituted several rounds 
of reform to its system of handling complaints against the police, eventually establishing 
the independent police complaints system under the control of the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission (IPCC). 7  The English system is therefore able to provide 
historical and also fresh perspectives on a police complaints system and the handling of 
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complaints. In referring back to the point of comparability between the units of analysis, 
Azarian underlined that the consequence of selecting objects that are not truly comparable 
is to put the researcher in the position of drawing asymmetrical comparisons and 
ultimately negates the advantage of comparison. 8  Is a comparison between the Thai 
external complaints systems and the IPCC asymmetrical? The Thai external complaints 
systems have certain features in common with the IPCC in England. Most important of all, 
they are all independent bodies; also, they share similar issues around independence and 
impartiality in the investigation of complaints (see chapters 4 and 5). Notably, both the 
Thai and the English systems have grappled with the question of whether serving police 
officers or people having police backgrounds should work within a supposedly 
independent police complaints system. Ultimately, the real test for the usefulness of an 
international comparison lies in the results, and the subsequent chapters will hopefully 
reassure readers that this particular comparison was worthwhile.  
The question arises here as to how comparative study as a logical plan for this research is 
supposed to work. Ragin highlighted that social researchers have attempted to 
approximate scientific rigor for the sake of a comparative study; later, such attempts 
culminated in the introduction of two significant strategies, namely a case-oriented 
strategy and a variable-oriented strategy. 9  Whilst the former strategy is very much 
predicated upon the pursuit of empirical evidence as it seeks to interpret a social world, the 
latter strategy is theoretically oriented which focuses more on evaluating the relationship 
between general features of social structures regarded as variables. 10 With regard to the 
matter of strategies, this research seeks to adopt the case-oriented one. Why so? In this 
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research, the IPCC is selected for comparative purposes due to its intrinsic value of being 
a more progressive model than those that currently exist in Thailand. The historical 
chronology of how the IPCC had been developed since its inception and the current 
situation of how the IPCC system is operated are helpful in pinpointing how an 
independent and effective police complaints system is supposed to run. The case-oriented 
strategy, as a result, is worth employing as it enables us, based on empirical work, to 
interpret and see where the shared problems of the systems in both countries lie and where 
Thailand can gain inspiration from the English system.   
III. Research Methodology 
To rush into decisions about which research methods will be used for the collection of 
data without having a thorough understanding of the philosophy and the principles 
underpinning research methodology may trap researchers into a situation where gross 
inconsistencies between the tenets and the use of research instruments arise. It is important, 
then, to discuss research from a paradigmatic perspective. 
Weaver and Olson described ‗paradigms‘ as ―sets of philosophical underpinnings from 
which specific research approaches (e.g. qualitative or quantitative methods) flow.‖ 11 
Philosophically speaking, a quantitative paradigm is underpinned by a positivist 
epistemology whilst a qualitative paradigm is upheld by an interpretivist epistemology.12 
Positivism is a theory of knowledge that approximates scientific approach and applies it to 
unpack the complexity of the social world.13 Collier highlighted that: 
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Positivism sets up a certain model of science as value-free, atomistic; 
discovering causal laws… These are supposed to be characteristic of the 
natural sciences that have made them so successful, and the assumption 
is that if the social science could only imitate them, they would achieve 
similar success.14   
This leads positivist researchers to strive for a study that rigorously looks into objective 
reality through means of exact measures and hypotheses testing; thus, the positivist 
paradigm largely centres on the analysis of numerical data and the evaluation of the 
relationship between variables.15       
In contrast to positivism, Weber pointed out that social science ―shall speak of ‗social 
action‘ wherever human action is subjectively related in meaning to the behaviour of 
others‖;16 this means an interpretive epistemology holds that we should examine motives 
and reasons that influence an individual‘s feelings and eventually leads to a decision to act 
or not to act in a particular fashion. 17  Neuman concisely summarised the interpretive 
approach as: 
[T]he systematic analysis of socially meaningful action through the direct 
detailed observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at 
understandings and interpretations of how people create and maintain 
their social worlds.18  
From an epistemological perspective, the approach of this research set out in the proposed 
design section clearly leans towards the qualitative paradigm. To put this in the context of 
the study of police complaints in Thailand, it is important that we look not just into the 
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regulations and procedures for complaints but also the views and experiences of 
stakeholders in the complaints systems in order to be able to fully grasp how the systems 
are run. A rich understanding of the views and experiences of the people involved in the 
systems under the control of the RTP, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC will 
provide insights into the ‗particularity‘ of how each of these systems operates in practice. 
These in turn will help answer the overarching question of this research as to whether the 
Thai police complaint systems conform to international standards on a police complaints 
mechanism.19 The question is would the quantitative or the mixed-methods approach be 
sensible for this research?   
A quantitative approach places emphasis on establishing objective facts to ―document 
universal causal laws of human behaviour‖20 and using the findings of a study to generalise 
and make claims about the world. Suppose, for example, that the quantitative approach 
were to be adopted in this research; the examination of police complaints in Thailand 
would then proceed by hypothesis testing in an attempt to establish causal relationships 
between relevant variables. Such research would need to rely on numerical statistics or a 
mass of surveys or questionnaires as objective evidence. Nevertheless, the above approach 
would merely produce general if not superficial findings concerning how the Thai police 
complaints systems operate and bar us from understanding whether these systems, in 
practice, are effective and capable of upholding international standards set out for the 
effectiveness of a police complaints system. By contrast, the mixed-methods approach 
implements quantitative and qualitative techniques of gathering data and allows 
researchers to examine the generality and the particularity of social phenomena at the 
same time. However, the use of a mixed-methods strategy involves enormous efforts in 
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terms of time and costs. In addition, there is a high likelihood that the findings from the 
use of qualitative and quantitative methods will not corroborate each other. For instance, 
the findings from a survey may suggest that the general public is normally satisfied with 
the existing police complaints systems whilst the findings from in-depth interviews may 
indicate differently, thus creating new problems for the researcher to address. The upshot 
is that it would be difficult for a sole doctoral student to attempt mixed-methods research, 
and nigh impossible in the context of Thailand where there are significant problems of 
access (see further below). 
Data Collection Methods 
Denscombe suggests that ―selecting [research] methods is a matter of horses for 
courses‖. 21  Methods are instrumental in allowing researchers to pin down the subject 
matters that they are studying. To draw an analogy here, one can view a research method 
as a key whilst conceiving of a mystery in a social world as a locked room. The selection 
of unsuitable methods to solve the mystery of social phenomenon is equivalent to the 
situation where we use the wrong key to open the door to that room. To unpack the 
complexities of the handling of complaints in Thailand, the in-depth interview and a 
documentary study of the relevant literature are selected as key methods in this research. 
However, this research is not aimed at collecting empirical evidence relevant to the 
English system because the abundance of the existing literature on the IPCC and its 
complaints system appears to be sufficient for a critical analysis and to draw some 
inspiration from for the changes in the Thai systems. 
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(a) In-depth Interview 
The in-depth interview is the most widely accepted method in qualitative research because 
it is a straightforward tool that allows researchers to gain insight into the subject matter of 
the study. This method maximises the opportunity for researchers to be aware of the 
sentiments and mentality of interviewees towards social phenomenon happening around 
them. The in-depth interview is a vehicle that facilitates this research to gain 
understanding about the interviewees‘ feelings and their perception of the handling of 
complaints by different complaints authorities. In Thailand, there seems to be a general 
consensus that the NACC complaints system is sufficiently powerful to bring ‗rogue cops‘ 
to justice.22 In-depth interview with the stakeholders of the systems, however, will allow 
this research to elicit detailed information and reflect whether or not the NACC system, in 
reality, is effective and whether it is able to attain or falls short of international standards 
laid down for a police complaints system. By comparison with quantitative methods such 
as surveys or questionnaires, a qualitative in-depth interview is far more capable of 
drilling down into the crux of the matter. Qualitative in-depth interviews are divided into 
three separate types; a structured interview, an unstructured interview and a semi-
structured interview.23   
A structured interview, as the name suggests, is based on a set of closed questions 
prompting a limited range of answers. This format does not require the interviewer to have 
advanced skills at conducting interviews as the whole process of how to do an interview 
can be well-prepared in advance. All interviewees will face identical questions and are 
provided with pre-coded answers. The purpose of this is to ensure that an analysis of the 
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data is straightforward. Therefore, a structured interview lends itself to the gathering of a 
large volume of data, which can be coded easily and subjected to quantitative analysis. It 
is a useful technique where the main dimensions of a problem are already known, and the 
object is therefore merely to quantify the relative weight of each dimension (eg, how many 
crimes of what type has a person suffered in a year). An unstructured interview, in contrast 
with a structured one, involves nothing much in advance apart from a broad topic and a 
theme of the matter that is the subject of discussion. Unstructured interviews are 
conducted with the attempt to place the interviewees‘ thought at the centre of the study 
whilst the interviewers will only be facilitators who smooth the path for interviews.24 To 
do this, the interviewers need to possess advanced skills at undertaking interviews because 
they have to strike a balance between allowing interviewees to focus on the matters that 
concern them whilst still ensuring that material relevant to the research questions is 
collected. The aim of unstructured interviews therefore leans towards the discovery of 
matters that are complicated, or where the main dimensions of a problem are not already 
known (eg, someone‘s thoughts about bereavement). The answer will require extensive 
coding (eg, to enable thematic discussion) and will not easily lend themselves to 
quantitative analysis. 
 A semi-structured interview – a combination between the above two formats of interview 
– engages interviewees with open-ended questions where the interviewees will be asked a 
set of prepared questions but also be allowed to advance interesting points that they deem 
relevant to the question.25 The lack of closed answer options means that such interviews 
lend themselves more to qualitative than quantitative analysis. Such interviews are suitable 
where some of the main dimensions of a problem are well-known but there remains 
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uncertainty about others, or there are issues to be explored which do not lend themselves 
easily to closed options (eg, the meaning of justice). The semi-structured interview is the 
most suitable format for this research. As noted above, the main concerns of this research 
fall within the interpretivist paradigm, requiring a qualitative approach, and thus a 
structured interview with closed category answers is inappropriate. An unstructured 
interview would also be inappropriate, because many of the dimensions of the problem to 
be investigated are known (eg, independence and accountability) and comparisons need to 
be drawn with published research on the English system – thus necessitating systematic 
prompting. A semi-structured interview thus will fit the purpose of this research which 
aims to understand in-depth how the complaints systems are run whilst leaving the option 
open for those being interviewed to put forward the points that they think important, and 
for the researcher to dig deeper into any interesting comments made by the interviewees.  
A successful interview requires effective techniques. One of the most common techniques 
is a one-to-one interview. This technique usually involves a meeting between one 
researcher and one research participant. 26  One-to-one interviews bring a number of 
advantages to the process of data collection in qualitative research. One is that it enables 
researchers to locate specific ideas during an interview because they are able to focus upon 
opinions and views expressed by only one person at a time. They may also be the best 
technique in cases where the matters to be discussed are highly confidential or personal. A 
one-to-one interview is also simply and flexibly arranged as a meeting can be held in 
private or office accommodation depending on the agreement of only two people. 
A group interview is another important technique that provides a number of different 
advantages. The obvious benefit is the chance it provides to collect a wide variety of 
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opinions and views in an efficient manner. More importantly, when people are exposed to 
a range of different viewpoints this can prompt them (with the help of the interviewer) to 
think more deeply about the subject matter. The group interview can also be a useful 
technique where it is thought that individuals may be uncomfortable talking in isolation 
(eg, police officers may feel safer in opening up to researchers about the dilemmas of their 
job if their colleagues are there to corroborate and support them). However, arranging a 
group interview involves a great deal of effort in terms of time, places and costs.  
Apart from the conventional techniques, the internet interview has recently emerged as an 
alternative option. This interview technique obviously saves the time and lowers the cost 
of travel.27 Nonetheless, the most serious disadvantage of an internet interview for research 
looking into sensitive issues is that it hinders rapport and mutual confidence, thus making 
it less likely that interviewees will relax and give frank, fulsome answers.  
As for this research, it is arguable that the conventional techniques are better suited than 
the high-tech one. The handling of police complaints is a sensitive matter and the 
participants may not be cooperative. Therefore, the participants‘ trust in the researcher is 
significant and needs to be developed, prior to and over the course of interview. By 
comparison with an internet interview, the conventional interview techniques which are 
carried out by means of a face-to-face meeting can help researchers to achieve this more 
easily. For instance, the researcher can start by introducing himself to the participant(s) 
(adopting normal social conventions such as shaking hands), and have a brief talk about 
general matters to create an intimate atmosphere before a real interview begins. In this 
research, the techniques of a one-to-one and a group interview were applied to suit the 
circumstances.  
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(b) Documentary Study 
This research is an empirical study supported by documentary research. In contemporary 
social research, the survey or field research may take precedence over documentary 
research but the document ―remains an important research tool in its own right‖.28 This 
method is relevant to the study of police complaints in both Thailand and England. The 
selection of documents for research inevitably starts with public records. In the case of 
Thailand, the annual reports of each complaints authority are an important source of data 
since they provide the researcher with access to important statistics and the details of high-
profile cases which can be used for a critical evaluation. As for the English system, the 
IPCC annual report, its statistical information and relevant research are invaluable sources. 
In addition, government and parliamentary reports such as reports produced by the Home 
Affairs Committee (HAC) in the House of Commons, UK which provide critical 
commentary on the performance of the IPCC, are also crucial for this research. Academic 
papers exploring the complaints authorities in Thailand and England can be another useful 
tool in documentary research. Academic work can provide insights into how the 
complaints authorities perform their duties and what the existing issues around the police 
complaints systems are. Media publications are also useful for documentary research. 
Although it is arguable that this type of publication can be particularly biased at times, it 
does not mean that everything reported by the media is untrustworthy. More often than not, 
media publications can reflect the reality of many social issues; added to this, they, on 
occasion, may be the only up-to-date sources for getting across and/or arguing some 
particular points. In England, the Guardian‘s reporting of the death of Ian Tomlinson (see 
sub-section Powers, (c) Power to conduct an investigation in chapter 5), and the Thai 
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media‘s exposure of cover-ups in the handling of police complaints, for instance, proved 
to be helpful. However, the point is that the researcher must take a cautious approach 
when using those publications.  
Crucially, the support offered by documentary research in this study is not only in terms of 
more data to be obtained but also in respect of having the data collected through empirical 
work cross-checked against those gathered from documents. This latter idea brings us to 
the notion of ‗triangulation‘, explained by Thomas as follows: 
In social science, the term [triangulation] is used simply in a 
metaphorical way,…to indicate that viewing from several points is better 
than viewing from one.29 
Some researchers associate this term with the use of mixed-methods research but others 
conceive triangulation as a combination of quantitative and qualitative strategies or 
approaches as opposed to research methods.30 The reality, however, is that within a single 
approach, say a qualitative one, researchers are able to implement two or more research 
methods for their data collection. By doing so, we are also able to triangulate our data. 
Thus, in-depth interview and documentary research can be used for the purpose of 
triangulation for the benefit of this research study. Should the data obtained from both 
tools corroborate one another, the findings can be claimed to be somewhat more solid. If 
not, then the further questions might be raised as to whether the lack of corroboration is 
merely an artefact of the different methods used or instead suggests that one or both of the 
methods has produced unreliable data.  
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Sampling 
In social research, the discussion of sampling inevitably concerns the choices between 
‗probability sampling‘ or a random selection of cases to study, and ‗non-probability 
sampling‘ or a discretionary selection of cases to study as two broad and basic forms. In 
qualitative research, samples are generally used to explore uncharted territory — to 
discover new ideas and perspectives rather than being taken as representative of a wider 
population; as a result, non-probability sampling, which involves the selection of samples 
on the basis of their intrinsic value, such as the professional expertise and/or practical 
experience of participants, is normally applied within a qualitative approach.31         
(a) Purposive sampling 
The process of data collection in this research entails the use of non-probability sampling. 
To examine the handling of police complaints, however, ‗purposive sampling‘ is employed 
as one of the key sampling techniques in this research. Bryman elucidated the core concept 
of purposive sampling and its strategies as follows: 
The goal of purposive sampling is to sample cases / participants in a 
strategic way, so that those sampled are relevant to the research questions 
that are being posed. Very often, the researcher will want to sample in 
order to ensure that there is a good deal of variety in the resulting sample, 
so that sample members differ from each other in terms of key 
characteristics relevant to the research question….The researcher needs 
to be clear in his or her mind what the criteria are that will be relevant to 
the inclusion or exclusion of units of analysis (whether the units are sites, 
people, or something else).32      
To understand the extent to which the operation of the Thai systems for handling police 
complaints corresponds to international standards, the perception of the stakeholders in the 
                                                          
31
 Denscombe (n 21) 23-25. 
32
 Bryman (n 12) 418. 
 
 
Page 47 of 367 
 
police complaints systems is vitally important. This research, therefore, adopts purposive 
sampling by selecting a number of executives serving in each complaints authority as the 
samples and approaching them for interview. Two commissioners each from the NHRC 
and the NACC and one ombudsman from the Office of the Ombudsman (the Ombudsman 
has only three executives) were selected for interview; these executives are generally 
known to have dealt with most police complaints in the past. Notably, none of them 
refused to give an interview for this research.    
The selection of police officers to interview for the purpose of this study is even more 
hand-picked. The aim was to recruit at least two police officers to participate in in-depth 
interview. These officers needed to be senior and holding a position that is capable of 
instigating disciplinary proceedings because they are likely to be able to share their 
experience about the internal complaints system and express some pragmatic views on the 
external systems. During the process of recruitment, five commissioned officers were 
approached for an interview. However, only two officers agreed to take part in this 
research, one a superintendent serving in the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and the 
other a Deputy Commander serving in one of the police force areas in one of the Northern 
provinces of Thailand. Purposive sampling was also applied to the selection of police 
complainants. The idea was that they had experienced both internal and external 
complaints systems and therefore it made sense to access them via the external complaints 
bodies. With the assistance of the external complaints bodies, four complainants were 
approached for interview but two of them declined to participate. This research also 
recognised the importance of the role of the experts in contributing to this project and 
selected seven knowledgeable figures to take part in this project. These included a social 
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researcher, a human rights lawyer, a senator, a judge and three retired police officers. 
However, two of these retired officers declined to participate. 
(b) Snowball sampling 
In this research, purposive sampling alone cannot help ensure the adequacy of data; as a 
result, the researcher sought to adopt more than one non-probabilistic technique in order to 
reach more potential participants; thus, snowball sampling was employed as another 
technique. Its function is described as follows: 
[Snowball sampling is] a sampling technique in which the researcher 
samples initially a small group of people relevant to the research 
questions, and these sampled participants propose other participants who 
have had the experience or characteristics relevant to the research.33  
Why does snowball sampling matter in this research? Generally, the police complainants 
best able to understand how complaints against the police are handled are likely to be 
those who have been involved in serious cases and thus have experienced large parts of 
the complaints systems. Whilst the perceptions of these people towards how the 
complaints system is run are regarded as worthwhile capturing through in-depth interview, 
the reality is that such individuals are normally hard-to-reach. Snowball sampling can 
therefore be helpful; the complainants‘ trust in the researcher can be built up from the 
involvement of an intermediary who shares the experience of being a complainant and 
who can vouch for the interviewer‘s integrity. This sampling technique eventually helped 
recruit five more complainants for this research. Apart from the complainants, this same 
sampling technique was also applied to increase the number of police officers interviewed 
for this research as well. Notably, the use of this technique helped recruit four more police 
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officers. Last but not least, the snowball sampling technique also helped recruit an inquiry 
officer from the Ombudsman.     
Sample Size in Empirical Research 
In the collection of empirical evidence in social research, the problem of how to determine 
sample size looms large. Social researchers — especially novice ones — are troubled by 
the question of how many qualitative interviews is enough. In this research, 24 
participants were interviewed in total. Is that number high enough? Mason has usefully 
highlighted that: 
Sometimes, it is a knee-jerk reaction to simply want to do ‗more 
interviews‘ because that must somehow be ‗better‘. But how many more 
depends on the logic by which each one adds to your understanding of 
the phenomenon you are investigating.34      
In similar vein, some scholars also indicated that increasing the size of samples is not 
always the best option and it is more advisable for social researchers to strike a balance 
between the size and the quality of samples: 
[A] small number of cases, or subjects, may be extremely valuable and 
represent adequate numbers for a research project. This is especially true 
for studying hidden or hard to access populations such as deviants or 
elites. Here, a relatively few people, such as between six and a dozen, 
may offer us insights into such things as the stratification hierarchy of a 
drug-producing subculture (i.e., methamphetamine), an outlaw 
motorcycle gang, or a corporate boardroom.35  
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To refer back to the total number of people interviewed for this research, it can be seen 
that even though the number of the interviewers is not substantial, the fact is that 
participants like the ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC commissioners, and the 
former deputy police commander are not just experts but embodiments of police 
complaints systems; added to this, when looking at chapters 3 and 4 we will see that many 
of these people were forthcoming about objective facts and also upfront about their 
subjective views on the handling of police complaints in Thailand. By the same token, the 
complainants interviewed for this research also showed remarkable insights into how the 
complaints systems are operated in practice because most of them have had their 
complaints registered with all of the complaints bodies examined in this research; added to 
this, most of them complained about death and serious injuries (eg, extrajudicial killings, 
forced disappearance). This suggests that they have practical and extensive experience on 
complaints that enable them to give very useful comparative impressions of the systems 
they have gone through as the complainants.        
I would accordingly argue that the interview samples for this research are capable of 
enriching a solid understanding of how the police complaints system in Thailand are 
supposed to run and how they are actually operating in practice (see Appendix 1: List of 
Research Participants).  
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IV. Ethical Considerations  
Barnes suggested that ethical considerations arise when: 
[W]e try to decide between one course of action and another not in terms 
of expediency or efficiency but by reference to standards of what is 
morally right or wrong.36 
It is not right for social researchers to conduct research for the acquisition of knowledge 
while ignoring ethical issues that may be attached to their research projects. Neuman 
asserts that researchers must ―never coerce anyone into participating; all research 
participation must be voluntary‖.37 In Britain, the Social Research Association (SAR) has 
laid down ethical guidelines advising that: 
Inquiries involving human subjects should be based as far as practicable 
on the freely given informed consent of subjects. Even if participation is 
required by law, it should still be as informed as possible. In voluntary 
inquiries, subjects should not be under the impression that they are 
required to participate. They should be aware of their entitlement to 
refuse at any stage for whatever reason and to withdraw data just 
supplied.38 
All of this leads us to the first essential point of ethical considerations – informed consent. 
The doctrine of informed consent holds that social researchers should give the people 
invited to participate in their research project the fullest information in relation to the aims 
and objectives of the project, including potential risks to which they may be exposed; also, 
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researchers should put in place arrangements to ensure that anonymity and confidentiality 
will be protected.39 
In this research, the participants were informed about the aims and objectives of the 
research project and how it was going to be conducted. The participants understood that 
this research is concerned with the handling of police complaints and is being undertaken 
for the purpose of developing proposals for possible reforms in police complaints systems 
in Thailand. Furthermore, the details of how the interview was to be conducted, including 
length of interview, the participants‘ right to withdraw from this research and a time period 
to exercise such a right, have been clearly notified (see Appendix 2: Participant 
Information Sheet). Informing about possible harm is also crucial. This research does not 
involve scientific experiment; therefore, there is no physical harm to be concerned about. 
Nonetheless, I was mindful that the interviewees, the complainants in particular, were 
likely to describe during the interviews how badly they were treated by the police during 
the matter that gave rise to the complaint, and that this might result in a certain level of 
psychological stress. Hence, during the interviews, the explanation was given to the 
interviewees from the outset that the key purpose of the interview was to explore how 
complaints are handled by each complaints system. Legal jeopardy is another issue that 
this research was always aware of during the interviews as some complaints are very 
controversial, whilst the investigations of some others remain ongoing. As a result, the 
interviewees were guaranteed that they would remain anonymous and the confidentiality of 
data will also be protected.40   
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Crucially, the participants‘ right to privacy is essential for the conduct of social research as 
personal information on each individual participant will be disclosed during interview. 
Accordingly, this all comes down to the protection of anonymity. Nevertheless, a number 
of social researchers might not take it seriously enough. Henn and others cited the 
following example showing the failure of some researchers to protect the anonymity of the 
participants: 
[A]lthough Holdaway (1982) used pseudonyms for the police stations in 
which his research took place, he left many other details unchanged. As a 
result, it was easy to identify his research as being conducted with the 
Metropolitan Police.41       
In recognition of this problem, in this research, the participants are identified merely by 
their statuses. For example, the interview with police officers is described as a group 
interview with police officers in a Northern Province, Thailand which comprises a number 
of police force areas. Nonetheless, it is impossible to make the interviews with the 
executives in the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC wholly unidentifiable. The best 
option therefore is, not to specify which commissioners have given interviews for this 
research. Anonymity and confidentiality normally go hand in hand. To protect the 
confidentiality of the data, those interviewed for this research were assured that their 
interview transcripts would be kept safely and would not be shared with other people apart 
from the researcher and his supervisors.  
Last but not least, there is an increasing trend amongst social researchers to have the 
participants sign a consent form to help ensure that informed consent is given. This 
research deployed a consent form to notify the participants all the relevant details in 
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relation to the interview. Crucially, the participants of this research were informed that 
their participation was voluntary and that they had the right to withdraw from this research 
within a certain period of time specified in the participant information sheet. Also, they 
were assured that their identities would be protected (see Appendix 3: Informed Consent 
Form). All participants signed the form prior to the interview.   
V. Arranging the Research Fieldwork 
This research is a PhD research-based thesis. Ethical review is therefore conducted by the 
university prior to the fieldwork. Having set out all the details of research fieldwork in 
Thailand, the application for ethical approval of this project was submitted to the 
Humanities and Social Sciences Ethical Review Committee, University of Birmingham 
and the official approval was subsequently granted. This project was designed to be 
compliant with the Code of Practice for Research issued by the University of 
Birmingham42 whilst the issues of health and safety in research were also recognised by 
having an assessment of risks to personal safety and health carried out to follow the 
guidance delivered by the Institution of Occupational Safety and Health (IOSH).43  
The recruitment of research participants started straight after the official approval from the 
university was granted. Three different approaches were implemented for the recruitment. 
It is standard that interviewing any person holding an official position requires official 
permission; therefore, the interviews with the executives serving in the external complaints 
authorities were arranged by prior authorisation (see Appendix 4: Sample of Written 
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Authorisation). However, I did not have any established relationship with any of the 
executives in the complaints authorities; in order to reduce the risk of non-participation in 
the research, the role of a middleman was crucial. I relied upon my personal contact who is 
the secretary of one of the senators in the House of Senate, Thailand, to increase the 
chance that the commissioners would participate in this research project. Once the 
commissioners‘ personal secretaries confirmed that the commissioners had no objection to 
taking part in the project, formal letters were dispatched to the commissioners to seek that 
participation. The ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC commissioners were furnished 
with a thorough explanation about the objectives of this research and how the interview 
would be conducted. Moreover, each of them were given a participant information sheet 
and an informed consent form explaining that their participation was voluntary, that 
anonymity and confidentiality would be protected and they had a right to withdraw from 
the project within a given time frame. The appointment was scheduled shortly after the 
letter had been received. Then, the secretarial officers notified me where and when the 
interview would take place.  
By comparison, the approach of this research to recruit police officers as participants is 
somewhat dissimilar. It proved difficult to gain cooperation from the police (see section VI 
Research Limitations) and the role of my personal contacts in the recruitment of police 
officers as participants were therefore even more pivotal. With the assistance of some 
respected figures in the Thai criminal justice system, a number of police officers were 
finally persuaded to take part in this project. However, I was advised not to submit a 
formal request for authorisation to their superior officers since the officers who agreed to 
participate expressed their wish to avoid becoming the centre of attention not least from 
the police force area they are serving with. Notably, each of them was provided with a 
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participant information sheet and an informed consent form. The documents explained the 
objectives of this research, how the interview would be undertaken, the protections relating 
to anonymity and confidentiality, and their right to withdraw within a given time period. 
Each officer was informed of a prearranged time and location for interview on the same 
occasion that a participant information sheet and an informed consent form were sent to 
them, as a travel plan needed to be arranged weeks ahead.     
The recruitment of the complainants proved the most challenging aspect of sample 
construction. Even though I have personal contacts with a few police complainants, their 
complaints cannot be regarded as serious enough to be able to reflect whether the existing 
complaints systems are capable of dealing with police misconduct. Hence, my approach to 
recruiting complainants as participants in this research was to seek help from the external 
complaints authorities. This seemed likely to be a productive way forward because a 
sizable proportion of complaints are lodged with them each year and their general image of 
being transparent and accommodating meant cooperation could be anticipated. Once the 
interview with each commissioner in different complaints authorities had finished, my 
intention to obtain help from them in recruiting complainants for interview was 
communicated. Whilst the NACC declined to assist, the secretariat office of the 
Ombudsman and the NHRC notified me shortly afterwards that my request was granted. A 
few days later, the Ombudsman and the NHRC informed me that a couple of complainants 
were approached and expressed their willingness to take part in this project. A participant 
information sheet and an informed consent form were duly dispatched to the complainants 
whilst a prearranged time and location (mainly the complaints authority premises) were 
also notified. To gain a larger sample size, however, this research also adopted ‗snowball 
sampling‘ as a strategy for recruitment. Subsequent to each interview with a complainant, 
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a request for putting forward some other complainants was made to the complainants 
interviewed for this research. This strategy was successful as it resulted in the recruitment 
of some more complainants who have valuable experiences on the complaints systems.   
Gaining cooperation from a broader range of experts for this research proved to be easier 
than from the key stakeholders in the police complaints systems already discussed. Thus, a 
human rights lawyer, a social researcher, a judge and a former senator were all keen to 
participate in this project with no strings attached. Interestingly, apart from the judge, all of 
them intimated that there was no need to keep their identities anonymous because they 
regularly voice their concern over police misconduct through the national media; however, 
I felt obliged to protect their identity and did so anyway. 
Some participants required me to provide them with a list of interview questions 
beforehand (see Appendix 5: Sample of List of Interview Questions). I believed that giving 
them a list of interview questions would help smooth an interview while it would also 
allow me to discuss in depth with interviewees because they would have had a chance to 
give some prior thought to their answers, although there was also the risk that they would 
prepare stock answers of course. On balance it seemed the benefits of providing advance 
notice of the questions outweighed the risks and I decided to satisfy their requirement.   
VI. Research Limitations    
Prior to the discussion of limitations which emerged during the fieldwork for this research, 
the work on The Royal Thai Police, 2006—2011: Five Years without Reform by a Thai 
graduate of Aberdeen – Krisanaphong Poothakool – is worth looking at as a specific 
instance demonstrating how difficult is the undertaking of extensive research on serious 
issues concerning Thai policing.   
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Poothakool was a serving Police Captain in the RTP prior to his study leave to the UK and 
was required to return to his duty in 2010; in this respect, he apparently is an insider of the 
police force.44  His police background aided him in ―re-establishing a network of contacts 
throughout the country with fellow police graduates from the late 1990s who were now 
serving in promoted posts outside Bangkok‖.45 In the introductory chapter of his work, 
Poothakool pointed out that the rebuilding of his network of friends in the police 
organisation was done through many social get-togethers several months prior to his PhD 
programme officially started.46 All the above suggests to the audiences of his thesis that his 
research project would go smoothly. This is, however, somewhat mistaken. Difficulties 
began when he sought formal approval for the research from the police leadership, as is the 
normal requirement. Poothakool explained that he had attended a lengthy interview at the 
RTP headquarters and was also engaged in controversial debates with members of the RTP 
committee over his project. Furthermore, he and his co-supervisor who accompanied him 
to Thailand both experienced some blocking tactics by the RTP ranging from keeping 
Poothakool waiting almost interminably; requiring him to seek multi-party approval of his 
project; and insisting that he clarified his project to each bureaucratic department 
potentially involved, however, tangentially.47   
This instance highlights how difficult it is to examine controversial issues surrounding the 
RTP even for an insider like Poothakool. The problems I faced as an outsider were 
different but no less challenging, not least because I was also seeking to study the external 
                                                          
44
 Krisanaphong Poothakool, ‗The Royal Thai Police, 2006—2011: Five Years without Reform‘ (PhD thesis, 
University of Aberdeen 2012) 6. 
45
 ibid 8. 
46
 ibid. 
47
 ibid 118-120. 
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complaints authorities. The limitations arising out of the conduct of my research fieldwork 
can be reflected from different experiences and perspectives as follows:     
(a) No established research tradition of studying the police complaints systems 
Policing is not a new field of study in Thailand. A number of Thai scholars had previously 
embarked upon the conduct of research that looked into police administration whilst a few 
of them have explored the issues which engulfed the Thai police in many other aspects.48 
However, conducting research examining the police complaints systems in Thailand 
proved to be arduous due to a lack of an established research tradition around the topic of 
police accountability through the complaints system. 49 The following underlying reasons 
account for this.  
First, the Thai police have a very high-octane culture nurtured by a Thai-style authoritarian 
democracy. In the past three decades, there has been a widespread public perception that 
investigating the issues around police malpractice is perilous. For example, Prasong 
Lertratanawisute, a veteran crime journalist, began his conversation about police 
malpractice whilst in attendance at an open seminar on police reforms on 16
th
 May 2007 as 
follows:50 
I [have to admit that I] come here today with fear as I‘m an outspoken 
person, and when I express my view on or criticise something, I do it 
                                                          
48
 For instance, Amorn Wanichwiwatana, ‗The 1998 Thai Police Reform: A Study of the Persistence of 
Institutional Corruption‘ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 2004); Krisanaphong Poothakool, ‗The Royal 
Thai Police, 2006-2011: Five Years without Reform‘ (PhD thesis, University of Aberdeen 2012). 
49
 In Thailand, there is only a piece of academic paper by Phongthon Thanyasiri that discusses police 
complaints systems. However, the analysis made in this particular paper is superficial as it is a non-empirical 
Master‘s thesis based principally on documentary research. See, Phongthon Thanyasiri, The Idea of 
Establishing the Organisation Responsible for Controlling and Inspecting the Performance of the Police by 
Receiving Complaints (Kittipong Kittayarak ed, the Commission of Police Administration Development 
2007) [in Thai]. 
50
 Kittipong Kittayarak, A Seminar Report on Police and the Expectation of Thai Society (the Secretariat of 
the Commission of Police Administration Development 2007) 54 [in Thai]. 
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unreservedly. So I‘m not sure whether I would be abducted after I got 
home!  
The above perception is heightened by the systematic harassment of those who have 
sought to complain against the police in the past.51 Second, from an academic point of view, 
‗socio-legal studies‘ is much less popular in Thailand compared to those top subjects such 
as law or politics. The existing literature on policing is accordingly not extensive and 
diverse. It should also be noted that most of the literature on policing in Thailand was 
mainly conducted by documentary research at Master‘s degree level which merely 
provides shallow analysis. In addition, the police complaints system in Thailand is 
fragmented whilst each complaints authority is entrusted with different tasks. The great 
majority of Thais including academics therefore tend to discuss each complaints system in 
isolation from one another and lose sight of considering the police complaints issues as a 
whole. Third, the fact that the RTP is under the control of the political establishment leads 
numerous people to the position that the rottenness of policing in the country is heavily 
shaped by political failure. Accordingly, they tend to discuss the issues within the Thai 
police force from a political perspective, and this means that the discussion of police 
complaints is too often overshadowed by a political discourse.52 All of the above factors 
discourage people from exploring in-depth the police complaints systems in Thailand and 
are ultimately responsible for a lack of established research on this subject.  
(b) Personal safety 
As shown in chapters 1 and 3, the RTP is an institution that inspires both deep-rooted 
respect and fear within Thailand. Undertaking rigorous research on police complaints in 
                                                          
51
 See text accompanying nn 139, 140 in ch 3.   
52
 This can be seen from a number of interviews given for this research. See text accompanying n 4 in ch 6, 
for example. 
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Thailand is therefore a tricky business. Care was needed to reduce the risk of finding 
myself in life-threatening situations at some points during the fieldwork or even after the 
completion of the research. Why do I say so?  
Over the course of research interviews with the police, I was likely to be mistaken by the 
officers as a person who was trying to extract confidential information and therefore as 
something of a threat. Most of the complainants interviewed for this research have suffered 
from gross malpractice and are still in the middle of fighting in court. Those who have 
been alleged of perpetrating misconduct are likely to be keeping a close watch on the the 
complainants interviewed for this research and those who come into contact with them, 
including myself. There were also particular precedents that made me wary (eg, the case of 
Mr. Somchai Neelapaijit and the experience of one of my interviewees whose attempt to 
expose the cover-up of an extrajudicial killing by the police was met by persistent police 
harassment).53 Then there is my own previous experience as a lawyer, during which I was 
told by senior colleagues which police force areas are particularly notorious for the use of 
extralegal means. All of this suggested to me that I had to be cautious during the process of 
research fieldwork, a period characterized by tension. Indeed, it was noticeable that every 
interviewee was very vigilant during the interview; a few of them asked me to show my 
identification and letter from the university (of course, I did), this happened even though 
the complaints authorities had helped me contact them in the first place. Moreover, the 
police interviewed for this research clearly drew a line by talking only in generalities rather 
than discussing any specific complaints made against their colleagues. I took this as a 
warning that I should follow suit. As a Thai it was clear to me that if I pushed deeper into 
such sensitive issues either the interview or my access to the police might terminate 
                                                          
53
 See text accompanying n 140 in ch 3.  
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prematurely or I would have put my own life at risk. I nonetheless managed to obtain some 
useful and rare interview data, albeit expressed in general terms.  
(c) The recruitment of police officers and complainants 
The sensitivity of the research topic, a lack of immunity against the high-octane police 
culture and the concomitant concern over personal safety, and the fears of criticisms 
amongst Thai bureaucrats (see the next sub-section), are factors that posed daunting 
challenges to the recruitment of police officers as research participants.  
Even though my former background as a lawyer contributed much to the establishment of 
a network of friends in the RTP, when it came to the conduct of this research fieldwork 
most of those friends were very reluctant to take part or offer help. Some of them 
explained that they were afraid of the consequences of letting an outsider in on the 
sensitive and controversial areas of the Thai police organisation, whilst others claimed that 
they were not senior enough to protect me from the very powerful police culture. The 
above reasons led me as an outsider of the RTP to seek help from certain personal contacts 
(respected figures in the Thai criminal justice system) to convince more open-minded 
officers to give an interview for this research. It might be arguable that more officers could 
have been successfully recruited with the assistance of those personal contacts. However, 
my personal contacts were doubtful that they could find more open-hearted officers for 
interview. It of course cannot be assumed that the Thai police officers with whom I spoke 
are representative of all such officers. The recruitment of complainants was similarly 
difficult. Apart from those already in the limelight, most complainants do not want to 
reveal themselves to the public; a number of reasons ranging from the trauma of the 
alleged incident of misconduct, and the concerns over retaliation and legal jeopardy 
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account for this. As a result, the role of the external complaints authorities as 
intermediaries between the researcher and the complainants is crucial.  
However, this research found that some complaints authorities were keen to select and put 
forward the complainants who have relatively pleasant experiences on the handling of their 
complaints whilst those who might have unpleasant experiences were screened out. Thus, I 
had to appeal to the complainants put forward by those authorities to propose some other 
complainants whom they knew. Ultimately, interviews with some more complainants who 
have extensive experience on the handling of complaints by the external complaints 
authorities were successfully arranged. There was scope for increasing the number of 
interviews still further but some of the complainants contacted were afraid of giving an 
interview for this research, two of whom said they had no confidence that the information 
they gave could really be protected.  
(d) The culture of fear of criticisms  
The NHRC commissioner interviewed for this research hit the nail on the head when he 
observed that the culture of fear of being criticised has long been ingrained in Thailand. 
During a group interview with the police, even though some of them were very candid as 
to how complaints registered with them are actually handled, others would every now and 
again interrupt the interview to remind their colleagues not to go too far with the answers.  
When it comes to the interviews with top executives of the external complaints authorities, 
it was surprising to find that some of these people proved to be not very forthcoming as 
they are generally expected by the public to be open in their approach. Amongst them, the 
ombudsman and the NHRC commissioners were more approachable and forthcoming than 
the NACC commissioners. One of the NACC commissioners interviewed for this research 
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said bluntly to the researcher that the time for interview should be reduced from 60 to 20 
minutes as there were a number of more important tasks for that particular commissioner 
to complete. During interviews, all commissioners interviewed for this research took a 
very cautious approach in answering each question and were clearly reluctant to elaborate 
on the points advanced by the researcher. Too often, they used ‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ to answer the 
questions and, when being pressed, they would say ‗I‘ve already given the answer‘. The 
given answers were useful but could have been clearer. For example, when the question 
was put to the NHRC commissioner as to why the Commission seeks cooperation from the 
police to come in for interview even though they rarely cooperate with them, the NHRC 
commissioner restricted his response to pointing out that the NHRC prioritises cooperation 
from the police rather than using any formal power requesting them to come in for 
interview. The commissioner failed to explain the reason behind that stance and 
discouraged the interviewer from seeking clarification.          
(e) The incompleteness of statistical data  
Though this research adopts the qualitative approach, statistical data on complaints against 
the police also proved to be useful for data analysis especially in terms of comparing and 
contrasting. During the research fieldwork in Thailand, it was found that some potentially 
useful quantitative data that should have been made available (eg, statistics on police 
complaints or disciplinary investigations) are missing from police complaints statistics 
normally released by the RTP and the external complaints authorities.  
I was informed during my interviews with senior members of each Thai complaints 
authority under review of this research that statistics on ‗substantiated investigations‘ and 
‗withdrawn complaints‘ have never been systematically produced or published. Attempts 
were made during this research to make good this gap. For example, the statistical data 
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presented in Table 3.3 in chapter 3 were supplied to this research by one of the local force 
areas; the data lacks statistics on substantiated investigations and/or withdrawn complaints. 
I personally appealed to the police leadership in that particular force area for more 
comprehensive data. That police force area responded that they do not produce statistics on 
substantiated investigations and withdrawn complaints.      
In addition to the above issue, the quantitative data published by most of the complaints 
bodies in Thailand is confusing. The Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC all use the 
term ‗finished cases‘ to mean the complaints cases are no longer being dealt with. In my 
view, however, this creates uncertainty because ‗finished cases‘ is an ambiguous term 
which can be interpreted differently as ‗investigated‘ or ‗withdrawn‘ or even ‗resolved‘ 
complaints. Even more perplexing, some complaints bodies like the NHRC and the NACC 
simply merge the numbers of police complaints with complaints made against other law 
enforcement personnel. All the above creates difficulty for those using the police 
complaints statistics to understand, for example, how many cases are actually related to the 
police only.  
To obtain more useful data, three separate appeals were made to the Office of Inspector 
General (OIG), the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC for the statistics on 
substantiated investigations and withdrawn complaints. Nearly eight months after the third 
attempt, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the OIG eventually accommodated the request 
and provided more statistical data for this research, although the data provided by the OIG 
still lacks statistics on substantiated investigations and withdrawn complaints.  
The NACC however did not respond. The analysis of the NACC‘s complaints statistics 
needs to rely on the material I have to hand, even if these statistics are incomplete.  
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The statistics on ex-police personnel serving in each organisation are also unavailable. I 
understand that each external complaints body releases the statistics on manpower every 
year; however, I have been informed during the interviews with the executives of each 
authority that detailed statistics on backgrounds of personnel have never been produced, 
but they offered to estimate the numbers of the personnel with a police background for the 
sake of this research. Therefore, the interview data is the best source available for this 
research. 
(f) Constraints of time and funding   
Time and funding are critical to the conduct of the fieldwork for this research. Whilst some 
might argue that I could have done more to gain a larger sample size, owing to constraints 
of time and funding, it was impractical to do so in reality. This research is a three-year 
PhD project and originally focused on a full comparative study between the Thai systems 
and the IPCC. A certain amount of time in the first year was therefore set aside for a 
critical study into the IPCC. It was not until the second year that the research question and 
the focus of this research project were settled. By the time that the arrangements for the 
research fieldwork had been finalised, an unexpected military coup had been staged in 
Thailand on 22
nd
 May 2014 following several months of political turmoil and violence. 
Whilst the long-standing political volatility and the coup did not create insurmountable 
obstacles to the research fieldwork, it certainly delayed the progress of the whole research. 
Why so? It is common practice of the military establishment to revoke the constitution 
after a coup is staged because the coup in itself is clearly against the law. There was thus a 
real possibility that the external complaints authorities which I intended to study would be 
abolished as a result of the repeal of the constitution. It took some time before the military 
junta issued an order allowing the complaints authorities to continue performing their 
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functions (see chapter 1). Furthermore, most of the bureaucrats and the police whom I had 
preliminarily approached with a view to arranging research interviews were not prepared 
to discuss my research in the first few months following the coup. Indeed, the political 
crisis and tense atmosphere meant that uppermost in their minds was what their future 
would hold.  
Some months after the coup the potential participants were finally given the green light to 
take part in this research. Given the amount of time left for this project to be completed, 
the plan for the main period of research fieldwork was set to be completed within a six 
weeks‘ time period. This was based on my calculation that at the conclusion of the 
fieldwork, half the amount of PhD time would already have been spent. I needed to allow 
myself a certain amount of time to analyse the data and to complete the first full draft of 
my thesis before a final writing-up stage. In addition to time constraints, a dearth of 
funding also contributed to the arrangements for this research. I am a sponsored student 
but my sponsorship excludes research expenses. Although I was granted almost £1,000 of 
research support funds from Birmingham Law School and College of Arts and Law 
Graduate School which was really helpful, it was not sufficient to cover all the expenses 
incurred during the fieldwork because two-thirds of the funding was spent on travel 
already. Thus, funding limitations also shaped this project.     
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VII. Data Analysis 
Thomas argued that every analytical technique applied to any research that adopts the 
interpretivist paradigm is backed by the so called ‗constant comparative method‘. 54He 
explained further what the constant comparative method entails as follows: 
The constant comparative method involves going through your data 
again and again (this is the constant bit), comparing each element – 
phrase, sentence or paragraph – with all of the other elements (this is the 
comparative bit)……From the constant comparison you mark you data 
up with codes…You eventually emerge with themes…55   
What we can understand from Thomas‘s clarification of the qualitative data analysis is that 
the constant comparative method provides a useful starting point for the critical analysis of 
the data the researcher has in hand, and it was adopted in this project. Next, we turn to 
another significant stepping stone of data analysis which is ‗coding‘. This involves 
reviewing field notes and/or transcripts and attaching labels to any component parts in 
those notes that illustrate theoretical significance and/or that give the impression of being 
specific salient features of the social worlds under investigation. 56  Coding of data is 
essential in qualitative research as it is one of the most common approaches assisting the 
researcher to arrange the collected data into unifying themes for the ease of analysis. In 
this research, coding helps reflect a number of salient features from the collected data. For 
example, the coded data identified patronage as one of the main themes that undermines 
the impartiality of the in-house system for handling police complaints in the RTP. It should 
be noted that this research did not use computer-assisted software for the data analysis 
                                                          
54
 Thomas (n 29) 235. 
55
 ibid. 
56
 Bryman (n 12) 568. 
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since the size of the raw data is not massive; as a result, manual coding proved to be more 
convenient and sensible.    
Network analysis is a crucial method when it comes to the identification of themes. This 
method is involved with the attempt to demonstrate how one idea relates to another by 
identifying a network of themes comprising the basic idea and a number of constituent 
ideas (if any). 57 For example, network analysis played an important role in helping this 
research to underline branches of ideas spreading from the key theme of patronage in the 
RTP; this is demonstrated as follows: 
       A chain of command 
    Professional     
       Future career prospects 
Patronage in the RTP 
       A bond of fictive brotherhood 
    Interpersonal    
       A master-servant relationship   
With the aid of network analysis, we are able to analyse more critically the extent to which 
the Thai police organisation is influenced by a patronage system. Network analysis as a 
method highlights a number of constituent ideas (sub themes) found in the data and also 
gives insights into the contributory factors of patronage in the Thai police organization. 
Ultimately, the sub themes of patronage enable us to draw a conclusion as to whether the 
                                                          
57
 Thomas (n 29) 236. 
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RTP internal system is capable of holding the police accountable for their performance of 
duties.  
VIII. Conclusion   
Thinking carefully about research design proved to be a critical part of this research project. 
It helped not just in terms of shaping the direction of this research and in pursuing answers 
to the research questions, but also it helped overcome possible pitfalls throughout the 
conduct of this study. The critical examination of each element of the Thai system enabled 
this research to drill down to the crux of the matters around the handling of complaints, 
whilst the comparative element allowed this research to draw useful comparison between 
the Thai system and the English system and to develop fresh perspectives that may be 
applied to the Thai system. The implementation of the in-depth interview as a key research 
method with the support of documentary study proved to be beneficial for this research. 
Whilst seeking penetrating insights into the handling of complaints against the police, this 
research project committed itself to the protection of anonymity and confidentiality; 
however, where possible, the data demonstrating significant points of how complaints are 
handled in reality will be disclosed for the sake of the arguments for reform, unless those 
data are likely to jeopardise the informants. Last but not least, this research has inevitable 
limitations, most notably in terms of the relatively small sample sizes of police officers and 
complainants. However, as argued above, the research design helped in terms of setting out 
proper strategies and effective techniques for data collection and analysis which proved to 
be useful in addressing these limitations.   
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CHAPTER 3: INTERNAL POLICE COMPLAINTS SYSTEMS 
I. Introduction 
The introductory chapter of this thesis demonstrated that police malpractice is a real and 
perennial issue in Thailand. The true scale of malpractice, however, is yet to be examined. 
In section two of this chapter, the exact scale of police malpractice in Thailand will 
therefore be explored. This discussion will form the basis for the later assessment of 
whether the internal police complaints system is capable of addressing any such 
malpractice effectively.  
Two different sets of arguments over the scale of malpractice will be outlined. Whilst the 
police suggest that the extent of malpractice should be assessed by the total number of 
complaints, members of the public believe that it should be considered from the gravity 
and frequency of the problem. As noted in chapter 1, the Thai police have always been 
subject to political interference since its inception; in the second part of section two, 
therefore, the connection between the Royal Thai Police (RTP) and the political 
establishment will be investigated to show the extent to which political influence comes 
into play in police malpractice. Although a mechanism for addressing complaints against 
the police has been put in place within the RTP, there is no evidence to suggest that such a 
mechanism is effective in remedying or guarding against malpractice. In sections three and 
four, the RTP complaints system will be critically examined drawing on the perceptions of 
those who have experienced the system. This will help us determine whether it is capable 
of handling complaints in a fair and effective manner. Lastly, this chapter will, in section 
five, discuss a number of outstanding issues that are arguably the root causes undermining 
the impartiality of the internal complaints system.  
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II. Police Malpractice – The Scale and the Connection with Politics      
Consistent with the constitutional framework of the country, the RTP has, at least in 
theory, adopted human rights values in its legislation.1 However, the concise overview of 
police malpractice in Thailand presented in chapter 1 highlighted that police malpractice is 
still prevalent. In this section, the scale of malpractice will be examined and reflected 
through official statistics and the empirical data collected for this research. The current 
political context within which police malpractice must be viewed will be discussed in the 
second part. 
The Scale of Police Malpractice 
Extensive research exploring the scale of malpractice is not available in the existing 
literature on Thai policing.2 Although the situation of human rights in Thailand is the 
focus of attention of international human rights movements, prominent NGOs such as 
Amnesty International (AI), Human Rights Watch (HRW) or International Commission of 
Jurists (ICJ) etc. do not supply statistical data on police malpractice in Thailand.3 It seems 
therefore that, except for the statistics rarely released by the RTP itself (see Tables 3.2-
3.4), the ‗Country Reports on Human Rights Practices‘ published annually by the 
Department of State, United States is the single external source of statistics on police 
malpractice in Thailand.  
                                                          
1
 For example, regs 8 and 19 (1) of the Police Regulations on Code of Ethics 2008 outline that: 
 
8 Police officers must strictly respect the rights and liberty of the people specified in the 
constitution and other pieces of legislation without discrimination. 
 
19(1) [When investigating crime, the police] must not torture any person or the other 
people having relationship with such person [whom they suspect]. 
 
2
 See s VI. Research Limitations in ch 2. 
3
 See, for example, Amnesty International, ‗Amnesty International Report 2014/15: The State of the World‘s 
Human Rights‘ AI-Index POL 10/0001/2015. 
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Between 2012 and 2015, the US human rights reports reveal the statistics on police 
malpractice in Thailand as follows: 
Table 3.1: US Human Rights Reports’ Statistics on                                                 
Investigations into Police Malpractice in Thailand4 
Year of Report Numbers of Internal (disciplinary) Investigations 
2012 
7,024 investigations (between 2010-2011) 
2013 
4,760 investigations (between 2011-2012) 
2014 
2,663 investigations (in 2013) 
2015 
2,243 investigations (in 2015) 
 
There are two important points worth making here. First, the data shown in the US human 
rights reports clearly supports the point that statistics on ‗substantiated investigations‘ and 
‗withdrawn complaints‘ are simply unavailable (see section VI. Research Limitations in 
chapter 2). The second point is that the reliability of the statistics presented in the above 
reports can be called into question. These statistics appear credible on the surface as they 
have been published by an official authority; however, the fact that the source of this data 
has not been explicitly identified raises a legitimate concern over the reliability and, 
indeed, the accuracy of this data; we can only presume that the US Department of State 
received the statistical data from the Thai police.      
In the absence of reasonably reliable and comprehensive quantitative data on police 
malpractice produced by the Thai police, the discussion about the scale of malpractice in 
this section will rely on the empirical data that I have collected during the research 
fieldwork in Thailand. However, it should be noted that this research will not involve 
                                                          
4
 US Department of State, ‗Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012-2015‘. It is worth noting 
that the statistics for 2014 are missing and that the unusually large number of complaints between 2010 and 
2011 was arguably due to political unrest in Thailand during this time. 
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itself in discussing in depth the scale of police malpractice from the angle of quantitative 
data, but rather seek to reflect broadly on the extent of malpractice under the current 
circumstances in Thailand.  
A seasoned social researcher on Thai policing and anti-corruption interviewed for this 
research observed that whether police malpractice is serious can be interpreted from 
different perspectives: 
It [the scale of police misconduct in Thailand] is very subjective. I 
mean you may have people with different standpoints arguing that the 
scale of police misconduct is huge or small.5  
In 2009, the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) commissioned research on 
preventive measures against the abuse of police power. This was undertaken by a group of 
researchers a majority of whom had police backgrounds.6 The research referred to the RTP 
data on police complaints at national level in a seven-year period from 2002-2008 as 
follows:7 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Interview with [anonymous], a social researcher (Bangkok, Thailand, 7 July 2014). 
6
 Kasemsarn Chotchakornpant, Preeda Sataworn and Prasert  Patanaponpaiboon, ‗A Study of Preventative 
Measures to Combat Abuse of Power: The Case of Abuse of Police Power‘ (NACC 2009) [in Thai]. 
7
 Royal Thai Police, ‗Statistics on Police Complaints‘ (RTP 2008) (as cited in Chotchakornpant and others 
(n 6) 3). It should be noted that the NACC research acknowledged the RTP as the source for this set of 
statistics without going into details from which department (within the RTP) the data was produced.     
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  Table 3.2: RTP's police complaints statistics 2002-2008  
 Year 
Complaints  
against 
commissioned 
officers 
Complaints  
against  
Non-commissioned 
Officers 
Total 
number of 
complaints 
2002 89 67 156 
2003 88 94 182 
2004 90 118 208 
2005 118 100 218 
2006 189 208 397 
2007 162 209 371 
2008 115 101 216 
 
It, then, identified that ―…when calculating the figures of complaints against the police 
nationwide, those officers complained against made up less than one percent of the total 
number of serving officers‖.8 Unsurprisingly, the same line of argument manifested itself 
in my own interviews with a sizable number of police officers. During a group interview 
with the police officers serving in one of the provinces in Northern Thailand, the 
complaints statistics for this province were disclosed as follows:9  
 Table 3.3: Provincial police force area's complaints statistics 2010-2014  
Year 
Number of 
Complaints 
Allegation of 
gross 
misconduct 
Allegation 
of 
misconduct 
Investigation Interrogation 
2010 50 1 49 17 2 
2011 53 1 52 - 1 
2012 51 2 49 11 2 
2013 31 2 29 7 2 
2014 23 3 20 4 3 
 
                                                          
8
 Chotchakornpant and others (n 6) 3. 
9
 Interview with [anonymous], a group of police officers (Thailand, 13 June 2014). 
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One of the officers observed:   
So considering 50 complaints [officially made] in a year in 
comparison to the proportion of 1,900 police officers serving in the 
province, it can be seen that complaints are a low percentage.10 
Consistent with the NACC research, this argument illustrates the train of reasoning found 
within much of the police community concerning the true extent of police malpractice. By 
contrast, in an interview with one of the human rights lawyers and activists, the whole 
premise of the police‘s arguments that a low percentage of complaints reflect the true 
extent of malpractice was categorically refuted:  
Why don‘t you [the police] compare this [the total number of 
complaints] with other departments [agencies]? Why not compare it 
with statistics collated in other countries or recorded by other 
organisations?11 
Two points are being made here. First, that the statistical data on police complaints 
gathered by the police themselves are not subject to external review; hence, they are 
partial. Second, a lack of comparison between the data presented by the police and the 
data gathered from other complaints mechanisms such as the Office of the Ombudsman, 
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission (NACC) etc. means that the people are likely to be misled by skewed 
statistics (see Tables 4.1-4.3 in chapter 4 for comparison). Nevertheless, it is not surprising 
that the police are keen to convince public audiences that the relatively low number of 
police complaints recorded by the police organisation reflects the accurate extent of police 
misconduct. Arguably, their aim is to protect a professional image of the RTP, and to 
                                                          
10
 ibid. 
11
 Interview with [anonymous], a human rights lawyer (Bangkok, Thailand, 15 July 2014).  
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portray police misconduct as individualistic (‗a few rotten apples‘) rather than systematic. 
Conspicuously, the foregoing NACC research also underpinned this position.12  
By contrast, the social researcher quoted above rejected the argument of the police that a 
low percentage of complaints means the full scale of malpractice is trivial. One of the 
complainants interviewed for this research similarly suggested that wider aspects should be 
considered when assessing the true extent of malpractice: 
I believe that from the perspective of ordinary people, the scale of 
malpractice is huge.13  
They [the police] can‘t point out this way [a low percentage of 
complaints reflects the scale of malpractice]. I think it should be 
considered from wider aspects such as negative effects upon the 
victims [the gravity of the problem] and how often the police commit 
malpractice.14  
Apart from a number of instances of malpractice described in chapter 1, the infamous 
cases of five teenagers who were electrocuted around their testicles to compel confession 
in connection with an accusation of theft in 201315 and a similar case of a local fireman in 
the Ayuthaya province who suffered the same act of brutality as the police tried to elicit 
his confession regarding an accusation of snatching in 2004;16 the notorious case in 2008 
in which eight former border patrol police officers robbed and gang-raped someone 
wrongly accused by those same officers of possessing illicit drugs; 17  the extrajudicial 
                                                          
12
 Chotchakornpant and others (n 6) 1-3. 
13
 Interview with a social researcher (n 5). 
14
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant A (Bangkok, Thailand, 25 June 2014). 
15
 ‗Complain of Police Brutality in Electrocuted Five Teenagers in relation to a Theft Case‘ Thairath 
(Bangkok 2013)  <http://www.thairath.co.th/content/334052> accessed 1 September 2014 [in Thai]. 
16
 Pichaet Pinthong, ‗Excessive Force of Police Power in Thailand: The Effect upon Human Rights 
Violations‘ (2012) 2 Thai Journal of Public Administration 135, 147 [in Thai]. 
17 ‗Police Gang Gets Jail for Robbery-Rape‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok 2013) <www.bangkokpost.com./      
news/local/385279/woman-robbed-and-raped-by-police-gang> accessed 1 September 2014. 
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execution of an innocent man whom the police claimed possessed illicit drugs and fought 
them in a gun battle at Sakon Nakhon province in 2012;18 and the most recent infamous 
case of the student whose car was damaged with bullets after the police mistook her for a 
drugs trafficker in 2014;19 all underline the point that the overall levels of brutality and 
abuse of power indicate serious cause for concern in relation to the extent of police 
malpractice, even though the frequency of such events have never been estimated 
officially. 
In addition, to argue that police malpractice is on a low scale without taking into account 
the people‘s mentality towards the police force and its complaints system is a serious 
misjudgement. It can be claimed that a feeling of fear of harassment or retaliation if 
complaints were to be lodged is a contributory factor that undermines the courage and 
determination of would-be complainants to voice their grievances. In Thailand, there has 
been a general perception that ―the cell is for incarcerating the poor‖ which reflects the 
belief that the poor are the ones that typically become the victims of injustice. Singkaneti 
has pointed out that: 
The criminal justice system nearly went rotten to the core. If [we] fail 
to take action, the disparity in the Thai society [in relation to criminal 
justice] will become wider.20  
 
                                                          
18
 ‗The Police Committee of the House of the Representatives Concluded that the Police Planted Illicit Drugs 
and Murdered the Innocent‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 14 March 2012) <http://www.manager.co.th  
/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9550000033297> accessed 5 October 2014 [in Thai]. 
19
 ‗Pongsapat sorry for shooting mistake‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 3 August 2014) 
<http://www.bangkokpost /news/local/423862/pongsapat-sorry-for-shooting-mistake> accessed 30 October 
2014.  
20
 Banjerd  Singkaneti, ‗Only Suspension in the Case of a Hit-and-Run Millionaire, the Cell Is for 
Incarcerating the Poor‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 5 September 2012) 
<http://www.manager.co.th/daily/viewnews.aspx?NewsID=9550000109547> accessed 1 October 2014 [in 
Thai].  
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To similar effect is the following interview data from a human rights lawyer:  
[T]he police are the worst in the public eye, they twist the facts in the 
case, and very often, they abuse their power. So, this leads to a general 
public perception, especially among the poor, that when they [become] 
involve[d] in [the] criminal justice system, they will become victims.21 
The implication is that people who are socially disadvantaged will tend to stay silent when 
suffering from police malpractice. The interviews underlined that the public are aware that 
it is possible for a socially underprivileged group to be treated unjustly and/or even 
become a victim of the justice system from which they might seek redress. All of this 
indicates the extent to which police malpractice is serious in the perception of the public; 
undeniably, these facts certainly discourage would-be complainants from filing their 
complaints with the police. Interestingly, previous research has shown that the police 
recognised that their positions and roles struck fear into the heart of ordinary members of 
the public.22 A few exceptional officers also acknowledged that this has implications for 
the statistics on police complaints, as can be seen from these comments made during a 
group interview:  
I agree [with my colleagues that based on the data available for the 
police, the scale of misconduct is small]. But, OK, to be fair, I believe 
that there might be some people who nurse their grievances against 
the police but owing to some apprehension that the police might bully 
them; as a result, they‘re afraid of registering their complaints with 
us.23  
                                                          
21
 Interview with a human rights lawyer (n 11). 
22
 Amorn Wanichwiwatana, ‗The 1998 Thai Police Reform: A Study of Persistence of Institutional 
Corruption‘ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 2004) 84. 
23
 Group interview with police officers (n 9). 
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We now move onto the discussion about the connection between the police force and 
politics in Thailand. This will show that politics has recently become one of the key factors 
shaping the extent of police malpractice in Thailand. 
Police Malpractice in a Modern Political Context  
As noted in chapter 1, the police reforms in 1998 which were aimed at ensuring a greater 
degree of independence within the Thai police force have proven abortive.24 A turning 
point in the link between the police and modern-day politics in Thailand was marked with 
the rise of a former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra – a businessman with a police 
profession background – to power in 2001.25 Hence, a number of major instances of police 
malpractice are drawn from what had happened during the Thaksin and successive pro-
Thaksin governments.   
Thitinan highlights that the Thaksin administration was very authoritarian, ―so much so 
that it can be compared to past military dictatorships‖.26 The way in which Thaksin used 
the Thai police force (and the troops, on occasion) to tackle illicit drugs; to counter-attack 
the insurgents in the insurgency-prone areas; and to suppress his critics and political 
opponents all point to the strong connection of his government and the police. In 2003, 
Thaksin ordered the RTP to wage ‗war on drugs‘. 27  He gave the following speech 
encouraging the police: 
                                                          
24
 Porntep Prasirtpum, ‗A Study on Administrators‘ Attitude towards Reconstructing of the Royal Thai 
Police‘ (MBA thesis, Ramkhamheang University 1999) 2-9 [in Thai]. 
25
 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris Baker, Thaksin (2nd edn, Silkworm Books 2009). See also, ‗Profile: 
Thaksin Shinawatra‘ BBC (London, 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13891650> 
accessed 1 September 2014. Note that Thaksin Shinawatra was removed from power in 2006 by the military 
coup. 
26
 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‗Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism‘ [2003] Southeast Asian Affairs 277, 278. 
27
 Human Rights Watch, ‗Thailand‘s 'War on Drugs'‘ (HRW, 12 March 2008) <http://www.hrw.org/news/ 
2008/03/12/thailand-s-war-drugs> accessed 3 September 2014. See also, Asian Legal Resource Centre, 
‗ ―Unsubstantiated‖ Police Abuses, Impunity and Human Rights Charades‘ (Statement) (3 September 2009) 
ALRC-CWS-12-05-2009. 
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With the [drug] traders, you must use hammer and fist, that is, act 
decisively and without mercy. Police General Phao Sriyanon once said, 
―There is nothing under the sun that the Thai police cannot do.‖ So I‘m 
confident that drugs are something that the Thai police can deal with.28   
A few months later, Thaksin praised the police for their performance in suppressing drugs:  
In the first three months, the police did very well…The enemy are 
weakening. Kill them off. Don‘t leave a trace behind, because they are [a] 
threat to society.29  
Shortly afterwards, the implementation of the ‗war on drugs‘ turned out to involve the 
bloody massacre of innocent people as formal investigations confirmed that more than half 
of the 2,800 people who lost their lives through extrajudicial killings carried out in the first 
three months ‗had no connection whatsoever to drugs‘.30 The slaughter of innocent people, 
beyond doubt, led to a grand scale of police complaints.  
In addition to the ‗tsunami of casualties‘ inflicted by war on drugs, the problem of police 
malpractice worsened in parallel to the eruption of violence in the three southern border 
provinces of Patani, Yala and Narathiwat where Muslim insurgency is rampant.31 In 2004 
Thaksin introduced the pro-war policy which he dubbed the ‗iron fist in a velvet glove‘, 
and was quite proud of, but admitted later to be a wrong approach to counter-insurgency.32 
Due to Thaksin‘s antagonistic approaches to Muslim insurgency, the RTP was once again 
                                                          
28
 Pasuk Phongpaichit and Crist Baker, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Silkworm Books 2004) 
158. 
29
 Pran Phisitsetthakan, Thaksinomics and Social Policy (Matichon 2004) 232 [in Thai] (as cited in Pasuk 
Phongpaichit and Chris Baker (trs), Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (Silkworm Books 2004) 
165). 
30
 HRW (n 27). 
31
 Aurel Croissant, ‗Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence, and Democracy in Thailand‘ (2007) 19 
Terrorism and Political Violence 1, 1-2. 
32
 Tom Plate, Conversations with Thaksin (Giants of Asia series) From Exile to Deliverance: Thailand's 
Populist Tycoon Tells His Story (KWF Printing 2011) 211-212. 
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tasked with responsibilities that are ―far beyond the scope of normal police work‖.33 The 
policy was analogous to the one used to tackle illicit drugs, i.e., extrajudicial killings34 and 
other draconian measures. The approach to counter-insurgency has claimed roughly 3,000-
3,500 lives since 200435 and frequently led to ―a host of mysterious disappearance of 
‗suspects‘‖.36 Notably, one of the most mysterious and notorious cases in connection with 
insurgency in Southern Thailand is the forced disappearance of Somchai Neelapaichit.37 
All of this apparently shows the then government‘s firm stance on the implementation of 
an authoritarian approach.  
Police misconduct linked to political context has 
become ever more evident following a series of 
anti-government protests. For example, on 7
th
 
October 2008, two of the anti-government 
protestors against the pro-Thaksin People Power 
Party were killed and another 443 protestors 
injured during a police operation to disperse a 
crowd in order to clear the Parliament‘s entrance 
for the cabinet to get in and make a statement on the government policies (see figure 2).38  
                                                          
33
 Jeff M. Moore, The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency (A Muir Analytics Book 2013) 228. 
34
 ibid 228. 
35
 ‗The Thai police: A Law unto Themselves‘ The Economist (Bangkok, 17 April 2008) 
<http://www.economist.com/node/11058580> accessed 1 September 2014. See also, Amnesty International, 
‗Thailand: Torture in the Southern Counter-Insurgency‘ (Report) (13 January 2009) AI-Index ASA 
39/001/2009.  
36
 Joseph Chinyong Liow nd Don Pathan, Confronting Ghosts: Thailand Shapeless Southern Insurgency 
(Lowy Institute for International Policy 2010) 53-55. 
37
 Human Rights Watch, ‗Thailand: Lawyer‘s ‗Disappearance‘ Unsolved 10 Years On – Shoddy 
Investigations, Cover-Up Undermine Justice for Somchai Neelapaijit‘ (HRW, 11 March 2014) 
<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/11/thailand-lawyer-s-disappearance-unsolved-10-years> accessed 10 
September 2014. 
38
 Pinthong (n 16) 150-151. See also, Thomas Bell, ‗Thai Army Deployed in Bangkok after Bomb Leads to 
Coup Fears‘ The Telegraph (Bangkok, 7 October 2008) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
Figure 2: Police fired tear gas at the 
protestors during the protest on the 7th 
October 2008.                                                
Source: www.telegraph.co.uk      
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Later, the Administrative Court ruled that the police did not follow the crowd control 
standards which they themselves announced in the first place. In addition, they had 
recklessly resorted to excessively disproportionate force even though the majority of the 
much larger number of protestors eschewed violence and refrained from counter-
attacking. 39  The NACC also implemented its resolution to prosecute the then Prime 
Minister Somchai Wongsawas and the Deputy Prime Minister General Chavalit 
Yongchaiyudh as the principals who ordered this police operation to be launched, and to 
prosecute the former Police Commissioner and the Metropolitan Police Commander as the 
accomplices.40 It can be stated that Thaksin himself and the latter pro-Thaksin governments 
had turned Thailand into something approaching a police state (L‘ Etat de Police) which 
exacerbated the problem of police malpractice in the meantime. 41  The heavy innocent 
casualties caused by the war on drugs campaign, and the suppression of insurgency and 
protests perhaps provide a clear answer to the question of the true extent of malpractice in 
Thailand. 
In a seminar on the Thai Police, a former member of the National Legislature – Sungsidh 
Piriyaransang – pointed out that:  
Thai politicians are always keen to interfere in the RTP for their own 
sake, and the last government (the Thaksin Administration) had 
unreasonably exploited the police organisation, leading to the 
                                                                                                                                                                              
asia/thailand/3151874/Thai-army-deployed-in-Bangkok-after-bomb-leads-to-coup-fears.html> accessed 5 
February 2013. 
39
 Administrative Court (Central), Thailand, ruling no. 1862/2555 (2012).  
―The Administrative Court of Thailand‖ serves as the judiciary for the adjudication of disputes between state 
authorities; and also between state authorities and members of the public. In this case, it has a role in 
conducting judicial review of the government order to disperse the protestors.    
40
 ‗The NACC Tabled a Resolution to Bring the Case of the Somchai Administration Dispersed the PAD to 
the Supreme Court‘s Criminal Division for Person Holding Political Positions‘ Matichon Online (Bangkok, 
10 October 2008) <http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1349863225> accessed 10 
September 2014 [in Thai].  
41
 Phongpaichit and Baker, The Business of Politics in Thailand (n 28) 164-165. 
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emergence of a police state in Thailand. The police force was also 
exploited for the suppression of the opposition.42    
Consistent with this, in an interview with a former senator who has experience in 
addressing human rights issues, the view was expressed that the extent of police 
misconduct has worsened due to political interference:  
It‘s [the scale of misconduct] huge. I view that the police enforce the 
law without acceptable standard. They perpetuate discrimination 
pretty much on grounds of political-orientation, and what‘s more, I 
think they have a wrong attitude towards the execution of their power, 
so it has been used unfairly.43   
Based on the available literature, and also, the interview data more generally, the causality 
of political interference and police malpractice is not in doubt. Whilst it is true that 
political interference is most evident at the higher levels of the Thai police, Armacost 
reminds us that ―decision-making in the organisational context is a function of the 
hierarchical relationships that define authorities and subordinates‖.44 To put it simply, one 
can think of the situation where an individual officer is faced with an order to pursue a 
particular course of conduct that he views to be wrong. This places him, on the horns of a 
dilemma – whether to follow his own conscience or to obey the superior. In the Thai 
context, political interference and the actions of senior police officers who succumb to this 
interference need to be taken into serious consideration in any discussion of police 
                                                          
42
 Kittipong Kittayarak, A Seminar Report on Police and the Expectation of Thai Society (the Secretariat of 
the Commission of Police Administration Development 2007) 48 [in Thai]. 
43
 Interview with [anonymous], a former senator (Bangkok, Thailand, 14 July 2014). 
44
 Barbara E. Armacost, ‗Organisational Culture and Police Misconduct‘ (2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 453, 
508. 
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misconduct. In assessing the scale of police misconduct in Thailand under current 
circumstances, political factors must be kept firmly in view.  
III. Internal Police Complaints Systems 
We now turn to the second question posed at the start of this chapter: can the internal 
police complaints system handle complaints effectively? The need for it do so is neatly 
summarized by Perry: 
[P]atterns and practices of police misconduct will not become apparent 
without the rigorous investigation of individual complaints. Absent 
thorough investigation it is unlikely that discipline of an individual police 
officer or reform of flawed policing practices will occur.45  
We start with a clarification of how complaints are dealt with under the RTP regulatory 
framework. Next, we will assess the internal complaints systems, considering whether or 
not these systems are sufficiently workable to address the problems, to deter future police 
misconduct, to maintain the credibility of the police and to increase the confidence of the 
public in the internal complaints systems. 
Paragraph 1, section 84 of the National Police Act 2004 prescribes that: 
Once an accusation has been leveled, or it falls under suspicion, that 
any police officer has committed professional misconduct, the 
superior [of such officer] must investigate or enquire preliminarily to 
see if there are reasonable grounds for such officer to be accused of 
committing misconduct.46       
                                                          
45
 Robert A. Perry, Mission Failure: Civilian Review of Policing in New York City 1994-2006 (NYCLU 
September 2007) 13. 
46
 This Act hereinafter will be referred to as the ‗NPA‘.   
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This provision lies at the heart of access to the whole internal complaints systems. It can be 
seen that an officer who is in a superior status is tasked by the NPA with the responsibility 
of handling complaints against his subordinates. It can be inferred that the superior, in 
particular, and the police force area concerned as the appropriate authority, in general, has 
a remit to deal with complaints against officers in the force area. In practice, this also 
means that putative complaints who seek to access the internal complaints system need to 
register their complaints with the local force area concerned. It should also be noted that 
the law does not require the complainants to complain solely with the police force area as 
complainants can complain to the Office of Commissioner General (OCG) – the RTP 
headquarters – or to the Crime Suppression Division (CSD) which has the remit to 
investigate high profile crimes which means that the internal complaints system is 
relatively flexible in terms of accessibility to the public. However, the OCG and the CSD 
are not directly responsible for the handling of police complaints; hence, whether or not 
complaints will be investigated by them very much depends on the gravity of the 
misconduct; less serious complaints will normally be transferred to the police force area 
concerned. 
By virtue of rule 5(b)(7)(c) of the Royal Decree, the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
has also been given the remit: 
To deal with complaints against the police or internal complaints of a 
person serving with the police, a civil servant and an employee 
working in the RTP; and to conduct an investigation into a complaint 
in accordance with its remit.47 
 
                                                          
47
 Royal Decree on the Organisational Structure of the Royal Thai Police 2009, r 5(b), (7)(c). 
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The Decree makes clear that, apart from each police force area, the OIG also play a vital 
role in the police complaints procedures as a central unit for handling complaints both 
from outsiders – members of the public – and insiders – any person serving in the RTP. In 
this regard, the complainants are entitled to file their complaints either with the police 
force area concerned or the OIG. 
As the internal complaints systems are highly flexible, for ease of analysis and 
understanding, the discussion of the internal systems in this paper will be hereafter 
categorised into two different levels; local level and national level. The former focuses on 
complaints made directly to each police force area concerned whilst the latter looks at 
complaints handled by the OIG as a central unit. 
Prior to the discussion of the internal complaints systems at local and national levels, it is 
worth reminding readers that statistical data on ‗substantiated investigations‘ and 
‗withdrawn complaints‘ are not available (see section VI. Research Limitations in 
chapter 2); thus the evaluation of the internal system will rely on the empirical evidence 
collected for this research.                    
Complaints at Local Level      
To comprehend the complaints procedures, we shall begin by looking at the NPA as a 
broad legal instrument outlining how complaints should be handled. To start with, the 
handling of complaints generally is governed by two key provisions. It is prescribed in 
section 85 of the NPA that: 
In case a police officer is accused of committing non-serious 
misconduct, the superior shall [investigate and if the complaint is 
substantiated, he shall impose minor disciplinary measures (see figure 
3)]. 
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In addition, paragraph 1, section 86 prescribes in its first paragraph that: 
In case a police officer is accused of committing gross misconduct, 
there shall be a committee organised to interrogate the matter, … 
It can be inferred that police complaints dealt with by the internal system are managed 
according to the gravity of misconduct, namely non-serious misconduct and gross 
misconduct. The handling of complaints is governed by paragraph 1, section 87: 
The rules, procedures and a time frame in relation to the investigation 
and the interrogation according to section 84 and section 85 shall 
conform to the provisions set out in the police regulations.  
The detailed procedures for dealing with complaints can be found in the Police 
Regulations on Factual Investigation 201348 and the Police Regulations on Interrogation 
and Hearing 2004.49 The former regulations govern the uncovering of the facts to see if the 
conduct of any officers amounts to non-serious misconduct or gross misconduct, whilst the 
latter regulations apply to a stage where there is a case to answer for gross misconduct. 
The regulations on investigation apply to any case where the superior of the officer whose 
conduct is subject to investigation reaches the view at the preliminary stage that a 
complaint made against his subordinate, if proved, would amount to misconduct. Under 
the framework of these regulations, ‗recording of complaints‘ is not described as a defined 
stage within the internal complaints-handling process; hence, the superior or the 
appropriate authority can, without delay, launch an investigation to uncover the facts on 
potential misconduct when: it comes to the attention of the superior that his subordinates 
                                                          
48
 Police Regulations on Factual Investigation 2013; this Regulations, hereinafter, will be referred to as ―the 
regulations on investigation‖. 
49
 Police Regulations on Interrogation and Hearing 2004; this Regulations, hereinafter, will be referred to as 
―the regulations on interrogation‖. 
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have committed misconduct;50 a complaint has been made against an officer in the force;51 
the appropriate authority receives a written notification from another department in relation 
to the conduct of an officer that amounts to misconduct;52 an anonymous letter identifying 
the facts and evidence concerning an officer‘s misconduct has been submitted to the 
force;53 conduct of an officer amounting to misconduct, with ample evidence, appears in 
the news media;54 and the superior deems it appropriate to do so.55 Once the superior of the 
officer concerned (or anybody who has the authority to do so such as the Prime Minister) 
deems an investigation is warranted, he selects three civil servants, two of which need to 
be commissioned officers whose ranks are higher than the officer complained against, as 
members of the investigatory panel to investigate the complaint.56 The investigatory panel 
needs to immediately notify the officer involved regarding the investigation of his 
conduct,57 whilst the investigation, subject to extension, must be completed within 60 days 
after the date that a chair or any committee members have received the notice of the 
convening of the investigating committee.58 Over the course of an investigation, the officer 
concerned is entitled to be accompanied by a legal representative or an adviser during an 
investigation interview but this person cannot act on his behalf.59  
Following an investigation, if a complaint is substantiated that the conduct of the officer 
involved amounts to non-serious misconduct, the investigating committee shall suggest in 
                                                          
50
 Regulations on investigation (n 48) reg 5(1). 
51
 ibid reg 5 (2). 
52
 ibid reg 5 (3). 
53
 ibid reg 5 (4). 
54
 ibid reg 5 (5). 
55
 ibid reg 5 (6). 
56
 ibid reg 10, paras 1, 2. 
57
 ibid reg 12 (1). 
58
 ibid reg 17 (1). 
59
 ibid reg 35. 
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The Superior 
Investigation 
Non-serious Gross Misconduct 
Interrogation 
 Probation 
 Minor penalty 
 Confinement 
 Solitary 
confinement 
 Deductions 
 Discharge 
 Dismiss 
a report what disciplinary action should be taken.60 Once the superior who convened the 
investigating committee has received the report and agreed upon the conclusions, subject 
to section 89 of the NPA, he should impose disciplinary action61 which ranges according to 
the seriousness of misconduct from being put on probation, [minor] penalty (like using 
labour or performing community service)62 or the more serious penalty of confinement, 
solitary confinement, and deductions (see figure 3).63  
If the investigating committee 
arrives at a conclusion that the 
conduct of the officer involved 
amounts to gross misconduct, it 
shall suggest the further step of 
setting up an interrogation and 
hearing committee.64 If the superior 
officer agrees, he shall submit the 
same report to the superior of a 
higher rank for further action to be 
taken. 65  The structure of the 
interrogation and hearing committee is very much the same as the investigating committee. 
However, there is a clearer time frame for every step to be taken within it; at this stage, the 
interrogation and hearing committee must within 15 days inform the officer involved that 
his conduct is to be subject to interrogation; then, this is followed by the process of 
                                                          
60
 ibid reg 31 (2). 
61
 ibid reg 36 (4). 
62
 NPA (n 46) s 82 para 2. 
63
 ibid s 89 para 1. 
64
 Regulations on interrogation (n 49) reg 31 (1). 
65
  ibid reg 36 (5). 
Figure 3: A sketch of internal disciplinary procedures 
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gathering and defending evidence which can last up to 165 days before the interrogation is 
concluded.66   
Shortly afterwards, the committee must submit the report to the superior who convened the 
committee. This will include recommendations, if the conduct of the officer involved is 
proved to amount to gross misconduct, as to what disciplinary action should be taken.67 If 
in agreement, the superior should arrive at a decision whether to discharge the officer 
concerned in which case his pension is still subject to be paid, or to dismiss him in which 
case he will leave the office with nothing.68 Notably, the disciplinary action as a result of 
investigation and/or interrogation outcomes is undertaken without prejudice to criminal 
proceedings. 69  The local complaints system relies entirely on internal disciplinary 
procedures. This is comparable to the system introduced in 1830s by the Metropolitan 
Police in England70 which lasted until the arrival of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) 
in 1984.71  
Complaints at National Level 
The Office of Inspector General (OIG) has as one of its main responsibilities to maintain 
police discipline including the handling of complaints against the police. 72 The annual 
statistics on police complaints that were registered with the OIG from 1
st
 October 2012 – 
30
th
 September 2013 are shown in the table as follows:73  
 
                                                          
66
 ibid reg 15 (1)-(5). 
67
 Regulations on investigation (n 48) reg 31 (1). 
68
 NPA (n 46) s 90 paras 1-3.  
69
 Regulations on investigation (n 48) reg 36 (6). 
70
 Mike Maguire and Claire Corbett, A Study of the Police Complaints System (HMSO 1991) 6. 
71
 ibid 9. 
72
 Royal Decree on the RTP‘s Organisational Structure (n 47) r 5(b), 7(c). 
73
 Email from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) concerning ‗Police Complaints Statistics‘ to the 
author (25 June 2014). Some crucial statistics are missing (see s VI. Research Limitations in ch 2). 
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Table 3.4: The OIG's 2012-13 complaints statistics 
The RTP 
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The statistics shown in the table alone are enough to attest to the significance of the OIG in 
respect of its role in dealing with police complaints in the eyes of ordinary members of the 
public. Given the importance of the OIG in this aspect, it is astonishing that there is no 
specific legal instrument for the OIG to handle complaints. During an interview with a 
police inspector it was revealed that: 
Basically, our procedures for the handling of complaints begin by the 
investigating officer who is responsible for the recording of 
complaints interviewing a complainant in the preliminary stage. Then, 
he will help a complainant to navigate the complaints mechanism by 
offering an explanation as to how the next step is going to be and also 
when a complainant will be informed about progress.74 
The diagram (see figure 4) provided by the OIG shows the overall complaints procedures 
undertaken by the Office. It was explained during my research fieldwork that once 
complaints have been made, they will be referred for screening, a process which takes one 
hour.  
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Figure 4: The OIG's complaints process 
Then, the screening unit will pass the 
matters to the superiors in the OIG for 
consideration to see if there are 
grounds for complaint: this step takes 
three days. After that, if the superiors 
deem appropriate, it takes 24 hours for 
complaints to be officially recorded 
and referred to the appropriate authority 
where the officer involved is serving. 
Now, it comes to the important and final stage where complaints are investigated by the 
appropriate authority and subject to the cross-check process by the Office which takes 30 
days in total before a complainant is notified of the outcome.                  
IV. Critical Discussion on Internal Police Complaints Systems 
An effective complaints system is of vital importance as it does not just provide redress for 
injustice that individual victims have suffered but also deters bad police officers from 
perpetrating malpractice. In this regard, it is arguable that the effectiveness of the system 
can be reflected through a degree of public confidence in it. One of the means for the 
complaints authority to make sure that it is capable of maintaining public confidence in the 
system is to ensure impartiality in the complaints-handling process. In the following 
sections, the chapter seeks to evaluate wider social and political dimensions in order to see 
whether or not the internal system is capable of instilling confidence in the public. Then, it 
looks specifically into the matter of impartiality in the handling of complaints with the aim 
of determining whether or not the internal complaints system is working in practice. 
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Issues around Public Confidence in the RTP Complaints System 
Having been in the forefront of reforms in police complaints for decades, England and 
Wales can be a model from which useful lessons for Thailand may be drawn. In 1976, the 
Police Complaints Board (PCB) had been established to secure a certain degree of 
independence in the handling of police complaints in England and Wales, yet the 
investigation into complaints remained the responsibility of the police. 75  In 1981, the 
outbreak of rioting and public disorder in Brixton, London paved the way for a public 
inquiry into the incidents and its ramifications. 76  Lord Scarman who was appointed to 
conduct the inquiry summarised the findings on the complaints system:  
The evidence, which was given in the two Phases of my inquiry and 
reinforced by my visit to the West Midlands and to Liverpool, has 
convinced me that there is a widespread and dangerous lack of public 
confidence in the existing system for handling complaints against the 
police. By and large, people do not trust the police to investigate the 
police.77  
The summary suggests that members of the public did not take the complaints system on 
trust as it was under the direction and control of the police and lacked the element of 
independence. The system lacked credibility across all sections of society not just amongst 
Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) people in Brixton.  
Scarman went further in observing that there was:  
[A] distrust in the procedure for investigating complaints against the 
police so great that many people would not even report their 
complaints.78  
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This raises the central question of why numerous people so distrusted the procedure that 
they would decide not even to lodge their complaints about police misconduct. The PSI 
Report on Police and People in London is useful for throwing light on the above question. 
The report confirmed that public disquiet about the honesty and integrity of the police was 
at a high level, as evidenced by the findings revealing that 25 per cent of informants said 
police ‗often‘ made threats against people during questioning;79 over two thirds of ‗West 
Indian‘ informants pointed out that the police sometimes stopped people with no grounds;80 
which linked to the more general perception that the police treated some groups in society 
unfairly, particularly ethnic minority people.81 This led to the conclusion that: 
There need to be mechanisms that try to achieve a measure of harmony 
between how the police behave … and how people wish and expect them 
to.82  
The findings from this report encapsulated the prevailing mood of public dissatisfaction 
towards the performance of the police in everyday policing at the time when the Brixton 
disorder took place, and, apparently substantiated what Scarman underlined in his report – 
that heavy-handed police methods and racial prejudice had brought about a break-down in 
relations between the people and the police.83 The report further shows how the credibility 
of the police in the society is linked to the overall level of public confidence in an internal 
complaints system. Thus, in a society where problematic everyday policing exists as a 
strong ground for ordinary members of the public to be distrustful of the police, the 
confidence of the public in such an internal system will be fragile.   
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Turning now to the Thai system, as noted in chapter 1, the performance of the Thai police 
force inspired little confidence in the public (see Table 1.1 in chapter 1). When it comes to 
the internal complaints system, it is well-documented that the RTP system also fails to 
secure the confidence of most Thais. 84  One of the complainants participated in this 
research stressed: 
In Thailand, a police investigation into complaints against the police is 
an utter disgrace. More often than not, the police fail to bring the 
wrongdoer to justice. The whole system is non-transparent, so most 
people don‘t put their trust in it.85 
In line with the above, a human rights lawyer interviewed for this research pointed out: 
Somehow, the police need to ask themselves why the people don‘t trust 
them to investigate complaints against their colleagues.86  
Chappell and Piquero argue that public awareness of the manner in which the complaints 
authorities handle complaints against the police substantially contributes to the rates of 
citizen complaints and accounts for a lack of trust in the complaints system.87 The deep 
distrust of the police which exists in Thai society closely correlates with the failure of the 
Thai police to ensure justice in everyday policing; their misbehaviour ranges from the 
abuse of position and power; ineptitude in handling day-to-day problems; and the 
deliberate neglect of duty. The following comments drawn from my interviews are 
illustrative of the general public perception towards the roles and performance of the Thai 
police in everyday policing:  
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 Phongthon Thanyasiri, The Idea of Establishing the Organisation Responsible for Controlling and 
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Administration Development 2007) 32 [in Thai]. 
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I‘m telling you, the police are armed and use absolute authority to 
investigate and make a decision about the case but usually abuse their 
power. They are drunk with power and are keen to turn Thailand into 
a police state.88 
First of all, I should say that the management of the police 
organisation in Thailand lacks morality, ethics and justice. I believe 
that up to 90 per cent of the officers are involved with some sorts of 
abuse of power and corruption.89 
The problematic nature of everyday policing in Thailand inevitably erodes public 
confidence in the internal complaints systems. To borrow a phrase from Scarman, there is 
a similarly widespread and dangerous lack of public confidence in the existing internal 
system for handling complaints against the police in Thailand, particularly the system at 
local level. The interview with a human right lawyer reflects this point: 
The police will distort the facts and/or fail to deal with complaints 
[including a report about crime] particularly when the complaints are 
related to influential figures. I view that the society has the same 
feeling which is whenever the police are engaged in any matters, they 
are likely to cause more trouble rather than offer help. People don‘t 
get co-operation from the police.90 
Loss of public confidence in the internal system, particularly the system at local level, 
results from widespread concern that it is not working. An air of uncertainty amongst 
members of the public as to whether or not the complaints will be handled formally is one 
of the causes for concern. This particular point comes from the so called ―Pao Kadee‖, or 
‗to blow the case away‘ in a word-for-word translation, which is a well-known 
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phenomenon amongst Thais. It is the common practice that the police simply turn a blind 
eye to the handling of crime and complaints cases when reported to them by members of 
the public.91 The NACC research on combating abuse of power highlighted the following 
facts from a group discussion: 
When the case comes before the police, they record the case but fail to 
launch an investigation and produce the interrogation report; they do 
nothing! Sometimes they just suggest the conflicting parties should 
negotiate instead of following what the law said. Whenever the 
benefits in the case are there, the police will either blow the case away 
or freeze it until the injured party checks on progress, so they will 
redo the case again. This kind of practice happens with numerous 
cases.92             
In a seminar on police reforms, one of the representatives described how the police had 
managed to evade dealing with her case: 
I reported the case regarding burglary. The police couldn‘t find who 
the offender was until we finally caught him red-handed. We called to 
the police to take him to the police station first and we would follow 
in a short time. But when I arrived there, the offender simply 
disappeared; thus, I decided to complain. At the time that I started to 
do so, the officers just shifted their responsibility from one person to 
another even though many of them were still around. One of the 
officers spoke to me: ―Sister, you see, it is his duty to handle your 
complaint but he [another officer] just left it with me‖. I asked him: 
―What would you want me to do‖? To which he replied ―I‘m afraid 
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I‘m finishing, so you need to wait until there is another officer coming 
in‖.93 
A former police officer and a former senator, when interviewed for this study, claimed that 
the reason the police neglect to address crime when it comes to their attention is because 
they are distracted and frustrated by a flood of trivial matters: 
The police are tasked with so many irrelevant responsibilities. Just 
thinking about these, when people do not know how to solve the 
problem, for example, when the tree collapsed and bent in a way that 
obstructed the pathway or when a snake crawled into the house, the 
police will be called to help.94   
I believe that most police officers are apathetic with many problems in 
their own organisation, so they won‘t be able to see complaints as 
something serious that need to be dealt with.95 
People expect the police to serve as guardians of social order and to become a symbolic 
and practical means of reconstructing it when it is shaky.96 Hence, the fact that the police 
are tasked with countless duties, most of which are irrelevant to what they should do seems 
understandable but is not a reasonable excuse for abdicating their statutory responsibility. 
To put it simply, the police‘s top priority is to keep people safe; consequently, turning a 
deaf ear to a crime people face is unacceptable. On the basis of the failure in everyday 
policing, the consequences of it, without doubt, seriously undermine public confidence in 
the standard of police service and the police organisation as a whole. It strengthens 
people‘s personal conviction that the police should not be trusted as even the issues arising 
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from everyday crime are likely to be ignored; thus, there is no reason to expect that the 
police will through an internal complaints system address the problems that they 
themselves or their colleagues created in the first place.  
Discrimination against people who have no personal contacts in the police force is another 
underlying cause shaking public confidence in the internal system. In the interviews with a 
social researcher and a human rights lawyer, the point that a personal contact in the police 
force leads to better treatment was raised as follows: 
It is the fact that if any complainants have connections with the police, 
they will be treated with care.97 
In Thailand, if you have connections [contacts], you can breach the 
law.98 
Sungsidh stresses that the Thai police enforce a double standard in everyday policing 
where the underprivileged are denied justice and are frequently taken advantage of by the 
police themselves: 
What we need is a standard of justice that the police will deliver for 
the people and our society. There were so many cases in which police 
officers bullied people and this ended up with those people being put 
in jail. Four five years ago, the then director general of the 
Department of Correctional Service revealed that up to 80 per cent of 
prisoners had no connection whatsoever to crime, this is the suffering 
of the common people who are socially underprivileged and bullied 
by the police.99 
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Under the recent political crisis in Thailand, discrimination on the ground of political 
orientation has been increasing. As pointed out in section two, the RTP has been heavily 
involved in the suppression of protests; hence, this led to a rise in complaints.100 There is a 
general public perception that if those opposed to the government (known to have a well-
established relationship with the police) seek to complain about malpractice, fair treatment 
will not be forthcoming. Public concern over discrimination on the basis of political stance 
was discussed in the following interview: 
If you are not the supporter of the government, you will not be taken 
care of. Look at the case of Mr.Sutin Taratin; even though the gunman 
has been captured by the video camera the police have not yet made 
any progress so far. Moreover, the camera also captured the moment 
where there are a group of people who were trying to collect and 
destroy the bullets from the crime scene, even [after] complaints have 
been made, the police did nothing.101 
Mr. Sutin was one of the anti-government protest leaders who was shot dead during his 
campaign at Bangna district, Bangkok in January 2013. In this particular case, there are a 
number of reasons to assume that some ex-police officers were involved, and the incident 
taken as a whole indicates that the police feigned indifference and neglected to intervene in 
the situation.102 Even with ample evidence little progress has been made in the murder 
investigation. This is one of the most obvious cases strengthening a widespread perception 
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that the police discriminate against the people who are not the supporters of the 
government.   
Impartiality in a Local Complaints System 
In many jurisdictions the police have failed to convince society that they have the ability to 
investigate and deter malpractice within their own force.103 Prenzler argues that:  
Traditional controls such as internal discipline [procedures of the police 
force]…have been shown by successive inquiries in many countries to be 
easily subverted.104  
In England and Wales, it was not until 1987 that a comprehensive survey on complainants‘ 
views about the police complaints procedure was undertaken. This found that ―many 
respondents were unhappy that there appeared to be an underlying bias against the 
complainant in the procedure. Nearly two-thirds of the sample (65 complainants [out of 
105 in total]) attributed this to the fact that the police themselves conducted the 
investigation of complaints.‖ 105  The findings of this survey apparently supported the 
conclusions drawn in the Scarman report some years earlier that the people did not have 
confidence in the complaints system as the police were the ones who investigated 
complaints.  
In Thailand, the following interviews with police officers show how the police are likely to 
become biased in favour of their colleagues when it comes to the handling of complaints:  
You know what, when an officer is disciplined, their future career 
prospect will certainly be ruined; accordingly, the investigators will be 
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sympathetic towards their colleagues [who are under investigation] 
and help them at times. That‘s also the reason why they usually advise 
the commander to give officers proved to have done wrong lenient 
punishment.106 
[T]he complaints mechanism as operated by the police only exists as a 
means of negotiation but not as a way to put things right. To be more 
precise, the operation of the complaints mechanism solely aims to 
minimise the damage happening on the police side. So if you ask me 
about what people will gain from the complaints system, the answer is 
the outright majority of complainants will not achieve justice when 
making complaints with the police because they tend to help each 
other by whatever means possible.107    
In Thailand, public concern over a lack of impartiality is at least as grave as that 
documented in the history of the English complaints system. Even in the absence of large-
scale research evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that there is an overwhelming sense of 
public distrust of the internal police complaints systems. The climate of a deep mistrust of 
the police in dealing with complaints against their colleagues is particularly obvious 
amongst those who have experienced the systems firsthand. Over the course of data 
collection, the following accounts in relation to internal systems have been given by a 
number of complainants:  
I don‘t believe that the Thai police will be impartial when it comes to 
the handling of complaints against their colleagues. I prefer the idea of 
separating the unit for interrogation from the RTP.108 
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The police are all bad. They like to break the law. So, I don‘t believe 
that they will investigate complaints neutrally; this is why I think it is 
ineffective.109 
Of course, the police shouldn‘t investigate themselves and I think the 
complaints system without police involvement will increase public 
confidence.110 
Who is going to believe that the police will investigate themselves 
impartially when they involve themselves in the wrongdoing in the 
first place?111 
In Thailand, quantitative data about rates of substantiation and withdrawal of complaints is 
not available to support or refute claims of a lack of impartiality. That notwithstanding, the 
findings from this research fieldwork suggest that there is a tendency for the internal 
systems to lack impartiality. What are the fundamental issues leading to the conclusion that 
the internal systems are not impartial? Chief amongst them is the diverse range of 
underhand tactics that the police adopt to stall complaints, mainly at local level. The 
empirical evidence collected for this study suggests that the following tactics are regularly 
used by the police to ensure that complaints would not be dealt with properly:     
(a) Unrecorded Complaints 
Recording of complaints is a critical first step in reassuring complainants that their 
grievances concerning police misconduct have been heard and will be handled 
subsequently. Under the English system, regulation 3(2) of the Police (Complaints and 
Misconduct) Regulations 2012 makes clear that a complaint should be recorded unless: 
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 (a) the matter is already the subject of a complaint made by or on behalf 
of the same complainant; 
(b) the complaint discloses neither the name and address of the 
complainant nor that of any other interested person and it is not 
reasonably practicable to ascertain such a name or address; 
(c) the complaint is vexatious, oppressive or otherwise an abuse of the 
procedures for dealing with complaints; 
(d) the complaint is repetitious; or 
(e) the complaint is fanciful. 
By comparison, regulation 5(2)-(4) of the Thai Regulations on Investigation 2013 set out 
that a complaint will be recorded when: 
(2)  it is made by a complainant…; 
(3)   the superior of the officer involved has been informed by 
government offices or any other bodies about misconduct; 
(4) the anonymous letter which clarifies the incidents of misconduct or 
provides any evidence that can lead to the conduct of an investigation has 
been sent to the superior of the officer involved; 
The rules that govern how police complaints should be recorded under the Thai internal 
system are much looser compared to the English ones. Under the system of the Thai police, 
the complaints procedures begin with the complainant giving a full account of the incident 
of malpractice, similar to when people report crime to the police. 112  But to have a 
complaint officially handled, most complainants need to overcome a tactical ploy designed 
to ensure that complaints go unrecorded. One of the complainants explained how this 
could happen as follows:  
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We don‘t really know what the police would actually do when we 
complain. In my case, the police didn‘t record my complaint from the 
outset. I became aware of this as I went to the force area for the 
second time to check on progress, and I noticed that he [the 
responsible officer] just started to process my complaints, so I suspect 
that the first time round he simply wrote the accounts I gave in his 
notebook. Just imagine if I wasn‘t determined to have my complaint 
addressed, it wouldn‘t have been recorded. This is why I need a 
change in the procedures for complaint.113 
The evidence of this research suggests that, after the complaint has been made, unless the 
complainant is deadly serious about seeing the complaint through to the end, the police just 
simply ‗stay cool under pressure‘ and wait until the complainant‘s anger at the officer 
complained against subsides or until the complainant‘s determination declines; then, they 
will simply throw the complaint away. In line with the above, a former deputy 
commissioner interviewed for this research made the following comments: 
I‘ll give you some examples of how complaints will go unrecorded. 
Assuming you complain against the officer on grounds of omission of 
duty, instead of having your complaint recorded for a formal 
complaints-handling process, some police officers just pretend that 
they take your complaint seriously. They will take notes of your 
accounts and now you feel like your complaint is being taken 
seriously, but the fact is your account of what had happened will 
simply be recorded in a fake casebook. After that, you wait months 
after months and start to lose your nerve as there is no progress being 
made; then, the police just cunningly get rid of your complaint.  
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Another technique the police use, including for those complainants who do seek to pursue 
their cases, is to persuade complainants to opt for negotiation instead, thus ensuring that 
the complaint remains unrecorded. As the former deputy commissioner continued: 
But if you are absolutely determined to see your complaints being 
dealt with, the police will change the tactic by trying to convince you 
to go through the evil cycle of negotiation eventually.114 
Interestingly, the police utilization of salesmanship to divert complainants‘ original 
intention to complain is a feature not unique to Thailand. The study of ‗Informal 
Resolution of Police Complaints‘ by Richard Young and others revealed that the British 
police also tend to persuade people seeking to complain not to follow formal procedures.115 
This is akin to a typical practice of the Thai police of which the people are acutely aware. 
The following comments demonstrate the complainants‘ accounts of being convinced not 
to make complaints: 
[When complaining against the police] the police would take 
complainants to the side of a police station and convince or negotiate 
with them in the direction that results in the discontinuance of 
complaints.116  
I have received so many calls from the police [after the complaint was 
made]. They said sorry to me about what has happened and explained 
the tough situation, they were in which I think it‘s too personal; and 
then, they convinced me not to go further with the case. The Deputy 
Superintendent has personally contacted me in order to make 
compromise and I didn‘t understand why [he had to do so]?117  
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The police begged me to stop complaining about the mysterious 
disappearance of my brother just like they did to him before he really 
disappeared. He made the point that my complaint dragged him into 
more trouble.118 
The manner in which the police try to cajole the complainants to put off complaining is 
unjustifiable and is not within the law. This clearly shows that the internal system seriously 
lacks impartiality. Note that as we move onto discuss other underhand tactics, we will see 
an increasing degree of dishonesty and harshness of those tactics at the same time.   
(b) Silencing Complainants 
This research found that, under certain circumstances, the police are keen to offer concrete 
inducements for the complainants to silence them. For example, the police may seek to 
make a one-off payment to the complainants in exchange for them not persisting with their 
complaint. The interviews with some police officers demonstrate how this tactic is used: 
You know what, some of these people [complainants] can be satisfied 
by some sorts of payments. The superior of the officer complained 
against just sometimes just cuts corners by giving the complainants 
some 3,000 Baht [Thai currency], for example, to stop the complaints 
process.119   
Following the negotiation, if the complainants are not convinced to 
stop complaining, most of the times, the superior of the officer 
involved will seek to offer the complainants some money in exchange 
for discontinuance of complaints. My experience is that in less serious 
cases, the complainants tend to receive the money as they realise that 
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if they refuse the offer and persist head-on in seeing their complaints 
go through to the end, they may not get the results they need.120  
In addition, one of the complainants gave an interview for this research explaining that the 
incentives the police officer use to silence the complainants may not necessarily be in the 
form of a payment; it can also be something like ‗doing favours‘ or ‗string-pulling‘: 
The tactics I and other complainants whom I knew have experienced 
are random. But their [the police‘s] first few attempts are to beg you 
[complainants] personally not to go further with the case, and in the 
meantime, they, in conversation with you, will try to spot if you have 
any requirements that can be fulfilled by them without resorting to a 
formal complaints process. In my case, it was money. But in some 
other cases, if the complainants do not care much about money, they 
will try something like making a promise to help the complainants‘ 
sons or daughters to get a job if they haven‘t got one already, or if 
they have, they will say something like they can ask their personal 
contacts to help pull strings for them to earn promotion to a higher 
post. Under these circumstances, in our society, if you are a nobody, 
would you receive the offer and go back to live your normal life or 
would you turn down what the police offer and continue to fight for 
the right thing?121  
The question arises here as to whether or not the practice of offering inducements in 
exchange for withdrawal of complaints at any point during the handling of complaints is 
within the law. In relation to this, neither the NPA nor other relevant legislation allows the 
discontinuance of complaints to be agreed on grounds of payment or other kinds of 
unregulated satisfaction. These are not like the out-of-court settlements that conflicting 
parties involved in civil litigation are legitimately able to negotiate nor are they akin to 
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mediation-like process used in some areas of the law. Rather, the payment paid to the 
complainants is actually hush money whilst the promise to return the favour should a 
complaint be dropped is merely a dubious settlement. Thus, these tactics are unlawful. 
Added to this, the police‘s claim that the complainants are satisfied with the offer they 
receive is a controversial point. As Reiner put it in relation to the UK, ‗police property‘ – 
the groups of people who are regarded as socially and particularly financially powerless – 
are frequently abused by the police.122 This is similarly the case in Thailand, where the 
poor are well-documented as ‗police property‘. 123  It is arguable, therefore, that 
complainants who are socially underprivileged are left with no effective choice but to 
accept an unwanted offer.  
(c) Discrediting Complainants  
Where initial attempts to silence complainants prove fruitless, the police resort to tougher 
approaches. Discrediting is one of the techniques done by ―condemnation of the 
condemners [complainants]‖ 124  which involves denying their identities as victims of 
misconduct so as to justify decisions that complaints should not be substantiated. One of 
the tactics the Thai police normally adopt to discredit complainants — which seems to be 
in common with what Box and Russell found in England and Wales — is the use of a 
previous criminal record.125 One of the complainants gave the following pertinent account: 
My nephew was 14 when he was thrown in jail as a result of 
motorcycle theft. During his time in jail, he‘d witnessed some police 
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officers and correctional officers selling drugs to the prisoners. These 
people then compelled him to help them. He refused, so he was 
tortured. He then told me to complain on his behalf, I did so, but the 
police [at the police force area] didn‘t believe in what he said; the 
police said my nephew was a crook, his words weren‘t reliable.126  
In the Thai context, the process of discrediting complainants is likely to go beyond the use 
of criminal record to include features of complainants which are regarded as deviant, such 
as drug addiction. A perception that a drug addict is an evil person who does not deserve 
respect appears to be widely shared in most parts of Thai society.127 Though drug abusers 
are now classified as patients not criminals, it seems that the above-mentioned norms and a 
status of being ‗police property‘ still license the police to beat them. 128 When these people 
seek to complain, they will no doubt be treated as unreliable sources which will eventually 
lead to the non-substantiation of their complaints.       
A vicious slander on victims or complainants as posing an imminent threat to justify the 
course of action the police have taken to maintain order is another discrediting technique. 
This tactic had been a matter for debate in the UK for decades, it originally derives from 
what Philip Corrigan and Derek Sayer defined as ―state talk‖.129 Sim described the notion 
of state talk as the misrepresentation of dangerousness the personnel in criminal justice 
system face in their work which legitimises them to resort to violence. 130  Pemberton 
pointed out that, in England and Wales, ―a facet of ‗mania‘, which is often associated with 
Black victims, is their reported physical strength. Victims portrayed in this way are often 
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characterised by state talk as possessing ‗super-human strength‘‖.131 In many cases, the 
depiction of victims as a threat to the officers when they seek to maintain law and order 
helps them evade accountability, as in the case of the death of Olaseni Lewis – a young 
black male with mental difficulties. He was restrained by a grand total of 11 police officers 
who were, however, initially found by the Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC) to have done nothing wrong.132 In Thailand, the people who complain on behalf of 
victims who died during or following police contact will normally encounter the police‘s 
devious tactic of portraying the dead, one way or another, as a person who committed or 
was about to commit an unlawful act against the police in the first place. In the interview 
with a complainant whose relative had been shot dead during the police crackdown on 
drug smuggling, the following comments were made: 
On the day of the incident, the officers complained against argued that 
during an exchange of fire with a group of bodyguards who were 
trying to protect my brother-in-law, they saw some of those 
bodyguards had mistakenly fired on my nephew. But the evidence has 
later proven that there wasn‘t any bodyguard involved, the police 
alone were firing on the car that my sister with my nephew was 
driving away.133 
In addition to the above instances, in the case of Aungkana Pradubpanya-avut – an anti-
government protestor who died as a direct consequence of a tear-gas canister fired by the 
riot police directly at her chest,134 the police had tried to create the misleading impression, 
even before the post-mortem, that the cause of her death was due to the explosion of a 
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hand grenade that she carried.135 The case of Somchai Kwanjun is another example which 
shows how state talk in Thailand works. In this case, the officer concerned planted an 
illicit drug – methamphetamine – on Somchai. 136  When he complained, the officer 
complained against portrayed him as having possessed an illicit drug, perverting the course 
of justice, and having a malfunctioning brain. It turned out that all of these allegations had 
been made in order to discredit him.137   
(d) Concealment and/or Fabrication of Evidence 
Under the internal complaints investigation, the police are in charge of gathering evidence. 
The interviews given to this research by a number of complainants suggest that one of the 
devious tactics that the police use for undermining the legitimacy of the complainants in 
order to dismiss their complaints is concealing or fabricating evidence or both. 
From my personal experience, I‘m sure that the police have concealed 
some key evidence relevant to my complaint. Just think about it, my 
brother [who complained against a senior officer at the local force 
area concerned] got a call from the police telling him to go to the 
[police] station to discuss his complaint. He was last seen at the police 
station at about 20.00 and has not been seen since then. The police 
kept saying that my brother went home after an hour of talk but the 
distance from his house to the police station was shorter than a 
kilometre, how could it be possible that he went missing? If there was 
an accident or anything like that happened to him, we or the people 
living nearby could have known it but there wasn‘t any trace. And 
most importantly, in the early morning of the following day, his son 
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[the complainant‘s nephew] got up and saw two missed calls from his 
dad [the complainant‘s brother] around midnight. I thought that that 
was the last chance that my brother could do something to let 
someone else knows that he was in great danger. So, from what has 
happened, I‘m sure that my brother was a forced disappearance and I 
suspect that some officers in the local force area concerned are 
involved with this case, and I‘m sure that some important evidence 
was concealed.138      
The fabrication of evidence to harass complainants was also alluded to during my 
interview with a former deputy commissioner: 
In the case where a complaint is made due to the fact that the police 
have carried out a search in the private premises without a search 
warrant because they believed that they would be able to catch 
somebody [who breaks the law] red-handed but it turned out that 
nothing wrong had happened; the superior of those officers involved 
will call the complainants to negotiate for compensation in exchange 
for the discontinuance of complaints. However, if the complainants 
are still determined to carry on with their complaints, the police will 
bluff their way by pressurising the complaints into accepting the deal. 
For example, the police may fabricate evidence to seek a search 
warrant in order to search the complainants‘ premises again and again 
until the complainants feel that they cannot tolerate this kind of 
situation any longer and eventually accept that deal.139 
This latter interview is valuable information as an insider has confirmed that the 
concealment and/or fabrication of evidence is one of the underhand tactics that some police 
officers employ with the intention to dismiss complaints. 
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(e) Intimidation 
Under the circumstances where complaints are sufficiently serious to amount to gross 
misconduct, it is very likely that intimidation and violence will be used as the last resort to 
petrify complainants and/or witnesses. One of the complainants who complained about an 
extrajudicial killing explained that: 
Soon after my complaints were made, a group of men whom I knew to 
be police officers from the local force area concerned that I 
complained against had been stalking me and some witnesses of mine 
for months. Once I realised that I decided to apply for witness 
protection. I filed the application to the Rights and Liberties 
Protection Department (RLPD) [the governing body of the Witness 
Protection Bureau (WPB), see chapter 5]. But instead of protecting 
my identification, this particular authority has supplied a tape 
recording of where I lived to the local force area even though they 
knew that I complained against them. And importantly, they‘ve done 
that even before informing me of the result of my application for 
witness protection. This was the collusion between them, wasn‘t it?  
I‘ve reported this to the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC). 
The NHRC required the representative from the RLPD to attend an 
interview. During the interview, one of the representatives admitted 
that they had given a tape recording of me to the local force area. But 
when I asked the NHRC commissioner to give me the interview 
statement as I wanted to sue them [the RLPD], the commissioner said 
it may worsen the case, so I followed the advice. Apart from my own 
case, I‘d helped some other complainants in my local province as well 
and I can tell you that most of them especially female complainants 
have experienced some forms of intimidation particularly stalking. 140  
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What is interesting from the above comments is not just the fact that some police officers 
resort to intimidation but also the fact that the police seem to have a network of contacts in 
other government departments that are able to help them to intimidate complainants into 
giving up complaining.  
The empirical data in the previous paragraphs have built up a picture of how the police 
employ a range of underhand tactics to convince, pressurise or even threaten complainants. 
During the research fieldwork, many complainants pointed out that their perception of how 
the internal system is not impartial was heightened by the fact that the RTP was keen to 
shelter the alleged officers. One of the interviewees of this research said: 
How can the systems be impartial if the police organisation aims to 
shelter the wrongdoers from the outset? You know what, in my case, 
the RTP has provided the officers whom I complained against with a 
certificate of accreditation to prove their decency, and these officers 
used this certificate to back up themselves whenever they are required 
to give an interview with complaints authorities or even the court.141     
Corresponding to the account of the above complainant, in the forced disappearance case 
of Somchai Neelaphaijit, Angkhana Neelaphaijit has made a number of observations which 
give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the police organisation dishonestly protected the 
wrongdoers:  
I‘ve got a chance to observe this case from start to finish. I‘ve made so 
many attempts to ask the RTP why one of the alleged wrongdoers 
who spent 30 days in jails could resume his post again, even though 
the law said that in such a case, the officer must be spontaneously 
                                                          
141
 ibid. 
 
 
Page 117 of 367 
 
dismissed? Why is his misconduct an exception? As yet, I haven‘t got 
any answer.142 
One of the senior crime journalists also made the following comments:  
Believe it or not, in the case of Blue Diamond Affair, some of the 
officers alleged to have been involved in the murder of the Saudi 
businessman only received lenient disciplinary sanctions whilst some 
others came out of it smelling of roses. Even worse, some of these 
officers had later been promoted and have now become Police General. 
You see, we don‘t have the mechanism to get rid of these people. Hence, 
the problems have gradually been escalated until it was nearly rotten to 
the core as what you can see now.143 
This shows that ordinary members of the public share in the frustration of complainants 
when the officers at fault are undeservedly protected.  
The following interview with a former deputy commissioner outlined one of the key 
reasons behind the attempt of the police, especially those who are in superior ranks, to stop 
complaints: 
The key factor is that the outcome of disciplinary sanctions imposed 
on the officers involved will also negatively affect their superiors of 
higher rank in the chain of command.144  
The above comments on the possible negative effects upon the superiors in cases where 
their subordinates are disciplined find their legal basis in paragraph 4, section 80 of the 
NPA which stipulates that: 
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Any superior who fails to conform to this section [to promote and 
improve rigid discipline and to prevent misconduct] … shall be 
regarded as committing misconduct himself.145         
This clearly creates a built-in incentive for the superior officer to avoid a complaint 
running its full course. 
Overall, the evidence of this research underlines that the complaints system at local level 
severely lack impartiality as the police are keen to protect themselves. We turn next to the 
system under control of the OIG where we will examine whether the handling of 
complaints at national level is any more effective and impartial.  
Issues around a Complaints System at National Level  
The OIG, as explained above, is in a position of responsibility for the handling of 
complaints. The OIG is, on the surface, comparable to the Professional Standards 
Department (PSD)146 in each police force in England and Wales as both are the internal 
units in the police organisation with special responsibility for disciplinary control and 
complaints.147  
The total number of 1,564 complaints recorded by the OIG in 2013 alone makes it clear 
the extent to which members of the public attribute importance to the roles of inspectors in 
handling police complaints.148  One of the key reasons is that the OIG is a national body 
with a rule-keeping responsibility and is generally portrayed as being capable of bringing 
―rogue cops‖ to book. In 2012, for example, the then Police Spokesperson at a press 
conference announced that, owing to a substantial number of complaints being made 
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during the year, the RTP would require the OIG to inspect the work of each police 
provincial region.149 However, a former senator interviewed for this research pointed out 
that the reality is different from that which the OIG is painted to be: 
It‘s meaningless [the roles of the inspectors in dealing with police 
complaints]. That‘s [the OIG] where the police go to sit and slap 
mosquitoes. They haven‘t got a powerful tool for dealing with 
complaints; besides, they lack authority and resources in many aspects. 
So the OIG‘s complaints system is just perfunctory. I‘d say that the 
police organisation does not enthusiastically support the work of the 
OIG.150 
The fact that the OIG is merely serving as a reference agency with no real power also 
emerged clearly in the interview with one of the police inspectors concerning his role in 
investigating police complaints: 
Let me put it this way, the OIG was able to appoint a group of 
investigators to deal with police complaints in the past; however, the 
amendment of the Police (Factual Investigation) Regulations has 
changed the way we work. Therefore, the Office currently pretty 
much serves as a reference agency that passes the matter to the 
appropriate authority.151 
Consistent with the above interview, the current regulations on investigation do not confer 
any power on the OIG to handle complaints. 152  The amendment of the regulations 
apparently undermined the authority of the OIG in terms of handling complaints. It also 
shows, at the same time, that the RTP does not place emphasis upon this aspect of the 
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complaints system as a means to ensure the accountability within the organisation. The 
following interview reinforces this argument: 
I accept that it is not so effective [complaints system] because there 
are a number of problems within the OIG, and these problems 
undeniably lie with the fact that senior police officers in the RTP do 
not recognise the importance of our work. Therefore, we lack 
sufficient resources, especially financially, to do our best.153 
This interview highlights that the complaints system at national level is not working as the 
OIG is clearly neglected and under-equipped. However, the OIG can still be tasked with 
the responsibility of investigating complaints on an occasional basis according to the 
Police Commissioner‘s instruction. In this regard, the question arises as to whether the 
handling of complaints by the Office is impartial. The following comment from a former 
Deputy Commissioner casts light on this question: 
Most police officers are similar, the inspectors are also the police, and 
therefore, they can help the officers concerned at times.154 
The same complainant who disclosed how the police discredited victims of malpractice 
gave the following interview underlining that the handling of complaints at the national 
level is not working any better than at the local level: 
The OIG [at first] pressed some officers with the charge of intentional 
murder [first degree murder] of my nephew. But when the alleged 
officers argued that my nephew was mistakenly shot dead by the 
bodyguards who were trying to protect my brother-in-law [the father 
of the dead], the police inspector later dropped all the charges without 
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reasons being provided, without letting me know and without 
providing me any opportunity to challenge.155 
The abrupt manner in which the inspector dropped the charges without providing any 
justification lends weight to the view that the OIG lacked impartiality. Even though the 
OIG has nothing to do with local police force areas, let it not be forgotten that it is also 
under the control of the National Police Chief just like any other police officer; therefore, 
using contacts in the chain of command to pull strings for those wrongdoers is possible. 
This example demonstrates the crucial point that so long as the police are still investigating 
themselves, there tends to be a lack of impartiality because the OIG is, as other divisions 
are, under the direction and control of the RTP.  
Above all, one of the most important points about the OIG is that it has no power to handle 
a complaint against the Commissioner for the reason that the Inspector General is a 
subordinate of the Commissioner; besides, the Commissioner has the authority over the 
task allocation and the transfer of all police (see figure 1 in chapter 1). Hence, if there is 
any complaint against him, it is uncertain as to whether the key investigating officers are 
likely to be transferred and forced to abdicate the responsibility or not. In this respect, this 
internal mechanism cannot fully function as the interested party, namely the Commissioner, 
can intervene into the investigation process. The aftermath of the tragic incidents during 
the anti-government protest on 7
th
 October 2008, for example, proved that the OIG lacked 
authority to hold the then Commissioner General and also the Metropolitan Police 
Commander to account.156 Therefore, as long as the OIG is an internal body in the RTP and 
is still under the influence of the Commissioner General, its complaints system cannot be 
impartial. 
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V. Root Causes of a Lack of Impartiality 
In this section we discuss the root causes of a lack of impartiality in the RTP system from a 
deeper and wider perspective. It will be argued that the patronage system within the RTP 
and the authoritarian mindset are the main problems undermining impartiality in the 
handling of complaints.  
Patronage System in the RTP  
The patronage system is explained as ―an exchange relationship between roles which may 
be defined as a special case of dyadic (two-person) ties involving a largely instrumental 
friendship in which an individual of higher socio-economic status (patron) uses his own 
influence and resources to provide protection or benefits, or both, for a person of lower 
status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, 
including personal service, to the patron.‖157 In the Thai context, the patronage system is 
comprised of the following types of connections; a master-servant relationship; an emotive 
brotherhood relationship; the ties of civil servants, businessmen, politicians and political 
canvassers; and the ties of kinship.158 The influence of the ties of kinship upon impartiality 
is obvious and is already acknowledged by the law on police complaints as a conflict of 
interest;159 thus, it will not be discussed in this part.  
The ranks and the chain of command in the RTP represent a quasi-military top-down 
management. The administration within the Thai police organisation, therefore, is 
controlled by a few most powerful officers at the top.160 The classification of the police into 
                                                          
157
 James C. Scott, ‗Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia‘ (1972) 66 Am Polit Sci 
Rev 91, 92. 
158
 Somchart Sangiamsak, ‗The Patronage System in Thai Society: A Case Study in Appointing and 
Transferring Commissioned Police Officers‘ (MA Thesis, Ramkhamheang University 2001) 27 [in Thai].  
159
 Regulations on Investigation (n 48) reg 5 (4). 
160
 NPA (n 46) ss 11, 13. Note that the highest rank of a commissioned officer is ‗Police General‘ whilst the 
highest rank of a non-commissioned officer is ‗Police Senior Sergeant Major‘. 
 
 
Page 123 of 367 
 
a commissioned officer, who has the opportunity for getting to the top, and a non-
commissioned officer, who lacks the same opportunity,161 even strengthened the chain of 
command because such classification created the barrier between a superior and an inferior. 
These conditions cement a master-servant relationship in the Thai police organisation. 
There is a Thai saying to the effect that ―in the police, subordinates give money to the 
superior‖; 162  beyond doubt, the aforesaid money is largely collected from illegal 
businesses.163 More often than not, in the RTP, subordinates (servants) have to provide 
their superior (a master) with benefits for job security. Having received the benefits, the 
superior provide his subordinates protection in return. This reciprocity is just in line with 
the definition of patronage given above.  
The interview with a human right lawyer demonstrates that the servant-master relationship 
within the Thai police organisation entails that impartiality is improbable in the handling 
of complaints:  
You see, the culture of feudal patronage is still there in the RTP. The 
superior carries on helping his subordinates even after they have been 
disciplined [as a result of malpractice]. These people are not going 
anywhere because the superior continues feeding and taking care of 
them with exchange of their personal service such as giving help with 
taking bribery.164   
The comments illustrate that the superior will give protection to his subordinate at any cost. 
In the rare case where a subordinate loses his job, the protection, flagged up during the 
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above interview to mean the support for a living, will nonetheless extend beyond the end 
of that subordinate‘s career.   
An emotive brotherhood relationship is a second obstacle impeding impartiality when it 
comes to the handling of complaints. Haanstad expounded on the cultural hegemony that 
shapes the mindset of the Thai police during their time in the Royal Police Cadet Academy 
(RPCA); it was indicated that: 
[M]any Thai officers enter into pre-cadet academy as young as 15 years 
old, and the militarised 2- or 4-year academy classes produce a strong 
sense of esprit de corps: an emotive, but bureaucratic brotherhood.165 
It is unsurprising that the pedagogic strategy which ensures that experience is shared 
amongst cadets almost 24/7 throughout four-year training will construct strong social 
networks that lasts perhaps a lifetime. The following interview with a police inspector 
shows how the ties of imaginary brotherhood fostered since he was in the police cadet 
academy plays a part in his life when it comes to the decision-making on important issues: 
You just think about how heartbroken I was when I still served as a 
Deputy Superintendent and I found that my subordinate, also my 
junior in the police academy, accepted a bribe. I have to put him into 
jail, and I saw him handcuffed and walked into jail!166 
Though the comments convey the impression that this police inspector has managed to do 
the right thing, his tone of voice shows how influential the emotive relationship is in the 
Thai police organisation. The police mindset of emotive brotherhood leads to the 
conclusion that if the options are open, an imaginary bond of this kind really undermines 
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impartiality. Support for this can be found in my interview with a former deputy 
commissioner:               
[T]he culture of patronage – the senior-junior relationship [an emotive 
brotherhood relation] that had very well been fostered when the police 
officers were in the RPCA in particular – is also another factor why 
complaints will not be addressed impartially. For example, if you 
investigate complaints against your subordinate, who is also your 
junior in the police academy, the complaints process will be, either 
more or less, manipulated in favour of that subordinate.167  
The ties of civil servants, businessmen and politicians also play a huge part in the 
patronage system in Thailand. In the following discussion, however, the relationship 
between the police and politicians becomes the focal point. As noted in chapter 1 the RTP 
is a unitary body under the direction and control of the Prime Minister, who exercises the 
statutory power to nominate or dismiss the Chief Police Officer.168 This, therefore, affords 
politicians the opportunity to exert undue influence upon the police. The interference 
fosters an institutional culture within which a sizable number of senior police officers, who 
seek to stand out from the crowd and win favour, are keen to be a servile follower of 
politicians. This becomes a factor shaping a lack of impartiality when it comes to the 
handling of complaints against the officers who abused their position due to political 
reasons. For example, the NACC decided to prosecute three senior police officers for their 
abuse of power in relation to the instruction given to riot police to adopt violent tactics to 
disband anti-government protestors. The resolution submitted shortly after by the Office of 
the Police Commission (OPC) (see figure 1 in chapter 1) which authorised these three 
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officers to resume their positions apparently shows how patronage between politicians and 
the police works in order to shelter the wrongdoers.169  
The case of the Deputy Commissioner – Police General Pongsapat Pongcharoen – who 
stood down in order to run for the office in the shirt of the leading political party in a 
coalition government – the Phue Thai party – in the 2013 Bangkok gubernatorial election 
provides further evidence of how political patronage serves to protect key police officers. 
During the election campaign, a number of Pongsapat‘s fellow party members tried to 
expose the alleged corruption in the construction of 365 police stations approved by the 
opposition party while they were in government; this was generally seen as an attempt to 
discredit the candidate from the opposition party. The plan, however, backfired on 
Pongsapat as it turned out later that he was one of the stakeholders that signed the 
construction contract.170 Having lost the election, Pongsapat sought the opportunity to have 
his old job back, and when he resumed the same position again,171 instead of being called 
to a disciplinary hearing for the alleged corruption, the government leapt to his defence and 
failed to dig deeper into the matter.172  
                                                          
169
 ‗The NACC Reveals the Police Commission Resolution Must be Interpreted by the Constitutional Court‘ 
<http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/home/detail/politics/politics/20100115/95686/> 15 January 2010 [in 
Thai].  
170
 Crime Correspondent Team, ‗Corruption in the Construction of Police Stations: ‗Accidental Discharge‘ 
over People in the Same Party‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 11 February 2013) 
<http://www.manager.co.th/Crime/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000017327&CommentReferID=227 
15649&CommentReferNo=1&TabID=2&> accessed 6 August 2014 [in Thai].  
171
 Fredrickson T,‗Pongsapat Wants Police Job Back‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 5 March 2013) 
<http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/338896/pongsapat-wants-police-job-back> 30 
June 2013.  
172
 ‗The Massage Palour Owner Shows Evidence How ‗Adul-Pongsapat‘ Need to Be Responsible for the 
Scandalous Police Stations Project‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 15 February 2013) 
<http://www.manager.co.th/daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9560000019413> accessed 30 October 2014 [in 
Thai].  
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All of this not just shows how close are the police and influential politicians, but also 
demolishes the argument that the 1998 police reform would lead to a greater degree of 
independence in the Thai police organisation (see the discussion in chapter 1).   
The Authoritarian Attitude towards Law Enforcement 
It is arguable that the manner in which the police justify their own action when dealing 
with crime inevitably influences their decision whether complaints made as a result of the 
action they have taken should be substantiated. In the NACC research, some officers 
expressed the following views during a group discussion: 
The police work consists of objectives and approaches, the aim of 
peaceful society may not be achieved if lacking one of them. 
Sometimes inappropriate approaches are necessary for the society if it 
is to become peaceful…the Thai society and the American society are 
dissimilar, so we need to consider the practicality.173 
The police need to adopt illegal methods at times, for instance, we 
need to interrogate the suspect by means of threatening, using both 
soft and harsh methods until he confesses in order to gather other 
evidence.174       
These comments evidence an aura of authoritarianism within the RTP, and that is so 
notwithstanding that it cannot be claimed either that an authoritarian characteristic belongs 
exclusively to the police profession or that every policeman is authoritarian. From the 
above viewpoints, it is arguable that the Thai police would use whatever means available 
to achieve their desired ends without giving consideration to human rights principles 
and/or the lawfulness of the course of action. Interestingly, this is in sharp contradiction to 
                                                          
173
 Chotchakornpant and others (n 6) 73. It can be assumed that the interviewee wanted to compare the Thai 
society and the liberal society in the Western world by citing American society as an example. 
174
 ibid 72. See also, Asian Legal Resource Centre, ‗Defective Criminal Justice Institutions Cause 
Systematic and Widespread Rights Abuse in Thailand‘ (Statement) (18 March 2007) ALRC-SHRC-04-19-
2007.    
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the claims made by some commissioned officers interviewed for the NHRC research that 
they are aware of and always uphold the principles of human rights.175 This leads to the 
conclusion that, when it comes to the handling of complaints, it is highly likely that the 
police just cling to their own mindset which makes impartiality impossible. For instance, 
the fact that many officers are keen to threaten the suspect as they believe it is a necessary 
evil as it is a better and quicker approach to the handling of cases suggests that if the 
suspect makes a complaint about threatening, it is unlikely that such a complaint will be 
substantiated.  
VI. Conclusion 
Police malpractice is a serious and perennial issue in Thailand. From ordinary people‘s 
perspective, the scale of malpractice is large because the facts show that the problem of 
malpractice is aggravated by political factors. The Thai police force has put in place a 
mechanism for addressing people‘s grievances against police malpractice. Although the 
internal complaints system provides complainants with a number of advantages, one of 
which seems to be the flexibility in the process, the evidence from this research suggests 
that the internal system has failed to instill public confidence. The interview data drawn 
from the complainants and relevant stakeholders have painted a coherent picture of the 
internal system as being unworkable because it severely lacks impartiality. Two root 
causes have been identified – the patronage system within the RTP and the authoritarian 
attitudes towards law enforcement. So long as these fundamental causes have not been 
dealt with seriously, huge numbers of ‗rogue cops‘ will still enjoy impunity. It is argued 
therefore that the disadvantages of having complaints against the police dealt with by the 
police far outweigh the advantages. It may be, however, that this conclusion is a little 
                                                          
175
 See text accompanying nn 11, 12 in ch 1. 
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premature. We must first consider whether the Thai systems for investigating complaints 
that are external to the police are capable of remedying the problems outlined above. This 
will be the subject of the next chapter.    
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CHAPTER 4: EXTERNAL POLICE COMPLAINTS SYSTEMS 
I. Introduction 
In recent times, ―the operation of a fair and effective system for dealing with complaints 
against the police has come to be recognised as a core component of democratic and 
accountable policing‖. 1  There followed a global trend of creating an independent 
complaints agency to enhance the effectiveness of a police complaints system.2  
As noted in chapter 1, the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC) as 
independent watchdog bodies were established since 1997 and formed the backbone of the 
police oversight mechanisms in Thailand, even though none of them was designed to be a 
specialised police watchdog. This chapter is divided into two major parts to examine the 
Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC in relation to their responsibility for dealing with 
police complaints. The first part examines the statutory responsibilities of the Ombudsman, 
the NHRC and the NACC and their roles as a police watchdog. This includes a discussion 
on the accessibility and complaints procedures of the complaints systems overseen by 
them. Following on from that is a critical analysis of the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the 
NACC which aims to see whether or not these complaints bodies are capable of dealing 
with police complaints and identify whether there are any outstanding issues that diminish 
the capability of each of them to resolve complaints effectively. The second part of the 
chapter will be devoted to deal particularly with the notion of ―independence‖ as it applies 
to the ombudsmen and the commissioners. In doing so, the theory of regulatory capture is 
                                                          
1 
Graham Smith, ‗Every Complaint Matters: Human Rights Commissioner‘s Opinion concerning 
Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints against the Police‘ (2010) 32 Int‘l JLC Just 59, 59. 
2
 Graham Smith, ‗The Tripartite Police Complaints System of Hong Kong‘ (2015) 15 Asia Pac JHR & L 119, 
119. 
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adopted as a conceptual framework for obtaining insights into the extent to which the 
systems under control of the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are working 
independently.             
II. External Complaints Systems   
This section starts by reflecting on the role of the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC. 
There follows a critical evaluation of these systems to see if there are any specific issues 
that may undermine the capability of the above agencies to deal with police complaints, 
and the extent to which the system overseen by each of them is effective against police 
malpractice. As we examine the Thai external complaints systems, a comparison between 
these systems and the English one will also be drawn in order to broaden our perspective 
on the handling of police complaints. 
Reflection on the Thai Independent Watchdog Bodies in Addressing Police Complaints 
The Thai constitutional framework makes it clear that there is no single authority which 
has responsibility to deal with police complaints exclusively. Moreover, each of the above 
organisations has a jurisdiction extending far beyond the handling of police malpractice. In 
practice this means that the systems adopted for handling complaints are not tailored 
specifically for dealing with such malpractice but rather are generic in nature. Moreover, 
complaints against the police have to jostle for attention with many other kind of complaint. 
Another notable feature of the current ‗system‘ is that these organisations have overlapping 
jurisdictions. Some may argue that the greatest advantage of the existing arrangements is 
that, no doubt, there is a wide variety of choices open for the Thai public to have their 
grievances against the police addressed. In addition to that, some of those who are working 
in these systems also pointed out another benefit of a fragmented system that: 
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From my point of view, this [the fragmentation of the existing system] 
provides the opportunity for the decision the complaints body has made 
to be cross-checked by other bodies. This helps make sure that the 
investigation contains fewer or no mistakes.3  
These arguments seem true as under current circumstances in Thailand the facts show that 
a number of complainants have registered their complaints with more than one watchdog 
body. 4  The downside of the existing arrangements, however is that it brings about a 
duplication of efforts between the complaints bodies to solve similar issues and, all too 
often, such a duplication results in an unnecessary delay.   
In a study by Rukhamate and Thananithichote, one of the directors serving with the 
Ombudsman confirmed that, in recent years, there has been an increasing duplication of 
effort between the Ombudsman and the NHRC in relation to the handling of complaints (a 
sizable proportion of them, police complaints). 5  At the peak of the political unrest in 
Thailand (between 2007 and 2012), for instance, the Ombudsman and the NHRC have 
dealt with many complaints about deaths and serious injuries as a result of riot police 
dispersing protestors. Grounds for such complaints can be viewed as administrative 
wrongdoing as well as human rights violations; hence, it is difficult for these bodies to 
determine from the outset which complaints fall within their remit. The same director then 
elaborated that, to make things clear, the Ombudsman set up a screening committee to 
look into each complaint. But this apparently caused delay, wasted resources and also 
                                                          
3
 Interview with [anonymous], a former NHRC commissioner (Bangkok, Thailand, 26 June 2014). 
4
 See further the discussion of the samples of this research in ch 2. 
5
 Pharkphoom Rukhamate and Satithorn Thananithichote, ‗The Ombudsman‘ in Satithorn Thananithichote 
(ed), Constitutional Organisations: Foundation Knowledge and Lessons for Reforms (KPI 2015) 84 [in 
Thai]. 
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undermined a certain level of public confidence in the system as some complainants 
perceived the Ombudsman to have abdicated its own responsibility.6  
The current chair of the Ombudsman has observed that whilst there might be some overlap 
between the work of the Ombudsman and the NHRC they do not duplicate one another, 
and in fact work in harmony with one another. He did acknowledge, however, that the 
responsibility of the Ombudsman in some ways duplicates that of the NACC.7  
The Ombudsman and the NACC have the power to deal with wrongdoing in the domain of 
law and administration alike. All of this indicates that the duplication of effort between the 
complaints bodies is one of the significant issues of the existing constitutional 
arrangements which need to be dealt with in the current study. 
Critical Evaluation of the Thai Independent Complaints Bodies 
The Office of the Ombudsman 
In 2013, the Thai Ombudsman highlighted in its annual report that 2,897 out of 3,420 
complaints received (84.71%) had been substantiated in that year. 8  The overall 
substantiation rate seems to suggest that the Ombudsman system is effective. When it 
comes to police complaints alone, however, the statistics revealed the following:9 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 ibid. 
7
 ‗The Ombudsman Opposed the Amalgamation with the NHRC‘ Prachatai (Bangkok, 17 April 2015) 
<http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2015/04/58872> accessed 20 May 2015 [in Thai].  
8
 Office of the Ombudsman, ‗Annual Report 2013‘ (Thai Ombudsman 2013) 52 [in Thai].  
9
 Email from the Office of the Ombudsman concerning ‗Police Complaints Statistics‘ to the author (20 June 
2015). Note that ‗complaints referred to the NACC‘ means any cases that the Ombudsman tentatively 
received but subsequently determined as within the purview of the NACC and therefore decided not to 
record them but handed them over to the NACC instead.     
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Table 4.1: Police complaints registered with the Thai Ombudsman 
 
 
During the given period, the rates for recording of complaints appear encouraging whereas 
the rates for substantiation of complaints are anything but. Two questions are prompted. 
First, what does a low rate of substantiation suggest about the effectiveness of the Thai 
Ombudsman system in relation to the handling of police complaints? Linked to this is how 
far can the public place their trust in the Thai Ombudsman when addressing complaints 
against the police? To answer these questions, we therefore need to look in-depth into the 
whole system.      
(a) Access to the Ombudsman Complaints System 
Under the Ombudsman system, paragraph 1, section 23 of the Organic Act on 
Ombudsmen 2009 specifies that:  
Any person, group of persons and community shall have the right to 
make a complaint to the Ombudsmen in accordance with the provisions 
of this Organic [Ombudsman] Act.10   
                                                          
10
 This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗Ombudsman Act‘. The Ombudsman Act was translated by 
the Office of the Ombudsman. 
Year 
Recorded 
complaints 
 
Unrecorded 
complaints 
 
Substantiated 
complaints 
Unsubstantiated 
complaints 
Complaints 
referred to the 
NACC 
2013 122 15 5 117 1 
2012 135 11 7 128 5 
2011 110 11 18 92 0 
2010 108 4 17 91 0 
2009 110 11 9 101 0 
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As shown in the above provision, the Ombudsman system is widely accessible to 
everyone irrespective of whether or not those who seek to make a complaint have any 
connection with the alleged incident of malpractice. To put it in the context of police 
complaints, this, therefore, suggests that the complainant can be anyone ranging from a 
direct victim of malpractice, a witness or even a person who has no connection with the 
alleged incident of malpractice but is aware of such an incident. Interestingly, the [local] 
community is also allowed to play a part in making complaints. By comparison, under the 
English complaints system, section 12 paragraph 1(d) of the Police Reform Act (PRA) 
2002 circumscribes the scope of ‗complaints‘ to include:11   
(1) …any complaint about the conduct of a person serving with the 
police which is made (whether in writing or otherwise) by— 
(d)   a person acting on behalf of a person falling within any of 
paragraphs (a) to (c) [(a)the person in relation to whom the conduct 
took place; (b) the person claiming to have been adversely affected 
by the conduct; and (c) the person who have witnessed the 
conduct].  
Similar to the system under control of the Thai Ombudsman, complaining by proxy is also 
allowed in the English system.  
One of the ombudsmen interviewed for this research made the following claim in relation 
to the accessibility of the Ombudsman: 
Our complaints mechanism is accessible more easily compared to the 
other two organisations [the NHRC and the NACC],…12 
                                                          
11
 This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ―PRA‖. 
12
 Interview with [anonymous], the ombudsman (Bangkok, Thailand, 23 June 2014).  
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Putting the NHRC and the NACC to one side for now, the claim that the Thai 
Ombudsman‘s system is easily accessible is supported by the survey of the performance of 
the Thai Ombudsman which illustrated that 64.55 per cent of respondents were satisfied 
with the way in which complaints can be registered.13 According to paragraph 1, section 
24 of the Ombudsman Act, ―a complaint can be made verbally, in writing or by other 
means‖.14 The following pie chart demonstrates a wide range of channels available for the 
public to file their complaints with the Ombudsman system:15  
Chart 4.1: Gateways to the Ombudsman system in 2013 
 
In England and Wales, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) points out 
to putative complainants that:   
The best way to make a complaint is to contact the police force involved. 
Police force websites include information about how to complain or you 
can visit any police station. You can complain to any force by using the 
                                                          
13
 Somjate Waiyakarn, The Survey of Complainants’ Satisfaction towards the Service of the Office of the 
Ombudsman in relation to the Handling of Complaints (as cited in Pharkphoom Rukhamate and Satithorn 
Thananithichote, ‗The Ombudsman‘ in Satithorn Thananithichote (ed), Constitutional Organisations: 
Foundation Knowledge and Lessons for Reforms (KPI 2015) 94) [in Thai]. 
14
 Ombudsman Act (n 10) s 24 para 1. 
15
 ‗Ombudsman Report‘ (n 8) 58. 
Postal service: 2,129 
cases 
Online service: 
576 cases 
Headquarters: 
564 cases 
Call Centre:  
107 cases 
Network of the 
Ombudsman: 
20 cases 
Facsimile: 
16 cases 
MPs or Senators: 
8 cases 
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online form on the IPCC website. Forms are also available to download, 
complete and email or to print off, complete by hand and post to the 
relevant police force.16 
You can, of course, use the IPCC‘s online complaint form. But please 
note that if you complete our form it is automatically sent to the relevant 
police force and we will not log the details.17 
It can be seen that, in effect, the handling of police complaints in England and Wales is a 
shared responsibility where the police have a crucial role at the initial stage not least the 
process of recording of complaints. 18  A fundamental difference between access to the 
complaints systems operated by the Thai Ombudsman and that by the IPCC in England 
and Wales is thus that the Ombudsman has the remit to handle complaints right from the 
start whilst the IPCC does not.  
Under the Ombudsman system, an inquiry into malpractice may be conducted without a 
complaint. Subject to paragraph 2, section 13 of the Ombudsman Act, it is specified that: 
In exercising of powers and duties …, the Ombudsmen shall proceed 
where there is a complaint thereon, provided that the Ombudsmen is 
of opinion that such act causes injuries to the public or it is necessary 
to protect public interests and, in such case, the Ombudsmen may 
consider and conduct and inquiry irrespective of a complaint. 
The fact that the Ombudsman is capable of handling malpractice on its own initiative is to 
the advantage of the Thai public as a whole since the Ombudsman can intervene in the 
                                                          
16
 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗A Guide to the Police Complaints System‘ (IPCC 2013).  
17
 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Complaints‘ (IPCC) <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/complaints> 
accessed 10 March 2015. 
18
 Recording of complaints is the process whereby a complaint is given an official status and will be dealt 
with. 
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situation where malpractice has reportedly been perpetrated without having their hands tied 
by regulations. In contrast, the IPCC does not hold any power to investigate misconduct on 
its own initiative as the Commission explained that: 
Under the existing complaints and conduct system a matter (whether a 
complaint, a conduct matter or a death or serious injury) must first be 
recorded before the IPCC can commence an investigation. This means in 
the majority of cases the IPCC cannot begin to act until a [local] police 
force has taken the first step. The IPCC has an existing power to direct 
that a conduct matter be recorded by the force. However, that still 
requires a force to be identified and for them to assess the matters, 
complete necessary paperwork and then formally refer the matter back to 
the IPCC…19 
Thus, the IPCC has to rely on the police whom it oversees to begin the process of 
investigation;20 this demonstrates how influential the role of the police is in the English 
complaints system.      
(b) Complaints Procedures 
Once a complaint has formally been recorded, the Ombudsman needs to proceed with an 
inquiry. In this regard:21 
The Ombudsmen shall, upon the complaint under this Organic Act, finish 
its consideration without delay and shall enable the complainant, 
government official, official or employee of related government agency, 
State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation to give a 
                                                          
19
 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Improving Police Integrity: Reforming the Police 
Complaints and Disciplinary Systems‘ (IPCC 2015) para 156. 
20
 ibid paras 157-158. 
21
 Ombudsman Act (n 10) s 31 para 1. Note that the Ombudsman may not record a complaint, if it is of 
opinion that the complaint is concerned with corruption charges or the matter that is being heard in court, for 
instance. For further detail, see ss 28, 29 of the Ombudsman Act.  
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statement and present evidence in relation to their statement as 
appropriate.  
In the course of an inquiry, the Ombudsman inquiry officer has the following powers when 
establishing the facts:22  
(1) to request a government agency, State agency, State enterprise or 
local government organisation to give, in writing, a statement of fact or 
opinion  concerning its performance or to submit any related object, 
document, proof or evidence for consideration; 
 (2) to request the superior or officer of the agency under (1), public 
prosecutor, inquiry official or any person to give a statement of fact in 
writing or orally or to submit any related object, document, proof or 
evidence for consideration; 
To lend some weight to the Ombudsman‘s request, punitive measures are provided for as 
follows:23 
Whoever violates or fails to comply with section 15 (2) shall be liable to 
imprisonment for a term of not exceeding six months or to a fine of not 
exceeding ten thousand Baht or to both. 
Mr. Wongsarayangkun – the current chair of the Thai Ombudsman has claimed to have led 
the way in changing the authority‘s approach to the handling of complaints.24 Prior to the 
changes, complainants would rarely have the opportunity to be aware of any justification 
provided in an account by the officers involved. Complainants are now told what 
justification the officers involved have given which will allow them the opportunity to 
                                                          
22
 ibid s 15(1), (2). 
23
 ibid s 45. 
24
 Office of the Ombudsman, ‗12 Years on: Thai Ombudsman‘ (Thai Ombudsman 2013) 51 [in Thai]. Note 
that Mr. Sriracha Wongsarayangkun has been appointed as the chair of the Ombudsman in 2015 after having 
served as one of the ombudsmen since 2010.  
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challenge it. He explained further that in terms of police complaints, what the Thai 
Ombudsman usually does following the recording of complaints is that the alleged officer 
would be required to provide a detailed account of the incidents of alleged malpractice. 
The chair of the Thai Ombudsman stressed that repeated attempts may be made in some 
cases to maximise the opportunity for complainants to prove all the points that they regard 
as crucial.25 In addition to that, a number of complainants indicated that one of the merits 
of the Ombudsman system is the promptness of the handling of complaints: 
I decided to use the online application service [to register a complaint 
with the Ombudsman]. To be honest, I‘ve done that even though I have 
no confidence that they [the Ombudsman] will respond to me. 
Unexpectedly, I got a reply email within a week saying that one of the 
officers at the Ombudsman will take me to the police station where the 
officer complained against is serving in order to inquire about the alleged 
misconduct. He [the Ombudsman‘s officer] did what he said. After that, 
it took only a month or so for my complaints to have finally been 
resolved.26 
I first raised the issue with one of the senators. He contacted the 
Ombudsman and advised me to register a complaint. Then, I got a call 
from the officer there [the Ombudsman] seven days after the submission 
of a complaint. I would say that even though I haven‘t got what I wanted, 
my view is that the Ombudsman responded and addressed my complaint 
very promptly and I totally understand that it is not within its remit to 
deal with all the issues I face up to.27 
                                                          
25
 ibid. 
26
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant D (Bangkok, Thailand, 8 July 2014). 
27
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant E (Bangkok, Thailand, 17 July 2014). Note that s 26 of the 
Ombudsman Act allows MPs or senators to complain on behalf of the injured party. 
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During my interview with one of the ombudsmen, the agreed time frame for the handling 
of complaints was commented upon as distinguishing the Thai Ombudsman system from 
other complaints systems in Thailand:  
We‘ve set out our goal to complete each inquiry within six months and, 
at all events, it should not exceed a maximum of twelve months ,…28 
Consistent with the above claim, the following pie chart illustrates the complaints that have 
been dealt with and completed within different time frames in 2013:29  
   Chart 4.2: Completion of complaints in different time frames 
 
The above chart shows that two thirds of the complaints were successfully resolved within 
six months. The success in completing a sizable proportion of inquiries within a reasonable 
time-scale is apparently one of the main selling points of the Ombudsman system. This 
gives the general public the impression that the Ombudsman as a complaints authority is 
attentive to resolving complaints. 
 
                                                          
28
 Interview with the ombudsman (n 12). 
29
 ‗Ombudsman Report‘ (n 8) 63. 
158 cases: 
5.457% 
640 cases: 
22.09% 
585 cases: 
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388 cases: 
13.40% 
1,126 cases: 
38.87% 
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At the end of an inquiry, the enabling law of the Ombudsman prescribes that it:30 
[S]hall prepare and submit the report summarising the facts together with 
its giving opinion and recommendation… to the related government 
agency, State agency, State enterprise or local government organisation 
for information or implementation. 
In cases where the police fail, within a reasonable period of time, to endorse the 
recommendations proposed to it by the Ombudsman, further steps may be taken as 
follows:31 
[T]he Ombudsmen shall inform the Prime Minister, Minister or the 
person controlling or supervising such government agency, State agency, 
State enterprise or local government organisation so as to have necessary 
order thereon and to report their implementation to the Ombudsmen 
forthwith. 
If the prime minister as the superior of the RTP fails to give any response but the 
Ombudsman takes the view that it is in the public interest that its proposed 
recommendations be endorsed:32  
[T]he Ombudsman shall urgently submit the inquiry report to the Council 
of Ministers, the House of Representatives and the Senate.  
Such report shall be disclosed to the public in accordance with the 
procedure as determined by the President of the Ombudsmen. 
It should be noted that if the Ombudsman inquiry report indicates a criminal or a 
disciplinary offence may have been committed:33 
                                                          
30
 Ombudsman Act (n 10) s 32 para 1. 
31
 ibid s 33 para 1. 
32
 ibid s 33 paras 2, 4. 
33
 ibid s 34 para 1. 
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[T]he Ombudsman shall inform the agency having the power to 
investigate such matter and the superior of a government official, official 
or employee of related government agency, State agency, State enterprise 
or local government organisation for information and further legal 
proceedings. 
In the context of police complaints, this means that the Ombudsman is capable of 
instructing the police to conduct an investigation. 34  Leaving aside complaints about 
misconduct, the Thai Ombudsman, as noted above, is also authorised to deal with a breach 
of professional ethics; in that event, the handling of ethical issues goes through the same 
procedures as the handling of complaints (see the example case in the next sub-section). 35 
Clearly the Ombudsman has numerous powers but the question arises as to whether they 
are used in practice so as to resolve complaints effectively. This will be answered in the 
following sub-section.          
(c) Critical Evaluation of the Ombudsman Complaints System 
As described earlier, the handling of complaints under the Ombudsman system is relatively 
expeditious and also offers the complainants a degree of flexibility. For instance, in some 
cases, the complainants might be invited by the Ombudsman officers to participate in one 
or more rounds of talks with the alleged officer in order to seek solutions (see text 
accompanying note 26). This approach, of course, proves to be useful, at least, in certain 
aspects of complaints-handling.    
Whilst some complainants may enjoy the flexibility of the Ombudsman complaints 
procedures, others feel differently. It is arguable that a flexible process can also leave the 
                                                          
34
 Peter Leyland, ‗The Ombudsman Principle in Thailand‘ (2007) 2 JCL 137, 144. 
35
 Ombudsman Act (n 10) s 38. If there is a complaint that a State official violates or fails to comply with the 
ethical standard under the code of ethics, the Ombudsmen shall submit such matter to the person responsible 
for the enforcement of the code of ethics to make enforcement thereof. 
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authority room not to make progress at times. Some complainants interviewed for this 
research aired their grievances that the Ombudsman was lukewarm about their complaints 
and made no progress subsequent to the recording of complaints. One of the complainants 
claimed that: 
The Ombudsman has never asked me anything about my complaints. I‘ve 
never been informed about anything until the investigation of my 
complaints was concluded. And it turned out that they [the Ombudsman 
officers] referred to the police report as the evidence against my 
complaints. I think this is unacceptable.36  
The evidence from my interview material suggests that the progress of the Ombudsman 
inquiry into complaints about serious malpractice tends to be held back. In an interview 
with a human rights lawyer, the role of the Ombudsman was critiqued as follows: 
[The Ombudsman is] really inactive. The key reason is the Ombudsman 
only requires the appropriate authority to clarify the incidents relevant to 
the complaints, that‘s it. I can say that the Ombudsman has not any 
concrete achievement, particularly in relation to the handling of police 
complaints.37 
During an interview with a former senator, the following comments suggest that the 
Ombudsman, as a complaints authority, needs to do much more to become proactive: 
Look, I used to ask one of the former chairs of the Ombudsman some 
years ago about the work they have done. The ombudsman said to me 
that it [the system] worked really well because all the complaints 
registered had been dealt with 100 per cent as they were transferred to 
the appropriate authority for further action. I was stunned by the answer 
because I don‘t think we need the Ombudsman to become a postbox, do 
                                                          
36
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant A (Bangkok, Thailand, 25 June 2014). 
37
 Interview with [anonymous], a human rights lawyer (Bangkok, Thailand, 15 July 2014). 
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we? We don‘t need them to send the letters and hand the complaints over 
to someone else but we need them to act and to solve the problems with 
regards to those complaints.38    
In other interviews for this research, skeptical views on the role of the Ombudsman fairly 
similar to the above ones were echoed by a social researcher and a former deputy police 
commissioner. The comments are shown as follows: 
From a cost-benefit dimension, I think the Ombudsman failed to prove 
that their roles in the handling of complaints can be as much 
advantageous to Thai society as ordinary members of the public want 
them to be, even though I believe that the sitting ombudsmen are decent 
people.39        
In my view, the Ombudsman is weaker than a ‗paper tiger‘. They don‘t 
dare to compel the officers involved to attend an interview, for example. 
Therefore, this organisation is ineffective and only serves as a postbox.40 
In a group interview with police officers, even though none of the officers unreservedly 
criticised the Ombudsman complaints system, the following comments suggest that the 
police also share the view that the Ombudsman is not proactive: 
The role of the Ombudsman is pretty diminished. Let me give you an 
example, they‘ve never conducted a field investigation [in our force 
area]. Instead, they simply request the submission of a written 
statement explaining as to what went wrong.41  
                                                          
38
 Interview with [anonymous], a former senator (Bangkok, Thailand, 14 July 2014). 
39
 Interview with [anonymous], a social researcher (Bangkok, Thailand, 8 July 2014). 
40
 Interview with [anonymous], a former Deputy Commissioner (Provincial Police Region) (Bangkok, 
Thailand, 24 June 2014). 
41
 Interview with [anonymous], a group of police officers (Thailand, 13 June 2014). 
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The above interviews consistently confirmed the Ombudsman‘s lack of interest in pursuing 
a rigorous inquiry.42 In reaction to all the criticisms made in relation to the approach to 
investigation the Thai Ombudsman implements, the ombudsman interviewed for this 
research pointed out the following: 
I know people consider the Institute of the Ombudsman as a ―postman‖ 
who sends a written warning to relevant departments without any real 
power to administer punishment for the wrongdoer. Nonetheless, I insist 
that we have the power to exact cooperation from the police. For instance, 
we‘re able to compel any officer to come in for interview as when it 
comes to an inquiry, we have powers conferred to us by the Penal Code. 
In the past, whenever I require the police to give me documentary proof, 
no one dared to refuse to comply with the instructions.43   
Interviewing is indispensable in the fact-finding process alongside an evaluation of 
documentary proof. An investigative interview enables the investigating officer to compare 
oral accounts with written accounts and spot inaccuracies and inconsistencies amongst the 
facts given by both kinds of statements; once the investigating officer detects significant 
discrepancies between them, he will therefore be able to dig deeper into the matter. 
However, the ombudsman interviewed for this research failed to provide any justification 
as to why the Ombudsman does not adopt a coordinated approach of checking the veracity 
of written accounts as well as requiring the alleged officer to come in for interview. In 
referring back to all the interview comments above, it can be pointed out that the 
undermining of the inquiry progress, in effect, comes down to the fact that the 
Ombudsman prefers the analysis of documentary evidence and ‗less formal negotiations 
                                                          
42
 Rukhamate and Thananithichote(n 5) 94.  
43
 Interview with the ombudsman (n 12).  
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and consultations‘44 as the approach to the handling of complaints (see also the following 
paragraphs). Arguably, this merely produces a weak inquiry.  
In an interview with a former senator, the work attitude promoted within the Thai 
Ombudsman was raised as another serious issue: 
The effectiveness of the [Ombudsman] complaints system depends 
very much upon the attitude of the ombudsmen as well. The question 
is what is the ultimate objective that they aim to achieve in the 
handling of complaints?45 
Mr.Prawit Ratanapian – a former ombudsman – proudly suggested while he was still in 
office that if the Thai Ombudsman was to become successful in addressing complaints, it 
needed to adopt the approach that: 
[C]omes up with a peaceful solution where ‗no one will lose or win, 
nobody will lose face‘ when they turn to the Ombudsman.46 
This notion of aiming for a ‗win-win‘ solution approach has since been accepted and is 
now one of the organisational values in the Thai Ombudsman. 47  A win-win solution 
approach may work well with certain types of conflicts. Indeed, it may well be that a win-
win, restorative justice style approach may be a proportionate and appropriate way of 
handling minor complaints against the police. 48  Such an approach is not, however, 
appropriate for the handling of more serious police complaints (ie, of the type that the 
Ombudsman tends to receive) because, in most cases, there is suffering involved and a 
clear right and wrong to be determined. Above all, the business of the Ombudsman as a 
                                                          
44
 Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1984) 199. 
45
 Interview with a former senator (n 38). 
46
 ‗12 Years on‘ (n 24) 55. 
47
 Unchalita Suvarnajata, ‗The Role of the Office of Ombudsman in Dispute Resolution in Thailand‘ (MA 
Thesis, Mahidol University 2007) 161 [in Thai]. 
48
 Graham Smith (n 1) 70. 
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complaints authority is to establish the facts about the alleged misconduct and not become 
distracted by the desire to protect anyone‘s image.  
The Thai Ombudsman‘s win-win solution approach appears to diverge markedly from the 
prevailing norm followed by the ombudsman institutions in many other parts of the 
world.49 The implementation of such an approach suggests that the Ombudsman lacks the 
will to use its powers to require police cooperation, not least in relation to an investigative 
interview. This arguably undermines the effectiveness of the Ombudsman‘s own inquiry 
and is responsible for the low substantiation rate of police complaints.50 Even though the 
ombudsman interviewed for this research aired disagreement with the pursuit of a win-win 
solution approach, the investigative inertia produced by the aforesaid approach remains 
one of the severe shortcomings in the Ombudsman system. Comparatively, the approach 
taken by the Ombudsman contradicts sharply with the one that the IPCC implements. The 
IPCC police witness policy shows that the Commission lays emphasis on an interview as 
the key fact-finding mechanism. The IPCC has the remit to require the officer involved or 
even any other officers that the IPCC deems appropriate to be interviewed to come 
forward.51  
Moving on to the power to enforce disciplinary measures against the officers at fault, some 
people reason that the Thai Ombudsman should work in a way that does not make any 
                                                          
49
 Nick O‘Brien, ‗Ombudsmen and Social Rights Adjudication‘ (2009) P. L. 466, 468-469.  
50
 The Ombudsman is apparently capable of compelling police cooperation as criminal proceedings may be 
brought against the officers concerned or the appropriate authority in case they do not accommodate the 
Ombudsman‘s request. See text accompanying n 23.   
51
 Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012, s 19(7). 
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enemy; thus, it should not be given the power to punish anyone.52 This notion is seriously 
flawed; the reason for this is given in the discussion below.  
The complaint made against Police Lieutenant General Kamronwit Thoopkrachang – the 
then Metropolitan Police Commander – about a breach of police ethics provides a high 
profile example of the ineffectiveness of the Thai Ombudsman in dealing with alleged 
police misconduct.53 In this case, the former commander paid a visit to Hong Kong to have 
Thaksin Shinnawatra – a former Prime Minister of Thailand who absconded and is now 
living in exile following his conviction for a corrupt land deal54 – attach his police insignia 
as a way to show his personal respect for Thaksin (see figure 5).55  
Subject to regulation 12 (6) of the Police 
Regulations on Code of Ethics 2008: 
[The police] have to lead their 
personal lives in the way that does 
not blemish their position in office… 
In this case, the Ombudsman found that 
Thoopkrachang had breached police ethics 
because he, as a guardian of law, had 
displayed a strong affinity for an absconded 
offender and paid a visit to that offender which apparently undermined the professional 
                                                          
52
 Chalat Chongseubphun, Somjate Waiyakarn and Padetkarn Duangtoh, ‗Status, Structure and 
Administration of Constitutional Organization: A Case Study of the Office of the Ombudsman‘ (KPI 2551) 
109 [in Thai]. 
53
 ‗Explanation Sought on Senior Police Officer‘s Meet with Fugitive Ex-PM Thaksin‘ MCOT.NET 
(Bangkok, 16 July 2013) <http://www.mcot.net/site/content?id=51e4a3dd150ba04f0600011c> accessed 5 
April 2015. 
54
 Ian MacKinnon, ‗Former Thai PM Thaksin Found Guilty of Corruption‘ The Guardian (London, 21 
October 2008) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/21/thaksin-thailand-corruption> accessed 5 
April 2015.  
55
 ‗Explanation sought on senior police officer‘s meet with fugitive ex-PM Thaksin‘ (n 53). 
Figure 5: Pol. Lt. Gen. Kamronwit 
Thoopkrachang and the former Prime 
Minister of Thailand - Thaksin Shinnawatra. 
Source: www.posttoday.com  
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integrity of the police and eroded public confidence in the criminal justice system as a 
whole.56 However, the Thai Ombudsman could not do anything more but refer the case to 
the RTP and the NACC for further disciplinary and criminal investigation according to 
section 34 of the Ombudsman Act.57 The incapability of the Thai Ombudsman, upon the 
completion of its inquiry, to commence disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings against 
the then commander reflects that its complaints system cannot ensure that complaints 
would be addressed effectively. The survey of the performance of the Thai Ombudsman 
highlighted at the beginning of this section indicated that only 43.20 per cent of 
respondents felt satisfied with the action taken subsequent to the inquiry of the 
Ombudsman.58 The impression given is that the Thai Ombudsman is unable to finish the 
job properly.  
Under the English system, by comparison, paragraph 27(3)(za) and (4)(a), (b), schedule 3 
of the PRA specifies that:  
27(3) the Commission may make a recommendation to the appropriate 
authority in respect of any person serving with the police – 
 (za) that the person has a case to answer in respect of misconduct 
or gross misconduct or has no case to answer in relation to his conduct 
to which the investigation related; 
27(4) If, after the Commission has made a recommendation under this 
paragraph, the appropriate authority does not take steps to secure that 
full effect is given to the recommendation—              
 (a) the Commission [IPCC] may direct the appropriate authority to 
take steps for that purpose; and     
                                                          
56
 ‗Ombudsman Report‘ (n 8) 131. 
57
 See also text accompanying n 33. As yet, no further progress in this case has been reported by the relevant 
bodies or in the media. See also, the statutory functions of the Ombudsman in ch 1. 
58
 Waiyakarn (n 13) 94. 
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 (b) it shall be the duty of the appropriate authority to comply with 
the direction. 
Clearly, the enabling legislation of the IPCC grants the Commission the power to compel 
the police to implement its recommendations, whilst the Thai law does not confer that 
same power on the Ombudsman (see chapter 5).59  
Considering how the Thai Ombudsman system was designed, some may argue that it is 
already fit for purpose. The evidence presented throughout this section underlines, 
however, that the approach implemented by the Ombudsman fails to address the problems 
underlying police complaints. In particular, the lack of any thorough inquiry, the low 
substantiation rate, and the inability to enforce its recommendations all suggest that it can 
play little part in deterring police misconduct.  
The National Human Rights Commission 
Many instances of police misconduct are closely connected with human rights violations; 
thus, the NHRC is inevitably at the forefront of the handling of police complaints. When it 
comes to the handling of complaints under the NHRC system, the statistics on police 
complaints in a five-year period demonstrate the following:60    
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59
 See text accompanying nn 30-32. 
60
 Email from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) concerning ‗Police Complaints Statistics‘ to 
the author (15 June 2015). ‗Unrecorded Complaints‘ refer to cases that are the ongoing matters in court and 
cases that are outside of the NHRC jurisdiction; ‗Referred Cases‘ include cases that are referred to the 
NACC, the PACC, or the cabinet minister and the Internal Security Operations Command for further 
investigation; and ‗Pending Cases‘ represent cases that have still been unresolved.  
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Table 4.2: Complaints registered with the NHRC 
 
The statistical data seems to suggest that the NHRC is capable of dealing with police 
complaints; at least, the Commission was able to secure higher substantiation rates 
compared to that of the Ombudsman during the same space of time (see Table 4.1). This 
begs the question to what extent does the data under review indicate the true capability of 
the NHRC when dealing with police complaints? Just how far can complainants put their 
trust in the NHRC system? To provide answers to these questions, we will start by 
exploring the accessibility of the NHRC complaints system and its complaints procedures. 
(a) Access to the NHRC Complaints System  
The enabling legislation of the NHRC sets out that the NHRC system is widely accessible 
to ‗any person whose human rights are violated‘.61 In its annual report, the NHRC also 
explained that ‗any person‘ shall include:62 
                                                          
61
 National Human Rights Commission Act 1999, s 23 para 1. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the 
‗NHRC Act‘. The NHRC Act was translated by the NHRC. 
62
 National Human Rights Commission, Reports on the Appraisal of Human Rights Situations in Thailand 
and on the Performance of NHRC 2012 (NHRC 2013) 120 [in Thai]. 
 
Complaints statuses/ years 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Unrecorded complaints 24 32 14 31 21 
Recorded complaints 62 56 59 52 68 
Withdrawn complaints 4 4 4 0 9 
Unsubstantiated complaints 37 30 35 16 15 
Substantiated complaints 20 19 16 24 33 
Complaints referred to the 
NACC 
1 1 1 4 2 
Pending cases 0 2 3 8 9 
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I. a person whose rights have been violated; 
II. a representative of the above person; and 
III. a witness of human rights abuse. 
 
Channels for filing complaints to the NHRC complaints system are demonstrated in 
paragraph 2, section 23 of the NHRC Act as follows:  
The petition [complaint] shall be submitted at the office of the National 
Human Rights Commission or by registered post with return receipt or to 
any member or via a private organization in the field of human rights to 
be referred to the Office of the National Human Rights Commission or 
by any other means as prescribed by the Commission.  
Regardless of an individual complainant, the NHRC also accepts the capacity of private 
agencies to associate themselves with human rights protection and allows them to 
represent a victim of human rights abuse. In this respect, paragraph 1, section 24 of the 
NHRC Act stipulates as follows: 
In the case where a petition [complaint]… is lodged with a private 
organisation…, if that organisation considers the case to be prima 
facie, it may propose the matter to the Commission for further 
proceedings.  
It is to be welcomed that the NHRC recognises the importance of the role of private 
agencies in safeguarding and promoting human rights. The agencies like human rights 
protection foundations can help the NHRC monitoring human rights situations in local 
areas. Their role as go-between is advantageous particularly to those who are 
underprivileged because the victims of human rights abuses are usually in a vulnerable 
position and less able to make complaints by themselves. The regulatory approval for a 
private agency to play its part in the handling of complaints distinctly differentiates the 
NHRC from the rest of the systems in Thailand.  
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The following pie chart shows the numbers of people having used each available channel 
for making complaints with the NHRC in 2012:63 
                                      Chart 4.3: Gateway to the NHRC system 
 
Leaving aside a complaints-based inquiry, the Commission also has the authority to deal 
with human rights abuse cases on its own initiative. This is specified in paragraph 1, 
section 25 of the NHRC Act as follows: 
In the case where the Commission deems it appropriate to examine any 
case of a human rights violation…, the Commission shall notify a person 
or agency alleged to be a human right violator or a person or agency 
whom the Commission considers to be involved in human rights 
violation to give a responded statement of facts within the period 
specified by the Commission. 
Arguably, it is the right approach that the NHRC is empowered to intervene whenever 
human rights abuses have been brought to its notice by whistle-blowers, media coverage 
etc. In 2012, for example, the Commission initiated an inquiry into six alleged misconduct 
incidents without complaints.64 This power enables the Commission to be proactive in 
                                                          
63
 ibid 124. 
64
 ibid.  
written complaints 
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verbal complaints 
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Complaints by fax 
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Complaints by 
a telephone call 
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Complaints by email 
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Complaints via other 
agencies 
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Human rights abuse 
cases intervened by 
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tackling human rights issues and be in touch with the real situation of human rights 
violations in Thailand.   
(b) Complaints Procedures 
Under the NHRC system, an inquiry is launched once a complaint has officially been 
recorded. In that case, the NHRC has the following powers to make sure that all the 
necessary evidence is in hand for the uncovering of the truth:65 
(1) [the NHRC can] summon a Government agency, State agency, or State 
enterprise to give written statements of facts or opinions concerning the 
performance of official duty or other duties or to deliver objects, documents, 
or other related evidence or to send a representative to give statements.   
(2) [the NHRC can] summon a person, juristic person, or private agency 
concerned to give statements or to deliver objects, documents, or other related 
evidence at the date, time and place specified. 
Under the system of the NHRC, mediation was also introduced as an alternative to a 
formal inquiry; this is prescribed in paragraph 1, section 27 of the NHRC Act as follows:      
[T]he Commission shall, if it deems mediation is possible, mediate 
between persons or agencies involved to reach an agreement for 
compromise and solution of the problem of human rights violation. If the 
parties agree to compromise and solve the problem and the Commission 
considers the agreement is within the scope of human rights protection, 
the Commission shall prepare a written agreement for the parties and 
settle the matter.      
The NHRC complaints system formally incorporates within it the principle of restorative 
justice – a process that manages a person-to-person communication within a controlled 
environment to let the victim clarify the impact of the crime and to let the offender makes 
                                                          
65
 NHRC Act (61) s 32 (1), (2). 
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amends to the victim for what had happened.66 This formal use of the process of mediation 
makes the NHRC system distinct from those operated by the Ombudsman and the 
NACC;67 arguably, one may see this process as the strength of the NHRC complaints 
system.          
The English complaints system similarly provides an option for the complainant to have 
their grievances addressed by means of mediation via the so called ‗local resolution‘ – a 
flexible process which aims to meet the needs of the complainant without resorting to a 
formal investigation into a complaint.68 It should be noted that neither mediation nor local 
resolution are compulsory but rather are entered into voluntarily (see further in chapter 6). 
In the case of Thailand, if the parties in conflict do not agree to mediate, the NHRC must 
proceed with a formal process of handling complaints. 
At the end of the inquiry:69 
If the Commission is, …, of the opinion that there is a commission or 
omission of acts which violate human rights, the Commission shall 
prepare a report of the examination which shall specify details of the 
                                                          
66
 Restorative Justice Council, ‗What is ‗Restorative Justice‘ (RJC) 
<http://www.restorativejustice.org.uk/what_is_restorative_justice/> accessed 10 December 2014.  
67
 As noted above, there is no mediation process under the Ombudsman system but the Ombudsman usually 
adopts the less formal negotiation approach, the so called ‗win-win solutions‘ when dealing with complaints. 
See also, the discussion about the NACC system below. 
68
 In this regard, para 6(2) and (7), sch 3 of the PRA prescribe that:     
  
6(2) Subject to paragraph 7, the appropriate authority shall determine whether or not the 
complaint is suitable for being subjected to local resolution, and—  
 (a) if it determines that it is so suitable and the complainant consents, it shall make 
arrangements for it to be so subjected; and 
 (b) in any other case, it shall make arrangements for the complaint to be 
investigated by that authority on its own behalf. 
 
 (7)  A consent given for the purposes of this paragraph shall not be capable of being 
withdrawn at any time after the procedure for the local resolution of the complaint has 
been begun.  
 
See also, Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Statutory Guidance to the Police Service on the 
Handling of Complaints‘ (IPCC 2015) 31. 
69
 NHRC Act (n 61) s 28 para 1. 
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circumstances of human rights violation, reasons for such opinion and 
remedial measures for solving human rights violation which shall clearly 
set forth the legal duties and methods of performance of a person or 
agency, including the period for implementation of such measures. 
Should the police force area or the RTP fail to implement the NHRC remedial measures:70 
[T]he Commission shall report to the Prime Minister to order an 
implementation of the remedial measures within sixty days as from the 
date the report is received.  
In any case where the Prime Minister also fails to take action to command the police to 
implement the measures:71 
[T]he Commission shall report to the National Assembly for further 
proceeding. In reporting to the National Assembly, if the Commission 
deems it beneficial to the public, the Commission may disseminate to the 
public the case in which no implementation of remedial measures for 
solving the human rights violation has been taken. 
As noted in chapter 1, the enabling law of the NHRC does not provide to it the power to 
discipline the officer found to have acted wrongfully. We saw earlier that this was also true 
of the Ombudsman. This raises the question as to whether or not a lack of power to require 
the police to implement the remedial measures also undermines the effectiveness of the 
NHRC.  
However, according to section 257 (4) of the 2007 constitution, the NHRC is authorised to 
present the case in court on behalf of the complainants. In this regard, another important 
question arises as to how the NHRC power to represent its complainants in court 
                                                          
70
 ibid s 30. 
71
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contributes to the effectiveness of the handling of complaints. All of the questions 
highlighted here will be critically discussed below.  
(c) Critical Evaluation of the NHRC Complaints System 
In NHRC inquiries, the Commission claims to place importance upon an interview 
alongside the examination of documentary proof. A number of the NHRC complainants 
confirm that they were notified to come in for interview after the recording of complaints:  
I was asked to visit the NHRC office for an interview. Not only that, I 
also had the chance to cross-examine a number of officers involved in 
my case.72 
The NHRC officers told me to come in for interview. And, I did have 
an interview once with the NHRC commissioner.73  
Nonetheless, some other complainants report that an interview is not always held to help 
establish the facts: 
I hadn‘t been required to give an interview with the NHRC; as far as I 
understand, the alleged officers too, they had never been summoned for 
any investigative interviews. All I could recall is that I did join the 
seminars on human rights [held by the NHRC] and I raised a number of 
questions about my case but they just broadly responded which didn‘t 
make me understand and you [the interviewer] have to know that in a 
seminar that consists of many complainants, they [the NHRC] were just 
bombarded with questions, but in the end, everybody agreed that all the 
answers given to us [complainants] were pretty vague.74 
The NHRC has done nothing apart from helping our family claiming 
some compensation that we were entitled to from the Ministry of Justice. 
                                                          
72
 Interview with a complainant A (n 36). 
73
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant C (Bangkok, Thailand, 2 July 2014). 
74
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant F (Bangkok, Thailand, 19 July 2014). 
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The Commission asked me to attend a number of seminars on human 
rights but I‘ve never been required to give a formal interview.75  
There are evidently inconsistencies in the way the NHRC seeks the truth as an interview is 
not always adopted as a means to establish the facts. Nonetheless, we can see a marked 
distinction in the approaches adopted by the NHRC and the Thai Ombudsman in the 
inquiry process.           
Turning next to more serious issues of power, even though in theory the NHRC has the 
authority to require the officer involved to present the evidence and/or to attend an 
interview,  the enabling legislation of the NHRC merely prescribes that:76 
Any person who fails to comply with section 32 (2) will receive a prison 
sentence [of] no more than six months or face fines of up to 10,000 Bath 
or both. 
This means the NHRC is only capable of imposing sanctions against a private body or a 
civilian who fails to comply with its instructions (see text accompanying note 65). The 
NHRC, therefore, lacks binding authority to force the officer involved or the government 
agencies concerned to provide full cooperation with its inquiry as, unlike the Ombudsman, 
it does not have the power to impose any punitive measures against the officials who fail to 
conform to its instruction. This has proven to be one of the long-standing issues of the 
NHRC system that often holds back the inquiry progress.  
Take the notorious incident which occurred during the protest against the Trans Thai-
Malaysia Gas Pipeline project. In December 2002, the indigenous peoples of Songkhla 
                                                          
75
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant G (Bangkok, Thailand, 26 July 2014). 
76
 NHRC Act (n 61) s 34. 
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province staged a peaceful protest77 against the above internationally-funded natural gas 
development scheme.78 Following the abortive attempt of the local protestors to submit a 
letter of complaint to the then Prime Minister while he was attending a cabinet meeting 
near the protest site, armed police unlawfully took 12 representatives of NGOs which had 
associated themselves with the protest into custody and dispersed the rest of the protestors 
by beating them aggressively.79 Having been invited by the NHRC for an interview, the 
Chief Police and five other senior officers involved in this violent incident all gave excuses 
(eg, having a meeting) and refused to come forward whilst the NHRC, on its own, could 
do nothing further. 80  The refusal of these officers to be interviewed shows just how 
powerless the NHRC was in a very serious case. Not only that, section 32(1) also leaves 
another glaring loophole in the NHRC system. Considering the phrase ―…send a 
representative to give statements…‖ (see text accompanying note 65), the previous study 
of the NHRC system highlights that, more often than not, instead of assigning those who 
are aware of the issues, the appropriate authority sends a representative who has no 
relevance or full knowledge of the alleged human rights abuse incident for an interview.81 
This apparently undermines the rigour of the inquiry and also creates delay because the 
Commission needs to require more officers to be interviewed to ensure that the accounts 
given to it are relevant and justifiable.   
                                                          
77
Administrative Court (Songkhla Province), Thailand, ruling no. 51/2549 (2006); Supreme Administrative 
Court, Thailand, ruling no. 711/2555 (2012).  
78
 Larry Lohmann, ‗Gas, Waqf and Barclays Capital: A Decade of Resistance in Southern Thailand‘ (2008) 
50 Race and Class 89, 3. 
79
 Friends of the Earth, ‗Barclays, Human Rights and the Trans Thai-Malaysia Gas Pipeline‘ (FOE 2005) 4. 
80
 National Human Rights Commission, ‗The Clarification of the National Human Rights Commission on 
the Violent Incident in relation to the Trans Thai-Malaysian Gas Pipeline Project‘ (NHRC, June 2003) 
<http://www.nhrc.or.th/2012/wb/th/contentpage.php?id=46&menu_id=1> accessed 30 July 2013; see also, 
the National Human Rights Commission, case no.20/2546 (2003) [in Thai]. 
81
 Pirom Sriprasert, ‗The Problems Relating to the Procedures of Investigation of Human Rights Violations 
by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand‘ (LLM Thesis, Thammasat University 2008) 178-
179 [in Thai]. 
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The position taken here is that the lack of power to compel the officers to attend an 
interview is a major hindrance to the NHRC inquiry process. A contrary position was 
taken, however, by the NHRC commissioner interviewed for this research. The 
commissioner said:  
We normally look for cooperation from those officers [who are 
required to be interviewed]. In the past, there might be some cases that 
we found difficult to get cooperation. I accepted that, normally, we 
rarely get cooperation from the police and judges in particular. In case 
of police complaints, for instance, they usually refuse to attend an 
interview with us; if [we] pressed them, they would just put off the 
attendance of interview until they‘re sure that they have everything to 
argue with us; then, they may come in for an interview. However, I 
just need to point out as well that when it comes to the inquiry, we 
[the NHRC inquiry officers] are the law enforcement officials 
according to the criminal penal code, so we are able to pursue criminal 
proceedings against the officers who fail to conform to our 
instructions. But we have never sought to do that.82 
Consistent with the interview, section 33 of the NHRC Act prescribes that: 
In the performance of duties under this Act,…officials appointed by 
the Commission to examine human rights violation shall be [the law 
enforcement] official under the Penal Code. 
The interview comments reflect the reality that the Commission aims to prioritise 
cooperation from the police officers and never wishes to capitalise upon its legal status for 
the benefit of the inquiry, even though the NHRC rarely obtains police cooperation not 
least when dealing with landmark cases.  
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 Interview with [anonymous], the NHRC commissioner (Bangkok, Thailand, 19 June 2014). 
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In addition to the Trans Thai-Malaysia case, the murder of two British citizens on Koh Tao, 
Thailand in 2014 (see chapter 1) indicates how hamstrung the NHRC was when it had to 
deal with the police. 83 Soon after the police began to investigate the murder, the NHRC 
received a complaint from the legal representative of the alleged offenders claiming that 
the confession of his clients was extracted under torture by police investigators; the 
Commission then notified the Office of Police Forensic Science (OPFS), the Provincial 
Police Region 8 and the Metropolitan Police Bureau (MPB), at least four times, to send 
their representatives to come in for an interview but none of those bodies responded to the 
NHRC.84 Even though the police later turned up before the Commission, the commissioner 
interviewed for this research made the following observations: 
As I told you earlier, the officers involved in this case finally turned up 
as they feel confident that they have everything in hand to argue with 
us.85  
Even though the NHRC does not have the power to penalise the officers who refuse to 
cooperate with its inquiry, it can pursue criminal proceedings against those officers; 
however, the facts show that the Commission has failed to adopt that approach. Taken 
together, the earlier interview with the NHRC commissioner and the approach the NHRC 
adopted in dealing with the Koh Tao case seem to suggest that the NHRC lacks the will to 
deploy other available channels to compel police cooperation at times. 
                                                          
83
 Peter Walker, ‗Koh Tao‘s Dark Side: Dangers of Island Where Britons Were Murdered‘ The Guardian 
(23 November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/nov/23/briton-thailand-murder-hannah-
witheridge-david-miller-mystery-mafia-fear> accessed 2 February 2015.  
84
 Paritta Wangkiat and Wassatos Ngamkham, ‗Police refuse to answer 'torture' claim‘ Bangkok Post (4 
November 2014) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/441255/police-refuse-to-answer-torture-
claim> accessed 10 January 2015.  
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 Interview with the NHRC commissioner (n 82). ‗Koh Tao murders defence details torture, intimidation‘ 
Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 25 September 2015) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/crime/707448/koh-tao-
murders-defence-details-torture-intimidation> accessed 10 October 2015. See also, Tom Phillips, ‗Three 
'Attackers' involved in Thai Island Murders, Police Say‘ The Telegraph (14 September 2014) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/11108188/Three-attackers-involved-in-Thai-
island-murders-police-say.html> accessed 10 January 2015.  
 
 
Page 163 of 367 
 
The human rights lawyer interviewed for this research also criticised the NHRC for 
adopting an approach that will lead an inquiry nowhere:  
The process of collecting evidence [by the NHRC] is superficial and 
slow. The NHRC will not get cooperation from the police in most 
circumstances as they would say something like the evidence that the 
NHRC is looking for is classified. So, I‘d say that on some occasions 
the NHRC should consider using formal powers to deal with the 
police.86 
In addition, the following interviews with complainants demonstrated that the NHRC is 
incapable of handling police complaints and is also too subservient to the police:  
They [the NHRC] came to my province and visited the scene of crime 
[where the interviewee‘s son died]. But unlike when the DSI 
[Department of Special Investigation] officers were here, no one [local 
police officers] paid respect to the NHRC commissioners or officers. I 
meant the local officers didn‘t seem to care to give them [the NHRC] 
cooperation. It‘s simple. The NHRC lacks adequate power to take on the 
police. Listen, when the DSI officers did a field investigation, the police 
[at a local force] were extremely cautious and anxious because they knew 
that the DSI is capable of investigating anyone they suspect, the law 
gives them power to do that.87  
I [the interviewee] told you. The NHRC is afraid of the police. I checked 
on the progress of my complaint with one of the senior investigating 
officers. Instead of explaining things to me, the officer said ‗isn‘t that 
enough?; you know what, I couldn‘t even live a normal live after I have 
                                                          
86
 Interview with a human rights lawyer (n 37). 
87
 Interview with a complainant F (n 74). The Department of Special Investigation (DSI) is a government 
body under the control of the Ministry of Justice. According to section 21 of the Special Investigation Act 
2004, the DSI officers have statutory duties to investigate all criminal cases that are within the purview of 
the department, including the allegations against senior police officers.  
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started handling your complaint‘. I suddenly realised that the responsible 
officer in my case is afraid of the police.88  
Apparently, the NHRC was perceived as lacking not just sufficient power but also the will 
to deal with the more powerful police authority; hence, the Commission is likely to make 
little or no progress in addressing complaints, especially the serious ones.    
In England and Wales, it has also been a perennial problem for the IPCC to receive full 
cooperation from the alleged officers when it comes to giving interviews. A former deputy 
chair of the IPCC has suggested the following when being asked about the obstacles the 
IPCC faced over the course of the investigation into a high-profile case: 
The difficulty is that we [the IPCC] rely on their [the police's] co-
operation.89 
Since March 2013, the enactment of the Police (Complaints and Conduct) Regulations has 
strengthened the position of the IPCC as it enables the Commission to compel the police to 
come in for an interview. The Regulations say ―the serving officer shall attend the 
interview [with the IPCC]‖.90 However, even after the legislative change the chair of the 
IPCC admitted that, still, the IPCC is struggling to uncover the truth during an interview 
with the officer involved: 
The law has now changed and we [the IPCC] can compel officers to 
come in for interview. However, they [the police] can and still do 
refuse to answer questions verbally at interview. Families and friends 
of those who die during police contact find it inexplicable that officers 
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 Interview with a complainant A (n 36). 
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 Simon Cox, ‗IPCC seeks increased powers to investigate police‘ BBC radio 4’s (26 April 2012) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17843690> accessed 5 February 2015.  
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present at someone's death do not fully co-operate with subsequent 
investigations – so do we. 91 
The IPCC went further and pointed out that: 
[I]n some cases, police officers and staff are being advised by the Police 
Federation or their legal representatives, to attend but not answer 
questions, and are offering instead to provide written statements.92 
It has been argued however that, in some cases, the IPCC deliberately failed to treat the 
officers involved as suspects and interview them under caution which would, compared to 
a witness interview, maximise the chances of  eliciting the facts from those officers.93 This 
argument is substantiated by the facts which emerged in the judgment given by Justice 
Collins in D v IPCC [2011] EWHC 1595 (Admin).  
The court set out clearly that it found the IPCC to have intended to treat the officers 
involved in this particular case as witnesses rather than suspects because the IPCC 
believed that they would cooperate more with its investigation, but it was apparent that this 
was wrong as none of the officers involved gave their cooperation to the IPCC. 94 This 
therefore reflects that the problem of a lack of cooperation is just one side of the coin as 
the other side of it shows that it is the IPCC that lacked courage to deploy its existing 
powers to establish the facts properly; notably, the above analysis of the NHRC, to a 
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 Vikram Dodd and Alan Travis, ‗Mark Duggan Police Must Stop Refusing to be Interviewed, Says IPCC 
Head‘ The Guardian (London, 14 January 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/14/mark-
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 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Review of the IPCC‘s Work in Investigating Deaths: Final 
Report‘ (IPCC 2014) 50. 
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 Police Action Lawyer Group, ‗Submissions to the Independent Police Complaints Commission regarding 
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certain extent, reflects a similar problem (see sub-section Powers, (h) Deploying powers in 
chapter 6).        
We now come to another controversial point of the NHRC complaints system which is 
concerned with the power to hold the officers involved responsible for their misconduct. 
Based on the evidence of this research, complainants wish that the NHRC had more power 
in order to finish their job properly:  
By and large, I‘m happy with the investigation outcomes however I 
think they [the Commission] haven‘t got enough power to do anything 
further. I view that they need more power in order to address 
complaints effectively. The NHRC has to rely on other bodies to 
compel the police to accept their recommendations but the fact is 
those bodies just don‘t respond to the Commission‘s request.95  
The NHRC couldn‘t help me. They said [the NHRC] they would like to 
help more, to bring the offender to justice, but according to the statutory 
powers they have, they could help this much [playing an intermediary 
role in claiming compensation from the Ministry of Justice for the victim 
of crime].96 
These interviews flag up a fundamental issue of the NHRC complaints system which is 
that the NHRC cannot afford to ensure that officers are properly held to account at the end 
of the investigation. The reason for this is that the enabling law of the NHRC does not give 
the Commission any power to enforce its own recommendations; even worse, the Supreme 
Administrative Court of Thailand has ruled that remedial measures introduced by the 
NHRC are non-binding on government agencies.97 Accordingly, the Commission can only 
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 Interview with a complainant F (n 74). 
96
 Interview with a complainant G (n 75). 
97
 Supreme Administrative Court, Thailand, order no. 451/2547 (2004). 
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require other constitutional bodies to compel the police to implement its 
recommendations.98    
The ramifications of the above ruling are that the police authority does not take the NHRC 
recommendations seriously, and neither does the government. The NHRC inquiry case 
number 18/2546, for instance, underlines how powerless the NHRC was when seeking 
cooperation from the police and the government. In this particular case, the Commission 
recommended some remedial measures to the RTP following its inquiry outcome which 
found that the officer involved had forced the victim (the complainant) to confess that he 
was a drug dealer.99 The RTP failed to enforce the proposed measures and also failed to 
respond to the NHRC. The NHRC then took a step further by reporting this case to the 
prime minister as the highest superior overseeing the RTP. However, the Office of the 
Permanent Secretary, the Prime Minister‘s Office, submitted a letter to the NHRC saying 
that the RTP found no evidence to substantiate the case.100 Another similar instance is the 
inquiry case no 341/2555. In this case, the NHRC recommended that the RTP should take 
action against an immigration police officer on grounds of illegally accessed personal data 
[of the complainant]; nevertheless, the police force area concerned refused to endorse such 
a recommendation but decided to conduct its own investigation into the case and produced 
a report confirming that the officer concerned was innocent. 101  The above cases 
demonstrate that it is difficult for the NHRC to bring the officer at fault to book. This 
research therefore argues that the substantiation rates of complaints that the NHRC is able 
to secure (see Table: 4.2) merely denote that the complaints are well-grounded but a lack 
of binding authority to punish the officers at fault leaves the NHRC incapable of 
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 NHRC Act (n 61) s 30 and s 31. 
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addressing the complainants‘ grievances effectively. At least, the two aforementioned 
cases prove that the NHRC inquiry is at risk of being conducted in vain at times.      
When asked about their existing powers, the NHRC commissioner and a former NHRC 
commissioner interviewed for this research were in agreement that the Commission should 
not be given the role and power to penalise the officer involved:  
The NHRC was designed to serve as the fact-finding mechanism. We 
are not the body that was designed to hold the officer at fault to 
account. So, my view is the NHRC is perfectly capable of doing its 
jobs. I can‘t see the necessity of us having the power to penalise the 
officer at fault.102  
It is important to be aware that the NHRC is acting as an inquiry body 
which seeks to establish the facts. We were designed for that purpose, 
so it is unnecessary for us to have the power to punish anyone.103 
The argument that the NHRC should act only as an inquiry body seems plausible in theory. 
However, the facts show that some of the NHRC inquiries were conducted in vain which 
means that the complainants‘ grievances will not be resolved which in turn erodes public 
confidence in the NHRC system; this seems to be supported at least by the national survey 
in 2012, which revealed that the NHRC received least trust compared to the Ombudsman 
and the NACC.104 
Despite that, a former NHRC commissioner argued further during the interview for this 
research that:  
                                                          
102
 Interview with the NHRC commissioner (n 82); this research will not go into details about the NHRC Bill 
as Thailand is under military rule at the moment; thus, the situation is uncertain as to whether such bill 
would be legislated or not. 
103
 Interview with [anonymous], a former NHRC commissioner (Bangkok, Thailand, 26 June 2014). 
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We don‘t have the power to punish anyone but don‘t forget that we 
[the NHRC] have the power to bring the case to the court [the 
constitutional court, the administrative court or the court of justice] on 
behalf of the complainant.105  
The interview with one of the serving commissioners indicated, however, that this power 
was rarely if ever used:106 
Yes, we do [have the power to present the case in court on behalf of 
complainants]. But, ok, I‘ll be honest with you; we have never used the 
power to bring the case to court of justice on behalf of any complainant 
since the Commission was established. The problem for the Commission 
is that we lack skillful personnel who can fight in court for us. These 
days, if we view that going to court is a must, I personally seek help from 
the Lawyer Council [of Thailand] but these cases normally involve 
administrative issues. So the whole issue is a bit complicated as there are 
so many things that we need to rely on a cooperative basis. So, this 
power hasn‘t been used to its best effect.  
This indicates that the power of the NHRC to represent complainants in court, as yet, does 
not contribute much to the handling of complaints. Nevertheless, it is arguable that, 
without a rigorous inquiry being conducted, even if the NHRC brings the case to court, it 
seems unlikely that the Commission will be able to fight the case in court effectively.     
Overall, the evidence from this research shows that, in reality, the NHRC system is beset 
with many disadvantages. The most serious of these are the lack of power to compel police 
cooperation and the lack of power to impose punishment when the officer complained 
against is found to have acted wrongfully. In this regard, the NHRC complaints system 
shares the same significant drawbacks with the system operated by the Ombudsman. 
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 Interview with a former NHRC commissioner (n 103). 
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The National Anti-Corruption Commission 
The NACC is another key agency for the handling of complaints on grounds of 
malfeasance in office.107 When it comes to police malpractice, the statistics in the seven-
year period from 2001 and 2008 show the following:108 
Table 4.3: Complaints registered with the NACC 
Year 
Complaints 
registered 
Pending and 
carry 
forward 
Unrecorded 
complaints 
Substantiated 
complaints 
Unsubstantiated 
complaints 
2008 254 599 9 10 57 
2007 401 1,517 171 11 571 
2006 385 1,132 no figures available 
2005 383 773 7 0 17 
2004 403 626 65 35 156 
2003 430 491 84 30 181 
2002 386 296 91 16 84 
2001 383 - 57 2 56 
 
These statistics do not just reflect the extent of police complaints that the Commission has 
dealt with in a given period, but also highlights two extraordinary facts; a massive backlog 
of police complaints being brought forward each year and substantial numbers of 
unrecorded complaints and unsubstantiated investigations. It is therefore worth drilling 
down into the NACC system to come to grips with its operation and to assess whether or 
not it is capable of addressing police complaints.  
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 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007, s 250 (3). The 2007 Constitution, hereinafter, will be 
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108
 Kasemsarn Chotchakornpant, Preeda Sataworn and Prasert  Patanaponpaiboon, ‗A Study of Preventative 
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(a) Access to the NACC Complaints System 
Before we go any further, it should be underlined that the handling of complaints by the 
NACC depends on a body of legislation; in this regard, the NACC Act and the NACC 
Inquiry and Evidence Regulations are the key frameworks streamlining the operation of 
the system.109 When it comes to the accessibility of the NACC system, in contrast to the 
Thai Ombudsman and the NHRC, basic criteria specifying the eligibility to complain are 
not set out in any statutory provision governing the system. However, we can reasonably 
assume from the NACC Inquiry Regulations that a complaint can be filed to the NACC by 
any person as long as he or she is able to provide sufficient information for the 
Commission to establish the facts in relation to the alleged misconduct. This is shown as 
follows:110 
(1) in any case where a complaint is made in writing, the officer shall 
record such complaint … and submit it to the director of the 
relevant division [in the NACC] for further consideration. 
(2) in any case where a complaint is made verbally, there shall be at 
least two officers writing down a detailed account given by the 
complainant … and [they should then] proceed to the next step as 
specified in (1). 
 
In line with the above regulation, the NACC advised its would-be complainants to access 
the following channels for registering complaints with the system; these channels range 
from making a complaint in person, submitting an online complaints form, 111 or sending a 
                                                          
109
 National Anti-Corruption Commission Inquiry and Evidence Regulations 2011, reg 5 (2). This 
Regulations, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗NACC Inquiry Regulations‘ This Regulations set out the 
detailed complaints procedures under the NACC system. 
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 ibid reg 5 (1), (2). 
111
 National Anti-Corruption Commission, ‗Advice on Making a Complaint‘ (NACC) 
<http://www.nacc.go.th/nacc_accuse_suggest.php> accessed 20 April 2015 [in Thai].  
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letter of complaint via a postal service.112 In addition, section 89 of the NACC Act widens 
the gateway even more via the following route:113 
In the case where the injured person [of the misconduct] has lodged a 
complaint, or a denunciation is made, to the inquiry official [the police] 
requesting for an action against a State official…the inquiry official 
[the police] shall refer the matter to the NACC within thirty days as 
from the date of the complaint or the denunciation…     
Leaving aside a complaints-based investigation, sections 43(4) and 88 of the NACC Act 
prescribe that:114  
[T]he NACC shall investigate the following; 
43 [T]he NACC shall conduct a fact inquiry in accordance with the 
provisions of this Chapter in the following circumstances: 
 (4) there is a reasonable cause to suspect that a State official… has  
committed an offence under section 88; 
88 When the NACC has a reasonable cause to suspect that any State 
official has committed an offence of corruption, malfeasance in office or 
malfeasance in judicial office, the NACC shall proceed in accordance 
with Chapter 4, Fact Inquiry [starting from section 43]. 
This shows that the NACC is allowed to conduct an investigation on its own initiative. It is 
worth pointing out that the Thai complaints authorities under review all have the power of 
initiative, and this is potentially useful for tackling police malpractice. 
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 National Anti-Corruption Commission, ‗A Leaflet on Increasing Public Involvement in the NACC‘s New 
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114
 ibid ss 43(4), 88. 
 
 
Page 173 of 367 
 
(b) Complaints Procedures 
Having recorded a complaint, the NACC investigating officer shall proceed with the 
following procedures according to the NACC Inquiry Regulations:115 
(1) to request more details on the alleged misconduct from the 
complainant; 
(2) to record verbal statements given by the people involved; 
(3) to summon evidence from relevant government agencies, private 
bodies or individuals; 
(4) to conduct a field investigation [if necessary]; 
 
During the investigation, section 25 (1) – (3) of the NACC Act sets out that the NACC 
shall have the following powers:116 
(1) to give an order instructing a Government official, official or 
employee of a Government agency, State agency, State enterprise 
or local administration to perform all such acts as are necessary for 
the performance of duties of the NACC or to summon relevant 
documents or evidence from any person or to summon any person 
to give statements or testimonies, for the purpose of a fact inquiry;  
(2) to file an application with the competent Court for an issuance of a 
warrant permitting an entry into a dwelling-place, place of 
business or any other place… for the purposes of inspecting, 
searching, seizing or attaching documents, property or other 
evidence related to the matter under inquiry.  
 
To make the officers involved legally bound by the NACC instructions, the following 
punitive measures were introduced under section 118 of the NACC Act:  
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 NACC Inquiry Regulations (n 109) reg 8 (1) – (4). 
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Any person who fails to comply with an order of the NACC under 
section 25 (1) … shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding ten thousand Baht or 
to both.  
Here, the position of the NACC over the course of an investigation is firmly consolidated 
because punitive measures against defiant officers enable the Commission to be able to 
exact cooperation from the police. Crucially, the NACC was also tasked with a criminal 
investigatory role; hence, it also has the jurisdiction over matters alleging criminality. In 
this respect, the Commission: 
[Can] inquire into facts and gather evidence in order for the facts to be 
known or the offence to be proved and in order for the offender to be 
prosecuted and punished;117          
In practice, the NACC investigation will be conducted to identify a disciplinary offence in 
parallel to a criminal offence. In 2014, the NACC announced during a press conference 
that it has brought 63 criminal cases to court since 2006.118  In this regard, the NACC is 
much more powerful compared to its counterparts.  
At the completion of investigation, if the Commission substantiates the complaint, it shall 
pursue one or all of the following options in accordance with section 92 and/or section 97 
of the NACC Act. Section 92 underlines that:  
[W]hen the NACC, …, passes a resolution that a particular alleged 
culprit has committed a disciplinary offence, the President shall send 
the report and existing documents together with the opinion to the 
                                                          
117
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superior or the person who has the power to appoint or remove such 
alleged culprit for the purpose of considering the disciplinary penalty 
for the offence in respect of which the NACC has passed the 
resolution, without the appointment of a disciplinary inquiry 
committee.        
Whilst section 97 paragraphs 1 and 2 specify that: 
In the case where the NACC passes a resolution that any matter put in 
the allegation amounts to a criminal offence, the President shall 
furnish the report, documents and opinion to the Prosecutor- 
General …for the purpose of criminal proceedings.  
[I]n the case where [following disagreement between the NACC and 
the Prosecutor-General on prosecution, a working committee is 
convened to settle such disagreement and] such working committee 
fails to arrive at a conclusion as to the prosecution, the NACC shall 
have the power to initiate the prosecution of its own motion or appoint 
an attorney to institute the prosecution on its behalf.    
By virtue of section 92, the NACC apparently has an absolute power to direct the police 
force area or the RTP to uphold its proposed disciplinary measures because the police are 
forbidden to re-conduct the investigation. In this respect, the Commission will table a 
resolution whether the alleged officer has committed gross misconduct or just misconduct. 
The police authority must endorse such a resolution and determine what disciplinary 
measures should be implemented to conform to the NACC resolution.119 The Commission 
also has the power to institute criminal proceedings according to section 97. Fifteen out of 
the 63 cases prosecuted by the NACC since 2006 have been brought to court without the 
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Officer of the Attorney General coming to its assistance.120 One of those 15 cases was 
involved with the deaths of the anti-government protestors on 7
th
 October 2008 (see 
chapter 3).121      
Under the NACC complaints system, the process subsequent to the investigation deviates 
very sharply from those of the Ombudsman and the NHRC. Sections 92 and 97 ensure that 
the NACC will handle the complaint from start to finish without the involvement of the 
executive and/or legislative branch. It is worth pointing out here that the NACC does have 
a role to play in the criminal prosecution whilst the IPCC does not. The IPCC briefly 
explains its role in criminal proceedings as follows:122 
If a[n] [investigation] report indicates a criminal offence may have 
been committed and the IPCC … considers it to be appropriate for the 
matters dealt with in the report to be considered by the CPS [Crown 
Prosecution Service] or they fall within a prescribed category, the 
report must be referred to the CPS. 
The legal framework of the NACC shows that it has the power it needs to deal with 
complaints against the police. It thus appears that the NACC is perfectly capable of 
resolving complaints against the police. One of the key reasons is that the Commission has 
a multiple role in handling police complaints as a disciplinary panel dealing with 
disciplinary matters;123 as an investigative body looking into criminal offences; and as a 
prosecutorial body. 124  The strengths of the NACC system lie in the fact that the 
Commission itself is a quasi-judicial-like authority (its resolution is indisputable and 
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cannot be subject to re-investigation),125 and in the fact that the Commission is able to 
instigate criminal prosecution against the alleged officer when disagreement with the 
Attorney General erupts.126 Given all the strengths the NACC system has, the question 
arises as to why the proportions of unrecorded complaints and unsubstantiated 
investigations are considerable each year. This question will be explored in the next 
section. 
(c) Critical Evaluation of the NACC Complaints System 
Leyland used the watchdog metaphor and described the NACC as a Doberman, at least in 
theory.127 To judge from the power it has, one can readily agree with such a metaphor. The 
former senator interviewed for this research claimed that:  
The NACC is far better compared to its predecessor organisation, 
namely the now defunct Office of the Commission of Counter 
Corruption (OCCC); I think the key reason is the NACC has a lot more 
power.128    
On the other side of the coin, a group of police officers interviewed for this research 
expressed their concern over the power of the NACC. They claimed that what worries 
them is the fact that, subject to the Constitutional Court judgement number 2/2546,129 the 
police are barred from filing an appeal to the Police Commission as an appellate body 
against the NACC resolution on the investigation outcomes as they can do under the 
internal complaints system; this means that the NACC resolution is definitive as the police 
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may neither re-investigate the case nor file an appeal against such a resolution. Here are 
their comments: 
The NACC, in a way, is unreasonably powerful. Look, its resolution 
on disciplinary measures cannot be reviewed by any appellate body. 
So it is unfair to the police because the NACC becomes the sole 
authority that determines our future.130     
The above notion is found within much of the police community. However, a former 
deputy police commissioner interviewed for this research suggested that it is right  that the 
NACC resolution on disciplinary matters cannot be challenged as: 
If the officer involved is allowed to challenge or appeal [to the Police 
Commission] against the NACC resolution, it is highly likely that that 
officer will seek help from somebody that is able to pull strings for 
him or her.131 
This argument is reinforced by previous studies which demonstrated that, over the lifetime 
of the OCCC, the police were not forbidden to dispute the OCCC‘s inquiry outcomes; 
hence, they were always keen to convene a disciplinary panel to re-examine the case 
whenever the outcomes of the inquiry counted against the officer involved. The 
consequence of this is that, ultimately, the decision whether to discipline the officers 
complained against was left in the hands of the police‘s governing body. What this meant 
in practice was that the officer complained about would either go free or receive a more 
lenient punishment than merited because of a ‗string puller‘.132   
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The human rights lawyer interviewed for this research pointed out that more power brings 
more responsibility to the Commission as well. The power the NACC has, therefore, does 
not just have a positive impact on the handling of complaints but also, somewhat 
paradoxically, has a negative impact upon it, not least in terms of the effectiveness of its 
investigation.  
My view on the NACC is that, in a way, it has too much power which 
gives the public the impression that the NACC complaints system is 
effective. So, many people lodge complaints with the NACC [that it] 
led to the current situation where it needs to deal with a wasteland of 
cases. The fact shows that in the past there have been many cases that 
haven‘t been addressed as the statute of limitations had come to an 
end. This reflects that the NACC shoulder a huge burden. This can 
leads to the ineffectiveness of the NACC complaints system in the 
end.133 
In referring back to the NACC statistics (see Table: 4.3), it can be seen that the NACC has 
a massive backlog of police complaints to cope with every year. One of the NACC 
commissioners interviewed for this research accepted that the handling of complaints is 
becoming an intolerable burden hindering the effectiveness of the NACC complaints 
system. The commissioner said:  
If you [the interviewer] talk about the effectiveness of our complaints 
system, I have to say that we‘re now facing heavy workloads, so the 
effectiveness is of course being undermined. Each of us [NACC 
commissioners] has to deal with so many cases year in year out.134 
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The same commissioner also pointed out during the interview that a referral of cases from 
other complaints authorities to the NACC is also one of the key factors adding to a 
substantial backlog of complaints. The commissioner claimed that: 
You know what, one of the reasons why we are bearing a huge burden 
of complaints is due to the proportion of referred cases as well. Look, 
the Ombudsman, for example, they refer a number of complaints 
cases to us. Then, they just simply chase us up to see if we‘ve finished 
off the job they left to us!135  
The fact that the NACC has to complete the job left to it by other watchdog bodies not just 
shows the limitations of those bodies in addressing complaints by themselves but also 
increases the burden of the NACC at the same time.  
Next, the question arises whether a massive burden on the NACC accounts for the high 
proportions of unrecorded complaints and unsubstantiated investigations. In this regard, 
the findings of this research suggest that although there are a number of factors creating a 
huge burden on the NACC, it is arguable that the reason for a large proportion of 
unrecorded and unsubstantiated complaints boils down to the Commission‘s approach to 
the handling of complaints. To eliminate the backlog of complaints, the NACC adopted the 
approach of having a sub-committee investigate complaints before referring them to the 
Commission for review at the final stage.136 The former senator interviewed underlined 
how problematic this approach can be:  
The NACC is working very hard. To make sure that progress [in 
dealing with each complaint] will be made, the Commission 
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introduced a sub-committee to help investigate complaints. But I‘m 
telling you, the funny part is this, although one of the commissioners 
will chair a sub-committee, the great majority of members are 
outsiders who are regarded as an expert on the issues relating to the 
complaint. These external experts may be academics, civil servants, 
state officials including ex-police. But in many cases in the past, the 
fact shows that some of these people have a strong connection with 
the alleged officers and may pull strings for them. I‘ll give you an 
example how can they do that? Normally, each NACC commissioner 
has a lot of work to do, so most of them are likely to lose sight of 
some complaints, this will become the opportunity for the members 
who seek to protect the alleged officers to put off the handling of 
particular complaints, or in some cases they may convince the 
commissioner to discontinue the case. I personally believe that all of 
this [is] responsible for a lesser degree of the effectiveness of the 
NACC system.137  
In line with the interview, previous studies demonstrated that the NACC can appoint any 
person as a member of the sub-committee so long as that person does not fall into the 
exclusionary categories. 138  In the handling of police complaints, for instance, an active 
police officer is usually appointed to sit on the sub-committee (see the next section for an 
in-depth discussion). However, one of the NACC commissioners interviewed for this 
research made the following points in reaction to the argument that some members of a 
sub-committee may help the alleged officers through the back door: 
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Of course, these people shouldn‘t be appointed but the fact is the 
process of setting up the committee can be opposed if any of the 
parties in conflict considers that some of them may not be impartial.139 
In line with the above interview, a member of the NACC sub-committee may be opposed 
if he or she falls into any of the exclusionary categories laid down in the NACC Inquiry 
Regulations.  
The criteria for this are shown as follows:140 
 
A person with any of the following conditions is prohibited from serving 
as a member of a sub-committee: 
       (1) having prior knowledge of the alleged incident of misconduct, 
or   having ever investigated the same matter…; 
       (2) having private interests in the alleged incident of misconduct; 
       (3) having animosity towards a complainant or the alleged 
wrongdoer; 
       (4) being a complainant himself, or being a spouse, a parent, a 
descendant, or a sibling  of a complainant or of the alleged 
wrongdoer; 
       (5) being a relative, a business partner of a complainant or of the 
alleged wrongdoer, or having partnership or conflicts with a 
complainant or the alleged wrongdoer. 
 
A petition against any members of a sub-committee must be submitted to 
the president of the NACC within seven days after the date those 
members are appointed… 
 
Although the above provision seems to be fair, it is impractical for the complainant not 
least who is in vulnerable position to be able to realise, in a very short period of time, 
whether any members of a sub-committee may have a personal relation in some ways with 
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the alleged officers. Crucially, a number of complainants pointed out that it is onerous in 
reality for an ordinary complainant to fully understand how the NACC system works and 
how a complaint is handled, let alone make use of the opportunity to make sure that none 
of the members of a sub-committee is likely to be biased: 
I can say that after I complained with the NACC, I haven‘t been 
informed or had an explanation  from anyone about how the system 
works. I remembered that the officer who registered my complaint just 
simply stamped my complaints form and told me to go back home and 
wait for the contact. I don‘t even know who was going to handle my 
complaint and how would it be handled? Most importantly, I‘ve been 
contacted after the NACC decided to dismiss my complaint.141  
When I got to the office [the NACC], there was a receptionist who 
skimmed through my complaint primarily to see the details of the 
complaint, the date, the name of the alleged officer and also the name 
of the complainant. Then, they stamped the complaint and let me go 
home. They explained nothing to me. I couldn‘t know who was going 
to investigate my complaint.142  
In addition to the above comments, previous studies also demonstrated that the NACC 
system is a closed and highly bureaucratic system. 143  The bureaucracy and a lack of 
openness of the system make it even more difficult for the complainants to understand the 
process and to be able to protect their rights. All of this substantiates the argument of a 
former senator that, in practice, those sitting in the NACC sub-committee are the real 
people who ‗call the tune‘.144  
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In the next section, this chapter aims to discuss the element of independence in the 
complaints bodies under review. The discussion will cast light on further issues that hinder 
the effectiveness of the Thai complaints systems. 
III. External Complaints Authorities and the Element of Independence 
A system for resolving complaints against the police is regarded as a vital component of 
the regulation of  policing as it helps ensure the accountability of the police.145 For decades, 
an element of independence has always been upheld as one of the core principles that 
should be adopted alongside the development of a police complaints system 146  since 
―independence will aid it [a complaints authority] in being objective and impartial‖.147 In 
this section, the notion of independence as it applies to the members of the Ombudsman, 
the NHRC and the NACC is critically discussed. A serious discussion of this will bring to 
light the extent to which the operation of these external complaints systems is independent.  
As noted in chapter 1, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are all independent of 
the police and the government. During the interviews for this research, the ombudsman, 
the NHRC commissioner and the NACC commissioners clarified their understanding of 
‗an independent organisation‘ as follows: 
An independent organisation is a non-governmental body and, 
therefore, is not under influence of or controlled by the executive 
branch [the government].148 
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The NHRC is an autonomous body meaning that it‘s not under 
command of anybody and not subject to political interference.149  
I‘d say that an independent organisation is usually established for a 
specific purpose, thus it is not part of the typical division of branches 
according to the principle of the separation of power. For these 
reasons, it is independent of the government, the national assembly 
and the judiciary.150 
It [an independent organisation] is an organisation that is not 
dependent upon the government or any other organisations. Besides, 
the independent organisation must have its own statutory powers, the 
administrative office and personnel to help streamline its 
responsibility.151  
These comments are reflective of how an independent body is usually conceived of in 
Thailand which is largely based on the concept that an independent body is an agency that 
enjoys structural autonomy from the government (and other bodies). The members of the 
complaints authorities interviewed for this research seem to suggest that because the 
authorities are independent of both the police and the government, the systems under their 
regulatory oversight would also be truly independent. However, structural independence is 
not necessarily indicative of operational independence. Therefore, the operational 
independence of the complaints bodies under review will be the main focus of attention in 
this section.  
In discussing this, it is useful to draw upon the concept of ‗regulatory capture‘. Prenzler 
pointed out in 2000 that regulatory capture was not a term used in the existing literature on 
policing oversight; nonetheless, it can be applied to the issue of police influence upon the 
                                                          
149
 Interview with the NHRC commissioner (n 82). 
150
 Interview with the NACC commissioner B (n 139). 
151
 Interview with the NACC commissioner A (n 134). 
 
 
Page 186 of 367 
 
independence of a regulatory body. 152  According to Dal Bó, regulatory capture is a 
situation where regulatory authorities end up being manipulated by the agencies that they 
are supposed to regulate in the first place. 153  Such manipulation results in what Kwak 
accounts for as a diversion of regulation away from the public interest and toward the 
interests of the regulatee.154 The questions are how the regulators can find themselves being 
captured by the regulatees and how does this concept apply to the Ombudsman, the NHRC 
and the NACC? Posner indicated that a regulatory agency can be captured by the 
infiltration of people having an intimate relationship with a regulated body into the agency 
itself. 155  In the context of an external police complaints system, having ex-police 
investigators serve in a complaints authority fits in with the above analysis of regulatory 
capture. It is arguable that close proximity between people with police backgrounds and 
the police force through cultural and institutional bonds brings with it a serious risk of 
compromising impartiality in the complaints-handling process. In the preceding chapter, 
the analysis of patronage and fictive brotherhood, for instance, demonstrated just how 
strong the intimacy between police officers can be. This arouses a legitimate concern over 
the impartiality of people with police backgrounds when dealing with police complaints as 
an intimate relationship between ex-police and the police force can pave the way for a 
complaints body being manipulated in the interests of the police.156  
In Thailand, people with police backgrounds are not in a list of excluded categories of 
candidates for the jobs in the watchdog bodies including the Ombudsman, the NHRC and 
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the NACC. Hence, their candidacies will not be rejected simply because they are former 
police officers.157 It should be underlined that the statistics on ex-police personnel serving 
in each external complaints agency in question are unavailable (see chapter 2). This 
research, therefore, relies on the evidence from interviews. The NHRC and the NACC 
commissioners estimated that roughly 10 per cent of their investigators are ex-police, 
whilst the ombudsman confirmed that there is only one investigator with a police 
background serving in the Office.158 On the surface, this does not seem to be problematic as 
the proportion of ex-police serving in each complaints body under review is relatively 
small. It is not just a case of percentages, however, but also the level of influence ex-police 
can have. The NHRC and the NACC, in particular, are moving towards capture as a 
number of people with police backgrounds are now serving as chief executives of those 
organisations. In addition, the findings of this research suggest that the roles of people 
having police backgrounds, together with the engagement of active police officers (see 
below, text accompanying note 159), in the investigation gives rise to considerable 
concerns that the handling of complaints may be directed towards the interests of the 
police (see also, how political influence can create the situation of regulatory capture in 
chapter 5).   
One of the complainants expressed his disapproval of the position of the NHRC 
commissioner, who has a police background, towards the handling of his complaints. The 
complainant recounted the following incident which left him thinking that that particular 
commissioner is not impartial:  
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 [He said] ‗I‘ve preliminarily looked into your complaint and I believe 
that the police officers who are alleged to be involved with your case 
have nothing to do with the case.‘ The comments just made my blood 
boil, and I kept thinking how did you [the commissioner] know 
whether or not the officers complained against are uninvolved in spite 
of the fact that the NHRC hasn‘t yet investigated my case? This show 
just how this commissioner leapt to the police‘s defence.159  
The NHRC commissioner interviewed for this research addressed the point about ex-police 
personnel serving with the Commission as follows: 
Of course, people having police backgrounds shouldn‘t investigate 
complaints against the police. These people have always served in the 
organisations that enforce the law, they don‘t really think carefully 
about human rights. As regards the NHRC, all I can say is that so long 
as each and every of these people came to office lawfully we just need 
to accept that as we can‘t do anything. But we are trying not to 
allocate police complaints to anyone having police backgrounds.160  
That people having police backgrounds will not be given a role in handling police 
complaints might appear to guard against regulatory capture, but this approach has proved 
unrealistic in practice. Thus one of the NHRC complainants interviewed for this research 
insisted that their complaints were handled by ex-police.161 More importantly, it is common 
practice within the NHRC that each resolution is tabled in a grand meeting of all 
commissioners;162 hence, the case can be made that the opinion of those who have police 
backgrounds may, more or less, have influence upon the views of others.       
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The NACC, for its part, has always had people with police backgrounds serving within it. 
The mindset of some NACC commissioners suggests that there is little concern about the 
possibility of regulatory capture. Thus, one of the NACC commissioners said: 
Having a police background is a good thing because we need the 
people who have investigative skills. These people are really helpful 
since they are determined and tough. What we need to do is just give 
them proper training that suits our way of dealing with the complaints, 
and adjust their attitudes a little bit.163  
In an interview with the ombudsman, the same line of reasoning emerged:  
We have only one ex-police investigator working with us at present. 
But I think he is really efficient and helps us a lot in terms of 
uncovering the truth.164   
This interview material indicates that, in Thailand, the reason that some top executives of 
the complaints authorities are in favour of employing people with police backgrounds to 
help investigate police complaints is due to the skills ex-police bring to the job.  
Similar sentiments have been expressed in relation to the English system. Dame Owers – 
the current chair of the IPCC – expressed her view about the involvement of former police 
officers in the handling of police complaints as follows: 
There are those who would argue that the IPCC should not employ 
any ex-police officers. I don‘t agree with that - ex-police bring 
essential forensic and investigative skills, and conversely the fact that 
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you come from a non-police background does not grant you immunity 
against the very powerful, high octane police culture.165 
One can readily agree that ex-police bring skills the complaints authorities need in 
investigating complaints but it is arguable that these are not unique to the police; rather, 
they are generic skills that can be imparted via training (see chapter 6). The claim that the 
complaints authorities need people with police backgrounds is thus debatable. In the 
context of Thai policing, for example, a deep-rooted patronage system within the police 
community is immensely influential in the decision-making of the police themselves, and 
we saw in chapter 3 how this can be counterproductive to the handling of police 
complaints. We will revisit the issue of who should investigate police complaints in 
chapter 6, but for now, we move on to another vital dimension of the regulatory capture 
that applies to the external complaints authorities in Thailand.  
In the 1950s Berstein introduced the concept of ―a life cycle of regulatory commissions‖ in 
which he elaborated that when the regulatory agency reaches the period of maturity, ―it is 
unlikely that the commission [the regulator], in this period, will be able to extend 
regulation beyond the limit acceptable to the regulated groups…the commission loses 
vitality…its goals become routine and accepted…there is a desire to avoid conflicts and to 
enjoy good relations with the regulated groups…‖.166 To apply this concept to the external 
complaints systems under review, the analysis of each of them highlights that the external 
systems are now going through a phase of becoming more routinely bureaucratic and 
inefficient. The NACC, for example, has increasingly been extending the role of active 
police in its complaints-handling process. To lift the burden on the NACC, however, a 
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Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Commission and the RTP has been 
signed. The MoU specifies that where a complaint is registered with the police, the 
responsibility to collect the evidence rests with them; in addition to that, the officer who 
looks after the case from the outset will also be made a member of the NACC sub-
committee to assist the NACC in the investigation stage. 167  The established working 
practices between the two clearly exceeds the original intention of section 89 of the NACC 
Act, which only assigns the police a role as a reference agency passing a complaint to the 
NACC.168 The fact that the NACC, through the MoU, devolved some responsibility to the 
police shows that it failed to think through how police involvement may undermine 
impartiality of the handling of complaints.169  
Previous research has shown that, apart from high-profile cases, the police often fail to 
gather evidence properly.170 One of the complainants to the NACC disclosed the following 
during the interview for this research: 
In my case, the fact is I got one of the NACC commissioners‘ 
telephone number from a journalist, I called that commissioner to 
check on progress, the commissioner said to me that the case was well 
on the way. After that I did call again some seven to eight months 
later, this time it was the PA [personal assistant] of that commissioner 
who answered the phone and I was informed that my case was handed 
over to the police. I got confused and asked for a reason but that PA 
explained to me that the commissioner has a lot of work to complete. 
Since then, I‘ve been waiting for three, four years achieving nothing. 
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Finally, I had to go for a conventional way of seeking help from the 
Office of the Attorney General.171  
The interview reflected how the NACC becomes apathetic about dealing with complaints. 
To apply Berstein‘s life ‗cycle of regulatory commissions concept‘ to the current situation 
that the NACC is now in, it is arguable that the handling of complaints under the NACC 
system is increasingly becoming routine. The engagement of the police in the handling of 
complaints seems to be another issue that accounts for high unrecorded and 
unsubstantiated complaints under the NACC system. 
The NHRC and the Thai Ombudsman are no exception to Berstein‘s concept of a life cycle 
of regulatory commissions. In the case of the NHRC, a number of complainants pointed 
out that the NHRC often takes for granted the police‘s accounts, one of whom disclosed 
the following in an interview for this research: 
Their [the NHRC] inquiry report was nonsense. They simply 
concluded that they believed what the police explained to them which 
is the real offender in my case remains unidentifiable. Look, how 
could they rely on the police‘s version of truth to count against me?172  
A series of NHRC inquiries illustrates how the NHRC appears to be easily led by the 
police‘s accounts — many complaints against the police about neglect of duty have been 
dismissed on the basis that the police confirmed that there was not any evidence to identify 
who the offender(s) was.173 It seems that the NHRC is too ready to accept the claims of the 
police which indicates that the handling of complaints by the NHRC is becoming more 
routine and shifting away from the public interest. This same phenomenon also applies to 
the work of the Thai Ombudsman as the Ombudsman‘s approach to the handling of 
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complaints is based heavily on the analysis of documentary proof which reflects that most 
complaints have been handled in a routine fashion.  
IV. Conclusion 
The Thai Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC form the backbone of the machinery for 
eliminating abuses in public office in Thailand. Their roles in addressing and deterring 
police malpractice in particular are crucial for promoting accountable policing. However, 
the evidence from this research highlights that each of the complaints bodies is beset by a 
number of serious problems that apparently neutralise the effectiveness and the 
independence of the operation of the complaints systems under the regulatory oversight of 
each of them. 
The key issues of the complaints systems in question are the mindset of the complaints 
authorities in approaching the problems; a lack of sufficient power; and the creeping trend 
towards capture. To start with the Thai Ombudsman, the mistaken pursuit of a win-win 
solution approach that arguably gives rise to a lack of will to deploy the existing powers to 
compel police cooperation, coupled with a lack of power to commence disciplinary and/or 
criminal proceedings, renders it largely ineffective.  One cannot help but think of the  
authority as nothing more than a paper tiger. In common with the Ombudsman, the 
mentality of the NHRC towards problem solving, such as an undue reliance on police 
cooperation, together with a lack of sufficient powers to ensure that those who found to 
have acted wrongfully will be disciplined, are all reflective of the Commission‘s inability 
to hold the police accountable for what they have done. Even though the NACC is 
markedly different from the first two organisations in terms of its power to deal with the 
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police, its tremendous backlog of cases both registered with and referred to it is becoming 
a serious issue compromising the effectiveness of the handling of complaints.  
Leaving aside the question of effectiveness, the evidence from this research also indicates 
that the complaints bodies in question are potentially moving towards capture as each of 
them has engaged people with police backgrounds in the handling of complaints. The 
NACC has ex-police as a commissioner and staff as well as having active police officers 
assisting its investigations, whilst the Ombudsman and the NHRC also have ex-police 
involved in their inquiry into police complaints at different levels. The facts established 
throughout this research, together with the existing literature, suggest that the 
effectiveness and impartiality in the handling of complaints under the complaints systems 
in question is undermined by the involvement of ex-police officers. All of this leads to a 
provisional conclusion that a radical reform should be pushed through to ensure that 
complaints against the police in Thailand will be handled impartially and effectively. At 
the same time it is important to be alive to the argument that ex-police personnel may need 
to be employed within external police complaints bodies in order to ensure that 
investigations are adequate. The potential for the values of independence and adequacy to 
come into conflict is discussed fully in the final two chapters of this thesis.
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CHAPTER 5: INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ON                                                         
THE HANDLING OF POLICE COMPLAINTS  
I. Introduction    
In chapters 3 and 4, the outstanding issues of both the internal and external complaints 
authorities in Thailand were examined. This chapter attempts to revisit those complaints 
systems from a different perspective as it aims to evaluate whether the complaints systems 
overseen by the Royal Thai Police (RTP),1 the Office of the Ombudsman, the National 
Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption Commission 
(NACC) conform to accepted international standards on the handling of police complaints. 
The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)‘s Handbook on Police 
Accountability, Oversight and Integrity lays down the essential criteria for an effective 
police complaints mechanism, and these will be applied as a key international benchmark 
in this chapter.2 In addition to the above, the Commissioner for Human Rights – Council 
of Europe has distilled from the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
five core principles for an effective investigation into police complaints which are applied 
to most European nations. 3  These principles, where appropriate, will be used as a 
supplementary benchmark in this chapter in order to bring alternative perspectives on a 
police complaints system. Apart from the above specific standards on a police complaints 
                                                          
1
 In this chapter, the RTP‘s system will only be discussed where applicable. Note that ‗the RTP‘s system‘ 
refers to the complaints systems run at both local and national levels.        
2
 UNODC, Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (UN 2011). This handbook, 
hereinafter, will be referred to as ‗the UN Handbook on Police Oversight‘.  
3
 The principles developed from the European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter, will be referred to as ‗the 
ECtHR principles‘; however, as the principles are explained in Commissioner for Human Rights, ‗Opinion 
of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints 
against the Police‘ (Report) (12 March 2009) CoE Doc CommDH (2009) 4. Therefore, the reference for the 
principles will be cited as ‗Opinion of the Commissioner‘.  
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mechanism, the Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions,4 albeit aimed at 
national human rights bodies, will also be adopted to assess the systems in question where 
applicable.  
Because ―thinking without comparison is unthinkable‖; 5  as the evaluation of the Thai 
systems is being carried out, this chapter also seeks to benchmark the system under the 
regulatory oversight of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) against 
the above same standards, drawing comparisons with the Thai systems where appropriate.    
II. Benchmarks for a Police Complaints System 
Drawing from the UN Handbook on Police Oversight, the ECtHR principles and the Paris 
Principles, an effective police complaints mechanism, at minimum, should satisfy the 
following criteria:        
Independence 
Independence is arguably the most significant element that helps uphold fairness and 
impartiality in the handling of complaints. The element of independence may be 
interpreted in many different ways but the UN Handbook underlines that, in the context of 
a police complaints system, independence should embrace the following fundamental 
aspects: 
 
 
                                                          
4
 UNGA, ‗Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles)‘ Res 48/134         
(20 December 1993) 48th Session UN Doc A/RES/48/134. The principles, hereinafter, will be referred to as 
‗the Paris Principles‘.  
5
 Guy E. Swanson, ‗Frameworks for Comparative Research: Structural Anthropology and the Theory of 
Action‘ in Ivan Vallier (ed), Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on Trends and Applications (UC 
Press 1971) 145. 
 
 
Page 197 of 367 
 
(a) Independence by statutory underpinning  
To cushion a police complaints system against volatility and interference,6 the complaints 
authority needs to be granted legal autonomy. In the UN Handbook on Police Oversight, 
the criterion for upholding autonomy of the complaints authority is prescribed as follows: 
The [complaints] agency should be established constitutionally or created 
through legislation (not executive order). 7 
In a democratic system, the constitution and the statute are passed in Parliament by the 
people‘s representatives, these laws, at least in theory, are difficult to amend compared to 
delegated legislation or an executive order which is easily subject to changes whenever 
there is a shift in policies and political directions. Thus, it is sensible that the existence of 
the complaints body shall be underpinned by the constitution or statute law. In England 
and Wales, the Police Reform Act (PRA) 2002 gave birth to the IPCC and also governs the 
operation of the complaints system overseen by the IPCC at the same time.8 In Thailand, 
the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC were established by the Constitution,9 whilst 
the operational functions of the complaints systems under control of each of them are 
regulated by their own enabling statutes. In similar vein, the RTP as the complaints 
authority was created by statute namely the National Police Act (see chapter 1) whilst its 
complaints mechanism is also governed by same legislation (see chapter 3).10 It can be seen 
                                                          
6
 UNGA ‗Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions‘ UNCHR 
(28 May 2010) 14th Session UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.8 para 60. Note that this particular report is the 
primary source from which the UNOCD has extracted in order to outline the criteria for an effective police 
complaints mechanism. The report, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ―Special Rapporteur Report‖. 
7
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 69.  
8
 Police Reform Act 2002, ss 9, 10 and sch 3 ‗Handling of Complaints and Conduct Matters etc.‘. This Act, 
hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗PRA‘. 
9
 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007, ss 242, 247, 256. To date, even though the 2007 
Constitution was repealed by the military junta, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC still exist under 
the Announcement of the National Council for Peace and Order no.11/2557 (see ch 1 for further details).        
10
 National Police Act 2004, s 6. This Act will hereinafter be referred to as the ‗NPA‘. The complaints 
procedures of the RTP are prescribed in pt 5 ‗discipline and disciplinary maintaining‘ of the NPA. 
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therefore that the above complaints authorities all meet the UN criterion for statutory 
underpinning.  
(b) Independence through democratic appointments and dismissals of members  
The process by which candidates for members of the complaints authority are recruited is 
crucial for the operational independence of the complaints system. Clearly if vested 
interests can influence recruitment then the appearance and substance of independence 
may be put in jeopardy. The UN Handbook on Police Oversight sets out the ideal way in 
which members of a police complaints body should be appointed: 
The [complaints] agency‘s members should be democratically appointed 
following consultation with or approval by the legislature,…11  
How can the consultation with or the approval of the legislative branch guarantee 
independence in the complaints body? Under a parliamentary democracy, the legislature is 
an elected representative of the people, the fact that it has a capacity to approve, or at least 
to be consulted about, the appointment of members of the complaints authority reflects that 
the authority itself has representation of the people as well. Furthermore, they can neither 
bestow favours nor apply sanctions to any state agency as they do not have administrative 
authority in the way that the government does; therefore, they are generally seen to be 
neutral compared to the government. For these reasons, the appointment of nominated 
candidates to serve in the complaints body should be subject to parliamentary consultation 
or approval.  
 
                                                          
11
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 70. 
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Under the Thai constitutional structure, the selection and appointment of the members for 
the external complaints authorities is a two-stage process. In the preliminary stage, there 
will be the selection committee which verifies the credentials of each nominated candidate 
and shortlists those whom the committee views as qualified candidates to serve in each 
complaints body (see more detail about the elements of the selection committee in the next 
sub-section). The list of the selected candidates will then be passed on to the Senate for 
approval in the second stage. Where the Senate rejects some or all of the nominated 
candidates and requires the selection committee to redo the selection process, but the 
committee then reaffirms the original chosen candidates with unanimity, the Senate is 
obligated to proceed with the appointment of those candidates. If there is no unanimity of 
opinion amongst the members of the committee, the selection process shall restart and 
must be finished within 30 days after the date that the non-unanimity of opinion has 
reached.12 The parliamentary approval process, however, is not applied to the RTP because 
the selection and appointment of the National Police Chief is conducted by the Office of 
Board of the Royal Thai Police (OBRTP)13 whilst promotions for other police officers are 
determined by the Office of the Police Commission (OPC);14 both of which bodies are 
presided over by the Prime Minister (see chapter 1).15  
 
                                                          
12
 Constitution (n 9) ss 243, 206(2) para 1; 256 para 5, 243, 206(2) para 1; 246 para 4, 206(2) para 1. Note 
that s 206(2) is applied mutatis mutandis to the selection and appointment of the ombudsmen, the NHRC 
commissioners and the NACC commissioners. According to s 111 of the Constitution, the Thai Senate is a 
hybrid model where half of its members come from election and another half come from selection. The 
Constitution will, hereinafter, be referred to as the ―Constitution‖.  
13
 NPA (n 10) s 18 (3). 
14
 ibid s 31 (3). 
15
 ibid ss 17 (1), 30 (1). 
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The appointment of the IPCC commissioners is akin to the RTP in that they are all 
government appointments,16 whilst the process is governed by the Code of Practice issued 
by the Office of the Commissioner for Public Appointments (OCPA).17  
According to the Paris Principles, dismissal of members of the complaints authority 
highlights another crucial aspect of independence. The principles which should govern this 
matter are expounded in the Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of National 
Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. It is prescribed as follows: 
To avoid compromising independence, the founding legislation should 
specify, in as much detail as possible, the circumstances under which a 
member may be dismissed. Naturally, these circumstances should relate 
to ascertainable wrongdoing of a serious nature….it is preferable that the 
power to dismiss be vested in parliament or at equivalently high level.18 
In Thailand, the criteria for removing members of the complaints authorities in question 
are specified in both the constitution and the enabling legislation of each complaints body. 
The ombudsmen, the NHRC and the NACC commissioners may be dismissed on grounds 
of misconduct, immoral conduct, corruption or a breach of law etc. 19  To commence 
dismissal proceedings, there must be a petition filed to the Senate for a vote of censure; in 
                                                          
16
 PRA (n 8) s 9 (2). Note that, under the English jurisdiction, the police forces are operationally autonomous 
of the government; thus, there might not be a strong case that the government and the police forces are likely 
to establish a collusive relationship in order to help one another. Nevertheless, the aforesaid is a separate 
matter which is irrelevant to this research.  
17
 Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointments to Public Bodies (the Office of the Commissioner for 
Public Appointments (OCPA), April 2012), this Code of Practice, hereinafter, will be referred to as the 
‗OCPA‘s Code of Practice‘. See also, Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗New IPCC 
Commissioner for Wales appointed by Home Secretary‘ (August 2013) 
<https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/new-ipcc-commissioner-wales-appointed-home-secretary> accessed 10 
May 2015.  
18
 UNCHR, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment and Strengthening of 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (Centre for Human Rights, UN 
1995) 11. This Handbook, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ―Handbook on National Institutions of 
Human Rights‖ 
19
 As regards the criteria for dismissal of the Thai Ombudsman, see Constitution (n 9) s 270 paras 1, 2(1); for 
the NACC, see Constitution (n 9) s 248 para 1; for the NHRC, see National Human Rights Commission Act 
1999, s 11 para 1; this Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗NHRC Act‘.   
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this regard, the resolution to discharge the member of the NACC requires three-fourth of 
the vote of the total number of the existing senators whilst the resolution to remove the 
member for both the Thai Ombudsman and the NHRC  needs three-fifth of such a vote.20 
Considering how the existing rules for dismissals are applied, independence in the 
complaints bodies is somewhat secure (see sub-section Independence, (b) Democratic 
appointments and dismissals of members in chapter 6). The criteria for dismissals 
explained in the Handbook on National Institutions of Human Rights, however, are not 
applicable to the RTP since dismissal of police officers is regulated by the standards of 
discipline which are tailor-made for the police force.21 When it comes to the IPCC, it is the 
Home Secretary alone who has the power to remove the chairman and the ordinary 
members of the IPCC according to paragraphs 1(4)(b) and 2(6), schedule 2 of the PRA. 22   
The appointments and dismissals of members of the independent complaints bodies in 
Thailand are apparently democratic. Even though the Senate does not have the absolute 
power to make a final decision on appointments, the way in which the selection committee 
passes the list of the nominated candidates to them for consideration ensures that they are 
at the least consulted. Overall, the appointments and dismissals of the members for the 
independent complaints authorities in Thailand not just satisfies the UN standard on 
democratic appointments but also conforms to the Paris Principles. In contrast, the RTP 
and the IPCC commissioners are not in conformity with the same international standards 
                                                          
20
 Constitution (n 9) ss 248 para 2, 274 para 1; see also NHRC Act (n 19) s 11 para 2. 
21
 NPA (n 10) pt 5 ‗discipline and disciplinary maintaining‘ 
22
 PRA (n 8) paras 1(4)(b), 2(6), sch 2: 
 
1(4) The chairman of the Commission may be removed from office by Her Majesty 
either— 
 (b) on being advised by the Secretary of State that there are grounds falling with   
                 sub-paragraph (5) for the removal of the chairman. 
 
2(6) The Secretary of State may at any time remove a person from office as an ordinary 
member if… 
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because the process of appointments and dismissals of personnel serving with these bodies 
are under the control of the executive branch.    
(c) Pluralistic representation 
A police complaints system is a type of mechanism for tackling abuses, some of which are 
abuses of human rights. The system should therefore be measured from a paradigm of 
human rights protection. From human rights perspectives, pluralistic representation in the 
complaints body helps uphold the independence of the complaints system. In this respect, 
the Paris Principles lay down that: 
The composition of the national institution and the appointment of its 
members, whether by means of an election or otherwise, shall be 
established in accordance with a procedure which affords all necessary 
guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of 
civilian society) involved in the protection and promotion of human 
rights…23      
Pluralistic representation is also incorporated in the principles prepared by the 
Commissioner for Human Rights and is prescribed as follows: 
The Independent Police Complaints Body (IPCB) should be 
representative of a diverse population…24 
How can pluralism secure independence in a police complaints system? Complaints 
against the police are similar to numerous human rights issues in that, to produce optimal 
solutions, the grounds for complaint need to be considered from a wide range of aspects, 
not just conventional law enforcement perspectives. A rich diversity of opinion is therefore 
                                                          
23
 Paris Principles (n 4) composition and guarantee of independence and pluralism, para 1. 
24
 Opinion of the Commissioner (n 3) para 38. 
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necessary and can be found in the reflections of people from different social and 
professional backgrounds.  
The OCPA‘s Code of Practice outlines that the appointments of executives to serve in 
public bodies in England should attract ―a strong and diverse field of suitable 
candidates‖.25 In line with the OCPA‘s Code of Practice, the facts show that, by and large, 
the IPCC commissioners have different professional backgrounds.26 On the contrary, the 
principle of pluralistic representation in the Thai complaints bodies has yet to be 
implemented as ―many posts [in various supposedly independent organisations] were filled 
by high-ranking former members of the military or the police force, and the same 
individuals circulated from one watchdog body to the next‖.27 One of the former chairs of 
the Ombudsman was a senior member of the military whilst one of the serving ombudsmen 
also has the same background.28 In addition, the fact that two out of five newly appointed 
commissioners for the NACC were senior members of the police and the military forces 
further substantiates that many posts in the watchdog bodies are filled by the people who 
have police or military backgrounds.29 Within the NHRC, a similar situation as that of the 
Ombudsman and the NACC also exists as one of its commissioners has a police 
                                                          
25
 OCPA (n 17) no. 2 (2.1). 
26
 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Chair and Commissioners‘ (IPCC) 
<https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/chair-and-commissioners> accessed 10 May 2015.  
27
 Peter Leyland, ‗Thailand‘s Constitutional Watchdogs: Dobermans, Bloodhounds or Lapdogs‘ (2007) 2 
JCL 151, 159. To date, it is still the case that some posts are filled by former senior members of the military 
and the police force. Note that, as the judiciary is playing an important role in the selection of members in a 
number of watchdog bodies under the 2007 Constitution, therefore, we will see many posts are also filled by 
former senior personnel from bureaucratic institutions including judges, prosecutors and so on.  
28
 See the backgrounds of the previous ombudsmen via <http://www.ombudsman.go.th/10/eng/3_2.asp>; see 
also, the backgrounds of the serving ombudsmen via  <http://www.ombudsman.go.th/10/eng/3_1.asp>. 
29
 ‗The NACC Tabled a Resolution to Bring the Case of the Somchai Administration Dispersed the PAD to 
the Supreme Court‘s Criminal Division for Person Holding Political Positions‘ Matichon Online (Bangkok, 
10 October 2008) <http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1349863225> accessed 10 
September 2014 [in Thai].  
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background.30 This pattern of appointment to the watchdog bodies in Thailand not only 
obstructs the involvement of civil society but also increases the risk of regulatory capture.31 
Even were that not so, the worry would remain that when most members are from similar 
professional backgrounds, one approach and set of understandings is likely to predominate 
in the decision-making process which could be detrimental to the handling of complaints. 
It is arguable that a lack of diversity in the elements of the complaints bodies in Thailand is 
due to the nature of the selection committee of those bodies. The selection committee of 
the NHRC, for example, comprises the following people: 
[T]he President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the 
Constitutional Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
the President of the House of Representatives, Leader of the Opposition 
in the House of Representatives, one person elected by the general 
assembly of the Supreme Court of Justice and one person elected by the 
general assembly of judges of the Supreme Administrative Court,… 32 
It can be seen that the selection committee is dominated by the judiciary and political 
figures. In this regard, the Sub-Committee on Accreditation (SCA) subordinate to the 
International Coordinating Committee for National Human Rights Institutions (ICC) 
rightly pointed out in its 2013 report that: 
[T]he enabling law [of the NHRC] does not provide a clear, transparent 
and participatory selection process that promotes merit based selection, 
ensures pluralism and promotes the independence of, and public 
                                                          
30
 See the backgrounds of the NHRC commissioners from ‗The National Human Rights Commission of 
Thailand (2009 - 2015)‘ <http://www.nhrc.or.th/en/Commissioners.php>. 
31
 See s III. External Complaints Authorities and the Element of Independence in ch 4. 
32
 Constitution (n 9) ss 256 para 5, 243. 
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confidence in, the senior leadership of a national human rights 
institution.33 
In response to the SCA, the NHRC has stressed in its press release the following: 
The NHRC acknowledged such concern [the SCA‘s concern over a lack 
of civil society groups‘ involvement in the selection process]. In this case 
[to address this concern], however, the amendment of the NHRC Act is 
required but this [to amend the Act] apparently falls outside the purview 
of the NHRC.34    
The matter was not left there, however. The SCA report notes that the NHRC was seeking 
to use its influence to bring about greater engagement of civil society groups: 
In its response, the NHRC had acknowledged concerns about the lack of 
participation in the selection process and indicated that it is advocating 
that the General Meeting of the Supreme Court of Justice and the 
General Meeting of the Arbitrators of the Supreme Administrative Court 
select two members from civil society.35  
For its part, the Ombudsman shares with the NHRC a similar problem when it comes to 
diversity in the elements of the selection committee because the selection process of both 
authorities is governed by the same key provision.36 As regards the NACC, the selection 
committee includes the following people: 
[T]he President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the 
Constitutional Court, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, 
                                                          
33
International Coordinating Committee for National Human Rights Institutions Sub-Committee on 
Accreditation, ‗Report and Recommendation of the Session of the Sub-Committee on Accreditation‘ (ICC, 
SCA October 2014) 32. This report hereinafter will be referred to as the ‗SCA report‘. 
34
 National Human Rights Commission, ‗The Announcement concerning the Proposal of the SCA to 
Relegate the Thai NHRC from an ‗A‘ to a ‗B‘ Status‘(NHRC, 16 January 2015) 
<http://www.nhrc.or.th/2012 /wb/th/news_detail.php?nid=3643&parent_id=1&type=hilight> accessed 20 
January 2015 [in Thai].  
35
 SCA‘s report (n 33). 
36
 Constitution (n 9) s 243. 
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the President of the House of Representatives and the Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Representatives. 37 
It can be seen that the elements of the selection committee for the NACC commissioners 
are even less inclusive compared to that of the Ombudsman and the NHRC. If we apply 
the human rights benchmark for pluralistic representation to the elements of the selection 
committee for the Thai Ombudsman and the NACC then we can see that there is a serious 
lack of diversity of members in the committee. This research argues further that a lack of 
diversity amongst the members of the selection committee has an impact upon the 
operational independence of the Ombudsman, NHRC and the NACC (see further 
discussion below).  
Judging by the principle of pluralistic representation, the enabling laws of each complaints 
authority under review failed to incorporate people from wider professional backgrounds 
not least civil society groups within the elements of the selection committee. Therefore, it 
is unlikely that the complaints bodies in question will be able to comply with the principle 
of pluralistic representation. It should be underlined that the principle of pluralistic 
representation is not applicable to the RTP.   
(d) Operational independence 
The issue of autonomy in a police complaints system can reasonably be claimed to boil 
down winning operational independence within the complaints agency. In the UN 
Handbook on Police Oversight, it is underlined that:  
The [police complaints] mechanism should have full operational and 
hierarchical independence from the police.38  
                                                          
37
 ibid s 246. 
38
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 70. 
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In the handling of police complaints, operational independence of the complaints system 
helps ensure that the investigation direction and/or the decision-making will not be subject 
to undue influence not least from the police. A police complaints system that is structurally 
independent, but falls within the ambit of the police force in reality is less likely to handle 
police complaints fairly and effectively. Full operational autonomy is therefore crucial for 
a police complaints system. In the course of my fieldwork in Thailand, a number of police 
officers interviewed for this research have shared their views on how the internal police 
complaints mechanisms can be operationally independent; one of them elaborated that: 
If you [ordinary people] look into the system from outside, you may 
think the internal system cannot be independent but I‘m telling you [the 
interviewer] what, there‘re a number of ways that we can guarantee the 
people that our complaints mechanism can be independent. First, when a 
complaint is made to us, we‘ll make sure that the person who investigates 
the complaint is holding a more superior rank compared to the officer 
complained against, and what‘s more, the investigator will not be a direct 
superior of that officer. In some cases, we‘ll invite the police from other 
force areas to investigate complaints in order to make sure that greater 
independence is secured. I don‘t know what people think of these 
approaches, but from my perspectives, I believe that the handling of 
complaints by the internal mechanism can be independent.39         
Can operational independence in the handling of police complaints be upheld by the police 
themselves? Globally, it has long been established that internal complaints systems often 
fail to deliver a fair and effective investigation because of a lack of operational 
independence. The following quote demonstrates this:  
To a large extent, attempts all over the world to combat police 
misconduct locally [i.e. internally] have revealed similar and recurrent 
                                                          
39
 Interview with [anonymous], a group of police officers (Thailand, 13 June 2014). 
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problems: police culture, lack of effective control of internal 
investigative procedures, lack of investigative resources, organisations 
and procedures which inhibit honest police and lack of public confidence 
in the police force‘s ability to investigate complaints against its 
members.40  
The internal police complaints system in Thailand suffers similar problems, if not more. In 
a group interview with the police officers, one of them made comments to the effect that 
institutional bias exists in the Thai police force.41 In addition, the discussion of the root 
causes behind a lack of impartiality in the RTP system in chapter 3 has also indicated the 
improbability of the RTP‘s system becoming impartial. The influence of the patronage 
system, either in the form of master-servant or fictive kinship relationships, serves to 
poison the investigator‘s mind and also allows bias to creep in the decision-making process. 
All of this suggests that, regardless of whether an investigation is conducted by officers of 
senior rank or by a seconded officer from other force areas, having the police investigate 
the police is very likely to lead to the undermining of operational independence in the 
handling of complaints. Thus, it is impossible for the internal system under the RTP to 
meet the UN criterion shown above.        
As regards the external complaints bodies in Thailand, the enabling legislation of each of 
them makes it clear that they all enjoy a separate legal autonomy and are not under the 
hierarchical command of the police force (see chapter 1).42 Nonetheless, the evidence of 
this research suggests that the systems under the above authorities lack true operational 
independence. There are a number of reasons which support this conclusion. First, 
according to the UN Handbook on Police Oversight: 
                                                          
40
 Tony Fitzgerald, ‗Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council‘ (Commission of 
Inquiry into Alleged Illegal Activities and Associated Police Misconduct 1989) 285.  
41
 See text accompanying nn 106-107 in ch 3. 
42
 Constitution (n 9) ss 242, 250, 256. 
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Making police staff members of an external agency should generally be 
avoided.43 
Some of the external complaints authorities in Thailand make use of active police officers 
in the handling of police complaints, even though those officers are not made members of 
the complaints authority. Most obvious is the NACC. According to section 89 of the 
NACC Act, the police are involved in the handling of complaints as one of the gateways to 
the NACC complaints system.44 In theory, the police are obliged by law only to receive and 
refer complaints cases to the NACC for further consideration. Nevertheless, as a result of a 
Memorandum of Understanding between the NACC and the RTP, the police now have a 
role in the NACC complaints system as an initial investigator.45 Here is where the problem 
emerges. According to previous studies on the NACC, apart from the cases that have been 
in the limelight, the role of the responsible police officer as the evidence collector in the 
early stage of an inquiry is problematic as most such officers do not take the gathering of 
evidence seriously. 46  The evidence from my interviews demonstrated that, in some 
complaints cases, the NACC has taken a back seat and left the cases to be dealt with by the 
police because the Commission sought to lighten its own burden. Under the police 
investigation, some complaints encountered unacceptable delay before they were dealt 
with.47 In addition to that, it is also arguable that having active police officers sitting in the 
NACC sub-committee can cause negative impacts upon the NACC investigation because, 
as the initial investigator, that officer may skew the facts and convince other members in 
the committee that the complaint lacks credible support and should be deemed 
unsubstantiated. 
                                                          
43
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 70. 
44
 See text accompanying n 113 in ch 4. 
45
 See text accompanying n 167 in ch 4. 
46
 See text accompanying n 170 in ch 4.        
47
 See text accompanying n 171 in ch 4. 
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We now focus on another important dimension of operational independence. From the 
ECtHR principles, the concept of operational independence should incorporate the 
following: 
[T]here shall be a lack of institutional …connection between 
investigators [serving with the complaints body] and the officer 
complained against.48 
In England and Wales, public concern over institutional connections between the IPCC 
investigators and the police is predicated upon a widespread perception that the IPCC 
investigators who have police backgrounds may be biased in favour of their former 
colleagues or their former forces. This perception is reflected via a number of NGOs‘ 
responses to the review of the IPCC‘s work in investigating deaths. The Police Action 
Lawyer Group (PALG) – a group of NGOs representing victims of police misconduct, 
alongside INQUEST – an independent charitable organisation, pointed out the following: 
Clearly, there is a crisis of confidence on the part of the public in the 
IPCC and the PALG hopes that this Review will assist the IPCC in 
reflecting upon this and opening itself up to the possibility of cultural 
change. In addressing the cause of this apparent culture of indifference, 
PALG considers that one reason may be the disproportionate number of 
investigators and staff at the IPCC who are formerly police officers, and 
maintain an overly close relationship with departments of Professional 
Standards.49 
                                                          
48
 Opinion of the Commissioner (n 3) para 63. 
49
 Police Action Lawyer Group, ‗Submissions to the Independent Police Complaints Commission regarding 
its Work in Cases involving a Death‘ (PALG, February 2013) <http://www.palg.org.uk/documents/> 
accessed 20 June 2015.  
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The high proportion of ex-police in pivotal and influential investigative 
positions also raises concerns about institutional and hierarchal 
independence.50  
In Thailand, the evidence that emerged over the course of interviews for this research 
suggests that complainants are usually sceptical of the role of ex-police in investigating 
police complaints.51 As one complainant expressed it: 
I think it was a stroke of luck that my case doesn‘t belong to that 
commissioner [the commissioner who was a police officer]; otherwise, I 
don‘t know what would happen to my case. I feel really sorry for those 
complainants that their cases have been dealt with by that commissioner; 
I believe the chances of bias creeping in the handling of those complaints 
are likely.52    
One of the NHRC commissioners expressed the following view on the role of people with 
a police background:  
Personally, I don‘t welcome the fact that ex-police are playing quite a 
significant role in the human rights body. But I find it hard to change 
things because it is the law that allows these people [people with a police 
background] to sit in the commission. The only thing we can do is to 
amend the constitution and I think we‘re going to need an open debate as 
to why people with a police background shouldn‘t be allowed to take part 
in a complaints body.53 
We shall leave the above point and a possible solution to be discussed in the next chapter 
on reforms in police complaints in Thailand. For now, we move on to political interference 
                                                          
50
 INQUEST, ‗Response to the IPCC‘s Review of Work in Cases involving a Death‘ (2013), 
<https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/review-ipccs-work-investigating-deaths-consultation-activities-and-
responses> accessed 20 June 2015.   
51
 See text accompanying n 159 in ch 4, for instance, where the complainant in question was evidently 
deeply mistrustful of the commissioner with a police background. 
52
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant A (Bangkok, Thailand, 25 June 2014). 
53
 Interview with [anonymous], the NHRC commissioner (Bangkok, Thailand, 17 July 2014). 
 
 
Page 212 of 367 
 
which also has an impact upon operational independence in the handling of police 
complaints. According to the UN Handbook on Police Oversight:  
The [police complaints] mechanism should be free from executive or 
political influence.54 
It is highlighted in chapters 1 and 3 that the police organisation in Thailand is under 
political control and is also highly politicised; thus, it is impossible for the RTP internal 
system to meet the UN criteria for being free from political influence. Leaving aside the 
police force, we should also be conscious of the possibility that the external complaints 
systems will be politically interfered with. It should be noted that political influence can 
also put the complaints authorities in the position of being captured. 
We saw above that the IPCC commissioners are appointed by the government.55 Although 
the issue of political interference in the IPCC has never been raised, it is worth underlining 
that the IPCC is not in conformity to the above UN criterion. In Thailand, since the 
Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC came into operation in the late 1990s, the attempts 
of successive Thai governments to interfere with their work became most evident during 
the administration of Thaksin Shinawatra (2001 - 2006). Pongsudhirak underlined the 
issues of political interference during the Thaksin administration as follows:      
The TRT [Thai Rak Thai party] has monopolised the party system, 
marginalised the opposition, co-opted and coerced the media, extended 
its controlling tentacles over the military and the police, and shunned the 
dissenting voices of civil society groups. The vaunted democratic 
institutions have become politicised and penetrated by the very vested 
interests they were established to root out. The Senate, which is supposed 
                                                          
54
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 70. 
55
 PRA (n 8) s 9(2). 
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to be politically unaffiliated, has become increasingly partisan in the 
government‘s favour.56 
Leyland pointed out that the Thaksin government was able to take control of the majority 
of senators via ‗illicit payments‘ to them, this led to the government‘s success in 
manipulating the upper house.57 The Thai Senate is designed to be a non-political chamber 
and senators have a pivotal role in approving members for independent watchdog bodies 
including the ombudsmen, the NHRC commissioners and the NACC commissioners. 58 
Political interference in the Senate which neutralises the independence of the Senate itself 
can therefore produce a domino effect on the independence of the watchdog bodies. This 
point is substantiated by Leyland‘s conclusion which underlined that: 
There was a creeping trend towards capture…. [since] Thaksin [a former 
Prime Minister], in his various terms in office, increasingly was able to 
put his nominees into positions which in effect neutralise the 
effectiveness of these [watchdog] bodies.59    
The legacy of that government has arguably set a precedent for people who have served 
with the police to seek future careers in watchdog bodies. Certainly, many posts in the 
police watchdogs, for instance, are still filled by former members of the military, the police 
force and also those having close relationships with people in government.60 Last but not 
least, it is worth pointing out that, for the NACC in particular, political interference may 
occur at the level of a sub-committee as well.61 Previous studies have highlighted that there 
is no mechanism for checking the credentials of those who will be appointed as a member 
                                                          
56
 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, ‗Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism‘ [2003] Southeast Asian Affairs 277, 
277-278. Note that the former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was a leader of the TRT party. 
57
 Leyland (n 27) 158. 
58
 See text accompanying n 12. 
59
 Peter Leyland, ‗Politics and the Rule of Law in Thailand‘ (17 January 2011) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDTHHSE9GUs> accessed 10 August 2015.  
60
 See text accompanying nn 27-30. 
61
 See text accompanying n 137 in ch 4. 
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of the NACC sub-committee (see chapter 4). This therefore arguably creates a loophole in 
which people who have close ties with the government can be appointed to serve in a sub-
committee. All of this ultimately increases the chance of the NACC sub-committee being 
subject to infiltration by those who seek to help the officer complained against. Political 
interference is therefore another area of concern over regulatory capture in the complaints 
authorities in Thailand.  
On the surface, it is indisputable that the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC all 
satisfy the UN criterion for operational independence as the complaints systems under the 
control of them are independent of both the police force and the government. However, it 
is also arguable that, as things stand, the engagement of active police officers as well as 
those who have police backgrounds in the systems under control of the above authorities 
demonstrates that the operation of these systems is creeping towards capture.     
(e) Financial autonomy 
It is not realistic to expect an independent police complaints body to be fully independent 
if it needs to rely on the budget of government ministries or other government agencies. 
The most obvious reason is that the complaints body will be pushed into a situation where 
it succumbs to political interference or compromise in the handling of complaints in 
consequence of the influence of government ministers who have control over the budget. 
To protect itself from interference and to enhance independence in the handling of 
complaints, the complaints authority should therefore be granted financial autonomy in 
order to manage its own budgets. In this respect, the UN Handbook suggests that: 
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Financial independence should be secured by having the agency‘s budget 
approved by the legislature, with statutory guarantees for the size and 
timing of the disbursement or the annual budget.62 
In Thailand, the Office of the NHRC, pursuant to section 21 of the NHRC Act, has the 
following responsibility in relation to finance for its own business: 
The Office of the National Human Rights Commission shall, with the 
consent of the Commission, submit an estimated annual budget to the 
Council of Ministers via the President of the National Assembly for its 
consideration of appropriate budgets, adequate for the independent 
administration of the Commission, in an annual appropriation bill or 
supplementary appropriation bill, as the case may be.63 
Consistent with the way the NHRC proposes its annual budget, the Thai Ombudsman and 
the NACC also follow much the same line and place the following duty on their own 
administrative offices: 
The Office of the Ombudsman shall, in the joint agreement with the 
ombudsmen, submit an estimated annual budget to the Cabinet… for the 
Cabinet to consider in an annual budget bill or an additional annual 
budget bill.64    
The Office of the National Anti-Corruption Commission shall, according 
to the NACC proposal, submit an estimated annual budget to the 
Cabinet… for the Cabinet to consider in an annual budget bill or an 
additional annual budget bill.65     
Even though each complaints body needs to submit its estimated annual budget to the 
Cabinet, in the end, the parliament will have its role in analysing and debating this budget 
                                                          
62
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 70. 
63
 NHRC Act (n 19) s 21. 
64
 Office of the Ombudsman Act 2009, s 12.  
65
 Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999, s 115. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗NACC 
Act‘. 
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in accordance with paragraphs 1-3, section 168 of the 2007 Constitution.66 This means the 
budgets of the external complaints authorities, in any event, are subject to parliamentary 
approval. It should be noted that the RTP annual budget is also subject to parliamentary 
approval through the submission of the government‘s annual budget bill to the 
parliament.67  
The way in which each complaints body in Thailand receives the funding it needs 
apparently meets the UN standard on financial independence, as the procedures for 
approving the government‘s annual budget bill (in which the funding for each complaints 
authority is included) do require parliamentary involvement and support. 
Powers 
One lesson that can be drawn from the history of police complaints reforms in England and 
Wales, not least during the lifetime of the IPCC‘s predecessor – the Police Complaints 
Authority (PCA) – is that a police complaints authority that is under-equipped with powers 
will not be capable of resolving complaints effectively.68 In the UN Handbook on Police 
Oversight, it is underlined that an external police complaints body should be furnished 
with sufficient powers. These powers include the following:  
                                                          
66
 Constitution (n 9) s 168: 
 
The House of Representatives must finish the consideration and analysis of the 
annual appropriations bill, a supplementary appropriations bill and a transfer of 
appropriations bill within one hundred and five days as from the date the bill is 
introduced to the House of Representatives. 
 
If the House of Representatives has not finished the consideration of the bill within 
the period referred to in paragraph one, such bill shall be deemed to have been 
approved by the House of Representatives and shall be submitted to the Senate. 
 
In the consideration by the Senate, the Senate must approve or disapprove it without 
any amendment within twenty days as from the date the bill is introduced to the 
Senate. Upon the lapse of such period, such bill shall be deemed to have been 
approved; in such case and in the case where the Senate approves it, further 
proceedings under section 150 shall be taken. 
 
67
 ibid. 
68
 Mike Maguire and Claire Corbett, A Study of the Police Complaints System (HMSO 1991) 19-26. See also, 
John Harrison and Stephen Cragg, Police Misconduct: Legal Remedies (3rd edn, Legal Action Group 1995) 
34. 
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(a) Power to receive complaints 
Receiving a complaint is an important initial process of the grievance handling cycle. In 
the UN Handbook on Police Oversight, it is suggested that: 
The [complaints] mechanism should be authorised by legislation to 
receive complaints from any person.69 
This particular criterion raises two interesting points; first, the capability of a complaints 
agency to receive direct complaints; second, the eligibility of would-be complainants. As 
regards the first point, the IPCC research on direct complaints reflected why the 
complaints authority should have the power to receive direct complaints. The research 
found that the complainants sought to submit their grievances against the police directly to 
the IPCC for many reasons. The most common were: 
[T]hey [complainants] did not believe that the police would deal with 
their complaint fairly …, they wanted to complain to an independent 
organisation …, and that they feared police harassment/other police 
action ...70 
As one complainant interviewed for the IPCC research put it:  
If there was a body that I could go to, independent of the police station, 
forget that, somebody, some office, some, a building you can go to like 
the Jobcentre and go in there and say, look I‘ve got a complaint against 
this policeman, this, that, what can I do about it, yeah I probably would 
go in there and do it. But to actually, as you say, walk straight into a 
police station and say, I‘ve got a complaint against one of your 
                                                          
69
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 69. 
70
 Harry Hagger Johnson, ‗Direct Complaints: A Survey Seeking Feedback from People who Complain 
Directly to the IPCC‘ (IPCC 2010) 14.  
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colleagues, I don‘t think so somehow ‘cos you‘ve got a camera up there 
in that little corner that‘s pointing at you.71 
On the point of an eligible complainant, the fact that anybody is permitted to make a 
complaint is significant. It does not take much imagination to understand that would-be 
complainants, not least those who are direct victims of serious malpractice, would find it 
intimidating to lodge their complaints against the police with the police. In the work of 
Smith, the evidence indicated that:  
[A] majority of the claimants expressed fear at the fact that they had 
suffered at the hands of members of the public institution responsible for 
their personal safety. Their fears extended beyond the dread of a repeat 
experience to a deep-rooted sense of insecurity and more general feelings 
of alienation.72 
In the circumstances described above, it will be to the victim‘s advantage should a proxy 
complaint be allowed. Also, it is right that people who have witnessed police abuse are 
able to make a complaint, for the benefit of the society as a whole. For these reasons, 
widening the gateway to a complaints system by allowing ‗any person‘ to make a 
complaint can prove to be an effective approach to the tackling of police abuse. Hence, the 
capability of the complaints body to receive direct complaints is arguably critical to 
complainants‘ personal confidence and the confidence of the public in the complaints 
system.  
The power to receive a complaint, however, should not be naively interpreted as the 
capability to ‗accept a complaint‘ only; also, this should mean the ability to ‗record‘ and to 
                                                          
71
 ibid. 
72
 Graham Smith, ‗Actions for Damages against the Police and the Attitudes of Claimants‘ (2003) 13 
Policing and Society 413, 416. 
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‗initiate‘ the handling of complaints. 73 For its part, the IPCC is incapable under most 
circumstances of dealing with complaints from the outset, it merely accepts complaints and 
passes them to local police forces for recording.74 The incapability of the IPCC to record a 
complaint arguably gives rise to two major problems. First and foremost, public 
confidence in the IPCC system is likely to be undermined. In 2014, the IPCC 
commissioned research to explore the confidence of the British public in the system it 
oversees; the findings illustrated that: 
Just under half of the public would go to the police force concerned or 
their local police station if they wanted to make a complaint (44%), with 
half (51%) saying they would go elsewhere to complain.75 
In addition, those who have had their direct complaints with the IPCC diverted to local 
police forces recounted the following experience during interviews: 
I was passed from department to department [within the force concerned], 
I had promises from officers who said they would contact me but I heard 
nothing.76 
I simply did not get a reply despite several verbal and written 
reminders.77 
 
                                                          
73
 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 53; see also, Special Rapporteur Report (n 6) paras 32-34 
74
 See text accompanying n 19 in ch 4. Note that, once a complaint has been recorded, the police shall refer 
such complaint to the IPCC if: 
 
 [the complaint] relates to any incident or circumstances in or in consequence of which any person 
has died or suffered serious injury (see paragraph 13(1)(a), schedule 3 of the PRA); 
 [the complaint] falls within the mandatory referral criteria laid down in regulation 4 and 7, Police 
(Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012;or 
 the IPCC notifies the appropriate authority that it requires that matter to be referred to the 
Commission for its consideration (see paragraph 13(1)(c), schedule 3 of the PRA). 
  
75
 Paul Harvey, Sarah Shepherd and Tom Magill, Public Confidence in the Police Complaints System (Ipsos 
MORI 2014) 20. 
76
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The IPCC has rightly pointed out that: 
The decision whether to record a complaint is a point of potential 
antagonism for members of the public,…the possibility that a complaint 
may not be recorded makes explaining the system to members of the 
public more difficult.78 
The fact that the IPCC needs to rely on the police to record and initiate the complaints 
handling process does nothing positive but merely adds another layer of bureaucracy in the 
system. One of the IPCC complainants offered the following response in relation to how 
the IPCC deals with direct complaints: 
So basically, it‘s pointless going through the IPCC if that option is really 
going directly to the [police force name] police complaints department.79 
Turning next to the systems under the Thai Ombudsman and the NHRC, the regulations 
governing both of them permit any person to file a complaint to them; thus, the 
Ombudsman and the NHRC apparently fulfil the UN criterion for receiving complaints.80 
Unlike the IPCC, the Thai Ombudsman and the NHRC have the power not just to receive 
direct complaints but also to handle them from the start (see chapter 4). The NACC also 
meets the UN criterion on receiving complaints but some concerns can be raised about 
access to its system. First, the enabling law of the NACC does not make clear who is 
eligible to make a complaint; moreover, the NACC system also lacks an effective guide for 
would-be complainants to navigate the system, this poses specific difficulties for ordinary 
people who seek to register complaints with them. 81  Last but not least, it should be 
                                                          
78
 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Improving Police Integrity: Reforming the Police 
Complaints and Disciplinary Systems‘ (IPCC 2015) para 52. 
79
 Johnson (n 70) 12. 
80
 See text accompanying nn 10 and 61 in ch 4. 
81
 See texts accompanying nn 141-142 in ch 4.  
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underlined that the RTP is capable of receiving and dealing with complaints from start to 
finish.82  
(b) Power to be informed about deaths of individuals during or following police 
contact 
In Thailand, the police do not have a duty to report cases involving deaths during or 
following police contact to the external complaints authorities. Thus, it may not be sensible 
to use the UN criteria concerning the reporting of deaths to benchmark against them. 
However, I will discuss this particular matter in the chapter on reforms in the Thai police 
complaints systems (see sub-section Powers (c) Involvement in the post-mortem 
examination in chapter 6). 
(c) Power to conduct an investigation 
Investigation, as the truth finding process, is critical to the handling of complaints as it is a 
stepping stone to the determination of whether complaints should be substantiated. In the 
UN Handbook on Police Oversight, it is stressed that:  
The [complaints] agency should be authorised to undertake 
investigations into complaints received.83 
The research on the confidence of the British public discussed earlier presented the 
following chart revealing popular views on who should investigate police complaints?84 
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 Police Regulations on Factual Investigation 2013, reg 4 (2). 
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 UN Handbook on Police Oversight (n 2) 69. 
84
 Harvey and others (n 75) 25. 
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0 20 40 60 80
A police officer being rude
Being stopped and searched by police officers
Failure by a police officer to offer adequate protection
to a vulnerable person
Excessive use of force by a police officer
A police officer displaying racist behaviour or attitude
Dies in a road traffic incident after being pursued
Dies from an existing illness while being detained
Dies after being restrained by police officers
while detained in a cell
A case of serious corruption by a police officer
Non-police =
Independent body from
outside the police,
or the Police and Crime
Commissioner (PCC)
Police = the police
force involved,
or one from another
area
 Chart 5.1: Police or non-police investigation of the police 
It is apparent that, apart from the issues of incivility and stop and search powers which are 
generally less serious, the majority of people wish to have their complaints investigated by 
a non-police body under most circumstances.  
Based on the above research findings, the power to investigate complaints is very 
important not just to the truth-finding process but also in terms of maintaining public 
confidence in the complaints system. It is therefore suggested that the external complaints 
body should have their own power to investigate complaints.85 In England and Wales, 
paragraph 15(4), schedule 3 of the PRA lays down that: 
The only forms which the investigation may take in accordance with a 
determination made under this paragraph are—  
(a)   an investigation by the appropriate authority on its own behalf;  
(b)  an investigation by that authority under the supervision of the    
       Commission;  
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 Special Rapporteur Report (n 6) para 34. 
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(c)  an investigation by that authority under the management of the  
 Commission;  
(d)  an investigation by the Commission. 
 
Under the English system, although the IPCC does not investigate every complaint, it is 
surely capable of investigating complaints on its own behalf. Hence, the IPCC would 
appear to be in conformity with the UN criteria. However, the adverse consequence of 
having the police sharing investigatory responsibility with the IPCC was evident in many 
high-profile cases. The death of Ian Tomlinson during the 2009 G20 protests in London is 
illustrative of the difference of the end result of a police investigation managed by the 
IPCC, and an IPCC independent investigation.86 In this case, the IPCC, at first, decided not 
to launch its own independent investigation and left the matter in the hands of the City of 
London Police as it claimed that the death of Mr. Tomlinson [at that stage] could not be 
linked to contact with the police. 87  
Later, the police investigation concluded that the death of Mr.Tomlinson was not the 
responsibility of the accused officer.88 However, it was not until the video footage of the 
assault upon Mr.Tomlinson by the accused officer was released that the IPCC decided to 
investigate the case independently and order another autopsy.89 The findings of the second 
post-mortem, together with the IPCC independent investigation, showed that 
Mr.Tomlinson died in consequence of a physical attack carried out by the accused officer 
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 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Independent Investigation into the Death of Ian Tomlinson 
on 1
st
 April 2009‘ (IPCC 2010) 10-11. 
87
 ibid 65. The reason for this was offered as follows: 
 
No such decision [on the IPCC involvement] could be made regarding the mode of 
investigation into the death of Mr.Tomlinson at this point as the relationship between his 
collapse and subsequent death, and the police, was unknown. Therefore, at this stage, the 
decision was made to closely monitor the investigation being undertaken by the City of 
London Police… 
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 ibid 73. 
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on him.90 It can be seen that the IPCC completely misjudged the complaint about Mr. 
Tomlinson‘s death from the outset because it was misled by the police.  
We can understand from chapter 1 and also from the previous chapter that although the 
Thai Ombudsman and the NHRC are both capable of addressing complaints, 91  their 
inquiries do not pave the way for disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings. Unlike these 
two bodies, the NACC‘s remit is to investigate every complaint about corruption and 
malfeasance in office allegedly committed by officers of at least Superintendent level (see 
chapter 1); nonetheless, the paramount concern over the impartiality of these investigations 
lies with the fact that active police officers are involved with the handling of complaints 
under the NACC system (see chapter 4). The evidence from this research suggests that 
most Thai police officers are keen to employ all types of devious tactics to ensure that 
there will be no investigation or the investigation will be conducted in favour of the police 
themselves.92 Drawing the lesson from Mr. Tomlinson‘s case in England, the NACC is 
highly likely to be misled by the police at times.  
As emphasised in the UN Handbook, the power to investigate police malpractice does not 
always need a complaint; indeed, the complaints body should ―have the capacity to start an 
investigation on its own initiative‖.93 It was outlined in the preceding chapter that the IPCC 
does not have the power to investigate malpractice on its own initiative as the Commission 
explained that, in most circumstances, the IPCC will become able to act only after the 
                                                          
90
 ibid 127-128. 
91
 Organic Act on Ombudsmen 2009, ss 31 para 1, 15(1), (2); see also, NHRC Act (n 19) ss 25 para 1, 26 
para 1, 32(1), (2). See also, the statutory functions of these bodies in ch 1. 
92
 See sub-s Impartiality in a Local Complaints System in ch 3.  
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police has taken the initial step.94 In contrast to the IPCC, the Thai complaints bodies in 
question are all capable of conducting an investigation on their own initiative.95       
In view of the fact that the Thai Ombudsman and the NHRC are incapable of undertaking 
an investigation directed at disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings to follow, it can be 
claimed that they are not in conformity with the UN criteria on the power of investigation. 
As for the NACC and the IPCC, even though they conform to the relevant UN criteria the 
fact that they share with the police some responsibility to investigate complaints, including 
some serious ones, causes a real worry in terms of effectiveness and impartiality. In 
addition, when it comes to the capability to handle complaints on one‘s own initiative, it 
was found that the Thai complaints bodies are all in compliance with the UN criteria whilst 
the IPCC is not. 
(d) Investigatory powers  
Unless a complaints body is well-equipped with sufficient powers, being able to launch an 
investigation alone is unlikely to be sufficient to get to the bottom of the matter. The 
investigatory powers that effectually allow the complaints body to compel police 
cooperation are vital to the conduct of an effective investigation. Discussion about 
investigatory powers in this sub-section therefore focuses on the power to compel police 
cooperation. In this regard, it is underlined in the UN Handbook on Police Oversight that: 
The [complaints] agency should have the power to compel police 
cooperation with its investigations…96  
In England and Wales, the IPCC has a wide range of powers akin to that of the police 
when they investigate crimes97 yet still struggles to gain full cooperation from the police. 
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 See text accompanying n 19 in ch 4. 
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The IPCC claim that, more often than not, the officers involved decline to answer the 
questions verbally during an interview; however, in some cases, the IPCC also failed to 
treat the officers involved as suspects and interview them under caution.98  
Turning now to the NHRC system, section 32 (1) – (3) of the NHRC Act provide the 
Commission with the power to instruct the officers involved to present their evidence 
and/or to attend an interview. Nevertheless, under section 33 of the legislation, sanctions 
against those who refuse to comply with the Commission‘s instructions may be applied to 
a civilian or a private organisation but not an official; this therefore creates a loophole in 
the NHRC inquiry.99 The landmark cases of the Trans Thai-Malaysia Gas Pipeline and the 
Koh Tao murder case, coupled with the interview given to this research by the NHRC 
commissioner, confirmed how lacking the NHRC is in terms of binding authority to 
compel police cooperation (see also sub-section Powers, (h) Deploying powers, chapter 
6).100 By comparison, the NACC is clearly capable of compelling police cooperation since 
section 118 of the NACC Act introduces penalties for those who fail to comply with the 
Commission‘s instructions, not least the instructions under section 25(1) concerning 
attendance at an investigation interview.101 In line with the NACC, the Ombudsman also 
has a wide range of investigatory powers under its statutory structure. The Ombudsman is 
capable of ordering the officers involved to submit the evidence and/or to come in for an 
interview pursuant to section 15(1), (2) and (4) of its enabling legislation, for instance. 
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 PRA (n 8) sch 3, para 19(4)(b). 
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 See text accompanying nn 93-94 in ch 4. 
99
 NHRC Act (n 19) s 33. Note that, the NHRC had made an effort to propose the amendment of its enabling 
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section 33 of the existing legislation in order for the NHRC to be able to compel cooperation from an official; 
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Much the same as the NACC, provision is made for punitive measures against those who 
fail to comply with the Ombudsman‘s instructions.102  
As an investigatory body, the complaints authority needs to have sufficient power to 
investigate properly in order to undertake an effective investigation. Judging from the 
above analysis, whilst the NACC and the Ombudsman similarly have the power to compel 
police cooperation, the NHRC does not have any binding authority to do the same. The 
NHRC therefore does not satisfy the UN criteria for investigatory powers.   
(e) Power to refer cases for criminal prosecution  
Sometimes, the investigation outcome identifies not just a disciplinary offence but also a 
criminal offence. Under such circumstances, the UN Handbook on Police Oversight 
underlines that: 
The [complaints] agency should have the power to refer cases for 
criminal prosecution to the public prosecutor.103 
Prior to the referral of cases for prosecution, the capability of the complaints body to 
identify whether a criminal offence may have been committed is an important prerequisite. 
This means the complaints authority should have the power to investigate criminal aspects 
of complaints it receives. Looking at the system under the NACC, section 97 of its 
enabling law apparently provides the Commission with the power to refer complaints cases 
for criminal prosecution and, under certain conditions, the NACC is capable of bringing 
the case to court itself.104 This shows that the NACC not just met the UN criteria for 
referral of cases for prosecution; actually, it has more power than the UN called for. In 
England and Wales, paragraph 23 (2)(C), schedule 3 of the PRA prescribes that the IPCC 
                                                          
102
 Ombudsman Act (n 91) s 45. 
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shall determine if the investigation outcomes should be notified to the Director of Public 
Prosecution. What this suggests is that the IPCC has the power to investigate and refer 
complaints cases for criminal prosecution, even though in comparison with the NACC in 
Thailand, the IPCC is less powerful on this matter. 
With regards to the Thai Ombudsman, section 34 of the Ombudsman Act makes it clear 
that it is not the business of the Ombudsman to drill down into matters relating to criminal 
offences, rather, if evidence of a criminal offence is found, the complaint shall be referred 
to the agency having investigatory powers to take further action. 105 One of the senior 
inquiry officers serving with the Ombudsman commented as follows during an interview 
for this research:  
Let me put it this way, assuming we found that the officer complained 
against may have perpetrated a criminal offence, we would refer the 
complaint to the police and inform them to convene a [investigatory] 
panel to look into the matter. But if we are of opinion that the officer at 
fault may have committed malfeasance in office, we will refer the 
complaint case to the NACC as the appropriate authority. In both cases, 
the bodies involved need to keep us informed of the progress once every 
three months.106  
This confirms that the Ombudsman has no power to commence criminal proceedings and 
refer the complaints for criminal prosecution. Instead, it needs to instruct the appropriate 
authority that has direct responsibility for a criminal investigation to take action. Thus, the 
Ombudsman is unable to satisfy the UN standard on referral of complaints for prosecution. 
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 Ombudsman Act (n 91) s 34. 
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 Interview with [anonymous], a senior inquiry officer of the Ombudsman (Bangkok, Thailand, 30 July 
2014). Note that in some cases, the Ombudsman also refers complaints cases to the NACC for further 
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Moving on to the NHRC, paragraph 1, section 28 of the NHRC Act underlines that, having 
concluded the investigation, if the NHRC views that human rights abuses have been 
committed by the officer involved, the Commission shall inform the officer involved or the 
appropriate authority about the legal duties and methods of performance for the remedy of 
the violation of human rights.107 However, the Commission does not have the power to 
instigate criminal proceedings nor does it have the power to refer complaints to the public 
prosecutor. 108  For example, in the NHRC inquiry case no. 474/2556, the complainant 
claimed to have been assaulted by the police following the arrest. In this case, the NHRC 
determined that there was a violation of human rights by the police; however, the 
Commission did not refer this complaint to the public prosecutor. Instead, it instructed the 
RTP to command the police force area concerned to investigate further and give its opinion 
on prosecution to the public prosecutor. 109  In this respect, the NHRC commissioner 
interviewed for this research explained that when it comes to referral of complaints to 
criminal prosecution: 
We cannot refer complaints directly to the public prosecutor. What we 
can do is just to conclude the investigation and if we‘re of opinion that 
the officer complained against may have committed a criminal offence, 
we will order the police to conduct an investigation but if an offence is 
related to malfeasance in office, we‘ll refer the case to the NACC. That‘s 
what we can and are now doing.110 
The interview clearly substantiated the argument that the NHRC does not have the power 
to refer complaints to the public prosecutor as, similarly to the Ombudsman, it needs to 
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 NHRC Act (n 19) s 28 para 1. 
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 Pirom Sriprasert, ‗The Problems Relating to the Procedures of Investigation of Human Rights Violations 
by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand‘ (LLM Thesis, Thammasat University 2008) 115-
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refer the complaint to the appropriate authority which has direct responsibility to 
investigate a criminal offence. 
We may thus conclude that, apart from the NACC, the external complaints authorities in 
Thailand do not fulfill the UN criteria concerning the power to refer for criminal 
prosecution. 
(f) Power to suggest (and enforce) disciplinary measures 
Substantiation of complaints means little unless action has been taken to remedy the cause 
for complaint. When a complaint is substantiated, the UN Handbook on Police Oversight 
emphasises that:  
The [complaints] agency should have the power to suggest disciplinary 
measures to the police department.111  
Whilst the power to propose disciplinary measures alone may not ensure any concrete 
result, one can argue that such a proposal will put some pressure on the police themselves, 
at least in terms of having to explain themselves to the public if they decide not to accept 
the complaints body‘s suggestions.  
Let us first consider the system under the Thai Ombudsman. Having substantiated 
complaints, the Ombudsman is capable of putting forward remedial measures to the police 
force area concerned or the RTP pursuant to paragraph 1, section 32. Notably, one of the 
senior inquiry officers of the Ombudsman interviewed for this research elaborated upon 
the authority of section 32 as follows: 
Putting it simply, section 32 is like a panacea for the problem, it‘s about 
methods, it‘s about the means of solving problems. This means if the 
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Ombudsman is of the opinion that something is helpful in addressing 
cause for complaint, he or she will recommend that to the police or any 
other appropriate authorities. But this power is not for us to determine 
what disciplinary action the police should take against the officer at 
fault.112      
The same interviewee also pointed out that under section 34 paragraph 1 of the 
Ombudsman Act, if the Ombudsman is of the opinion that a criminal offence and/or a 
disciplinary offence may have been committed, it may require the police to initiate an 
investigation into such complaints cases.113 For instance the Ombudsman found in one case 
that the officer complained against had deliberately delayed recording the alleged offence 
reported to him with further intention to ‗Pao Kadee‘– to allow the case to go unrecorded 
(see chapter 3); it determined that such an act amounted to a breach of discipline. Then, it 
went on to require that the police force area involved, as the appropriate authority, should 
investigate the matter by relying on the findings of its inquiry report.114 Here the question is 
whether the power to order the police to convene an investigatory panel to investigate a 
criminal offence is equivalent to the power to suggest disciplinary measures and thus in 
accordance with the UN criteria?  I would tentatively answer this in the affirmative, but 
with the rider that requiring an investigative panel to be set up is a relatively weak form of 
such power.  
Under the NHRC system, the procedure following the inquiry is similar to the Ombudsman 
which is that subsequent to the substantiation of complaints, the Commission has the 
power to propose remedial measures to the police force area concerned or the RTP in 
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 Interview with a senior inquiry officer of the Ombudsman (n 106). 
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 Ombudsman Act (n 91) s 34. 
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 Office of the Ombudsman, ‗Annual Report 2011‘ (Thai Ombudsman 2011) 104-107 [in Thai].  
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accordance with section 28 paragraph 1 of the NHRC Act.115 In the interview with one of 
the NHRC commissioners, the power of section 28 was explained as follows: 
The power to recommend remedial measures in section 28 enables the 
NHRC to come up with any possible approach to the problem. For 
instance, in case of police misconduct, we may suggest the police set up 
an investigatory penal to look further into the matter, if we are of opinion 
that the officer complained against may have committed disciplinary 
offences.116  
Much the same as the Ombudsman, this interview reflected that the NHRC is capable of 
suggesting that the police force area concerned should appoint an investigatory panel. As a 
result, it can be seen that the NHRC is also in conformity with the UN criteria.  
As opposed to other complaints authorities in Thailand, the NACC has the power to direct 
the police to take specific disciplinary action against the wrongdoer.117 In 2012, the NACC 
handled a high profile complaint against the then Commander of the Metropolitan Police 
Division 1 – Police Major General Wichai Sangprapai – who had capitalised upon an arrest 
warrant by unlawfully taking the arrestee into custody in order to made her repay 10 
million Thai Baht to a creditor (the then Commander‘s personal contact). Having 
investigated the matters, the NACC arrived at the decision that the then Commander was 
guilty of abuse of power; afterwards, the Commission directed the RTP to take disciplinary 
action pursuant to sections 78 (1) and 79 (1), (5) and (6) of the NPA on grounds of both 
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misconduct and gross misconduct. 118  This apparently shows that the NACC system 
complies with the UN criteria. 
Turning to the English system, according to paragraphs 23 and 27 of schedule 3 to the 
PRA, the IPCC has the power to notify the police force concerned that the officer 
complained against has a case to answer for misconduct or gross misconduct and then 
make recommendations to the force concerned that a disciplinary meeting or hearing 
should be held. In case the force concerned has failed to implement such recommendations, 
the IPCC also has the power to direct them to do so. This illustrates that the IPCC can 
require the police to adopt its recommendations on disciplinary proceedings, although not 
to the extent of ordering what specific outcome should follow.       
Apart from the power to suggest disciplinary measures, it is suggested further in the UN 
Handbook on Police Oversight that the external complaints body, if it is to be perceived as 
strong, should also ―be able to enforce proposed disciplinary measures‖.119 Referring again 
to the Sangprapai case above, unlike the other complaints bodies, the NACC is not only 
able to recommend disciplinary measures to the police, it is also capable of enforcing the 
proposed measures according to section 92 paragraph 1 of the NACC Act because this 
provision specifies that the NACC recommendations shall not be subject to the 
[re]examination of any disciplinary panel. The implication of this is that the police have to 
endorse the proposed measures without the power to dispute the Commission (see chapter 
4). On the contrary, the Ombudsman and the NHRC need to rely on other constitutional 
                                                          
118
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bodies when it comes to enforcing proposed recommendations which proves to be a major 
hindrance to them in finishing their jobs effectively.120  
In the case of the IPCC system, even though the police force concerned has a duty to 
follow the IPCC‘s recommendations which means that it needs to bring disciplinary 
proceedings against the officer alleged to have perpetrated misconduct, 121  the IPCC‘s 
decision on disciplinary measures is often challenged at misconduct proceedings. The 
IPCC explained this as follows;  
Recently, in case where we had to direct a force to bring proceedings (in 
this instance a misconduct meeting), the force informed us that they 
intended to present the case at the meeting as ‗no case to answer‘ and 
produced their own report to that effect.122  
It can be seen that, in the end, the IPCC does not have the power to enforce the disciplinary 
measures that they themselves propose to the police force concerned. In other words, the 
IPCC cannot require what the outcome of the misconduct proceedings should be. 
Based on the evidence in this research, it is apparent that the complaints authorities in 
Thailand and the IPCC all satisfy the UN minimum criterion on the power to suggest 
disciplinary measures. The fact also shows that the NACC is the sole body that reaches the 
UN higher standard as it is capable of enforcing its proposed recommendations.  
(g) Witness protection 
Safeguards for witnesses are indispensable in the fight against impunity. Arguably, ―a legal 
system that promotes justice but does not set in place the means to protect witnesses is a 
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 NHRC Act (n 19) ss 30, 31; Ombudsman Act (n 91) s 33. 
121
 PRA (n 8) sch 3, para 27(4)(b). See also, Police (Conduct) Regulations 2012, reg 19(6)(1). These 
Regulations, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗Conduct Regulations‘. 
122
 IPCC, ‗Improving Police Integrity‘ (n 78) para 176. 
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fraud‖ 123  because witnesses not least in serious cases will simply be left exposed to 
violence arising out of retaliation. In the UN Handbook on Police Oversight, protection for 
witnesses is emphasised as an important mechanism in the complaints system. It is 
underlined that:    
The [complaints] agency should be able to provide or refer witnesses to 
witness protection where necessary.124 
Since 1997, Thailand has endorsed the principle of giving protection to witnesses in 
criminal proceedings,125 but it was not until the Witness Protection Act came into effect in 
2003 that safeguards for witnesses in Thailand became somewhat systematic. 126  As a 
unified regulatory framework for witness protection in Thailand, the WPA is also applied 
to police complainants who need protection. To ensure that a witness protection scheme is 
organised properly, the Witness Protection Bureau (WPB), affiliated with the Rights and 
Liberties Protection Department (RLPD), Ministry of Justice,127 was established to play a 
pivotal role in safeguarding witnesses alongside the RTP. 128 
Without doubt, complainants of the internal system in Thailand can be given protection 
directly from the police. In contrast, the external complaints authorities do not have the 
capacity to offer protection to their complainants or witnesses but they are able to refer 
them to the relevant bodies for witness protection.   
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 Asian Legal Resource Centre, ‗Protecting Witnesses or Perverting Justice in Thailand‘ (2006) 5 Article 2, 
1, 2.  
124
 ibid. 
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One of the complaints cases dealt with by the NHRC demonstrates how the Commission 
performed its role in referring the complainant for protection; following the investigation, 
the NHRC recommended as one of the remedial measures:  
To inform the Rights and Liberties Protection Department [about the 
investigation outcomes], in order for the Department to use the 
information to introduce measures to follow the situation and give 
protection to the witness…129     
Even though this case reflects that the NHRC is capable of referring witnesses for 
protection, the NHRC commissioner interviewed for this research explained that the 
cooperative framework between the NHRC and the authority having the power to give 
witnesses protection is based on an informal arrangement: 
We can‘t instruct nor require anybody to give our complainants witness 
protection as there is no formal agreement between us and any other 
authority on protection. What we can do is to discuss with the 
responsible authority that we need help with witness protection but 
ultimately everything is up to that authority.130  
As for the Thai Ombudsman, it is encouraging that, unlike other complaints systems in 
question, the complainants and witnesses of the Ombudsman system are granted immunity 
from prosecution according to section 19 of the Ombudsman Act. 131  Similarly to the 
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 National Human Rights Commission, case no. 99/2553 (2010). The NHRC submitted its 
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NHRC, the Ombudsman can also refer witnesses to the protection provider on an informal 
basis. One of the senior inquiry officers of the Ombudsman interviewed for this research 
elaborated that: 
On the witness protection, we need to ask for cooperation from the 
bodies that have direct responsibility for giving protection. Normally, 
we‘ll point out in our investigation report that the complainant should be 
protected and who we are seeking cooperation from to give the 
protection.132    
In most relevant cases, the Ombudsman seeks help from the police to provide protection 
for its complainants. 133  Unlike other complaints bodies, the NACC enacted its own 
regulations concerning witness protection. In this regard, it is specified that:  
In case where the NACC is of [the] opinion [that] the witness protection 
should be given, the Office of the NACC shall notify the Witness 
Protection Bureau, the Rights and Liberties Protection Department or the 
Royal Thai Police or other authorities concerned in order to implement 
the witness protection measures…134    
Apart from the witness regulations, the NACC has also signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on witness protection coordination with the RTP which even 
enhances the referral process between the two.135 All of this shows just how systematic is 
the referral of witnesses for protection under the NACC complaints system.   
In sum, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are in conformity with the UN criteria 
as they are able to refer witnesses for protection.  
                                                          
132
 Interview with a senior inquiry officer of the Ombudsman (n 106). 
133
 ‗Ombudsman Report‘ (n 114) 104-107.  
134
 National Anti-Corruption Commission Regulations on Witness Protection 2011, reg 8 para 2. 
135
 ‗MoU on witness protection measures signed‘ The Nation (Bangkok, 10 July 2013) 
<http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/MoU-on-witness-protection-measures-signed-
30210091.html> accessed 26 May 2015 [in Thai].  
 
 
Page 238 of 367 
 
(h) Power to make reform recommendations on policing 
All too often police misconduct is treated as a matter of individual responsibility on the 
part of the officer concerned, even though a number of misconduct cases also result from 
flawed policies and/or operational strategies. Offering general reforms recommendations to 
the police and/or the government is thus vital to tackling repeated patterns of malpractice; 
this matter is underlined in the UN Handbook on Police Oversight as follows:  
An [complaints] agency should be able to propose general reform 
measures on policing to the police force and the government.136 
Since its inception, the IPCC has addressed a series of complaints against the police 
concerning the mishandling of people with mental health difficulties.137 High profile cases 
involving the deaths of Sean Rigg and Oliseni Lewis,138 for instance, have heightened 
concerns over the approach the police adopt in response to situations where people with 
mental problems need to be dealt with.  
In September 2008, for example, the IPCC commissioned research to be carried out on the 
issues of police custody and people with mental health difficulties. It, then, in line with the 
above statutory duties, proposed a number of general reform measures to police forces in 
England and Wales to ensure that they would implement safer approaches when dealing 
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with people with mental health problems in order to avoid unexpected deaths in custody.139 
The IPCC‘s capacity to propose general reforms to the police forces could help minimise 
the problems arising out of flawed operational strategies.  
In a similar fashion to the IPCC, the complaints authorities in Thailand also have the 
power to propose general reforms measures on policing and related issues. Considering 
section 15 (3) of the NHRC Act, for instance, the Commission has as one of its main duties:  
[T]o propose to the National Assembly and the Council of Ministers 
policies and recommendations with regard to the revision of law, rules 
and regulations for the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights. 
During the ‗war on drugs‘ campaign in Thailand (see chapter 3), the NHRC had played its 
role in proposing general reform measures to the then Prime Minister Thaksin designed to 
guard against the worrying spate of extrajudicial killings.140 In 2004, the Commission again 
issued general reform recommendations requiring the government to rescind ‗a state of 
emergency‘ decree passed by the Thaksin Administration in reaction to violence from 
Islamic militants in three southern-most provinces of Thailand. The reason was that this 
decree severely violated human rights as it empowered the police to bug and monitor 
private conversations and communications, as well as to take any suspect into custody for 
up to seven days without having to seek a court warrant.141  All of this indicates that the 
NHRC system apparently matches the UN criteria on general reform recommendations.         
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The Ombudsman and the NACC both have the ability to propose general recommendations 
on policing as the NHRC does. Nonetheless, the recommendations made by the 
Ombudsman are mainly concerned with the implementation of the constitution and the 
issues around ethical standards of the state officials142 whilst those issued by the NACC are 
predominantly focused on anti-corruption measures. 143 Given the primary roles that the 
Ombudsman and the NACC are playing, it seems impractical to use the UN criteria for 
general reform recommendations to benchmark against them. 
Adequate investigation    
Adequacy is one of the key elements for the effectiveness of a complaints-handling process. 
The lessons from many countries consistently suggest that the failure of the complaints 
system run by the police to address police complaints properly largely results from ‗a lack 
of adequate investigation‘.144       
The ECtHR adequacy principle embraces thoroughness as the essential ingredient for an 
adequate investigation. For an investigation to be perceived as thorough and adequate, the 
complaints body should be required to adopt the following practices as a minimum:145 
[T]aking a full and accurate statement from the complainant covering all 
of the circumstances of their complaint; 
                                                                                                                                                                              
<http://www.nhrc.or.th/2012/wb/img_contentpage_attachment/421_file_name_6414.pdf> accessed on 17 
January 2015 [in Thai]. See also, Leyland (n 27) 172.  
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[M]aking reasonable efforts to trace witnesses, including members of the 
public and police officers, for the purpose of obtaining full and accurate 
statements; 
[W]here issues of criminal culpability may arise, interviewing police 
officers accused or suspected of wrongdoing as a suspect entitled to due 
process safeguards, and not allowing them to confer with colleagues 
before providing an account; 
[M]aking reasonable efforts to secure, gather and analyse all of the 
forensic and medical evidence; 
[P]ursuing lines of inquiry on grounds of reasonable suspicion and not 
disregarding evidence in support of a complaint or uncritically accepting 
evidence, particularly police testimonies, against a complaint;…  
‗Taking a full and accurate statement from the complainant‘ is a significant first step not 
just in terms of giving the complainant an impression that the complaints authority is 
taking people‘s grievances seriously but also in terms of making sure that the complaint 
can be thoroughly investigated provided an investigation is warranted. On this particular 
matter, the evidence from this research indicates that the Thai complaints bodies in 
question seem to adhere to the adequacy principle.  
As noted in chapter 1, the NACC has the function of dealing with certain types of criminal 
culpability (eg, bribery and corruption in public office) whilst the Ombudsman and the 
NHRC do not. When the issues of criminal wrongdoings arise, the NACC uses police 
powers to deal with them; hence, the NACC is clearly capable of treating any officers 
involved as suspects and interviewing them in that manner. However, the Ombudsman and 
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the NHRC are unable to do the same. This research found that the NACC, as a police 
complaints body, is relatively efficient in addressing issues of criminal culpability.146 With 
respect to uncontaminated police accounts of fatal incidents and the preserving of forensic 
and medical evidence, the fact that it is not within the remit of any Thai complaints 
agencies under review to take part in the post-mortem examination in the first instance (see 
sub-section Powers (b)) means that they cannot ensure that the officers involved will not 
exchange their information about the incident and thus police accounts will be 
uncontaminated. A lack of involvement in the post-mortem examination also means that 
the Thai complaints bodies are not capable of preserving, gathering and analysing forensic 
and medical evidence at the outset — points discussed more fully in the next chapter.  
As for the other practices mentioned above, the evidence shown in the previous chapter 
apparently demonstrated that the handling of complaints by the Ombudsman tends not to 
involve fieldwork  but rather relies heavily on the evaluation of documentary proof; surely, 
the Ombudsman inquiry is not as thorough as the adequacy principle requires.147 When it 
comes to the NHRC, although the Commission does make a reasonable effort to gather 
evidence, there is a lack of consistency in doing so with each and every complaint.148 The 
fact that the Ombudsman and the NHRC suffer from a lack of reasonable and consistent 
efforts to collect evidence to identify whether the officer complained against has 
perpetrated misconduct seems to suggest that they are likely to take police justifications 
and evidence at face value at times.  
The analysis of the NACC in the preceding chapters demonstrated that the Commission 
uses its formal and coercive powers on a regular basis when investigating complaints; 
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however, the fact that active police officers are assigned a role in the investigation carries 
with it the risk of the NACC uncritically accepting police justifications and evidence.149 
Moreover, the interview data collected for this research shows that the NACC sometimes 
fails to deal with the complaints registered directly with it.150 In exploring the thoroughness 
of the IPCC independent investigation, the high-profile case of Sean Rigg in 2008 is worth 
discussing. Mr. Rigg was a person with mental difficulties who had been arrested by the 
Brixton police and died shortly after whilst in police custody. 151 Having faced a chorus of 
criticisms about its investigation into the death of Sean Rigg, the IPCC commissioned a 
group of experts to review its own independent investigation report. The report highlighted 
a number of critical issues including the fact that the IPCC investigators failed to make 
reasonable efforts to view and deduce from the CCTV footage that Mr Rigg was left 
unconscious in the cage in the back of the police van without having the responsible officer 
monitoring his fitness; this ultimately led to the death of Sean Rigg and, apparently, shows 
that the police neglected their duty of care. 152  The report also revealed that the IPCC 
investigators appeared to be too ready to accept the police accounts of the incident.153 
The above discussion underlines that all of the complaints bodies under review of this 
research face a considerable challenge in terms of ensuring that their investigation / inquiry 
into police complaints is thorough and adequate for effectively identifying whether the 
officer involved has committed misconduct. It can be concluded that each of them is not in 
full compliance with the adequacy principle.   
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Promptness 
A prompt investigation is arguably the key to the success of the truth-finding process. In 
2006, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) has adopted the term the ‗Golden 
Hour‘ in its murder investigation manual to describe: 
[T]he principle that effective early action can result in securing 
significant material that would otherwise be lost to the investigation. 154 
Apart from loss of evidence, the negative impacts of the delay in investigating the incident 
of malpractice can also range from the decay of witnesses‘ memories, disturbance of the 
crime scene, or the intimidation or even murder of witnesses, to name but a few.155 In 
addition, a delayed investigation also dents public confidence in the complaints body. As 
pointed out in the Opinion of the Commissioner: 
Failure to conduct a complaints investigation in a prompt and reasonably 
expeditious manner may give the appearance that there is a reluctance to 
investigate or of collusion between investigators and officers complained 
against to conceal wrongdoing.156 
Therefore, the complaints authority should make sure that the handling of complaints will 
be conducted promptly in order to provide reassurance that the complaints authority is 
efficient and impartial. In England and Wales, regulation 8 of the Police (Complaints and 
Misconduct) Regulations 2012 specifies that: 
Any DSI [Death or Serious Injury] matter which is required to be 
referred to the Commission shall be referred in such manner as the 
Commission specifies and— 
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 Association of Chief Police Officers, ‗Murder Investigation Manual 2006‘ (National Centre for Policing 
Excellence 2006) 42. 
155
 Tamar Hopkins, An Effective System for Investigating Complaints against Police: A Study of Human 
Rights Compliance in Police Complaint Models in the US, Canada, UK, Northern Ireland and Australia 
(Grants Publications Education 2009) 54. 
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 Opinion of the Commissioner (n 3) para 71. 
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(a) in a case where the Commission directs that the matter be referred to 
it, without delay and in any event not later than the end of the day 
following the day on which the Commission so directs; 
(b) in any other case, without delay and in any event not later than the 
end of the day following the day on which the matter first comes to the 
attention of the appropriate authority.  
In addition, the IPCC also explained its role in handling deaths and serious injuries cases 
as follows: 
If someone dies during police contact, the police will always be on the 
scene before the IPCC. The local police force should immediately secure 
the scene and refer the matter to the IPCC. As soon as that happens, we 
make a decision about whether to send investigators to the scene straight 
away.157 
It can be seen that, under the IPCC system, an investigation into deaths and serious injuries 
can be initiated promptly because the police are obligated to refer deaths and serious 
injuries matters to the IPCC. However, a number of cases show that this does not always 
happen. The fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes in 2005 in London, for instance, 
highlighted that the police had referred the case to the IPCC three days after the incident, 
in breach of the Complaints Regulations.158  
In contrast to the IPCC, the police are not obliged to refer deaths and serious injuries 
matters to any complaints bodies in Thailand. In practice, the complaints bodies will start 
to act when a complaint is made to them or after they have been made aware of incidents 
involving deaths and serious injuries. All of this means the Thai complaints bodies, in 
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 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Review of the IPCC‘s Work in Investigating Deaths: Final 
Report‘, (IPCC 2014) 37. 
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 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Stockwell One: Investigation into the Shooting of Jean 
Charles de Menezes at Stockwell Underground Station on 22 July 2005‘ (IPCC 2007)  11-12. 
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practice, will not be able to conduct an investigation immediately after an incident of death 
or serious injury. For these reasons, it is impractical to benchmark the Thai complaints 
systems against this aspect of the promptness principle but it is reasonable that this point 
will be discussed in the reform chapter.  
From the opinion of the Commissioner, there are several key features adhering to the 
principle of promptness that are worth discussing. These features are: 
(a) Timely notification 
Every complainant wishes to have their complaints addressed as expeditiously as possible. 
To alleviate complainants‘ concerns about progress in the handling of complaints, it is 
reasonable that the agency should notify complainants of investigative progress on a 
regular basis. In England and Wales, regulation 12 (2)(a) of the Police (Complaints and 
Misconduct) Regulations sets out that the IPCC needs to inform a complainant and/or an 
interested party:159 
(a) of the progress of the investigation promptly and in any event− 
 (i) if there has been no previous notification, within four weeks of  
 the start of the investigation; and   
 (ii) in any other case, within four weeks of the previous notification; 
Apparently, the IPCC is placed under a duty to notify the complainants about progress on 
the handling of complaints at least every 28 days. This shows that, in theory at least, the 
complainants will be informed about progress on the handling of complaints by the IPCC 
on a regular basis.  
                                                          
159
 This Regulations, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗Complaints Regulations‘. 
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In Thailand, none of the complaints agencies, internal or external, is obliged by law to 
notify the complainants about progress in the same way as is the IPCC. In reality, most 
complainants will be contacted and informed about progress only when the investigation 
has reached a conclusion. However, it is worth pointing out that the NHRC is the sole 
complaints body amongst those bodies under review that has a duty to inform the 
complainants about the completion of the inquiry within seven days after the date the 
inquiry report has signed.160 
(b) Timeliness in the investigation 
Timeliness is also significant for the handling of complaints. To make sure that the whole 
process of investigation until the determination of complaints will be done in due course, 
setting out a reasonable time frame proves to be useful. According to the IPCC statutory 
guidance, the Commission states that it expects a complaint to be recorded as soon as 
possible and in any event no later than 10 days after the date it has first been registered.161 
In addition, as we have just seen, the referral of Death and Serious Injury matters must be 
done without delay.162 
The most recent available IPCC survey disclosed that some IPCC complainants thought 
―the time taken to complete the investigation seemed disproportionate to the matter under 
investigation‖,163 however, the above clauses, at least, can prove that the system under the 
IPCC has a relatively clear timescale in a number of respects. The Thai systems, however, 
are dissimilar to the IPCC as most of them have introduced a looser time frame. The RTP 
                                                          
160
 NHRC Regulations on Examination of Human Rights Abuses 2015, reg 43 para 2. Note that the rest of 
the authorities have not set out the timeframe for notification of the completion of the investigation report.  
161
 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Statutory Guidance to the Police Service on the Handling 
of Complaints‘ (IPCC 2015) 20. 
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 Complaints Regulations (n 159) reg 8 (b). 
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 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗IPCC Investigations: A Survey Seeking Feedback from 
Complainants and Police Personnel‘ (IPCC 2009) 18. 
 
 
Page 248 of 367 
 
has imposed a 60-day time frame for its investigation to be finished with a condition that 
allows such timescale to be extended,164 whilst the Ombudsman has set a timescale of a 
maximum of six months, and in the event where a maximum target cannot be met, the 
inquiry should not last more than 12 months.165 Apart from the above agencies, the NHRC 
also sets a three-day timescale for the notification of recording of complaints, and as 
mentioned above a seven-day timescale for the notification of the completion of inquiry.166 
Unlike other agencies, the NACC system is not subject to any mandatory timescales.  
It is apparent that the principle of promptness is not applied within the operation of the 
Thai complaints systems under review. Arguably, a lack of promptness can be one of the 
causes leading to the situation where some complaints cases may have ‗fermented‘ for 
years before the complaints body has arrived at the conclusion; however, we shall leave the 
solution to this to be discussed in the next chapter.      
The Complainant’s Involvement 
Smith argues that ―the complainant should be involved in the investigation of a complaint 
in order to safeguard his or her legitimate interests‖. 167 Having made a complaint, the 
complainant should not be left with a sense of exclusion. Based on the opinion of the 
Commissioner for Human Rights – Council of Europe, a police complaints authority 
should have the responsibility to ensure close liaison with the complainants throughout the 
course of the handling of complaints in order to communicate and explain how the system 
works, not least for those who do not understand or lack confidence in the system.168 Legal 
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 Police Regulations on Factual Investigation 2013, reg 17 (1). 
165
 See text accompanying n 28 in ch 4. 
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 NHRC Examination Regulations (n 160) regs 17 (1), 43 para 2. 
167
 Graham Smith, ‗Every Complaint Matters: Human Rights Commissioner‘s Opinion concerning 
Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints against the Police‘ (2010) 32 Int‘l JLC Just 59, 68. 
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counseling and representation should also be made available for the complainants in order 
to help them ―scrutinise proceedings and challenge unfair and ineffective practice‖.169  
To maximise the complainant‘s involvement, the IPCC statutory guidance indicates that a 
guide to navigate the complaints system should always be available when a complaint is 
received; the person who receives a complaint should also inform the complainant who is 
going to handle his or her complaint including such person‘s contact details.170 In addition, 
the fact that the complainants will always be informed about every critical decision on the 
handling of complaints also enhances the complainant‘s involvement. For example, in a 
case where the appropriate authority or the IPCC itself is of the opinion that the complaint 
may be dismissed, it needs to notify the complainant to make his or her representations 
within 28 days before a final decision can be made.171 However, the following comments 
indicate that some complainants would like more extensive involvement in the IPCC 
system:  
The IPCC should ― ….invite the complainant to a meeting in person so 
that vital information and any relevant history is not missed. I did not get 
the chance to discuss the report which is flawed in some areas…‖172 
In contrast to the English system, victim involvement in the external complaints systems in 
Thailand is neither guaranteed by law nor fostered consistently in practice.  Those seeking 
the assistance of the Thai Ombudsman are generally not encouraged to take part in the 
handling of complaints173 as the Ombudsman usually gives preference to a documentary 
analysis of a complaint. 174  For its part, the NHRC is inconsistent in its approach to 
                                                          
169
 ibid para 79. 
170
 IPCC, ‗Statutory Guidance‘ (n 161) 12-13. 
171
 Complaints Regulations (n 159) reg 5(a)(ii). 
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 IPCC, ‗Survey Seeking Feedback from Complainants and Police Personnel‘ (n 163) 12.  
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involving complainants as those who have been invited to take part in the investigation 
process were selected at the Commissioner‘s random discretion. 175  As for the NACC 
system, previous studies consistently showed it to be highly bureaucratic,176 which makes it 
alienating for ordinary people.  None of my interviewees who said they had registered 
complaints with the NACC have ever had the opportunity to become involved in the 
handling of complaints. My first-hand experience having had casual conversations with a 
number of NACC clients also suggests that the involvement of complainants in the process 
is minimal. It seems that the Commission requires the complainants to come in for an 
interview only if it is of the opinion that more information is needed.177  
Judging by the evidence from this research, there has been a lack of effective involvement 
of the complainants in the complaints systems. Hence, the Thai complaints systems in 
question do not match the standard on the complainant‘s involvement extracted from the 
opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights. 
Transparency  
Arguably, if the complaints system is to gain the credibility of the public as well as of the 
police in the performance of their duties, the complaints authority needs to make sure that 
the system it oversees is transparent. In the UN Handbook on Police oversight, 
transparency in a police complaints system can be secured through the following means: 
(a) Public reporting 
In England and Wales, as required by the PRA, the IPCC is tasked with a duty to produce a 
report on its work and performance in each financial year. This report will then be 
                                                          
175
 See text accompanying nn 72-75 in ch 4. 
176
 See text accompanying n 143 in ch 4.  
177
 Note that I paid a visit to the NACC premises in three separate occasions during the fieldwork. While I 
was waiting to interview NACC commissioners, I had the opportunity to have conversations with a couple 
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submitted to the Secretary of State whilst a copy of it will also be presented to 
Parliament. 178  In Thailand, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are similarly 
assigned the responsibility to produce and submit their reports to the Parliament 
annually.179 When it comes to the details in a report, it is stressed in the UN Handbook on 
Police Oversight that ―detailed data on police abuses‖180 should be displayed in the report, 
including statistical or general reviews of abuses and complaints; added to this, ―budgets 
and expenses [of a complaints authority] should be publicly reported‖.181 Considering the 
IPCC annual report, it can be seen that the report is relatively comprehensive not least in 
terms of statistical reviews of complaints.182 In the same report, the IPCC also makes 
public its financial spending. 183  On the contrary, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the 
NACC, as pointed out in chapter two, fail to produce a comprehensive report, with some 
key data such as a statistical review on police complaints absent from the report.. The Thai 
complaints authorities all publicise and declare their financial spending in their respective 
annual reports.   
(b) Accessible information 
To afford the complainants easy access to a complaints system, general information on the 
complaints-handling process should be accessible to the public. This helps members of the 
public, not least those nursing legitimate grievances against the police, to understand the 
system and have more confidence to come forward. In this regard, it is suggested in the 
UN Handbook on Police Oversight that:  
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 PRA (n 9) s 11 (1), (5). 
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It [a police complaints authority] should maintain a website with easily 
accessible information [on complaints].184  
In recent times, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC have made attempts to raise 
public awareness about the existence of their systems via a number of routes; for instance, 
they made themselves known to the public via TV commercials, online sources etc.185 The 
survey in 2012, however, demonstrated the following findings: 
Chart 5.2: The lack of public knowledge of independent complaints bodies in  
Thailand  
 
The bar chart illustrated that 9.5 per cent of members of the public do not realise that the 
NACC exists whilst 14.4 per cent of them do not know of the Ombudsman, and finally, 
16.3 per cent of them are not aware of the NHRC.186 Given that the systems under the 
control of the above bodies have been in operation for almost two decades, and that each of 
them has adopted a number of approaches to increase public awareness about their 
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existence, the fact that a certain proportion of people still do not recognise them apparently 
means more needs to be done on this front. In addition, when looking at the information on 
how to access the complaints systems under their regulatory oversight, it is apparent that 
the complaints authorities in question failed to enrich would-be complainants‘ 
understanding about the systems and also failed to increase their confidence in the systems 
because only little information is provided. What is also important but has been omitted, 
even on their online sources, is, for example, a concise explanation of the process after the 
registration of complaints and, above all, the complainants‘ legal entitlements and duties.187 
Unlike the Thai systems, the IPCC system clearly satisfies the UN criteria since it provides 
the information on complaints in many forms such as online information on its website, 
and printed information in the form of guidance. 188  Moreover, it also displays the 
information at many premises including local police stations and Citizen Advice Bureau 
(CAB).189  
In sum, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are not in full compliance with the UN 
criteria on transparency because there has been a lack of comprehensive data on the 
complaints system provided to would-be complainants and members of the public.  
III. Conclusion 
Having benchmarked the complaints bodies in question, it was found that whilst the 
systems under regulatory oversight of the RTP in Thailand and that of the IPCC in 
England and Wales did not satisfy the UN criteria for independence because they are under 
                                                          
187
 For the NACC, see <http://www.nacc.go.th/main.php?filename=index_en>; for the NHRC, see 
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political control in terms of appointments and dismissals, the external complaints 
authorities in Thailand are in conformity with the UN criteria because they are independent 
of the police and the government. However, the Thai complaints systems are not in 
compliance with the principle of pluralistic representation as many members of the 
complaints bodies were formerly civil servants, police officers, or members of the military. 
When it comes to financial independence, the fact that an annual budget of the Thai 
complaints systems and the IPCC are similarly approved by Parliament means that they are 
all in compliance with the relevant UN criteria. On the point of power, the NACC proved 
to be the most formidable complaints body under review of this research as it met almost 
every UN criterion. In effect, the NACC has actually exceeded the UN criteria; for 
instance, it is, under certain conditions, capable of bringing complaints cases to court on its 
own. The IPCC apparently satisfied the UN criteria for powers even though it does not 
have as much power as the NACC in Thailand does. The Ombudsman and the NHRC did 
not match the same criteria in a number of aspects. They are not capable of conducting an 
inquiry intended for disciplinary action and/or criminal proceedings to follow; in addition, 
both of them lack the power to refer complaints for criminal prosecution. The RTP 
exercises police powers and therefore met the UN criteria.  
When it comes to the adequacy principle, this research found that none of the complaints 
agencies under review fully complies with the principle. The evidence suggests that all of 
them are not sufficiently effective in collecting evidence and seem to accept police 
accounts uncritically at times. As regards the key features of the promptness principle, it 
was highlighted that the IPCC set out a clear timescale in a number of aspects, especially 
in relation to bringing its complainants up to date with the investigation progress. In 
Thailand, the Ombudsman proved to be the best compared to the other authorities in 
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Thailand in terms of setting out reasonable timeliness whilst the NHRC and the NACC all 
need to do much more to make sure that the handling of complaints will be processed 
expeditiously; this is also true of the RTP system. In regard to the complainants‘ 
involvement in the handling of complaints, it was found that the IPCC is well ahead of the 
Thai complaints authorities because, under the Thai complaints systems, the involvement 
of complainants in the handling of complaints is uncertain; in most circumstances, 
allowing complainants to take part in the handling of complaints is at the discretion of the 
people who are in charge of dealing with complaints.  
On the point of transparency, the IPCC is apparently in conformity with the UN criteria as 
it produces a comprehensive report including statistics on police abuse, complaints, and 
facts about financial spending every year. The Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are 
not in full conformity with the UN criteria because they do not produce comprehensive 
records on police abuse and complaints. Last but not least, when it comes to the provision 
of accessible information on the complaints process, the Thai complaints bodies, need to 
do more to make sure that the information is widely available for would-be complainants; 
furthermore, the existing source of information such as online information is arguably not 
enough to enhance people‘s understanding about how to use the system. The findings 
demonstrated that the IPCC is in compliance with the UN criteria as it offers would-be 
complainants comprehensive information on how to make a complaint whilst also 
increasing public awareness about the complaints system by disseminating the information 
about the IPCC system at many different premises.   
The analysis in this chapter has helped us identify where there are areas for improvement. 
In the following chapter, reform measures to the Thai system will be proposed to enhance 
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the effectiveness of the handling of police complaints in Thailand, and with a view to 
ensuring that the new system meets all applicable international human rights standards.
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CHAPTER 6: PROPOSED REFORM MEASURES 
I. Introduction 
Although Thailand has already created independent complaints systems that have the 
remit to address police complaints, these systems, as highlighted in previous chapters, are 
ineffective in a number of different respects; in addition, the element of independence in 
the existing systems is arguably on the verge of being captured. The main objective of this 
chapter is therefore aimed at offering a package of reform measures to improve the Thai 
police complaints system.  
This  chapter is divided into two main parts. In the first part, the focal point is concerned 
with the structure of the proposed complaints system in Thailand with the discussion 
centred around the question whether reform to the existing systems or the introduction of a 
new system would be preferable. In the second part, additional reform measures for the 
proposed system ranging from securing independence, ensuring effectiveness, granting 
extra powers to the regulatory agency, maximising the involvement of victims and civil 
society groups and building police faith in the system will be recommended. It should be 
underlined that the proposal of additional reform measures adopts the criteria for a 
successful police complaints system laid down in the United Nation Handbook on Police 
Accountability, Oversight and Integrity;1 the principles of an effective investigation into 
police complaints distilled by the Commissioner for Human Rights from the caselaw of 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR);2 and the principles for strengthening a 
                                                          
1
 UNODC, Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (UN 2011). This handbook, 
hereinafter, will be referred to as ‗the UN Handbook on Police Oversight‘. 
2
 The principles developed from the European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter, will be referred to as ‗the 
ECtHR principles‘; however, as the principles are explained in Commissioner for Human Rights, ‗Opinion 
of the Commissioner for Human Rights concerning Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints 
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national human rights body in the Paris Principles,3 all of which have introduced pertinent 
standards that are both reasonable for an effective police complaints system and consistent 
with the principles of human rights protection. 
II. Police Complaints Systems in Thailand: Reform or Replace?  
The evidence throughout this research suggests that the systems under the regulatory 
oversight of the Royal Thai Police (RTP) are hopelessly ineffective, and that those under 
the control of the Office of the Ombudsman, the National Human Rights Commission 
(NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption Comission (NACC) are all plagued with 
practical problems not least a creeping trend towards capture, a lack of sufficient powers in 
certain areas, and a lack of will to deploy the existing powers; indisputably, far-reaching 
reform is necessary if the handling of police complaints in Thailand is to be improved. In 
discussing reforms,  however, the question of whether to overhaul the existing systems or 
to introduce a new system is a practical dilemma needing to be tackled at the outset. 
In the course of interviews for this research, the NHRC commissioner and the human 
rights lawyer both pointed out that it is preferable to improve the existing complaints 
systems, not least the external ones: 
The first thing that I want to say is this – our country has too many 
independent organisations already, so, to set up a new one, I think would 
become redundant. Why don‘t we reform the existing systems? Besides, 
I don‘t think [a new system] it‘s going to work. Don‘t forget, the police 
are highly politicised;  even though we may become successful in 
                                                                                                                                                                              
against the Police‘ (Report) (12 March 2009) CoE Doc CommDH (2009) 4; therefore, the reference for the 
principles will be cited as ‗Opinion of the Commissioner‘. 
3
 UNGA, ‗Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles)‘ Res 48/134         
(20 December 1993) 48th Session UN Doc A/RES/48/134. The principles, hereinafter, will be referred to as 
‗the Paris Principles‘. 
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establishing an independent police complaints agency, I‘m afraid that 
this organisation would ultimately be interfered in one way or another.4  
I don‘t think that a new system would solve the problems [about the 
handling of police complaints] we‘re facing, so I have a preference for 
the idea to improve the existing systems especially the one in the control 
of the NACC.5  
The disapproving stance evident in these comments as regards establishing a new police 
complaints system is apparently based on the presumption that this would become ‗more 
of the same‘. Before we examine that contention, it is worth dealing with the question 
whether reforms to the existing complaints systems would be more likely to enhance the 
effectiveness of the handling of police complaints than  the founding of a new system.  
We saw in chapter 3 that the ineffectiveness of the internal system results from negative 
influences that crowd into much of the police community including patron-client relations; 
imaginary brotherhood; and political partisanship etc. To reform the internal system would 
require solutions to the above deep-rooted problems as the prerequisite to success. Given 
that the police organisation remains one of the significant political tools in Thai politics, 
the chance of success in that regard is slim. As a result, it is arguable that reforms to the 
internal system will not bring about any material change in the handling of police 
complaints.   
The possibility of introducing effective reforms to the external systems may look more 
achievable as at least they are bound by the image of having more good governance 
compared to the internal one. On the other hand, as we saw in the preceding chapters, each 
of the existing systems fell short of international standards for a police complaints system 
                                                          
4
 Interview with [anonymous], the NHRC commissioner (Bangkok, Thailand, 19 June 2014). 
5
 Interview with [anonymous], a human rights lawyer (Bangkok, Thailand, 14 July 2014). 
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in many respects; furthermore, it is arguable that each of them is creeping towards capture. 
Hence, a major overhaul would be needed to ensure that these systems will become more 
effective. However, initiating reforms to the existing complaints systems is not just about 
legislative amendments as the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC 
all extend beyond police complaints. It follows that a thorough examination of each part of 
the above systems is required; otherwise, any reform measures brought in may cause 
difficulties for the other work of these agencies and would be likely to culminate in 
incoherence.  
In contrast, the introduction of a new complaints system that deals exclusively with police 
complaints contributes far more to the effective handling of police complaints. First, this 
new body would gain legitimacy through its exclusion of police involvement (see the 
proposed model in the next sub-section). We may note here that the newly appointed 
elements of the NACC, for instance, constitute tangible proof that the exclusion of people 
with police backgrounds from the watchdog bodies having jurisdiction to deal with wider 
issues in the checks and balances system in Thailand seems improbable. 6  Equally 
important, police complaints will be given absolute priority and will also be handled 
systematically under the new system. Finally, the emergence of the new system will also 
help cope with a massive backlog of police complaints the existing complaints bodies are 
now shouldering; ultimately, this not only enhances the effectiveness of the handling of 
police complaints but also helps improve the effectiveness of other existing systems at the 
same time. In addition to the above justifications, it should be noted that the reform 
measures that will be discussed in the following sub-sections also constitute the basis for 
the arguments why the introduction of a new police complaints system is more desirable.       
                                                          
6
 See text accompanying nn 27-30 in ch 5. 
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A Civilian Model? 
Before going any further, it is worth focusing some attention on the terms ‗external‘ and 
‗independent‘, found to be used interchangably in the existing literature on police 
complaints, in comparison with the term ‗civilian‘ which is a key word explaining the 
nature of the proposed model of police complaints systems in this research. The 
characterisation of a police complaints system as ‗external‘ serves  to accentuate the point 
that the system is outside the organisational and/or hierachical confinements of the police 
force as is the case with the Department of Special Investigation (DSI), which is affiliated 
to the Ministry of Justice of Thailand. An ‗independent‘ system, as its name suggests, 
means a system that retains its own autonomy; hence, it is not under the direction and 
control of any other bodies not least the government. Examples include the Ombudsman, 
the NHRC and the NACC. The term ‗civilian‘, in the context of police complaints, 
however, is totally different to the other terms described above. A civilian system not just 
precludes active police officers engaging in the handling of police complaints, it also lays 
emphasis on putting civilians (the people with non-police/military backgrounds) in charge 
of running the system.7 However, such a  system may employ a controlled number of 
former police officers,8 even though, ideally, it should avoid doing so. In this respect, we 
can see that whilst the Ombudsman and the NHRC fall into the category of a civilian 
system, the NACC does not (because active police officers are drawn into the complaints-
handling process under the latter system). It should also be underlined that the IPCC 
system, by the above definition, is not a civilian system either, but is a hybrid model where 
responsibility for handling complaints is shared between the IPCC and police forces. 
                                                          
7
 Andrew J. Goldsmith, ‗External Review and Self-Regulation: Police Accountability and the Dialectice of 
Complaints Procedures‘ in Andrew J. Goldsmith (ed), Complaints against the Police: The Trend to External 
Review (Clarendon Press 1991) 6; Stephen P. Savage, ‗Thinking Independence: Calling the Police to 
Account through the Independent Investigation of Police Complaints‘ (2013) 53 BJC 94, 95. 
8
 Tim Prenzler and Carol Ronken, ‗Models of Police Oversight: A Critique‘ (2001) Policing and Society 151, 
166. 
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Interestingly, most police complaints in England and Wales are still investigated by the 
police whilst the IPCC investigates independently only a small proportion of  very serious 
matters (eg, deaths or severe injuries).9  
During the fieldwork for this research, the participants were invited to express their views 
on the idea of Thailand introducing the civilian model of a police complaints system 
whereby police officers and people with police backgrounds would not be allowed to take 
part in the system. The idea was given an enthusiastic welcome by most of them.10 For 
instance: 
It‘s a great idea [to have the civilian control model]. [And] I hope that 
lawyers and investigators in this organisation are [really] selected from 
the ordinary people.11 
I support this idea [having the civilian control model] because I think this 
kind of organisation will help raise public confidence in the handling of 
police complaints.12 
It is necessary to have this kind of agency [the civilian control model of a 
police complaints system]. I think it is because this agency will be more 
likely [compared to the existing ones] to be able to ensure the people that 
their complaints will be investigated impartially. I also think that we 
need the organisation having its main task to tackle police malpractice, 
this agency is therefore good for our society as it deals particularly and 
seriously with the issues of police misconduct.13 
I‘d say that it might be helpful to have this organisation [the civilian 
control model of a police complaints system], especially because it is 
                                                          
9
 Home Affairs Committee, Independent Police Complaints Commission (HC 2012-2013, 494-XI) 8. 
10
 The civilian control model of a police complaints system, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗civilian 
system‘. 
11
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant C (Bangkok, Thailand, 2 July 2014). 
12
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant E (Bangkok, Thailand, 17 July 2014). 
13
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant B (Bangkok, Thailand, 27 June 2014). 
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under control of civilians, and what‘s more, [it is helpful because] its 
main responsibility is to address police complaints.14 
Interestingly, a number of police officers interviewed for this research also expressed an 
approving opinion on the civilian system, even though they also laid down certain 
conditions: 
I don‘t think we‘ve got any problem about this idea [having the civilian 
control model] but what we need is the complaints system that consists 
of three separate levels of tribunals; in other words, we need the three-
tier complaints system similar to the structure of court of justice, that‘s 
what we regard to be fair, honestly.15       
In contrast to the above, the idea of disqualifying people with police backgrounds from the 
civilian system is regarded by some participants to be an unrealistic plan for a number of 
reasons. Consistent with the sceptical view on a new complaints system discussed earlier, 
the following interviews indicate that it is impossible to change the way things are. 
Examples were: 
I believe that power is a double-edged sword; thus, it is all about the 
selection of people to use that power, if we have more decent people, 
who are brave, behave with integrity, honest with the truth and do not 
succumb to the influence and/or the temptation of money, [but rather] 
serve… the organisation, it is worth granting the power. On the contrary, 
supposing the civilian control model becomes reality with full power to 
deal with police complaints in the future but the people serving in this 
body are corruptible, this will become a nightmare.16 
                                                          
14
 Interview with [anonymous], a complainant A (Bangkok, Thailand, 25 June 2014). 
15
 Interview with [anonymous], a group of police officers (Thailand, 13 June 2014). Their wish to see a 
three-tier system will be discussed further at ‗sub-s Miscellaneous, (f) The right of the officer to appeal. 
16
 Interview with [anonymous], a former Deputy Commissioner (Provincial Police Region) (Bangkok, 
Thailand, 24 June 2014). 
 
 
Page 264 of 367 
 
I believe that we cannot discuss an effective police complaints system in 
isolation from the issues about selecting decent people to serve in it 
because if the members of the police watchdog lack ethics and morality, 
the truth will be distorted. Besides, we need to build a strong society 
which will have a vital role to scrutinise the complaints system as well.17  
The interviews thus express a concern that even if the civilian system by which people 
with police backgrounds have no involvement was succesfully installed to deal with police 
complaints in Thailand, interference from political quarters remains a serious risk to the 
independence of the complaints system. This particular point will be fully addressed when 
we come to considering the arrangements for the civilian system later in the chapter but for 
now we shall consider the arguments for and against ex-police investigators versus civilian 
investigators.  
A trade-off between independence and effectiveness 
Prior to proposing the civilian control model for Thailand, it is worth discussing a trade-off 
between independence and effectiveness associated with such a model. Smith highlights 
that ―the effectiveness of investigations sits alongside the ‗who investigates‘ question as a 
core police complaints dilemma‖.18 The predicament attached to the civilian control model 
proposed by this research is that its key feature of not using people with police 
backgrounds to conduct investigations may be good for the public perception (and 
substance) of independence and objectivity, but bad for the effectiveness of the complaints 
investigation. 19  
                                                          
17
 Interview with a human rights lawyer (n 5). 
18
 Graham Smith, ‗Oversight of the Police and Residual Complaints Dilemmas: Independence, Effectiveness 
and Accountability Deficits in the United Kingdom‘ (2013) Police Practice and Research 92-103, 96.  
19
 Louise E. Porter and Tim Prenzler, ‗Police Oversight in the United Kingdom: The Balance of 
Independence and Collaboration‘ (2012) International Journal of Law, Crime and Justice 152-171, 159.  
 
 
Page 265 of 367 
 
The rationale behind the endorsement of ex-police engagement in the handling of police 
complaints is the notion that people with police backgrounds master investigative skills 
and are therefore able to bring technical expertise into the job when they become part of a 
police complaints mechanism.20 This notion is also prevalent in Thailand; apparently, the 
NACC commissioners interviewed for this research displayed a strong tendency towards 
favouring the engagement of ex-police investigators in an investigation into a police 
complaint. 21  It is frequently contended that former police officers are valuable within 
complaints bodies because they have received appropriate training and acquired hands-on 
experience in complicated processes of evidence collection, observing and preserving 
scenes of crime and also dealing with cases in court.22 In addition to investigative skills, 
ex-police officers are perceived to have a good grasp of the sophisication of law and legal 
procedures.23  
Linked to the above, Smith points out that the credibility and integrity of investigations 
depend on effectiveness as an essential ingredient.24 He also highlights that, in Europe, a 
state has the duty to conduct an effective investigation into death and/or injury allegedly 
involving police officers.25 As noted in the previous chapter, an effective investigation is 
one that is adequate for identifying whether the conduct of the officer complained against 
was unlawful. The ECtHR adequacy principle holds that an adequate investigation depends 
on reasonable thoroughness (see Adequate Investigations in chapter 5). Experience is 
therefore needed for ensuring the thoroughness that an effective investigation requires. To 
                                                          
20
 Stephen P. Savage, ‗Seeking Civilianness: Police Complaints and the Civilian Control Model of Oversight‘ 
(2013) 53 BJC 886, 895. 
21
 See text accompanying n 163 in ch 4. 
22
 Prenzler and Ronken (n 8) 166. 
23
 Savage, ‗Seeking Civilianness‘ (n 20) 895. 
24
 Smith, ‗Oversight of the Police and Residual Complaints Dilemmas‘ (n 18) 96. 
25
 Graham Smith, ‗The Interface between Human Rights and Police Complaints in Europe‘ in Tim Prenzler 
and Garth den Hayer (eds.), Civilian Oversight of Police: Advancing Accountability in Law Enforcement 
(CRC Press 2016) 167.  
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resolve a complaint about deaths during or following police contact, for instance, the 
investigator certainly needs forensic skills to uncover what has actually happened. People 
with police backgrounds are thus in a better position compared to those without this same 
background to undertake an effective investigation as, beyond doubt, they have been 
trained to discover traces of criminality. 
In many English-speaking jurisdictions, there seems to be a consensus amongst sceptics of 
the civilian control model — most of them police officers — that civilians will not make 
efficient investigators for a police complaints system. In the US, Wells and Schafer found 
that serving officers in Carbondale, Illinois, expressed profound misgivings about citizen 
oversight of the police, in part because of doubts concerning ―the ability [of civilians] to 
investigate complaints and subpoena witnesses‖.26  Hibberd highlighted that, in Northern 
Ireland, the officers whose conduct had been investigated by the Police Ombudsman‘s 
Office expressed concerns over the (civilian) investigators‘ lack of knowledge and 
understanding of policing,27 (although a few years later the Police Ombudsman presented 
survey findings indicating that 88 per cent of police officers viewed the Ombudsman‘s 
investigators as knowledgeable).28 Similarly, in its 1995 report on the system for handling 
police complaints the Australian Law Reform Commission declared that: 
Only the police force or former members have the necessary 
investigatory skill and expertise to investigate serious 
misconduct…There would be tremendous difficulties in finding sutably 
                                                          
26
 William Wells and Joseph A. Schafer, ‗Police Skepticism of Citizen Oversight: Officers‘ Attitudes toward 
Specific Functions, Processes, and Outcomes‘ (2007) Journal of Crime and Justice 1, 18. 
27
 Malcolm Hibberd, ‗Survey of the Attitudes of Police Officers of the Police Service of Northern Ireland to 
the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland‘ (2008) Social and Market Strategic Research, 5.  
28
 Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, ‗Police Officer Satisfaction Survey 2009/2010‘ (2010) 5. 
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experienced and qualified staff if an external investigation unit was to 
avoid police and ex staff…A wholly external body would reduce police 
morale service wide.29 
 On the other side of the argument, Harrison and Cunneen contend that the lessons from 
civilian oversight agencies operating in some states in Australia and in the US illustrate 
that the reason that these agencies enjoyed little success is not so much due to 
‗inadequacies in the experience of civilian investigators‘ but rather can be attributed to 
insufficient powers and resources.30 As regards investigative skills, Prenzler and Roken 
have argued that, effectively, ―investigation is a generic skill that can be taught and 
developed in diverse contexts‖. 31  This is also true in relation to understanding the 
legislation governing police work. This argument is supported by the comments of a 
former Deputy Chief Justice of the Criminal Court and a social researcher when 
interviewed for this research:  
I view that anybody can investigate complaints so long as they know 
[understand] law and the procedures [relevant to policing and police 
complaints]. I also believe that ordinary people can learn how to 
investigate complaints, it is not that difficult!32 
I don‘t think only ex-police officers are capable of investigating 
complaints. It can be any departments [the investigation can be 
conducted by any agencies] with staff who know  law.33 
                                                          
29
 Australian Law Reform Commission, ‗Under the Spotlight: Complaints against the AFP and NCA‘ (1995)  
151-152 cited in Tim Prenzler, ‗Scandal, Inquiry, and Reform: The Evolving Locus of Responsibility for 
Police Integrity‘ in Tim Prenzler and Garth den Heyer (eds.), Civilian Oversight of Police: Advancing 
Accountability in Law Enforcement (CRC Press 2016) 22. 
30
 James Harrison and Mary Cunneen, ‗An Independent Police Complaints Commission‘ (Liberty 2000) 37. 
31
 Prenzler and Ronken (n 8) 168. 
32
 Interview with a complainant C (n 11). 
33
 Interview with a complainant A (n 14). 
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‗The police culture is impenetrable to an outsider‘ is another key argument in favour of 
engaging people with police backgrounds to enhance the effectiveness of an investigation. 
In line with the view expressed by the current chair of the IPCC (see chapter 4), this 
argument holds that it is difficult for an outsider to comprehend the informal aspects of the 
police world. By contrast, people with police backgrounds were once insiders and  can 
therefore appreciate and take account of the cultural dimension of the police world.34 In the 
work of Savage, one of the interviewees elaborated that: 
[Y]ou set a thief to catch a thief. So there‘s always going to be a need of 
experienced police in this organisation, we‘d miss a massive trick if there 
weren‘t…only a police officer really knows what police officers can do 
and how they can skew the records….35 
As people with police backgrounds certainly ‗know the way things work‘ within policing, 
it might be asked who better can investigate complaints against the police effectively?   
The argument that an outsider could not come to grips with police culture seems 
reasonable but is  not beyond challenge. An important point here is that police culture is 
remarkably enduring and thus relatively easy to learn and understand. Whilst many argue 
that police culture has been in transition in the past few decades,36 Loftus pointed out that 
the core cultures of the police organisation remain intact: 
I would question the extent to which police culture has changed in light 
of developments in policing. Moreover, by emphasising the novel aspects, 
I am concerned that they [those who argue that an old police culture is 
now defunct] lose sight of the remarkable continuities and inertia within 
police values, assumptions and practices. Authors writing in the field are 
                                                          
34
 See text accompanying n 165 in ch 4. 
35
 Savage, ‗Seeking Civilianness‘ (n 20) 896. 
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 Megan O‘Neil and Anne-Marie Singh, ‗Introduction‘ in Megan O‘Neil, Monique Marks and Anne-Marie 
Singh (eds.), Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions (Elsevier 2007) 10-14. 
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right to identify the changes taking place within policing, but they 
nevetheless exaggerate them.37 
Ultimately, some of the key findings in Loftus‘s work such as the police‘s crime control 
mindset or the approach to the recruitment of police personnel, for instance, underline that 
the police culture in those key areas, as yet, has not changed.38 
Thai police culture also has enduring features. Chamnansuk – a Thai policing scholar – has 
argued that, whilst many Thai academics have stressed the need for structural reforms to 
the RTP, it is the police culture that must be addressed as a priority, because an 
unreformed culture has long been at the root of a number of serious problems within the 
Thai police institution.39 This is in line with the NACC research which shows that political 
influence and patronage, for instance, are still the key factors shaping most parts of the 
Thai police culture.40 All of this reflects that, police culture, at least in the Thai context, 
remains pretty much the same as it was in the past.  
Thus one may conclude that police culture is not so esoteric as to be beyond the grasp of 
an outsider. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that experience and familiality 
developed through inter-institution collaboration between the civilian system and the 
police force could offer civilian investigators a realistic possibility of comprehending 
police culture and the informal dimensions of their practices. Should civilian investigators 
work with the police in relation to deaths during or following police contact, for example, 
the experience gained over time would allow them to recognise how the police work, and, 
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 Bethan Loftus, ‗Police Occupation Culture: Classic Themes, Altered Times‘ (2010) 20 Policing and 
Society 1, 16. 
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with the passage of time, they would come to understand the perceptions of the police in 
the discharge of their duties.  
Some might argue that civilians are incapable of understanding every single dimension of 
police culture as the osmotic understanding they may acquire from work experience and 
inter-institutional cooperation will always be partial. In my view, nonetheless, it is 
justifiable to claim that as long as the degree of the understanding of either formal or 
informal dimensions of the police world is sufficient to help civilian investigators achieve 
investigation targets, the objectives of the civilian system are met. Flowing from this, it is 
arguable that the understanding of civilian investigators can be enriched by providing them 
with a foundation of education in the areas including but not limited to ‗the rule of law‘, 
‗ethics‘, ‗policing‘ and ‗a fair handling of complaints‘ etc. This would ultimately be 
sufficient for them to grasp how an investigation can be undertaken properly.  
It is noteworthy that the evidence of this research shows that the police in Thailand cannot 
be trusted to investigate complaints against themselves in a fair and adequate manner. Thus 
the question here is not whether civilians would in the abstract make for better 
investigators than the police but rather whether civilians are likely in the real world Thai 
context to investigate more fairly and adequately than do the police currently.  
Inspired by that famous quote of a former US Secretary of State – Colin Powell: ―Tell me 
what you know. Tell me what you don‘t know. And then, based on what you really know 
and what you really don't know, tell me what you think is most likely to happen‖,41 we can 
realise that there might be things that we think we know but, actually, we do not really 
know. This quote sets us to think that, to deal with problems, we sometimes need new 
                                                          
41
 Colin Powell, ‗Intelligence Reform‘ (Speech at the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Washington 
DC, 13 September 2004) <http://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/091304 powell.html> accessed 11 February 
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ideas and ―a fresh pair of eyes‖ 42  to move beyond complacent preconceptions and 
conventional approaches to investigation. That these conventional approaches can prove 
dominant is illustrated by the remarks of one of the investigators in a police watchdog 
interviewed for the work of Savage: 
[D]uring the training, the ex-police officers who maybe had 30 years 
experience really felt the need to talk over the rest of us a lot of time. It 
was their way or the highway, they had the ‗experience‘ and a lot of the 
time they didn‘t really want to listen to us.43 
In Thailand, there was a bomb blast at the heart of the capital city – Bangkok on the 17th 
August 2015 that claimed at least 20 lives. The police assured the people that the relevant 
material evidence around the crime scene had been collected and a rigorous investigation 
could therefore now follow. But only three days after that tragic incident, the BBC 
reported claims that somebody [street vendors] found three live rounds embeded in the 
wall near the scene of crime (a few metres away), even worse, when the journalist who 
reported that news tried to give this new evidence at the Police headquarters, he was 
informed by security guards that it was now outside the opening hours.44 The way in which 
the ongoing investigation into the appalling incident of a bomb blast in the city of Bangkok 
has been conducted informs us not just of the impulsiveness and unthoroughness of the 
investigation but also reflects the police‘s traditional baggage of a narrow approach to 
evidence collection, with the police complacent that they know how to deal with the case.   
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 Savage, ‗Seeking Civilianness‘ (n 20) 896. 
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Another crucial advantage the civilian control model can offer is the opportunity to take a 
balanced perspective when investigating and determining complaints.45 In the interview 
with a human rights lawyer, the deep-held belief that people having police backgrounds are 
likely to fail to take a balanced perspective when investigating and determining complaints 
was expressed as follows:  
I think that these people [with police backgrounds] are influenced by a 
mindset that will ultimately drive them to act in favour of the police.46   
The same line of argument is shared by the NHRC commissioner and a social researcher 
interviewed for this research: 
These people [with police backgrounds] have been in the organisation 
that always uses power to enforce law, they were shaped a with certain 
type of mindset which is, in my judgement, contradictory to the attitudes 
towards the protection of human rights.47    
I believe that people having police backgrounds will still adhere to the 
same sentiment of looking at the problem by adopting a legalistic 
approach even after leaving the service, just like people working in other 
law enforcement agencies. This will become the key obstacle to the truth 
finding process of police complaints.48 
It looks far more likely, from the ‗customer‘s viewpoint‘ that, when handling complaints, 
civilian investigators will be ―able to perhaps understand and have greater empathy with 
members of the public‖ compared to ex-police investigators;49 of course, this does not 
mean that civilian investigators should show favouritism towards complainants. In sum, 
civilian investigators are likely to determine the issues arising out of complaints not just 
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 Interview with a human rights lawyer (n 5). 
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 Interview with the NHRC commissioner (n 4). 
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from the legalistic aspect but also from a wider context with a balanced component of 
common sense.   
Last but not least, the most important factor contributing to confidence of the public in the 
civilian control model of police complaints systems is the image of civilian investigators as 
being impartial compared to ex-police investigators. The following interviews demonstrate 
this: 
I think this [the civilian control model] will help people a lot. My view is 
that this kind of organisation can help increase public confidence in the 
police complaints system. At least, the fact that the complaints body is a 
civilian agency would, in my view, attract those who may be in a 
dilemma whether to complain against the police to become bolder to 
come forward.50 
I view that the idea of having the civilian control model is good. I think 
people will feel confident if an investigation is conducted by civilians.51    
One of the NACC commissioners pointed out during the interview for this research that it 
cannot simply be assumed that all civilians will be impartial in their approach because: 
Even if a complaint is handled by a person with non-police background 
but such a person has never had negative experience about police 
malpractice, it is possible that a complaint will be addressed in a 
compromise approach. So, we can‘t be certain about personal 
backgrounds.52       
Whilst this is undoubtedly true, the problem pales into insignificance when weighed 
against the benefits that a civilian control model would bring overall. In Thailand, this 
model would alleviate public concern over a secret collusive relationship between people 
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with police backgrounds and the police institution, and lead to increasing public 
confidence in the police complaints system.53  
Challenging the mixed background civilian control model 
A former Deputy Chief Justice of the Criminal Court interviewed for this research has 
suggested a solution that would reconcile the need for effectiveness and independence as 
follows: 
It is good to have non-police personnel as commissioners of this body 
[the civilian control model]. But I still believe that in order for it to work 
effectively, the system under this body needs to employ some ex-police 
personnel, may be with a limited number, to work in conjunction with 
civilian investigators as ex-police investigators are more skillful and 
tough.54   
Notably, the above idea is analogous to the approach of the IPCC in England and Wales 
which allows both people with and without police backgrounds to have a stake in the 
handling of police complaints. Under the IPCC system, people with police backgrounds 
are disqualified from serving as an IPCC commissioner but they are not precluded from 
working for the IPCC in other capacities such as an investigator.55 It is arguable, however, 
that replicating the IPCC approach to deal with the situation in Thailand is not a sensible 
way forward. The reason, ultimately, boils down to the level of ‗public confidence‘ in the 
Thai police.  
Let us consider this from a comparative viewpoint. In England and Wales, the survey in 
2014 showed that ―66 per cent of the public are either happy or very happy with the 
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treatment they received during contact with the police in the last 12 months‖;56 in contrast, 
the opinion poll in Thailand in 2014 revealed that only 15.92 per cent of the public have 
confidence in the police.57 Why does the Thai police receive a very low level of public 
confidence? The nub of the matter is that a sizeable proportion of the Thai police have 
achieved notoriety for being dishonest, brutal and subsevient to influential politicians; add 
to this, the evidence from this research also indicates that there are many occasions where 
police complaints are not investigated impartially and effectively by the police themselves 
(see chapters 1 and 3). All of this inevitably provokes a relatively strong scepticism 
amongst many Thais about having people who have served with the police playing a 
critical role in the handling and determining of complaints against the police (see chapter 
4). Certainly some of the complainants interviewed for this study believed strongly that 
people with police backgrounds were biased in favour of the officers complained against 
when handling their complaints.58 Hence, in the Thai context it would not be wise to limit 
the restriction of employing ex police-officers just to the post of commissioner of the 
police complaints body.  
Interestingly, although most British public said they were satisfied with the treatment they 
received when in contact with the police (see the above paragraph), when it comes to the 
handling of police complaints, one of the key challenges the IPCC has faced is a 
widespread concern that the increased involvement of people with police backgrounds in 
the IPCC system will push the IPCC towards capture.59 Crucially, the Commons Select 
Committee for Home Affairs found that, according to public opinion, the IPCC employs an 
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unwarranted number of ex-police personnel.60 We can see that, even in England and Wales 
where most people are satisfied with the police service, the issue of public perception of 
the involvement of ex-police personnel in the police complaints system is one of the 
fundamental challenges that the IPCC has to wrestle with; undoubtedly, were Thailand to 
introduce the mixed background model similar to that of the IPCC, the issue of public 
perception would become much more difficult to address.        
Public anxiety over the number of ex-police investigators serving in the IPCC prompts the 
question as to what is the right proportion of people with police backgrounds in the police 
watchdog? Arguably, there will not be unanimity of opinion about the appropriate balance 
between people with and without police backgrounds in the police watchdog. One 
suggestion is that: 
A maximum of 25% seconded or ex-police officers will effectively utilise 
police experience and help the IPCC to break into the police culture 
while allowing the IPCC as a whole to maintain an organisational 
identity that is distinct from the police.61 
By contrast, the then chair of the Home Affairs Committee (HAC) said that he expected 
the proportion of former police officers in the IPCC to be 20 per cent or below.62 Even if 
there was consensus on the appropriate balance of civilian and ex-police investigators, the 
problems in relation to the role of ex-police investigators would still loom large. If it was 
thought that ex-police investigators are, by and large, far more experienced than civilian 
investigators, this might put them in a dominant position within the police watchdog, with 
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too much influence over civilian investigators; ultimately, the watchdog would end up 
moving towards capture. Under the IPCC system, the figures in 2014 showed that 9 out of 
14 senior investigators are former police officers.63 This apparently raised public concerns 
as INQUEST, for example, stressed that:  
[T]he high proportion of ex‐police in pivotal and influential investigative 
positions also raises concerns about institutional and hierarchal 
independence.64 
In line with the above, John Crawley – a former IPCC commissioner (2004-2008) – said 
that when he was serving with the IPCC: 
[I]n the East Midlands, a whole group of officers from one of the local 
forces had been appointed to the regional investigative and management 
team and I thought that was quite inappropriate.65 
He added that the reliance on former police officers as investigators caused a direct adverse 
impact on the IPCC because it promoted :  
[A]n emulation of police investigative models and practices, which in 
turn reproduces a ‗policing culture not a public facing, complainant-
oriented ombudsman service‘.66      
Taken together, the lessons from the existing Thai systems and the IPCC all indicate that, 
in Thailand, the mixed background civilian control model would merely serve as a blind 
alley. 
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Overcoming a practical dilemma 
To sum up the argument thus far, whilst the prospect of having purely civilian 
investigators conducting an effective investigation into police complaints can be 
questioned, the case for ensuring independence in the police complaints agency in the Thai 
context is clear-cut (see also the discussion of the patronage system and authoritarianism 
within the RTP in chapter 3). I have argued further that the mixed background model 
similar to that of the IPCC is also not a sustainable solution. The question now is how can 
we  secure effectiveness at the same time as ensuring independence in a complaints 
investigation? 
Going back to the point where the trend towards greater independence in the investigation 
into police complaints emerged, the study of Goldsmith reminds us that it was a lack of 
effectiveness of a police investigation into police complaints that resulted in demands for 
greater independence in the first place;67 and as the existing literature on police malpractice 
and complaints and, indeed, the evidence from this research all suggest that the Thai police 
are unlikely to secure an effective investigation (see chapters 1 and 3), how can anyone 
believe that, by going through a revolving door from the police force to the police 
watchdog, people with police backgrounds will be able to ‗de-policify‘ and conduct an 
effective investigation into police complaints?68 This research therefore reaches the clear 
conclusion that the civilian model is the best way forward for Thailand.           
Although the civilian system is proposed as the optimal solution for Thailand, the proposal 
will not dissociate police experience altogether from the civilian system not least during 
the embryonic stage of the proposed system. To both secure effectiveness and also ensure 
                                                          
67
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independence of an investigation, the following are recommended as practical approaches 
for the proposed system: 
First, the enabling legislation of the proposed civilian system should clearly set out that the 
members of the proposed system must be civilian and that the recruitment of former police 
officers to serve in an investigating capacity is only allowed within the first five years 
following the establishment of the system. The suggested time period would arguably be 
sufficient for the new Thai body to lay the groundwork for an effective complaints system; 
at least, experience and knowledge of those with police backgrounds could be properly 
imparted upon civilian investigators.69 In addition, prescribing a fixed upper time limit on 
the engagement of former police officers as an investigator in the new Thai system would 
help ensure that the system would have a realistic prospect of becoming a purely civilian 
system but not a ‗permanent‘ mixed background system.  
Second, the law should also impose a clear limit on the proportion of investigators with 
police backgrounds, ideally no more than 10 per cent. Third, to ensure independence, an 
investigation should be carried out in the form of an investigative team where one of the 
commissioners sits as a team leader and the right combination of investigators with and 
without police backgrounds is made. 70  Fourth, former police officers should also be 
encouraged to take part in the civilian system in other capacities other than investigators 
such as advisors or trainers.71 
                                                          
69
 Porter and Prenzler (n 19) 158. 
70
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Civilians appointed as investigators within the new Thai body would not necessarily need 
a great deal of advice and training, however, in order to conduct an effective investigation. 
As Hayes notes, in his review report of the police complaints system in Northern Ireland:72 
The arguments for independent [without police backgrounds] 
investigators are also well documented. There are such investigators in 
the Customs & Excise, Inland Revenue, Immigration and the Department 
of Health for example. They bring a different experience and although 
they would not be overly familiar with police practices they do have 
experience in, for instance, interviewing, preserving and compiling 
evidence etc.    
In line with the above view, another crucial approach is that the proposed civilian 
complaints body should lay emphasis on employing people with a certain degree of 
investigative skills who serve with other public offices other than the RTP such as the 
officers from the Revenue Department or the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) 
etc. because these are potentially fast learners. 
Ultimately, as Punch reminds us, ―no agency is infallible‖73 but, the discussion in this 
section suggests that it is possible to strike a good balance between independence and 
effectiveness of the handling of police complaints within the proposed civilian system . For 
now, we move on to additional proposals for the proposed system.      
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III. Additional Reform Measures 
As we saw in the preceding chapter, the UN Handbook on Police Oversight, principles 
distilled from the ECtHR caselaw, and the Paris Principles, have laid down criteria for an 
effective and legitimate police complaints system. A number of additional reform 
measures inspired by the above sources will also be outlined as the necessary arrangements 
that would support the proposed civilian system. These measures are presented as follows:  
Independence 
(a) Statutory underpinning 
The UN Handbook on Police Oversight suggests that the existence of the regulatory body 
of the complaints system and the system itself should be underpinned by statute law not 
executive order.74 To satisfy the above criterion, it is therefore proposed that, in the same 
way as how the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC were established in 1997, the 
creation of the civilian system in Thailand should be underpinned by the Thai constitution, 
whilst the complaints procedures and the remit of the agency having oversight of the 
system should be regulated by its enabling law in the form of an Act. In addition to a 
general legislative framework, the enabling law of the civilian system should specify that 
the regulatory agency of the system shall be free from operational and/or hierachical 
command of the police and the government and would be accountable to the public via the 
Parliament only. Last but not least, the matter of term in office for members of the 
regulatory agency also creates stability in the system; it therefore should be set out clearly.  
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(b) Democratic appointments and dismissals of members  
Considering the pessimistic views on the introduction of the civilian control model of a 
police complaints system,75 it can be concluded that the real worry is that such a system 
would be plauged with the same issues as the existing complaints systems have always 
been, chief amongst others is the risk of being captured by political interference. It can be 
seen that even though the selection and appointment of members for the complaints 
authorities in Thailand is democratic in the sense that the Parliament has a role in the 
approving process, it is deficient from the standpoint of engagement with civil society 
groups.76 The evidence presented in chapters 4 and 5 demonstrate that a creeping trend 
towards capture persisting within the Thai complaints systems stems from the process of 
appointments of members for the regulatory bodies of those systems (bearing in mind that 
politics is likely to be involved in this because the police force is part of the mechanisms 
for the consolidation of political power in Thailand).77  
To deal with the contention that the proposed civilian system may face this similar issue, 
the founding legislation of the civilian system should conform to the UN standard that the 
appointment of members of the complaints agency should be made democratically through 
consultation with or approval by the legislative branch; also, it should uphold the principle 
of pluralistic representation prescribed in the Paris Principles.78 Dealing specifically with 
the latter principle, it is recommended that people from civil society groups should be in a 
majority of the selection committee because they represent the interests of common people. 
In addition, diverse representation of all social groups in Thai society including but not 
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limited to people at grass-roots level, ethnic minorities and representatives of people who 
are mentally and/or physically vulnerable etc needs to be ensured.    
Turning next to the credentials of the members of the civilian system which lies at the 
heart of the reform. Without doubt, the civilian system cannot be runby people with police 
backgrounds. It is therefore proposed that former police officers shall be precluded without 
exception from being appointed as a commissioner of the civilian system. Support for such 
a ban was found  in the interviews with the sitting and the former commissioners of the 
NHRC:  
My view is people with police backgrounds, and actually including 
people who have served in the organisations where their roles are to 
exercise powers to maintain law and order, should not be selected to 
serve in the complaints systems because the overall attitude of the people 
from these organisations are largely contradictory to the principle of 
human rights.79          
I totally agree [that people having police backgrounds should not 
investigate complaints against the police]. But not only the police and the 
people with a police background, also, the people with a background of 
serving in the public prosecution service should not have any role in the 
civilian model because the police and the public prosecution service are 
working closely to one another, so who knows the people with a public 
prosecution background might help the police for the return of some 
personal or professional favours.80    
The comments are illustrative of the legitimate concern over the possible undermining of 
operational independence of a police complaints system caused both by people having 
police backgrounds and by those having a close professional relationship with the police. 
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However, it is arguable that imposing statutory prohibition against people having 
professional backgrounds in other law enforcement agencies to serve in a police 
complaints system is out of proportion to the existing problems at this stage; in addition, if 
the selection process of members of the civilian system is overseen by a majority of people 
from civil society groups (as proposed above), the people who are heard of or seen as 
‗police-friendly‘ would not be easily selected for the job.  
Equally important, the process of dismissals of members of the complaints authority 
should also be democratic. To safeguard operational independence in the system, it is 
proposed that the dismissal of members of the civilian system should adopt the existing 
process applied to the watchdog bodies in Thailand. Thus dismissal of members would be 
on the basis of serious misconduct only, whilst the process should be conducted through a 
parlimentary mechanism in order to avoid political interference from the executive.81   
(c) Financial independence 
Adequate financial arrangements are crucial for the effective operation of the civilian 
system and are also significant for the independence of its operational activities. The UN 
Handbook on Police Oversight recommends that the approval of the complaints body‘s 
annual budget should be secured by the legislature.82 It has already been highlighted in 
chapter 5 that each existing complaints agencies in Thailand has to prepare its own annual 
budget spending proposal and submit it to the Council of Ministers in order for the 
proposal to become part of the Government Annual Budget Bill. Having done that the 
government will present the bill in the Parliament for approval according to the 
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constitution.83 To ensure that Thailand would not fall short of the above UN standard, this 
same practice should also be applied to the way in which an annual budget of the proposed 
civilian system would be set.    
Powers 
(a) Receipt of complaints 
In the UN Handbook on Police Oversight, it is suggested that a police complaints agency 
should be authorised to receive complaints from anybody. 84  The capability of the 
complaints body to receive direct complaints is arguably one of the most important factors 
that encourages people nursing grievances against the police to come forward whilst also 
increasing  overall public confidence in a police complaints system. In Thailand, the 
situation where underhand tactics are employed by a sizable proportion of police officers 
to ensure that complaints go unrecorded increases the importance of a police complaints 
body having the power to receive complaints directly. 85  It is therefore proposed that, 
similar to the existing complaints authorities, the regulatory body of the civilian system 
should be able to receive complaints made directly to them. In addition, the suggestion that 
there shall be no restrictions on the eligibility to file a complaint is another significant 
point. To impose no restrictions apparently helps maximise the opportunity for legitimate 
grievances being addressed since, inspired by the IPCC system,86 the people who have 
been adversely affected by police malpractice but may not clearly fall into any categories 
of complainants, for instance, would have their grievances resolved. Thus, the proposed 
civilian system should uphold the UN arrangement by receiving complaints from 
‗anybody‘.   
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 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007, s 168. The Constitution, hereinafter, will be referred to as 
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Dealing with alleged misconduct via complaints alone is not sufficient to deter police 
abuse; a police complaints body needs to be proactive. In doing so, it needs to be able to 
investigate alleged misconduct by its own initiative. However, it may prove to be difficult 
at times for a complaints agency to investigate alleged misconduct without complaints 
being made to them. Hence, some additional measures should be introduced to improve a 
proactive approach. In this respect, it is underlined in the UN Handbook on Police 
Oversight that: 
Police should be required by law to report to the external agency all 
deaths of individuals in police custody and deaths due to police action, 
and there should be penalties for non-reporting and delays in reporting.87 
Taking the example of the IPCC, schedule 3 section 13 (1)(a) of the PRA prescribes that: 
It shall be the duty of a police authority or a chief officer to refer a 
recordable conduct matter to the Commission if,… 
that matter relates to any incident or circumstances in or in consequence 
of which any person has died or suffered serious injury.88 
The IPCC pointed out that ―we wrote to all chief constables in August 2013 to clarify their 
responsibility to notify us of a death as soon as possible, which should be immediately, 
unless there are exceptional circumstances that prevent this‖.89 Even though no provisions 
for penalties exist for cases where the police delay in reporting to the IPCC deaths during 
or following police contacts, the above legislation shows that some basic groundwork has 
been done. For a Thai system to comply with the above UN arrangement whilst also 
drawing on the experience of the IPCC, there needs to be a provision specifying the 
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imposition of punitive measures for delays in reporting deaths to the police complaints 
system.   
(b) Full investigatory powers 
The evidence throughout this research indicates that the Thai complaints bodies, not least 
the NHRC, often struggles to get to the truth of the matter in high-profile cases, mainly 
because of a lack of power to compel police cooperation. Notably, this also proves to be 
the case for the IPCC in England as when the police are required to attend a witness 
interview, they often refuse to answer questions verbally (see chapters 4 and 5). In the UN 
Handbook on Police Oversight, the power to compel cooperation from the police during 
the investigation process is emphasised as one of the key arrangements for an effective 
complaints system.90   
Consistent with the above suggestion, calls for additional powers to be conferred on a 
police watchdog with a view to obtaining police cooperation have recently been made in 
England and Thailand alike. According to the Home Affaris Committee (HAC), 
examination of the IPCC‘s performance shows that: 
It [IPCC] has neither the powers nor the resources that it needs to get to 
the truth when the integrity of the police is in doubt…the voice of the 
IPCC does not have binding authority. The Commission must bring the 
police complaints system up to scratch and the Government must give it 
the powers that it needs to do so.91 
Even though the police are now bound to attend an interview with the IPCC, they are still 
able to resist answering questions verbally (see also sub-section Powers, (h) Deploying 
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powers below).92 In Thailand, the idea of having the civilian control model is very much 
welcomed but most of the interviewees for this research also pointed out that this new 
system must be equipped with the powers it needs to handle police complaints: 
It would be a good idea [having the civilian system]. However, it needs 
adequate powers to handle the complaints to ensure that it‘s not a waste 
of time and effort complaining with them.93  
It‘s good [having the civilian system]. But in that event, it needs to be 
well equipped with power; otherwise, the history will repeat itself [a 
police complaints system that is incapable of holding police officers 
accountable for what they have done].94 
A police complaints body needs binding authority to exact cooperation from the police 
whenever it struggles to investigate complaints as a result of stubborn resistance from the 
police (see also sub-section Powers, (h) Deploying powers below). In addition to the 
power to compel police cooperation, it is also underlined in the UN Handbook on Police 
Oversight that the complaints agency should have ―full investigatory powers similar to 
those of a police investigator‖.95 The powers similar to that of the police, such as the power 
of arrest, the power to seize exhibits and other evidence etc., will improve the capability of 
a complaints body to be able to investigate complaints effectively just like the way the 
police investigate everyday crime. In Thailand, the NACC is arguably the only watchdog 
body that has wide-ranging powers similar to those of the police. Section 29 (1) for 
instance, provides the Commission with the following powers:  
[T]o file a petition to the court for an issuance of a warrant permitting an 
entry into a dwelling-place…including vehicles…for the purposes of 
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inspecting, searching, seizing or attaching documents, property or other 
evidence related to the matter under inquiry.96 
Even clearer, paragraph 2, section 31 of its enabling law prescribes that when it comes to 
the investigation of complaints, the NACC commissioners and the investigating officers 
shall be granted the same powers as a police interrogator has.97 To meet the UN criteria in 
terms of power, it is therefore recommended that the enabling legislation of the civilian 
system should clearly specify that police powers shall be applied to the regulatory body 
when investigating police complaints.    
(c) Involvement in the post-mortem examination  
Consistent with the UN criterion on having the police obliged to report to the complaints 
authority deaths during or following police contact, and to provide the public with a 
requisite degree of guarantee that forensic evidence would be well-preserved, it is 
suggested that the authority should be involved in the post-mortem examination of the 
deceased after the notification of deaths has been received (see below Adequate 
investigation). In Thailand, the Criminal Procedures Code (CPC) stipulates that: 
[In an]… investigation into deaths as a result of the performance of the 
police officers or deaths in police custody…the police investigator shall 
notify the public prosecutor to join the investigation process.98 
What this means is the police solely take charge in the process of post-mortem 
examination whilst the public prosecutor will be informed so that they can become 
involved in the examination of the outcome of the post-mortem. Notably, none of the 
external complaints bodies has the power to participate in the post-mortem examination. 
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Considering the lessons of the IPCC system, not least in relation to the death of Ian 
Tomlinson, it is indisputable that the post-mortem examination is critical to the way in 
which the investigation is conducted (see chapter 5). To enhance the whole investigation 
process, the regulatory body of the civilian system should be given the power to take part 
in the post-mortem examination. This means the complaints authority should be capable of 
observing, gathering or even inviting an expert to do the post-mortem examination if it 
thinks fit.   
(d) Referral of criminal offences to the public prosecution service 
As noted in chapter 5, the UN Handbook on Police Oversight highlights the need for a 
complaints body to have the power of referring cases to the public prosecutor for 
prosecution.   
Paragraph 23 (2A), schedule 3 of the PRA specifies that the IPCC has the power to 
determine whether or not a complaint needs to be referred to the public prosecutor for the 
consideration of criminal proceedings when: 
[T]he [IPCC investigation] report indicates that a criminal offence may 
have been committed by a person to whose conduct the investigation 
related. 
This provision shows that the IPCC is capable of identifying if there are criminal aspects 
of complaints alongside the finding of disciplinary offences. Inspired by the IPCC system, 
the proposed civilian system should therefore be equipped with the power to investigate 
criminal aspects of complaints and should be capable of referring the case to the public 
prosecutor without having to rely on the police to carry out a criminal investigation; 
notably, the Ombudsman and the NHRC systems remind us of how lacking they are in 
terms of the power to instigate criminal proceedings and refer a complaint case to the 
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public prosecutor (see chapter 5). However, the above proposal alone may not be sufficient. 
We saw in chapter 3 that the RTP is highly politicised, and in recent times, the role of the 
public prosecutor in relation to the prosecution of high-profile misconduct arising from the 
suppression of political protests has been in doubt. Thus disagreement between the public 
prosecutor and the NACC on this type of case often occurs and has led the NACC to 
decide to bring some cases to court itself (see chapters 3 and 4).  
To meet the UN criteria on this matter, the proposed civilian system should therefore have 
the power to refer a complaints case to the public prosecutor but, to address practical issues 
in Thailand in particular, whenever disagreement between the authority and the public 
prosecutor arises, the complaints authority should be able to bring the case to court on its 
own right.  
(e) Enforceable measures 
Here we come to another critical factor for enhancing the effectiveness of a police 
complaints system – enforceable disciplinary measures. The UN Handbook on Police 
Oversight underlines that it is desirable for a police complaints authority to be able to 
enforce its own recommended disciplinary measures. In his work, Leyland developed the 
watchdog methaphor to explain the performance of the Ombudsman and the NHRC and 
described both of them as bloodhounds as they are incapable of enforcing their own 
remedial measures suggested to the police but have to rely on other constitutional players 
to do that instead; this proves to be a significant point that goes straight to the heart of the 
ineffectiveness of the Ombudsman and the NHRC in relation to police complaints.99  
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In chapter 4 we saw that the former and the current NHRC commissioners are inclined to 
believe that, as an inquiry body, the NHRC should not have the power to enforce proposed 
remedial measures.100 The IPCC also takes this view, even though it claims to understand 
the complainants‘ frustration about the disconnection between its investigation findings 
and the ultimate outcomes determined by a subsequent disciplinary panel, 101  as it 
underlined that: 
We do not consider that the IPCC, as the investigating body, should also 
be the decision-maker on disciplinary sanctions.102 
Nonetheless, as Schedler points out, to hold anybody accountable for his or her action does 
not mean that a person should only be made answerable for what he or she has done, but 
when that person is found to have misbehaved, the enforceable punishment shall also be 
inflicted upon him or her.103 This notion, coupled with the fact that the NHRC and the 
IPCC, for example, often meet resistance from the police when remedial measures are 
proposed to them (see chapter 4), leads to the proposal that the enabling legislation of the 
civilian system should authorise the regulatory body to be capable of enforcing its 
recommeded disciplinary or remedial measures in order to uphold the UN standards and to 
ensure that appropriate remedies to the problem will be offered.  
In addition, having learnt the lessons from the Office of the Commission of Counter 
Corruption (OCCC) – the NACC‘s predecessor – where during its lifetime, the officers 
complained against often escaped accountability through the help of string pullers (see 
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chapter 4), the legislation governing the civilian system should make it clear that the 
investigation outcome shall not be subject to re-investigation by the police themselves or 
to a review of the police‘s governing body.104  
(f) General reforms recommendations  
Prevention is better than cure. General reform measures suggested to the police and/or the 
government are assigned as high a priority as dealing with individual complaints cases in 
the UN Handbook on Police Oversight.105 This matter is of great importance in Thailand 
under normal circumstances, but more especially so during times of political turmoil, as 
the RTP is answerable to the Prime Minister and obviously functions as the government‘s 
tool in keeping law and order. In recent times, it is only the NHRC that has made a number 
of general recommendations to the police as well as to the government when it comes to 
matters of human rights abuses.106 To meet the UN criteria for this, however, it is important 
that the proposed civilian system should have the same responsibility as that of the NHRC. 
The role of the civilian system in suggesting general reform recommendations would not 
amount to interference in the police work; instead, it would help monitor the performance 
of the police and help ensure that the approach the police take in everyday policing would 
be more respectful of citizens‘ rights. That in turn would help improve confidence in the 
police organisation as a whole.       
(g) Witness protection 
Effective witness protection is arguably the most important factor that helps increase 
personal confidence of would-be complainants to make serious complaints against the 
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police. In the UN Handbook on Police Oversight, it is underlined that the complaints body 
should be able to provide or at least refer witnesses to witness protection when it thinks 
fit.107 As we saw in the preceding chapter, the Thai complaints bodies are able to refer their 
complainants for witness protection but there are nonetheless a number of serious issues 
that need to be tackled.        
First of all, apart from the NACC, a clear cooperative framework between the other Thai 
complaints agencies in question and the Witness Protection Bureau (WPB) or the RTP 
does not exist (see chapter 5). This means it is totally within the remit of the WPB or the 
police to determine whether protection should be provided for the applicant. Under the 
NHRC system, for example, the Commission usually calls for assistance from the WPB on 
a case-by-case basis.108 In addition, one of the interviews for this research confirmed that 
the NHRC may act as a coordinator in helping complainants access the witness protection 
scheme at times, but cannot afford to do more if the WPB declines to provide witness 
protection:  
I myself sought witness protection from the WPB from the outset, the 
NHRC hadn‘t involved [itself] in the process until I informed them that 
I‘ve appealed to the WPB for witness protection but there was no 
response. So, the NHRC invited the representative from the Rights and 
Liberties Protection Department (RLPD) [the governing body of the 
WPB] to come for an interview. However, it didn‘t help as the WPB 
declined to give me protection, one of the representatives even said in 
front of me and the Commissioner involved that they would provide me 
protection only when it became clear to them that the police attack me 
with firearms, even after there was ample evidence to prove that a group 
of men had been stalking me for weeks at that time, and I was terrified of 
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that. To be honest, the NHRC couldn‘t help me much on this matter as it 
wasn‘t able to provide me protection but needed to rely on the 
cooperation of the WPB as the main organisation for protecting 
witnesses.109   
Leaving aside the above point, it can be claimed that the most controversial territory of 
witness protection in Thailand is the role of the police in its delivery. Although the WPB is 
generally seen to be the key body which provides protection for witnesses, it is the police 
who control most parts of the work in practice as it has larger manpower and national 
reach.110 From this angle, the WPB is widely perceived to have already been ―in danger of 
becoming no more than a subsidiary agency to the police force‖111 as in practice it is the 
police who call the tune when it comes to giving protection.  
Why is this problematic? The answer is twofold: first, the overall tarnished image of the 
Thai police makes it unlikely that witnesses will have confidence in their protective 
services, and second, the witness may well be dubious of the value of having peers of the 
officer complained against made responsible for their safety. As Neelapaijit puts it: 
The witness or victim in a criminal case involving state agents or 
influential persons feels that the police as a whole are bad. [Even] if they 
accept protection [which is, in practice, run by the police], they will still 
feel insecure and vulnerable.112  
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Kankaew suggests that there are further problems with police-provided witness protection: 
[I]t [witness protection] is seen as something that doesn‘t require any 
skill, knowledge to perform, the commanding officials also do not show 
a lot of importance and care towards it. This job doesn‘t provide progress 
in a government official‘s career. 113 
There is a strong case therefore that the police officers who are tasked with protecting 
witnesses may not perform their duty efficiently. This leads to the conclusion that, in 
Thailand, the problems of witness protection are not just about a lack of public confidence 
in the role of the police but are also about the efficiency of the police themselves in 
performing their duty on this matter. 
From the above we can now set out the points that need to be taken seriously when it 
comes to providing protection for those who complain against the police. First, the 
complaints body of the proposed civilian system should be capable of offering witness 
protection to its complainants and witnesses. Second, the enabling legislation of the 
complaints authority should make sure that the complainants whose complaints cases 
involve deaths and serious injuries would be automatically drawn into a witness protection 
scheme unless they willingly opt out of the scheme. Finally and most importantly, the 
complaints authority needs to have sufficient personnel who are trained to be able to give 
protection ‗in-house‘ because this will best secure the confidence of those who seek 
protection that they will be effectively protected (this also links to the matter of resources, 
see sub-section Resources).      
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(h) Deploying powers 
Though a lack of power to compel police cooperation is a real issue for some complaints 
agencies under review, the evidence discussed in chapter 4 also indicates that, in some 
circumstances, the failure of such complaints bodies to secure cooperation from the police 
is due to a lack of will to deploy other existing powers or other available channels.     
This highlights that no matter how powerful a complaints body might be, as long as there 
is a lack of will to ensure that, when it is proved necessary, the power will be exercised 
effectively for the benefit of an investigation, not least in receiving police cooperation, the 
handling of police complaints will arguably be unlikely to yield any reasonable outcomes. 
As a result, it is proposed that the enabling legislation of the civilian system should specify 
that, following the recording of complaints, if the complaints authority is of the opinion 
that an investigation is warranted, it should become mandatory for the complaints agancy 
to conduct an investigative interview. It should also be compulsory for the officer 
complained against and/or other officers involved to attend an interview. As an interview 
is an instrumental part of the handling of police complaints, the suggested approach will 
therefore make sure that attending an interview will become one of the basic requirements 
rather than an unfettered discretion of a complaints authority (see also Adequate 
investigation).  
Adequate investigation 
As noted in chapter 5, the adequacy principle holds that a thorough and effective 
investigation should, at least, make sure that a statement from the complainant is full and 
accurate; reasonable efforts have been made for gathering evidence and recruiting 
witnesses; police evidence and/or testimonies will not be accepted uncritically; in addition, 
the principle also holds that the rights of the officer complained against as a suspect also 
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need to be upheld. 114  It is recommended in this research therefore that, to secure the 
effectiveness of investigations, the authority of the proposed system in Thailand should  
comply with the ECtHR adequacy principle.   
Linked to the proposal of imposing a reporting duty on the police and conferring the power 
upon the complaints agency to take part in the post-mortem examination (see Powers (c) 
Involvement in the post-mortem examination), as soon as the complaints agency has been 
informed of deaths during or following police contact, it needs to make sure that the police 
will treat the scene of an incident as the scene of a crime so that forensic evidence will 
remain intact until the agency‘s investigating officers have arrived or the police have 
received any other notification of the agency‘s decision. In connection with sub-section 
Powers (h) Deploying powers, the adequacy principle also underlines that, to enhance the 
effectiveness of an investigation, the accounts of the incidents of alleged malpractice or 
criminality should be uncontaminated.115 Therefore, the complaints agency should make 
reasonable efforts to instruct (and remind) the police force areas that the officers involved 
should not be allowed to confer with colleagues prior to the giving of their accounts; 
moreover, they should not have access to the complaints by the complainants or victims 
before their statements about the incidents of alleged malpractice or criminality have been 
made to the complaints body.116    
Promptness  
Delays in the handling of complaints apparently shape a public perception that the 
complaints system is ineffective; in some cases, the system may be perceived as having a 
                                                          
114
 Opinion of the Commissioner (n 3) para 69. 
115
 ibid. 
116
 Tamar Hopkins, An Effective System for Investigating Complaints against Police: A Study of Human 
Rights Compliance in Police Complaint Models in the US, Canada, UK, Northern Ireland and Australia 
(Grants Publications Education 2009) 59-60. 
 
 
Page 299 of 367 
 
secret collusive relationship with the police. Based on the ECtHR‘s principle of 
promptness, the complaints authority should focus on the implementation of effective 
timely notification and the setting out of timelines in order to maintain a reasonable pace 
of progress in dealing with complaints.117    
In chapter 5, the issue was raised that notification of the handling of complaints by the 
existing complaints systems in Thailand is uneven because there is no clear statutory duty 
in relation to this. In compliance with the ECtHR principles, it is suggested that 
notification should be set out as one of the regulatory obligations for the civilian system. 
At a minimum, there should be a set period of time within which notification has to be 
given to complainants; in this respect, the notification shall be issued at three different 
stages including the recording of complaints, the investigation of complaints and the 
conclusion of complaints; ideally, complainants should also be notified of investigatory 
progress. Where delays in notification occur, explanations should be provided to 
complainants. When it comes to the matter of timeliness, the Ombudsman can be a good 
example. Referring back to the interview with one of the ombudsmen, it was highlighted 
that the Ombudsman has set out its goal to address each complaint within 12 months.118 
The civilian system should similarly set out its own standards on timeliness and encourage 
its personnel to achieve them.      
Resources 
Resources are beyond doubt instrumental in keeping a complaints system operating; thus, 
the injection of adequate resources into the system is of great significance. Linked to the 
matter of financial independence, it is highlighted in the UN Handbook on Police 
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Oversight that sufficient resources should be given to the complaints system so that it is 
capable of carrying out rigorous investigation and of employing skilled personnel.119  
It is indisputable that inadequate resources can create difficulties for effective human 
resource management. In this regard, the IPCC pointed out in its progress report in 2013 
that: 
[S]pecific concerns are raised when ex-police staff investigate 
individuals in their former force. There are currently practical difficulties 
in ensuring this never happens, due to existing staffing and resource 
constraints in the Investigations directorate.120 
To avoid such problems, the complaints agency of the proposed civilian system needs to 
draw a clear plan for resource utilisation to enclose with its submission of an annual 
budget proposal to fulfill its financial requirements (see sub-section Independence, (c) 
Financial independence). In this respect, the plan for human resource management should 
embrace a wide range of matters such as the offer of decent salaries to attract skilled 
people to join the organisation, and the provision of comprehensive and ongoing training 
to ensure that civilian investigators are capable of conducting an investigation; both of 
which matters are vital not just in terms of ensuring that the complaints system employs 
the personnel who are properly qualified but also in terms of preventing undesirable 
turnover of staff; 121 all of this would ultimately help prevent the civilian system from 
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experiencing low staffing which might culminate in the recruitment of ex-police 
investigators as an alternative.  
Turning now to the necessity of devoting sufficient resources for an effective investigation; 
indisputably, witness protection is one of the essential areas that can enhance an effective 
investigation as a witness is a primary source for an investigation. An effective witness 
protection scheme inevitably requires sufficient resources. The United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) underlines that basic costing of a witness protection 
programme shall include ‗allowances for witnesses‘ and ‗staff salaries and overtime‘.122 It 
is right that, apart from physical protection, some living allowances are given to the 
recipients of witness protection; however, this should be secured only for the applicants 
whose complaints have been assessed as very serious and/or those who need to attend the 
protection programme for a considerable period of time. The reason is that, under the 
witness protection programme, a number of measures to assure the safety of the applicants 
of witness protection such as temporary relocation means that those applicants cannot lead 
their normal lives; accordingly, living allowances are necessary for them.123 In addition, 
financial resources also need to be spent on the budget for front-line officers whom the 
authority employs to keep watch over the applicants. Finally, resources need to be used for 
raising public awareness of a witness protection scheme; this is particularly important for 
those who are socially and financially vulnerable. The special report on witness protection 
in Thailand underlines that: 
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The government of Thailand has the resources to make effective 
protection of victims and witnesses a reality.124   
It is therefore proposed that the Thai government must allocate sufficient funds for the 
civilian system to enhance the effectiveness of witness protection and of the complaints 
system as a whole. 
Transparency  
(a) Reporting 
The UN Handbook on Police Oversight sets out that it should be mandatory for the 
complaints agency to report to the government and the public on its operational activities 
on a regular basis.125    
In Thailand, although the existing complaints authorities have as one of their statutory 
duties to report on annual performance and financial spending to the government and the 
parliament, the analysis in chapter 2 highlighted that the yearly report produced by each of 
the Thai complaints bodies under review lacks comprehensive content. The unavailability 
of detailed statistics on police abuse, the substantiation rate of police complaints, and the 
withdrawal of complaints, for instance, has also been raised as one of the limitations of this 
research. A paucity of statistical data not only makes it difficult for members of the public 
to understand the situation pertaining to police misconduct and police complaints but also 
pre-empts a comprehensive critical examination of the various systems. It is therefore 
proposed that there should be reporting requirements specified in the enabling law of the 
civilian system to ensure that detailed public reporting including key statistics and other 
relevant activities become available to the public. Last but not least, the civilian system 
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should be required to report its financial spending each and every year; this financial report 
needs to be easily accessible to the public to show its transparency in spending tax payers‘ 
money. The regulatory body of the system should present this report and submit a copy of 
it to the government, the police force and the parliament alike.126 All of this would help 
fulfill the criteria on reporting set out in the UN Handbook on Police Oversight.     
(b) Accessible information 
This research demonstrates that making a complaint with the existing complaints systems 
is not difficult but what proves to be a major hindrance to would-be complainants, even 
those who are well-educated, is a lack of comprehensive information that helps the 
complainants to navigate the system (see chapter 5). Drawing inspiration from the IPCC, 
the proposed civilian system in Thailand should therefore publish ‗statutory guidance on 
police complaints‘ explaining to the public detailed processes from start to finish; the 
guidance should be displayed at public premises like public libraries, district council 
offices and police stations or anywhere else that would-be complainants may seek initial 
advice, including an easily accessible website (see also sub-section Miscellaneous Reform 
Measures, (b) Support and assistance).   
The Complainant’s Involvement  
According to the ECtHR principles, one of the key elements that fosters the involvement 
of complainants in the handling of police complaints is to provide the complainants the 
opportunity to scrutinise the complaints proceedings.127 As Tamar Hopkins rightly puts it: 
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An effective investigation requires victim involvement, not just for the 
sake of victims‘ rights, but because victims are critical in ensuring the 
investigation occurs and that it has the capacity to get to the truth of what 
occurred and hold police, who abuse their power, to account.128 
The practical merits of promoting the involvement of the complainants are confirmed by 
the interview comments given to this research by one of the complainants, reflecting how 
the roles of complainants in the complaints process could expose problematic issues and 
the ineffectiveness of the complaints system in some areas, for example, the existing 
witness protection scheme.129 The evidence from this research demonstrates, however, that 
participation of complainants in the Thai complaints systems is arranged inconsistently,  
even randomly. In some cases, complainants who are victims themselves did not have the 
opportunity to be involved at any stage of the complaints procedures (see chapters 4 and 5). 
To follow the principle established by the ECtHR and ensure the effectiveness of victim 
involvement in the proposed civilian system, the regulatory body of the system must be 
complainant-oriented. This means the complaints body needs to put complainants centre 
stage and engage them in critical processes, not least the cross-examination of evidence 
presented by the police and the process of considering the application for witness 
protection.130  
Political Support and Cooperation with Civil Society  
The UN Handbook on Police Oversight indicates that political support for the 
establishment and the operation of a police complaints system is necessary. This is 
particularly important in Thailand where the police institution is highly politicised. With 
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political support, the introduction of the proposed civilian system is achievable. The 
question is how political support for the civilian control model of a police complaints 
system can be rallied in Thailand?  
The simple answer is it is difficult but attainable by increasing public awareness of how 
the civilian system would be the most constructive approach to reforming the handling of 
police complaints in Thailand. There is a useful precedent here, dating back to a few years 
before the emergence of the 1997 Constitution which subsequently introduced many 
independence watchdog bodies in Thailand (see chapter 1). At first, proposals for 
constitutional change were resisted by the traditional establishment. However, the 
consequences of the so called ‗Tom Yam Kung Disease‘131 – the severe economic slump 
that caused the financial crisis in Asia in 1997 – alerted Thai society to the need for 
constitutional and governance reforms which would help the country recover from the 
crisis.132 In similar vein, attempts to mobilise public opinion about the problematic police 
service and the failure in the handling of police complaints in Thailand began under the 
major project of police reforms in the last decade following the 2006 coup. Referring back 
to chapters 1 and 3, it can be seen that public seminars were convened by the now defunct 
Commission of Police Administration Development on a number of occasions to allow 
common people to express their views on how to improve the police service and deal with 
police misconduct.133 Even though the police reform project, back then, was unsuccessful, 
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the seeds of raising public awareness of the importance of an effective police complaints 
system have already been sowed; arguably, the momentum for reform can be rebuilt again.    
Indisputably, the mobilising of public support needs cooperation from civil society groups. 
As the UN Special Rapporteur pointed out that: 
Civil society has greater community outreach or monitoring capacity 
than the agency itself [a police complaints body]. Civil society 
organisations are often well-placed to provide valuable expertise, training, 
research and input on reform policies. Greater civil society participation 
can also improve community support for an agency, by providing a 
bridge between the oversight body and the community it serves,…134 
Most of the people working in civil society groups normally pledge long-term commitment 
and devote themselves to work for the indigenous peoples of the area and therefore they 
already manage to make their presence felt. These people are the driving force in assisting 
the work of a police complaints authority and at the same time they also help strengthen  
the complaints system. In Thailand, the NHRC has already laid some groundwork on this 
matter; thus, it is suggested that the proposed civilian system should combine forces with 
the NHRC and build a strong alliance to achieve its goals. To follow the UN criteria on 
this matter, promoting public awareness and building close liaison between civil society 
and the complaints system prove to be the keystone; the involvement of civil society 
groups also strengthens the process of selection and appointment of members in the 
complaints authority (see sub-section Independence, (b) Democratic appointments and 
dismissals of members).    
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Miscellaneous Reform Measures 
It should be noted that miscellaneous reform measures provide an assortment of pragmatic 
approaches to the introduction of the proposed civilian system inspired by wide-ranging 
sources not only from the UN Handbook on Police Oversight and the ECtHR principles, 
but also, the vital lessons of the current and the abolished complaints systems in England 
and Thailand.  
(a) Advice and training 
Clearly, the deployment of civilian investigators in dealing with police complaints is 
proposed in this research as a better alternative to the use of ex-police investigators. But 
police experience can be beneficial to the handling of police complaints. The question is 
how can we use police experience without seeking to engage active or ex-police officers in 
the handling of complaints? One of the sensible approaches is that ex-police can act in an 
advisory and/or training capacity.  
The IPCC claimed in its 2013 progress report that it sought to maintain independence in its 
system by: 
[Having] introduced a trainee investigator programme with the aim of 
developing investigators with a more diverse range of backgrounds, as 
trainees do not need to have previous investigative experience. We have 
also actively encouraged those with non-police backgrounds to apply to 
be investigators.135 
Inspired by the IPCC approach, it is also suggested that the proposed civilian system 
should encourage civilians to apply to become an investigator; meanwhile, it should also 
make sure that a comprehensive training programme will be delivered for those without 
investigative experience. To make a training programme credible and effective, the 
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complaints body should encourage the involvement of experienced personnel. This is 
where the people who have investigative experience including ex-police investigators 
could contribute to the system. For example, the complaints authority may invite ex-police 
officers as outsiders to provide training or give advice for civilian investigators. To date, 
there are some ex-police officers who have made and are still making contributions to Thai 
society in different capacities and still enjoy enormous respect,136 these people could also 
be drawn into the civilian system for the purpose of offering advice and/or training for 
civilian investigators. 
(b) Support and assistance  
Support and assistance are a stepping stone for any complainant to fully engage with the 
complaints procedures. 137  Studies show that a lack of support and assistance in the 
complaints system is one of the key reasons why would-be complainants decide not to 
complain.138 This argument is substantiated by the work of Smith which pointed out that 
the complainants have faced difficulties in receiving support: 
Whether in the form of basic information about who to complain to and 
where, advice about procedures, counselling, assistance with forms, 
providing a statement, attendance at interviews or full legal 
representation, the unavailibility of support will immediately strike a 
person with a grievance and influence whether or not he/she makes a 
complaint and sees it through to the end.139 
Without such support, whether a complaint is made or not may be down to chance. This is 
exemplified by one of the interviewees for this research:  
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I wanted to complain for quite some times but honestly I‘m nobody and I 
don‘t know where can I get help as I know nothing about the complaints 
process; luckily, I happened to meet one of the senators and asked him to 
help, that‘s why my complaint is under investigation at the moment.140 
All of this reflects the necessity of having support and assistance offered to the 
complainants. As outlined in the ECtHR principles, once the complainant gains access to 
the complaints system:141 
Victim support and counselling should be available to help traumatised 
complainants cope with their ordeal throughout the determination of their 
complaints. Legal advice and representation should be available to 
complainants to ensure that his or her interests are effectively 
safeguarded. 
To adopt the above principle, first and foremost, a navigation system should be put in 
place to help potential complainants to understand how the system works. In addition, as 
complainants normally find the criminal justice system including the complaints 
mechanism to be ‗a source of annoyance and concern‘, 142 a counselling service should be 
provided for vulnerable complainants. For those who are traumatised, counselling in the 
form of emotional support that seeks to ―defuse the emotions aroused by the trauma‖ and 
―to help victims re-establish their connection with other people‖ can prove helpful and 
should also be given. 143 In addition, there should be a social worker and/or a clinical 
psychologist helping vulnerable complainants like children or those with mental health 
difficulties thoughout the complaints process. Last but not least, legal advice should be 
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dispensed to every complainant whilst legal representation should be provided for 
complainants who are involved with subsequent disciplinary or criminal proceedings. 
(c) Withdrawal of complaints  
In a complaints system, the fact that the complainant withdraws his or her complaint is not 
unusual. But what deserves considerable attention is the supposedly suspicious withdrawal 
of complaints which may stem from a number of reasons including fear of threatening acts. 
During the lifetime of the Police Complaints Authority (PCA) in England and Wales, the 
research clearly indicated that a sizable proportion of complainants who withdrew had 
done so unwillingly. One example shows this: 
He [a police officer] told me to go away and think very carefully about it. 
He implied that if I continued I might get reprisals because I was putting 
these policemen‘s jobs on the line.144    
Similarly, during an interview with one of the complainants interviewed for this research, 
it was claimed that the police officer involved was trying to persuade this complainant‘s 
brother,145 with subtle hints that contained a menacing tone, to withdraw the complaint: 
He [the officer involved] said to my brother: ―Could I ask you not to 
complain?‖ to which my brother replied: ―I‘m afraid I can‘t‖. He 
responded: ―Brother, let me be clearer. Are you sure that you want to 
complain, you want to go down this route?‖. 
The above examples highlight how the complainants can be pushed to withdraw the 
complaints. As a result, the proposed civilian system should carry out a proper check. At 
the very least, there needs to be an interview with those who complained about deaths and 
serious injuries when they inform the authority of the withdrawal of complaints. Crucially, 
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the withdrawal assessment which should be completed before allowing the complainants to 
withdraw their complaints should ensure that the complainants are aware of the witness 
protection scheme available for them.  
(d) Mediation 
The Commissioner for Human Rights – Council of Europe suggested:146 
Where a relatively uncomplicated misunderstanding or breakdown in 
communication between a police officer and member of the public gives 
rise to a complaint it may not necessary for the police or IPCB to 
undertake a lengthy and expensive investigation. …Provision should be 
made for such complaints to be resolved through mediation or a less 
formal mechanism. 
In line with the above, Smith suggests that less serious grievances should be dealt with by 
a simple and straightforward process.147 This seems appropriate, not least because such a 
process would help lighten the burden on the complaints authority freeing up time and 
resources for handling more serious complaints effectively.  
In addition, resolving complaints without entering into a formal complaints process can be 
an optimal alternative for some complainants because as Sanders and others have put it: 
Many of them [complainants] wanted nothing more than an apology and 
a recognition of how they felt about their treatment by the police.148  
In England and Wales, however, Young and others found that the way in which the police 
are allowed to attempt an informal (or local) resolution results in some practical problems; 
amongst them, a salemanship-like strategy has been implemented to persuade the 
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complainants to resolve their complaints locally [informally].149  In Thailand, the evidence 
in chapter 3 illustrates that should the police become involved in informal resolution, the 
tactics to draw the complainants into the informal resolution or what is simply called 
‗mediation‘ in Thailand would be far more underhand compared to the situation in 
England and Wales.150 Inspiration concerning how to avoid such distortions of mediation 
can be drawn from the NHRC. The NHRC Act allows the Commission to proceed with the 
following: 
[T]he Commission shall, if it deems mediation is possible, mediate 
between persons and agencies involved to reach an agreement for 
compromise and solution of the problem of human rights violation…  
If it appears to the Commission thereafter that there is non-compliance 
with the written agreement under paragraph one, the Commission shall 
further proceed with the examination under its powers and duties.151 
It is argued therefore that the civilian system should play a critical role in the mediation 
process in the way that the NHRC is doing at present because it helps maintain the 
confidence of the public that complainants will not be lured into mediation against their 
will. The solutions after the process of mediation should include at least the making and 
the accepting of an apology; also, in some cases, the offer of an ex gratia payment can 
satisfy the injured party.152 Upon the completion of the mediation, it is important that the 
complaints authority of the proposed system should have the power to instruct the officer 
concerned and/or the appropriate authority to honour the agreement coming out of the 
mediation.         
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(e) Malicious complaints  
Undeniably, the success of the system for handling complaints against the police does not 
just rely on public confidence but also the faith of the majority of police officers in the 
system. It is significant that whilst the proposed civilian system should not be perceived by 
members of the public as part of the police force, it should also not be perceived by the 
police as a mechanism for persecuting them.  
It is recommended that a number of measures should be implemented to reassure the police 
that the whole process of handling complaints is fair. The enabling law of the civilian 
system should grant the regulatory body the authority to refuse or dismiss malicious 
complaints;153 moreover, should the complaints authority, with ample evidence, be of the 
opinion that there is a repeated attempt by any complainant to file a malicious complaint, 
the authority should have the power to punish those complainants. 154  Why so? In 
contemporary conditions of political unrest in Thailand, the Thai police are often drawn 
into suppressing political dissidents.155 This inevitably results in an increase of complaints 
against police malpractice; thus, it is important to realise that a police complaints system 
may be manipulated by people from different political camps as a mechanism to victimise 
individual police officers. In addition to political reasons, it is appropriate that the 
proposed civilian system should deal robustly with malicious complaints made for 
whatever reasons. As Lustgarten persuasively argued:  
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The police are of course highly vulnerable to false complaints, because 
discrediting them may deflect attention from or minimise the alleged 
victim‘s own criminality.156 
If what appears to be a malicious complaint was to be substantiated, it would only serve to 
demoralise decent police officers and ruin the reputation of the police force as a whole. 
Accordingly, it is necessary that when the regulatory agency of the civilian system finds 
that particular complainants have filed malicious complaints against any officers, it should 
be able to punish them. An appropriate punishment might be a fine, enforceable through 
court procedures in the normal way.   
(f) The right of the officer to appeal 
To uphold a fair complaints system, the right of the officer to appeal is as significant as the 
mechanism for dealing with malicious complaints. The right to appeal provides a channel 
for the officer complained against to have any decision that negatively affects him 
critically reviewed. In Thailand, lodging an appeal is regarded as a right even though the 
right to appeal is not prescribed explicitly in the Thai constitution.157 Referring back to the 
point made earlier in this chapter,158 police officers interviewed for this research expressed 
their views that they raised no objection to the civilian system so long as their right to 
appeal is guaranteed.  
To maintain the police‘s faith in the complaints system, an appeal system should therefore 
be available for the alleged officer. The Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC all offer a 
single-tier system of handling complaints; hence, they do not have a role in hearing an 
                                                          
156
 Laurence Lustgarten, The Governance of Police (Sweet and Maxwell 1986) 126. 
157
 Podsawas Kanoknak, ‗Structural Change in the Appeal System of the Court of Justice in Thailand‘ (2005) 
2 Research Journal 168, 1-3 [in Thai].  
158
 See text accompanying n 15. To be exact, the officers said ‗we need the three-tier complaints system 
similar to the structure of court of justice, that‘s what we regard to be fair‘ which reflects that they seek a 
guarantee of the right to appeal. 
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appeal. However, under the proposed civilian system, the right to appeal must be 
guaranteed for the officer complained against. Giving such guarantee prompts two 
relevant questions: on what grounds can an appeal be filed; and who should the alleged 
officer file an appeal to? Police complaints investigations look into potential disciplinary 
and criminal offences. When an investigation indicates a criminal offence may have been 
perpetrated, the regulatory body shall submit the case to the public prosecutor, who will 
determine whether or not to bring prosecutions. A three-tier court system is then available 
for the alleged officer. It follows that an appeal against the investigation outcomes of the 
civilian system is only needed where the regulatory agency seeks to discipline the officer.  
Turning next to the question of who should be in charge of hearing an appeal. Having 
learnt the lessons of the OCCC (see chapter 4), justice would likely to be denied if the 
alleged officer is allowed to appeal against the investigation outcome to its governing body 
or any other government-affiliated agencies. In relation to appeal, Prenzler and Ronken 
point out that an independent thrid party should be assigned a role in hearing an appeal.159 
Leyland notes that the court also has close links with the existing complaints agencies 
especially the Ombudsman:160  
[A]n official of the Office of the Ombudsman may take up a case on his 
own behalf in the Administrative Courts. In this sense, the 
Administrative Court can be regarded as a body which lines up alongside 
the other organs of the state designed to act as watchdog bodies at a 
number of different levels.161 
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 Prenzler and Ronken (n 8) 174. 
160
 Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual Analysis (Hart 
Publishing 2011) 200; see also, the Act on Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court 
Procedure 1999, s 43. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗Administrative Court Act‘. 
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 Peter Leyland, ‗Droit Administratif Thai Style: A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Courts in 
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We also saw in chapter 3 that the Administrative Court played a crucial role in hearing the 
case in which it was alleged that the police had used excessive force to disperse the 
protestors on 7
th
 October 2008. 162  Considering all of this, it is arguable that the 
Administrative Court should be assigned a role in considering an appeal against the 
investigation outcome of a police complaint.163 There is a risk here, of course, that this will 
provide too much scope for police officers to delay and thus deny justice. One partial 
solution would be for the Administrative Court to prioritise cases where the underlying 
complaint is particularly serious, as in the case of one relating to a death in custody. 
Another partial solution lies in narrowing the grounds on which an appeal could be made, 
although the degree of narrowing should be determined by the issues at stake. For example, 
an appeal against an investigation outcome that would lead to dismissal of the alleged 
officer should be heard by the court at all events. In respect of less serious cases, however, 
it is proposed that an appeal could only be made alongside the submission of fresh 
evidence in order to prevent an attempt to string out the disciplinary action. It should be 
underlined that, regardless of whether the case is minor or major, an appeal on the ground 
of procedural irregularities should be allowed in any event. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
of their legal duties falls within the purview of the Administrative Court.  According to section 9 (2), (3) of 
the Administrative Court Act, the Administrative Court has jurisdiction over: 
 
(2) the case involving a dispute in relation to an administrative agency or State official 
neglecting official duties required by the law to be performed or performing such duties 
with unreasonable delay; 
 
(3) the case involving a dispute in relation to a wrongful act or other liability of an 
administrative agency or State official arising from the exercise of power under the law 
or from a by-law, administrative order or other order, or from the neglect of official 
duties required by the law to be performed or the performance of such duties with 
unreasonable delay;… 
 
162
 See text accompanying n 39 in ch 3. 
163
 Supreme Administrative Court, Thailand, order no. 264/2553 (2010) shows that the former National 
Police Chief, who was found guilty by the NACC in relation to the allegation of mishandling of crowd 
control during the 7
th
 October protest (see ch 4 for more details), had already attempted to exploit the 
hearing of the Administrative Court as a venue to dispute the NACC.  
 
 
Page 317 of 367 
 
(g) Challenging the authority’s decision 
Too often, complaints cases may not be addressed to the complainants‘ satisfaction; 
therefore, it is necessary that an effective complaints system must include a mechanism for 
the complainants to air their grievances against the outcome of an investigation and/or any 
alleged mistakes in the complaints process. In line with the ECtHR principles concerned 
with the opportunity for the complainant to challenge the authority‘s decision, 164  it is 
proposed that the enabling legislation of the civilian system should make it clear that, 
when disagreement with the complaints authority arises, the complainant is entitled to seek 
judicial review on the matter. Consistent with the proposal of the alleged officer‘s right to 
appeal, it is suggested that judicial review of the complaints authority‘s decision should be 
sought through the submission of petition to the Administrative Court. To secure 
practicality in the complaints process at the same time, it should be noted however that, in 
line with the previous points on an appeal by the alleged officer, the complaints about 
cases involving deaths and serious injuries or on the basis of irregular procedures should 
be subject to judicial review whilst this would be true of less serious complaints only 
where fresh evidence has emerged.   
IV. Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that of the available alternatives for reform, a civilian control 
model is the best way forward for handling police complaints in Thailand. With non-police 
involvement, the confidence of the public (including would-be complainants) in the 
complaints system can be instilled; no longer would there be concerns about institutional 
and cultural bonds between people having police backgrounds and their former force, 
bonds likely to culminate in bias in the handling of complaints. It is possible that the 
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introduction of this model would be at the expense of some degree of effectiveness in the 
handling of complaints during the period when civilian investigators (at least those with 
little relevant background) were being trained by ex-police personnel in investigative 
technique and how to penetrate police cultural practices. It is nonetheless arguable that the 
civilian control model would provide a sustainable solution for Thailand in relation to the 
handling of police complaints. In addition, a civilian system would also bring in a fresh 
perspective on an investigation into a complaint. However, this model needs a package of 
effective measures to deal with practical issues in the Thai context. Additional reform 
measures are therefore proposed in this chapter. The key measures seek to ensure that civil 
society groups participate more in the selection and appointment of members of the 
complaints authority, as their invovement is able to diminish political influence which 
poses a serious threat to the independence of the complaints system. Conferring enforcable 
powers on the complaints body is another critical measure as it helps smooth the process of 
investigation whilst also engendering public trust that the authority ‗has teeth‘ to deal with 
the police. To strengthen the effectivenesss of the proposed system, it is recommended that 
the complaints authority should ensure the adequacy and promptness of its investigation. 
Finally, the measures such as the punishment for malicious complaints or the appeal 
system are also proposed  to maintain police faith in the system. All of the aforesaid 
additional measures will ultimately enhance the effectiveness of the proposed civilian 
system.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS 
I. Introduction 
The overall objectives of this final chapter are: to encapsulate the central themes of 
discussion in each chapter throughout the entire thesis; to underline the thesis‘s 
contributions to original knowledge; and to suggest the possibility of future research. To 
start with, the chapter seeks to reflect the aims and objectives of this research and 
underline how the research professes to have satisfied them by indicating the key findings 
in each chapter. Then, it proceeds to summarise the reform measures proposed in this 
research. Next, the chapter outlines the research‘s original contribution to knowledge 
which derived from an empirical study into the effectiveness of the police complaints 
mechanisms in question. Finally, the chapter discusses research design, methodology and 
the limitations of this research, before conveying some closing thoughts on further 
research opportunities in the field of policing oversight in Thailand.  
II. Reflection upon the Aims and Objectives 
The Key Findings 
This research aimed to evaluate in depth the effectiveness of the complaints systems under 
the regulatory oversight of the Royal Thai Police (RTP), the Office of the Ombudsman, 
the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) and the National Anti-Corruption 
Commission (NACC). The analytical framework of the research was primarily based on 
the use of international standards on a police complaints system as a benchmark for the 
analysis of the effectiveness of the systems in question. To meet the avowed aim, this 
research has discussed the practical experience of those who have lodged their complaints 
against the police with the systems in question; also, it has critically explored the 
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perceptions of those who have served or are serving as members of the complaints 
authorities and other people who have extensive knowledge about the operation of the 
systems.  
In chapter 1, the thesis began by examining public confidence in the Thai police force. In 
the last two decades, national surveys have demonstrated that the majority of Thais place a 
very low level of trust in the police force. The Thai police are seen to be submissive in 
their relations with influential politicians; in addition, they are seen to have engaged in 
human rights violations as well as abuses of power.1 In the same chapter, the functions of 
each complaints authority under review of this research were discussed. This was designed 
to give readers a clear understanding from the outset of what is within the remit of each 
complaints agency in question. The last section of chapter 1 explained the ambit of the 
research and the structure of the thesis.   
Following an explanation of the design of the research in chapter 2, the thesis then 
discussed the internal complaints system under control of the RTP in chapter 3.2 It was 
highlighted that the Thai police force has always been and is still now heavily manipulated 
by those who possess political power. This is due to the fact that the Thai police force has 
a centralised top-down management style and is under the control of the prime minister;3 
in consequence, the orders the chief police receives from the government will become the 
                                                          
1
 ABAC Social Innovation in Management and Business Analysis, ‗Public Poll for Views on Structural 
Reform of the Police Work: A Study of the People in Bangkok and Neighboring Cities and the Police 
Serving Nationwide‘ 153 (as cited in  The Minutes of the Special Meeting of the National Assembly 65/2550 
on the National Police Bill (21 November 2007) 153-156). 
2
 A summary of ch 2 in relation to research design and methodology is in the final part of this chapter. 
3
 National Police Act 2004, ss 16, 30. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗NPA‘. 
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instructions that define the decision-making of subordinates.4 For these reasons, it was 
argued that the political situation also shaped the extent of police malpractice in Thailand.    
Next in the same chapter was the examination of the RTP complaints systems at local and 
national levels. The RTP mechanism for handling complaints is tied to a police 
disciplinary system governed by the National Police Act (NPA).5 The mechanism at a 
local level is under control of the police force area whilst the Office of Inspector General 
(OIG) is in charge of operating the system at a national level. However, it was underlined 
that the remit of the OIG to deal with complaints has been diminished over time.6 A 
thorough investigation into the internal complaints system found that the handling of 
complaints seriously lacked impartiality. Based on the empirical evidence of this research 
and the documentary analysis, it was concluded that the police employed many underhand 
tactics to make sure that complaints are not addressed properly; these tactics include ‗not 
recording complaints‘, ‗silencing complainants‘, ‗discrediting complainants‘, ‗fabrication 
of evidence‘, and ‗the intimidation of complainants‘.7 It was argued that the main root 
causes of a lack of impartiality in the internal complaints system are the patronage system 
in the RTP and the authoritarian mindset within the Thai police force.8  
In chapter 4, the fragmentary nature of the independent police complaints systems in 
Thailand has been highlighted. Whilst the fragmentation arguably brings certain types of 
advantage to the handling of police complaints in Thailand, one of which is that people 
have a wide range of choices when seeking to complain, it also creates problems in the 
handling of complaints, one of which is the duplication of efforts between the complaints 
                                                          
4
 Barbara E. Armacost, ‗Organisational Culture and Police Misconduct‘ (2004) 72 Geo Wash L Rev 453, 
508. 
5
 NPA (n 3) pt 5.  
6
 See figure 4 in ch 3. 
7
 See sub-s Impartiality in a Local Complaints System in ch 3. 
8
 See s V. Root Causes of a Lack of Impartiality in ch 3. 
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bodies which gives rise to unreasonable delays and a waste of resources. 9  Next, the 
systems under the regulatory oversight of the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC 
were critically examined and compared with the IPCC system in order to bring new 
perspectives to the Thai system. The study of the Ombudsman system found that the 
system has a low rate of substantiated complaints. 10  The comparison between the 
Ombudsman and the IPCC indicated that whilst the Ombudsman is capable of receiving 
and handling direct complaints (this is also true of the NHRC and the NACC), the IPCC 
has no power to do the same.11 Unlike the Thai complaints authorities under review, the 
IPCC lacks the capability to take the initiative in investigating misconduct.12 A critical 
exploration of the Ombudsman system found that the system affords complainants a 
sufficient degree of flexibility in terms of dealing with complaints.13 But it has also been 
underlined that the Ombudsman offers a weak inquiry into police complaints in most 
circumstances as the authority tends to rely on analysis of the accounts provided to it by 
the complainants and the officer complained against. 14  Crucially, the evidence of this 
research suggested that the Ombudsman implements an approach to its work which 
reflects and perhaps exacerbates a weakening of its own will to utilise the existing powers 
to compel police cooperation. It was also found that the Ombudsman has neither the 
                                                          
9
 Pharkphoom Rukhamate and Satithorn Thananithichote, ‗The Ombudsman‘ in Satithorn Thananithichote 
(ed), Constitutional Organisations: Foundation Knowledge and Lessons for Reforms (KPI 2015) 84 [in 
Thai].  
10
 See Table 4.1 in ch 4. 
11
 Harry Hagger Johnson, ‗Direct Complaints: A Survey Seeking Feedback from People who Complain 
Directly to the IPCC‘ (IPCC 2010) 5. 
12
 Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Improving Police Integrity: Reforming the Police 
Complaints and Disciplinary Systems‘ (IPCC 2015) para 156. 
13
 See text accompanying nn 26-27 in ch 4. 
14
 Office of the Ombudsman, ‗12 Years on: Thai Ombudsman‘ (Thai Ombudsman 2013) 51 [in Thai]. 
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power to impose punishment on the wrongdoer15 nor a role in criminal proceedings when 
it is of the opinion that the officer at fault may have committed a criminal offence.16    
Following the examination of the Ombudsman, the chapter continued by analysing the 
system under control of the NHRC. It was found that the NHRC system maintained a 
higher rate of substantiated complaints compared to that of the Ombudsman. 17  The 
investigation into the NHRC system highlighted that the system provided the opportunity 
for private bodies in the domain of human rights to play a part in dealing with complaints 
in an early stage.18 In line with the IPCC local resolution, it has been outlined that the so 
called ‗mediation‘ process was introduced under the NHRC system as an informal 
approach to the handling of complaints.19 By comparison, however, it was highlighted that 
whilst the NHRC as the complaints authority is in charge of proceeding with the 
mediation, the local resolution under the IPCC system falls within the remit of the local 
police force concerned.20 The evidence of this research suggested that the NHRC seriously 
lacks the power to compel police cooperation.21 The thorough analysis of the NHRC also 
revealed that the Commission seems to lack the will to exploit any other available 
channels to ensure that police cooperation may be received.22  
When it comes to holding officers responsible for their actions, it was found that the 
NHRC does not have the power to penalise the officer involved,23 nor does it has any 
capacity to refer a complaint case to the public prosecutor even if it is of the opinion that 
                                                          
15
 Organic Act on Ombudsmen 2009, s 34. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗Ombudsman Act‘. 
16
 ibid ss 32 para 1, 33 paras 1-3. 
17
 See Table 4.2 in ch 4.  
18
 National Human Rights Commission Act 1999, s 24 para 1. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the 
‗NHRC Act‘. 
19
 ibid s 27 para 1. 
20
 Police Reform Act 2002, sch 3, para 6(3) (a). This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗PRA‘. 
21
 NHRC Act (n 18) s 34. 
22
 See text accompanying nn 82-88 in ch 4. 
23
 NHRC Act (n 18) ss 30, 31. 
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the officer complained against may have committed a criminal offence.24 The examination 
indicated that the NHRC, at the request of the complainants, can present the case before 
the court on behalf of the complainants. Nevertheless, it was confirmed that this power has 
never been used for the benefit of police complainants as the Commission lacks skilled 
personnel in this area to assist in litigation.25  
The NACC system was also examined in chapter 4. The statistics not just illustrated that 
the substantiation rate of police complaints under the NACC system was low, but also 
showed that the system is faced with a substantial backlog of complaints.26 As regards the 
handling of complaints, it was found that the Commission has the power to compel police 
cooperation.27 It was also highlighted that the NACC is capable of suggesting disciplinary 
action against the officer at fault and also has a role in criminal proceedings; notably, 
under some circumstances, the NACC is capable of bringing the complaints cases to court 
on its own. 28  The evidence of this research suggested that the introduction of a sub-
committee, which was originally aimed at helping the Commission to eliminate a backlog 
of complaints, is highly likely to become the route for those complained against to seek to 
‗string pull‘ in their favour.29  
In the final part of chapter 4, the element of independence was discussed using the 
conceptual framework of regulatory capture which holds that the independence of the 
regulator can be undermined should the regulatee be able to manipulate the regulator.30 In 
the context of police complaints, the engagement of active police officers and/or those 
                                                          
24
 ibid. 
25
 See text accompanying n 106 in ch 4. 
26
 See Table 4.3 in ch 4. 
27
 Organic Act on Counter Corruption 1999, ss 25(1)-(3), 118. This Act, hereinafter, will be referred to as 
the ‗NACC Act‘. 
28
 ibid s 97 paras 1-2.  
29
 See text accompanying n 137 in ch 4. 
30
 Ernesto Dal Bó, ‗Regulatory Capture: A Review‘ (2006) 22 Oxf Rev Econ Policy 203, 203-204. 
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who have police backgrounds in the complaints system is likely to result in the complaints 
body being captured.31 Impartiality in the handling of a number of complaints by Thai 
police complaints authorities was called into question because a number of people with 
police backgrounds are serving in the complaints authorities as commissioners and 
investigators. The empirical data revealed that the NACC in particular allows active police 
officers to engage in the handling of police complaints. 32 For these reasons, there is a 
strong case that the systems under review are creeping towards capture.  
In chapter 5, the complaints system under control of the RTP, the Ombudsman, the NHRC 
and the NACC were benchmarked against established international standards on police 
complaints. Similar to the preceding chapter, the IPCC was also examined in this chapter 
to provide fresh perspectives for the Thai complaints system. The aforementioned 
standards included the ones that were laid down in the United Nations Handbook of Police 
Accountability, Oversight and Integrity;33 the principles distilled from the case law of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR); and Principles relating to the Status of 
National Institutions (the Paris Principles). When it comes to the element of independence, 
it was found that all of the complaints authorities under review are in compliance with the 
UN criteria as they were all established and are governed either by a constitution or by 
statute law. 34  In terms of appointments and dismissals of members of the complaints 
authority, it was highlighted that the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are in 
conformity with the UN criteria and the Paris Principles because according to the Thai 
                                                          
31
 Richard A. Posner, ‗The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History‘ in Daniel Carpenter 
and David A. Moss, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (CUP 
2014) 54. 
32
 National Anti-Corruption Commission, ‗Memorandum of Understanding between National Anti-
Corruption Commission and the Royal Thai Police in accordance with the Organic Act on Counter 
Corruption 1999‘ (25 March 2001). 
33
 This Handbook, hereinafter, will be referred to as the ‗UN Handbook on Police Oversight‘. 
34
 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand 2007, ss 242, 250, 256. 
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constitution, the House of Senate controls the appointments and dismissals of the members 
of the above bodies.35 In contrast, the RTP and the IPCC did not meet the aforementioned 
criteria as the appointment and dismissal of the members in these bodies are under control 
of the government.36 The examination found that the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the 
NACC all failed to comply with the Paris Principles and the ECtHR principles on 
pluralistic representation since the Thai constitution precluded the involvement of civil 
society groups in the selection of the members of the complaints bodies.37 This particular 
criterion however is not applicable to the RTP.  
As regards operational independence, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC are in 
conformity with the UN criteria as they are all formally independent of the police force; 
this is also true of the IPCC. However, it was found that the systems in question all failed 
to meet the criteria for substantive independence as all recruit people with police 
backgrounds to work in the complaints systems under their control. It was noted further 
that the NACC allows active police officers to be involved with its complaints system. It 
was found that the Thai complaints bodies cannot be entirely free from political 
involvement in practice as the President of the House of Representatives and the Leader of 
the Opposition in the House of Representatives both have a stake in the selection 
committee. This is also the area where regulatory capture was argued to be relevant to the 
Thai complaints system. Financial independence is also crucial for the operational 
independence of the complaints authority. The annual budget of each of the complaints 
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 See text accompanying n 12 in ch 5. 
36
 See text accompanying nn 21-22 in ch 5. 
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 See text accompanying nn 33, 37-38 in ch 5. 
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authorities in Thailand is subject to parliamentary scrutiny; therefore, all Thai complaints 
bodies are in compliance with the UN criteria for financial independence.38 
In terms of powers, it has been highlighted that whilst the Thai complaints bodies are all 
capable of receiving direct complaints and dealing with them from the outset, the IPCC in 
England only receives and passes complaints to the local police force concerned for 
recording. 39  Thus, the Thai complaints authorities apparently satisfied the UN criteria 
whilst the IPCC did not. It was found that the Thai complaints bodies and the IPCC all 
have the power to initiate an investigation into complaints although the investigation/ 
inquiry under the IPCC system is a shared responsibility between the IPCC and the police 
force. 40  Based on the institutional arrangements of the IPCC, it is clear that the 
Commission has the same power as that of the police when investigating complaints.41 The 
study found that the Ombudsman and the NHRC do not have the power to investigate 
complaints such that disciplinary and/or criminal proceedings can subsequently be 
instigated. When it comes to the matter of compelling police cooperation, the NHRC does 
not have the power to compel police cooperation during an investigation,42 but also lacks 
the will to use other available channels to make sure that police will cooperate. The 
Ombudsman does have such a power but seems to lack the will to deploy it. In contrast, 
the evidence suggests that the NACC has the power to compel police cooperation and is 
keen to exercise it. 
When it comes to the handling of complaints with criminality,  the NACC is the only 
complaints body in Thailand that has the power to refer the complaint to the public 
                                                          
38
 See text accompanying nn 63-65 in ch 5. 
39
 See text accompanying nn 19 in ch 4. 
40
 PRA (n 20) sch 3, para 15(4). 
41
 ibid sch 3, para 19 (4)(b). 
42
 See text accompanying n 99 in ch 5. 
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prosecutor; furthermore, under some circumstances, it also has the capability to bring the 
case to court on its own.43 In line with the NACC, the IPCC also has the power to refer the 
complaints to the public prosecutor although it does not have a role in prosecuting the 
officer at fault like the NACC does.44 Hence, the NACC and the IPCC both satisfy the UN 
criteria for referral of cases for criminal prosecution, whilst the NHRC and the 
Ombudsman do not. Apart from criminal matters, the discussion showed that the 
Ombudsman and the NHRC have no power to impose any disciplinary measures as, 
according to the constitutional framework, both of them need to rely on the help of other 
constitutional players to instruct the police to implement their remedial 
recommendations.45 On the contrary, the NACC has the power to enforce its suggested 
disciplinary measures.46  
In respect of witness protection, it was found that the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the 
NACC are in conformity with the UN criteria for witness protection because they are 
capable of referring witnesses to the police and the Witness Protection Bureau (WPB). It 
was underlined however that the relationship between the NHRC or the Ombudsman and 
the police or the WPB in relation to witness protection is on an informal basis whilst the 
NACC implemented a formal approach in terms of witness protection as it has specific 
regulations on the subject. 47  It has been highlighted that each complaints authority is 
capable of making general reform recommendations to the police; nonetheless, the NACC 
                                                          
43
 See text accompanying n 104 in ch 5. 
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 PRA (n 20) sch 3, para 23(2)(c). 
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 See text accompanying nn 114-116 in ch 5. 
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 NACC Act (n 27) s 92. 
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 National Anti-Corruption Commission Regulations on Witness Protection 2011, reg 8 para 2. 
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and the Ombudsman tend to focus primarily on general recommendations on anti-
corruption and administrative matters.48   
In respect of the effectiveness of investigations, the evidence from this research 
demonstrated that the Thai complaints bodies and the IPCC similarly failed to make sure 
that their investigation / inquiry into complaints is as thorough as the adequacy principle 
requires. Notably, it was suggested that these bodies seem to take police accounts at face 
value at times. When it comes to the principle of promptness, it was found that all of the 
Thai complaints authorities failed to ensure that the complainants were updated on the 
progress of the handling of complaints in a timely manner. In terms of the complainant‘s 
involvement, the discussion showed that all complaints authorities in Thailand have to do 
much more to make sure that the complainant will be allowed to take part in the handling 
of complaints; this is also true of the IPCC. As regards transparency in the complaints 
system, all the complaints bodies in Thailand have to report their performance as well as 
disclose their financial spending to the government and the parliament every year; this is 
also true of the IPCC. In this regard, even though they are all in conformity with the UN 
criteria for transparency, concerns were raised about the comprehensiveness of their 
reports.    
The Main Proposed Reform Measures 
The critical examination into the complaints systems of the RTP, the Ombudsman, the 
NHRC and the NACC indicated that the effectiveness of these systems has been 
compromised in many different aspects.  
To increase the effectiveness of the handling of complaints in Thailand, a package of 
reform measures was proposed in chapter 6. Having considered the counter-arguments, 
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particularly those centering on the apparent conflict between the values of adequacy and 
independence in relation to an investigation, it was concluded that the introduction of a 
civilian control model is the best way forward for Thailand as it would (after bedding in) 
enhance the independence and effectiveness of the Thai police complaints system. 
Additional reform measures were also advocated. First, the civilian system needs to be 
underpinned by statute law whilst the members of the authority need to be appointed 
democratically; crucially, the selection of the members should also be free from politics. 
In addition, there should be diversity amongst the members of the authority to ensure that 
the authority is widely representative of the people. The above measure should inoculate 
the system from capture. Whilst it is important that the civilian system should have 
sufficient powers, especially the power to compel police cooperation, the power to enforce 
disciplinary measures and the power to provide protection to witnesses, the complaints 
authority should also have the will to deploy those powers. In addition, the new Thai 
system should be able to handle complaints adequately and promptly. Above all, it was 
argued that the success of the civilian system depends on political support and sufficient 
resources, this can be achieved by a greater degree of civil society involvement and a clear 
financial spending plan. Finally, it was proposed that the civilian system should maintain 
not just the confidence of the public but also that of the police; thus, it was proposed that 
the police should be guaranteed the right to appeal; in this regard, the Administrative 
Court should be assigned a role as the appellate body.  
All of the proposed reform measures would not just help the proposed civilian system 
conform to established international standards on the system for dealing with police 
complaints but also ensure the effectiveness of the handling of police complaints in 
Thailand.         
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Contributions to Original Knowledge 
This thesis contributed towards the literature on police accountability, policing oversight, 
and human rights protection. The novelty of knowledge in this thesis came primarily from 
an empirical study of the effectiveness of the handling of police complaints under the 
systems of the RTP, the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC and by applying 
established international standards on a police complaints system as a benchmark. The 
study represents the first time in Thailand that the views and perceptions of police 
complainants, police officers, the members of the complaints authorities and other 
stakeholders in the field of police complaints towards the systems in question have been 
seriously and systematically examined. In addition, it was also unprecedented that the 
operational independence of the Ombudsman, the NHRC and the NACC was looked into 
from the perspective of regulatory capture.  
III. Research Limitations and Future Research Possibilities  
It was explained in chapter 2 that this research is a qualitative study which employed the 
qualitative interview as the main method for data collection. Furthermore, purposive and 
snowball sampling was adopted to recruit the participants of this research. The participants 
included police complainants, members of the complaints bodies, police officers, and 
those who are knowledgeable about policing and the police complaints system.49 In the 
course of research fieldwork, a range of practical obstacles and limitations was 
encountered. First, there is no established research tradition concerning the police 
complaints system in Thailand. Second, this research has looked into very serious issues, 
most of which involved deaths and serious injuries; thus, there is a reasonable level of 
threat posed to the researcher himself which made it difficult to probe deeply in some 
                                                          
49
 See sub-ss Data Collection Methods and Sampling in ch 2. 
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interviews. Third, due to the sensitivity of the issues under investigation in this research, it 
proved somewhat difficult to recruit research participants. Fourth, the culture of fear of 
criticisms is deep-seated in Thai society; hence, some of the participants especially those 
who are in power, were unlikely to be completely frank when they spoke with me. Fifth, 
the analysis of this research is, to a certain extent, limited by the lack of comprehensive 
quantitative data. And finally, the constraints of time and funding also came into play as 
another practical limitation in the conduct of this research.  
Given the above limitations, the scope of this research (examining four complaints 
authorities with an element of comparison with the IPCC) was perhaps overly ambitious. 
However, as Thailand has a fragmented complaints system, to look into just one system at 
one time might lead to a lack of rounded thought about how the handling of police 
complaints in Thailand should be reformed.  
To better enhance understanding about the handling of complaints against the police in 
Thailand, there may be two different approaches that provide the opportunities for future 
research. To begin with, as this research focused on serious complaints involving deaths 
and life-threatening injuries, future research may want to look into less serious complaints 
in order to strike a balance and see how effective the systems are when dealing with more 
mundane matters. In addition, future research could usefully increase the sample size in 
order to develop new perspectives on the systems under review and/or validate the 
analysis in this thesis. All of this may well be useful for shedding more light on the 
effectiveness of the systems in question.  
That said, there are arguably sufficient grounds presented in this thesis to justify radical 
reforms to the police complaints systems in Thailand without further ado. Adoption of the 
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civilian control model would enable Thailand to meet international human rights standards 
in this sphere and, more importantly, enable Thai people to hold the police to account 
when malpractice occurs.        
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1: LIST OF RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS 
 
No. 
 
Status 
The Location of the 
Interview 
Interview Date 
1. The ombudsman Bangkok, Thailand  
2. The NHRC commissioner Bangkok, Thailand  
3. The former NHRC commissioner Bangkok, Thailand  
4. The NACC commissioner A Bangkok, Thailand  
5. The NACC commissioner B Bangkok, Thailand  
6. Police Colonel, an inspector Bangkok, Thailand  
7. 
Police Colonel, a Provincial Deputy 
Commander 
Northern Thailand  
8. Police Colonel, a senior investigator Northern Thailand  
9. Police Colonel, a senior investigator Northern Thailand  
10. Police Captain, an investigator Northern Thailand  
11. Police Captain, an investigator Northern Thailand  
12. A former senator Bangkok, Thailand  
13. A human rights lawyer Bangkok, Thailand  
14. A social researcher Bangkok, Thailand  
15. 
A former Provincial Deputy Police 
Commissioner 
Bangkok, Thailand  
16. 
A former Deputy Chief Justice, 
Criminal Court Thailand 
Bangkok, Thailand  
17. 
An inquiry officer, the Office of the 
Ombudsman 
Bangkok, Thailand  
18. A complainant A Bangkok, Thailand  
19. A complainant B Bangkok, Thailand  
20. A complainant C Bangkok, Thailand  
21. A complainant D Bangkok, Thailand  
22. A complainant E Bangkok, Thailand  
23. A complainant F Bangkok, Thailand  
24. A complainant G Bangkok, Thailand  
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APPENDIX 2: PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
Participant Information Sheet 
ค าชีแ้จงข้อมูลส าหรับผู้เข้าร่วมการวิจัย 
 
Police Complaints: A Comparative Study between England and Thailand 
การร้องทุกข์กรณีเจ้าหน้าที่ต ารวจปฏบิัตหิน้าที่โดยมิชอบ:  
ศึกษาเปรียบเทยีบระหว่างประเทศอังกฤษและประเทศไทย 
 
This research project aims to critically examine a police complaints system in response to 
the necessity of protecting intended victims and also healing those who are or have been 
suffering from abuse of power by the police. The research studies the complaints system 
in England which is under the direction and control of an autonomous national body – the 
Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) – and the existing complaints 
channels and mechanisms in Thailand. It, then, compares and contrasts the effectiveness 
of the English and the Thai complaints systems and put forward recommendations for 
future improvement of the Thai complaints mechanisms. 
You are invited to participate this research project on a voluntary basis. This process 
involves an in-depth interview which will last approximately 40-60 minutes. The 
questions focus on your direct or indirect experience towards the police complaints 
mechanism that you have involved in including your opinions on its effectiveness. There 
are no right or wrong answers. As a volunteer interviewee, you are entitled to the right to 
answer or not to answer any question at any stage of this interview; also, you have a right 
to discontinue and/or withdraw from this research project during or after this interview. In 
case of withdrawal, you need to declare your intention not to participate in this research 
via the researcher‘s email and/or address given in this information sheet within 30 days 
since the date the interview is conducted. Once the researcher has received the notification 
of withdrawal, the data provided will be automatically deleted and the confirmation of 
deletion will be sent to the participant within 10 days. Having said that we hope the honest 
opinions you provide will offer a deeper insight into the existing police complaints 
channels and/or mechanisms in Thailand.  
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The information you will provide during this interview will be anonymous and 
confidential. By saying so, 
 No interviewee will be named, nor be identifiable in any document, published or 
unpublished, by the researcher. 
 No individual or case will be named, nor be identifiable in any document, 
published or unpublished, by the researcher. 
The information provided will only be used for the purposes of this research. The 
information will be stored on CD-ROM with the password and will also be kept in a 
highly secured place. No information will be copied and/or retrieved from the researcher‘s 
personal computer.  
If you have any questions about this research or would like to be kept informed of the 
outcomes please contact us on the details provided below. 
This research is funded by the College of Arts and Law Graduate School and the Birmingham Law 
School, University of Birmingham. 
 
 โครงการวิจยันีม้ีวตัถปุระสงค์ท่ีจะศกึษาระบบการร้องทกุข์กรณีเจ้าหน้าท่ีต ารวจปฏิบตัิหน้าท่ีโดยมิ
ชอบ เพ่ือตอบสนองตอ่ความจ าเป็นในการปกป้องผู้ ท่ีอาจจะตกเป็นเหย่ือ หรือบคุคลทัง้หลายท่ีได้รับ
ผลกระทบ หรือก าลงัได้รับผลกระทบจากการใช้อ านาจโดยมิชอบของเจ้าหน้าท่ีต ารวจ งานวิจยันีท้ าการศกึษา
ระบบการรับเร่ืองราวร้องทกุข์ของประเทศองักฤษซึง่อยู่ภายใต้การด าเนินงานของหน่วยองค์กรอิสระระดบัชาติ 
ในนามของ “คณะกรรมการอสิระเพ่ือการด าเนินงานอนัเก่ียวเน่ืองกบัการร้องทกุข์เจ้าหน้าท่ีต ารวจ” หรือ “ไอ
พีซีซี” และช่องทางหรือกลไกการร้องทกุข์ฯ ของไทยท่ีมีอยู่ในปัจจบุนั การศกึษาดงักลา่วมานีจ้ะเปรียบเทียบ
ประสิทธิภาพในการท างานระหวา่งระบบการร้องทกุข์ฯ ขององักฤษและกลไกการร้องทกุข์ฯ ของไทย และเสนอ
ค าแนะน าเพ่ือการพฒันากลไกการร้องทกุข์ฯ ในประเทศไทยตอ่ไปในอนาคต 
 ท่านได้รับการเชิญให้ร่วมเป็นสว่นหนึง่ของโครงการวิจยันีบ้นพืน้ฐานของความสมคัรใจ 
กระบวนการวิจยันีจ้ะด าเนินไปโดยการสมัภาษณ์เชิงลกึ ซึง่มีระยะเวลาประมาณ ๔๐ ถงึ ๖๐ นาที ค าถาม
ทัง้หลายจะเน้นไปยงัประสบการณ์ทัง้ในทางตรง และทางอ้อมของท่านในการมีสว่นเก่ียวข้องกบัการร้องทกุข์ฯ 
ผ่านกลไกใดกลไกหนึง่ท่ีมีอยู่ในปัจจบุนั รวมทัง้ทศันะของทา่นตอ่กลไกดงักลา่ว โดยการตอบค าถามดงักลา่ว
มานี ้ไมม่ีค าตอบท่ีถกูหรือผิด และในฐานะผู้สมคัรใจเข้าร่วมการสมัภาษณ์ ท่านมีสามารถจะตอบ หรือไมต่อบ  
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ค าถามใดค าถามหนึง่ ในขณะใดขณะหนึง่ ระหวา่งการสมัภาษณ์นีก้็ได้ เช่นเดียวกนั ท่านสามารถจะหยดุการ
สมัภาษณ์ทัง้หมดในขณะใดขณะหนึง่ระหวา่งการ สมัภาษณ์ หรือ แสดงเจตนาถอนตวัจากการเข้าร่วมงาน
วิจยันี ้ ระหวา่งหรือภายหลงัเมื่อการสมัภาษณ์เสร็จสิน้ก็ได้ ในกรณีการถอนตวันัน้ ผู้ ให้สมัภาษณ์จะต้องแสดง
เจตนาขอถอนตวัตอ่ผู้ วิจยัภายในระยะเวลา ๓๐ วนั นบัจากวนัท่ีการสมัภาษณ์เสร็จสิน้ โดยแจ้งผ่านทาง
อีเมลล์หรือท่ีอยู่ซึง่ผู้ วิจยัได้ให้ไว้ในเอกสารฉบบันี ้ อย่างไรก็ตาม ในการสมัภาษณ์ครัง้นี ้ เราหวงัเป็นอย่างย่ิงท่ี
จะได้รับข้อมลูเชิงลกึจากท่าน เพ่ือเสริมสร้างความเข้าใจตอ่กลไกการร้องทกุข์ฯ ในประเทศไทย 
 อนึง่ ข้อมลูที่ท่านจะได้ให้ไว้ในการสมัภาษณ์ครัง้นีน้ัน้ จะไมถ่กูน ามาเปิดเผย ผู้ วิจยัขอยืนยนัวา่ 
๑. ผู้ถกูสมัภาษณ์จะไมถ่กูระบช่ืุอ และ/หรือข้อมลูสว่นบคุคล ในเอกสารใดๆ ไมว่า่เอกสารนัน้จะ
ได้รับการตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่หรือไมก่็ตาม 
๒. จะไมม่ีบคุคลใด หรือคดีความใดๆ ถกูระบช่ืุอและ/หรือข้อมลูสว่นบคุคล ในเอกสารใดๆ ไมว่า่
เอกสารนัน้จะได้รับการตีพิมพ์เผยแพร่หรือไมก่็ตาม 
นอกจากนี ้ข้อมลูที่ท่านได้ให้ไว้จะถกูเก็บไว้ในแผน่ซีดี ซึง่ต้องใช้รหสัผ่านเพ่ือเปิดอา่น และแผ่นซีดีดงักลา่วก็จะ
ถกูเก็บรักษาไว้ในสถานท่ีซึง่มีความปลอดภยัสงู ผู้ วิจยัขอยืนยนัวา่ ข้อมลูที่ให้ไว้จะไมส่ามารถถกูน าไปท าซ า้ 
ท าส าเนา หรือถกูกู้ ข้อมลูออกมาจากเคร่ืองคอมพิวเตอร์ของผู้ วิจยั 
 หากท่านมีค าถามหรือข้อสงสยัประการใด เก่ียวเน่ืองกบัการวิจยันี ้ หรือ มีความประสงค์จะได้รับการ
แจ้งถงึผลการวิจยัเม่ือได้ถกูด าเนินการจนเสร็จสิน้แล้ว ได้โปรดติดตอ่มาตามข้อมลูที่ได้ให้ไว้ด้านลา่งนีต้อ่ไป 
 โครงการวิจยันีไ้ด้รับทนุสนบัสนนุจาก บณัฑิตวิทยาลยั และคณะนิติศาสตร์ มหาวิทยาลยัเบอร์มิ่ง
แฮม ประเทศองักฤษ 
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Contact Details  
ข้อมูลการตดิต่อ 
1. Mr. Dhiyathad Prateeppornnarong                 Principal researcher, University of 
Birmingham 
Email:                           Tel:  
         ู้ ั  
2. Professor Andrew Sanders                              Lead Supervisor, Head of School, Law 
School, 
       University of Birmingham  
             Email:   
          ์ ี่ ึ ั ั  
3. Dr. James Treadwell          Co-supervisor, Lecturer, Law School 
       University of Birmingham 
             Email:   
          ์ ี่ ึ ั ่  
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Personal Information  ข้อมูลส่วนบุคคล 
1. AGE:  อายุ                                                      2. GENDER: เพศ 
 20 – 29 years (ปี)  
  30 – 39 years (ปี)  
 40 – 49 years (ปี)  
 50 – 60 years (ปี)  
 60 years (ปี)  and above หรือ
สงูกวา่ 
 
3.  EDUCATION BACKGROUND:                       4. OCCUPATION: อาชีพ 
     ภูมิหลังทางการศึกษา                                                  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time  
ขอบคณุเป็นอย่างย่ิงท่ีท่านกรุณาสละเวลาร่วมการสมัภาษณ์ครัง้นี ้
 
 Male      ชาย 
 Female  หญิง 
 Less than High School 
ต ่ากวา่มธัยมศกึษา 
 High School 
มธัยมศกึษา 
 College Graduate or 
Equivalent 
ปริญญาตรี หรือเทียบเท่า 
 Diploma of Higher 
Education 
ประกาศนียบตัรบณัฑิต 
 Postgraduate 
บณัฑิตศกึษา 
 a person serving with the police 
ข้าราชการต ารวจ 
         a civil servant or state officer 
ข้าราชการ หรือเจ้าหน้าท่ีของรัฐ 
 an academic or expert 
นกัวิชาการ หรือผู้ เช่ียวชาญ 
 Other (please state)  
อื่นๆ โปรดระบ ุ
...................................................... 
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APPENDIX 3: INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
 
 
Consent Form for Semi-structures Interview 
แบบแสดงความยนิยอมเข้าร่วมการสัมภาษณ์ 
 
Title of Project  Police Complaints: A Comparative Study between England and 
Thailand 
หวัข้อวิจัย              การร้องทุกข์กรณีเจ้าหน้าที่ต ารวจปฏบิัตหิน้าที่โดยมิชอบ: ศึกษาเปรียบเทยีบ
ระหว่าง 
   ประเทศอังกฤษและประเทศไทย 
 
 I confirm that I have read and understand the participation information sheet for 
this study. I have had the opportunity to ask questions if necessary and have had 
these answered satisfactorily. 
ข้าพเจ้าขอยืนยนัวา่ ข้าพเจ้าได้อา่นและมีความเข้าใจในค าชีแ้จงข้อมลูส าหรับผู้ เข้าร่วมวิจยัส าหรับ
การศกึษาครัง้นีเ้ป็นอย่างดี นอกจากนี ้ ข้าพเจ้าได้รับโอกาสในการถามสิ่งตา่งๆ อนัเก่ียวกยัการวิจยันี ้
ตามความจ าเป็นและได้รับการค าตอบเป็นท่ีพอใจ  
 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 
any time without giving any reason. If I withdraw and inform the researcher to 
remove my data from this study within a specific timescale set out in the 
information sheet, the data will be removed and destroyed automatically.  
ข้าพเจ้าเข้าใจดีว่า การเข้าร่วมการวิจยัของข้าพเจ้าในครัง้นีน้ัน้ เป็นไปด้วยความสมคัรใจ และ
ข้าพเจ้ามิได้ถกูผกูมดัด้วยประการใดๆ ในการท่ีจะถอนตวัจากการเข้าร่วมในครัง้นี ้ ไมว่า่ในช่วงเวลา
ใดๆ และไมว่า่ด้วยเหตผุลใดก็ตาม ในกรณีท่ีข้าพเจ้าถอนตวัโดยแจ้งกบัผู้ วิจยัวา่ให้ลบข้อมลูที่
ข้าพเจ้าได้ให้ไว้ในกรอบเวลาท่ีก าหนด ข้อมลูดงักลา่วจะถกูลบออกโดยทนัทีจากการศกึษาในครัง้นี ้  
 I understand that my personal data will be processed for the purposes detailed 
above, in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998.  
ข้าพเจ้าเข้าใจดีว่า ข้อมลูสว่นบคุคลของข้าพเจ้าจะถกูด าเนินการเพ่ือประโยชน์ตา่งๆ ท่ีได้กลา่วมา
ข้างต้น โดยเป็นไปตาม พระราชบญัญตัิการปกป้องข้อมลู ปี ค.ศ. ๑๙๙๘ )กฏหมายฉบบันีต้ราขึน้
เพ่ือใช้ปกป้องการให้ข้อมลูข่าวสารของบคุคล ในสหราชอาณาจกัร(  
 I agree to being re-contacted by the researcher if necessary. 
ข้าพเจ้าตกลงหากผู้ วิจยัจะได้ติดตอ่กบัข้าพเจ้าในภายหลงั ในกรณีท่ีจ าเป็น  
 
 
 
Page 341 of 367 
 
 Based upon the above, I agree to take part in this study. 
จากเง่ือนไขท่ีกลา่วมาทัง้หมดข้างต้นนี ้ข้าพเจ้าตกลงเข้าร่วมการวิจยัในครัง้นี ้
Signed            )ลายเซน็ต์( …………………………………………………. 
Print name )ลายมือช่ือ( …………………………………………………. 
Date            )วนั/เดือน/ปี(  …………………………………………………. 
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APPENDIX 4: SAMPLE OF WRITTEN AUTHORISATION 
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APPENDIX 5: SAMPLE OF A LIST OF INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Sample interview questions 
(For complainants) 
1. General questions  
 
1.1 What was your complaint about? 
1.2 Did you complain on behalf of somebody else? 
1.3 When did you file a complaint? 
1.4 What were your objectives of lodging a complaint?  
 2.  Pre-complaint process 
  2.1 Have you got any first-hand or second-hand experience in police complaints  
  before?          
   (If so) 2.1.1 Which organisation have you ever registered your complaints 
            with?        
   2.2.2 How many times have you ever made complaints?   
   2.2.3 What were those previous complaints about?     
  2.2 Have you complained to the appropriate authority where the officer involved 
   is/was serving before?        
   (if so) 2.2.1 Why did you decide to complain to this organisation?  
   (if not) 2.2.2 Why did you choose to complain to this organisation without  
             trying to register your complaint with the appropriate  
             authority?       
  2.3 How did you hear about this [the name of organisation]  organisation?  
  2.4 Do you know or have you ever sought information about any other   
  organisations that you may be able to register your complaint with?    
  2.5 Why did you choose to lodge your complaint here?    
  2.6 How well did you understand about the powers and the roles of this   
  organisation in handling with complaints before you have registered your  
  complaint with them?                  
  2.7 Did you find getting access to the complaints system run by this  
  organisation straightforward or complicated, and why?    
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  2.8 How much confidence did you have in this organisation that it is   
  effective, transparent and impartial before your complaint     
  had been lodged?   
 3.  During the process 
  3.1 Have you got any officers responsible for the receipt of complaints to help you 
  navigate the complaints procedures?        
   (if so) 3.1.1 Did you find it helpful, why?     
   (if not) 3.1.2 How did you cope with that situation where no one had  
     offered you any help?      
  3.2 Have you been informed, and in what way, that:     
    3.2.1 your complaint was being processed; and   
    3.2.2 who the investigator in your case was?    
  3.3 Does the investigator in your case have a police background?   
   (if so) 3.3.1 Did his former background undermine your confidence in the 
                                  investigation?        
  3.4 Have you involved in any process of the investigation?     
   (if so) 3.4.1 How have you involved in the investigation?   
  3.5 How often did your investigator and/or any other officers inform you about the
  progress of the investigation?        
  3.6 Have you ever raised any particular concerns over the way the investigation  
        was being conducted?         
   (if so) 3.6.1 How did your investigator respond?    
    3.6.2 Are you satisfied with such response?    
  3.7 How long did the investigation last?      
  3.8 How have you been informed about the completion of the investigation process,
  and in what way?               
  3.8 Are you satisfied with the overall treatment that you received since your 
  complaint has submitted until the investigation has been completed?  
 4. Post-complaint process 
  4.1 How have you been informed about the investigation results, and in what way?
  4.2 Since the completion of investigation, how long did it take before you have  
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   been informed?         
  4.3 Are you satisfied with the investigation and its outcomes?   
   (if not) 4.3.1 Have you been informed about what next could you do? 
   (if so) 4.3.2 Have you been informed about what next they would do to put 
    things right for you?       
  4.4 Have you finally got what you wanted?      
  4.5 Throughout the process, what satisfied you most?    
  4.6 Throughout the process, what upset or worried you most?   
  4.7 From your practical experience in registering a complaint with this   
  organisation, do you think the complaints system run by this organisation is  
  sufficiently effective, and why?        
  4.8 If you have a chance to talk to someone who is looking for lodging a complaint,
  would you recommend this organisation to them?      
 5.  Perception towards the police complaints systems in Thailand 
  5.1 What do you think complaints against the police in Thailand would be like  
  if there is a single independent body dealing specifically with such issues exists  
  in the future?           
  5.2 If an independent body would be established, what should become top   
  priorities to ensure that it will be effective, transparent and impartial?    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for your time 
 
 
 
Page 347 of 367 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
ABAC Social Innovation in Management and Business Analysis, ‗Public Poll for Views 
 on Structural Reform of the Police Work: A Study of the People in Bangkok and 
 Neighboring Cities and the Police Serving Nationwide‘ (as cited in  The Minutes 
 of the Special Meeting of the National Assembly 65/2550 on the National Police Bill 
 (21 November 2007) ) 
Abbott K and Charoensiri S, ‗Ten Years without Truth: Somchai Neelapaijit and Enforced
 Disappearance in Thailand‘ (ICJ 2014) 
Alder P A and Alder P, ‗How Many Qualitative Interviews is Enough: Expert Voices and 
 Early Career Reflection on Sampling and Cases in Qualitative Research‘ in Baker S E
 and Edwards R (eds) NCRM Review Paper 2012 <http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/> 
 accessed 26 January 2013 
Amnesty International, ‗Thailand: Torture in the Southern Counter-Insurgency‘ (Report) 
 (13 January 2009) AI-Index ASA 39/001/2009 
−− ‗Amnesty International Report 2009 – Thailand‘ (Report) (28 May 2009) AI-Index 
 POL 10/001/2009 
−− ‗Amnesty International Report 2014/15: The State of the World‘s Human Rights‘ 
 (Report) (23 February 2016) AI-Index POL 10/0001/2015 
 
−− ‗Thailand: 10 Years on, Find Truth and Justice for Family of Somchai Neelapaijit‘ 
 (Report) (12 March 2014) AI-Index ASA 39/001/2014 
Armacost E B, ‗Organisational Culture and Police Misconduct‘ (2004) 72 Geo Wash L 
 Rev 453 
Ashayagachat A, ‗Court Acquits Somchai Case Cops‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 30 
 December 2015) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/politics/810572/court-acquits-
 somchai-case-cops> accessed 20 January 2016 
Asian Human Rights Commission, ‗Thailand: Police Reforms Mean Command 
 Responsibility‘ (Statement) (14 December 2006) AS-313-2006  
Asian Legal Resource Centre, ‗Rule of Law versus Rule of Lords in Thailand‘ (2005) 4 
 Article 2, 1 
−− ‗Protecting Witnesses or Perverting Justice in Thailand‘ (2006) 5 Article 2, 1  
−− ‗Defective Criminal Justice Institutions Cause Systemic and Widespread Rights Abuse 
 in Thailand‘ (Statement) (18 March 2007) ALRC-SHRC-04-19-2007 
 
 
Page 348 of 367 
 
−− ‗―Unsubstantiated‖ Police Abuses, Impunity and Human Rights Charades‘ (Statement) 
 (3 September 2009) ALRC-CWS-12-05-2009 
Associated Press, ‗Thai Police‘s Internal Investigation into Corruption Widens Following 
 Arrests‘ The Guardian (London, 25 November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com 
 /world/2014/nov/25/thai-senior-police-officer-corruption-charges> accessed 5 March 
 2015 
Association of Chief Police Officers, ‗Murder Investigation Manual 2006‘ (National 
 Centre for Policing Excellence 2006) 
ASTV, ‗8 Years on: The NACC is Handling 34,528 Complaints Cases – the Provincial 
 Administrative Organisations have been Complained against Most – Some Cases 
 have been Brought to Court without Having to Rely on the OAG‘ Manager Online 
 (Bangkok, 21 October 2013) <http://www.manager.co.th/Politics/ViewNews. 
 aspx?NewsID=9570000121349> accessed 20 January 2015 
Australian Law Reform Commission, ‗Under the Spotlight: Complaints against the AFP 
and NCA‘ (ALRC 1995) 
Azarian R, ‗Potentials and Limitations of Comparative Method in Social Science‘ (2011) 
 1 IJHSS 113 
−− ‗Bangkok Bomb: Two Suspects Cleared by Police after Questioning‘ BBC (20 
 August 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34007723> accessed 1 
 September 2015 
Baker C and Phongpaichit P, A History of Thailand (3rd edn, CUP 2014) 
Barling K, ‗Been Here Before – A Death in Custody‘ (Barling’s London, 25 November 
 2010) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/kurtbarling/2010/11/been_here_before_-
 _a_death_in.html> accessed 18 July 2015  
Barnes J A, Who Should Know What: Social Science, Privacy and Ethics (Penguin 1979) 
Bell T, ‗Thai Army Deployed in Bangkok after Bomb Leads to Coup Fears‘ The 
 Telegraph (Bangkok, 7 October 2008) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ 
 asia/thailand/3151874/Thai-army-deployed-in-Bangkok-after-bomb-leads-to-coup-
 fears.html> accessed 5 February 2013 
Berstein H M, Regulating Business by Independent Commission (PUP 1955) 
−− ‗Beset with Cases ―Shinawatra-Wongsawat‖ Opportunity and Way Out‘ Isaranews 
 Agency (Bangkok, 15 February 2015) <http://www.isranews.org/isranews-
 scoop/item/36540-policy_36540.html> accessed 30 June 2015 
 
 
Page 349 of 367 
 
Box S and Russell K, ‗The Politics of Discredibility: Disarming Complaints against the 
 Police‘ (1975) 23 Sociol Rev 315 
Brown D, The Police Complaints Procedure: A Survey of Complainants’ Views (HMSO 
 1987) 
Bryman A, Social Research Methods (4th edn, OUP 2012) 
Buachareon S, Vivatvanit C and Wattanasin K, ‗The Reasons for the Police to Violate 
 Human Rights in Criminal Justice System‘ (NHRC 2011) [in Thai] 
Casale S, Corfe M J and Lewis J QC, ‗Report of the Independent External Review of the 
IPCC  Investigation into the Death of Sean Rigg‘ (IPCC 2013) 
Chamnansuk P, ‗Challenge to Reforms to the Police Culture‘ Kom Chad Luek Online 
 (Bangkok, 4 February 2015) <http://www.komchadluek.net/detail/20150204/ 
 200737.html> accessed 27 July 2015 [in Thai] 
Chappell T A and Piquero R A, ‗Applying Social Learning Theory to Police Misconduct‘ 
 (2004) 25 DB 89 
Chevigny P, Police Power: Police Abuses in New York City (Vintage Books 1969) 
Chongseubphun C, Waiyakarn S and Duangtoh P, ‗Status, Structure and Administration of 
 Constitutional Organization: A Case Study of the Office of the Ombudsman‘ (KPI 
 2551) [in Thai] 
Chotchakornpant K, Sataworn P and Patanaponpaiboon P, ‗A Study of Preventative 
 Measures to Combat Abuse of Power: The Case of Abuse of Police Power‘ (NACC 
 2009) [in Thai] 
Commissioner for Human Rights, ‗Opinion of the Commissioner for Human Rights 
 concerning Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints against the Police‘ 
 (Report) (12 March 2009) CoE Doc CommDH (2009) 4 
−− ‗Complain of Police Brutality in Electrocuted Five Teenagers in relation to a Theft 
 Case‘ Thairath Online (Bangkok 2013) <http://www.thairath.co.th/content/334052> 
 accessed 1 September 2014 
Collier A, ‗Philosophical and Critical Realism‘ in Steinmetz G (ed), The Politics of 
 Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and its Epistemological Others (DUP 
 2005) 
Corrigan P and Sayer D, The Great Arch: English State Formation as Cultural Revolution 
 (Basil Blackwell Inc. 1985) 
 
 
Page 350 of 367 
 
Cox S, ‗IPCC seeks increased powers to investigate police‘ BBC radio 4’s (26 April 2012) 
 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17843690> accessed 5 February 2015 
Crime Correspondent Team, ‗Corruption in the Construction of Police Stations: 
 ‗Accidental Discharge‘ over People in the Same Party‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 11 
 February 2013) <http://www.manager.co.th/Crime/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID= 
 9560000017327&CommentReferID=22715649&CommentReferNo=1&TabID=2&> 
 accessed 6 August 2014 
Crime Correspondent Team‗ ‗Suraphon‘ Made an Apology to ‗Beau‘s Mom‘ for Not 
 Making a Case against Him as a Result of His Slanderous Remarks‘ Manager Online 
 (Bangkok, 16 February 2009) <http://www.manager.co.th/Crime/ViewNews   
 .aspx?NewsID =9520000017765> accessed 20 July 2014 
Crime Correspondent Team, ‗The Royal Thai Police Disclosed the Information regarding 
 People‘s Complaints against the Police‘, Manager Online (Bangkok, 9 October 2012), 
 <http://www.manager.co.th/Crime/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9550000123808> 
 accessed 15 March 2013 
Croissant A, ‗Muslim Insurgency, Political Violence and Democracy in Thailand‘ (2007) 
 19 Terrorism and Political Violence 1 
Dal Bó E, ‗Regulatory Capture: A Review‘ (2006) 22 Oxf Rev Econ Policy 203 
Denscombe M, The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects (4th 
 edn, Open UP 2010) 
−− ‗Disclosing the Strategies for Destroying ‗the Pongpat Network‘: Cleaning the Khaki 
 [Uniform]‘ Thairath Online (Bangkok, 2 December 2014) 
 <http://www.thairath.co.th/content/466668> accessed 9 January 2015 
Docking M, Grace K and Bucke T, Police Custody as a ―Place of Safety‖: Examining the 
 Use of Section 136 of the Mental Health Act 1983, (IPCC 2008) 
Dodd V and Travis A, ‗Mark Duggan Police Must Stop Refusing to be Interviewed, Says 
 IPCC Head‘ The Guardian (London, 14 January 2014) 
 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/14/mark-duggan-police-must-talk-
 says-ipcc> accessed 5 February 2015 
−− ‗Ekkayuth's Body Found; Theft Motive Disputed‘ The Nation (Bangkok, 13 June 2013) 
 <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/national/Ekkayuths-body-found;-theft-motive-
 disputed-30208186.html> accessed 15 February 2014 
Email from the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) concerning ‗Police 
 Complaints Statistics‘ to the author (15 June 2015) 
 
 
Page 351 of 367 
 
Email from the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) concerning ‗Police Complaints 
 Statistics‘ to the author (25 June 2014) 
Email from the Office of the Ombudsman concerning ‗Police Complaints Statistics‘ to the 
 author (20 June 2015) 
−− ‗Even I Myself Had been Deceived by Mr.Thaksin for a Year, I Believe that Those 
 Folks will Open up Their Eyes‘ Thaipost (Bangkok 2013) 
 <http://www.thaipost.net/tabloid/240313/71309> accessed 10 September 2014 
−− ‗Explanation Sought on Senior Police Officer‘s Meet with Fugitive Ex-PM Thaksin‘ 
 MCOT.NET (Bangkok, 16 July 2013) <http://www.mcot.net/site/content?id= 
 51e4a3dd150ba04f0600011c> accessed 5 April 2015 
−− ‗5 New Members Join NACC‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 20 October 2015) 
 <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/735508/5-new-members-join-nacc> 
 accessed 20 October 2015 
Fitzgerald T, ‗Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council‘ 
 (Commission of Inquiry into Alleged Illegal Activities and Associated Police 
 Misconduct 1989) 
Fredrickson T,‗Pongsapat Wants Police Job Back‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 5 March 2013) 
 <http://www.bangkokpost.com/learning/learning-from-news/338896/pongsapat-
 wants-police-job-back> 30 June 2013 
Friends of the Earth, ‗Barclays, Human Rights and the Trans Thai-Malaysia Gas Pipeline‘ 
 (FOE 2005) 4 
Frenquest J, ‗Koh Tao murders defence details torture, intimidation‘ Bangkok Post (25, 
 September 2015) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/crime/707448/koh-tao-
 murders-defence-details-torture-intimidation> accessed 10 October 2015 
Gecker J, ‗Thai Intelligence Chief Jailed on Corruption Charges Owned Rolex Watches 
 and Vintage Wine Costing $4,000 a Bottle‘, Independent (London, 5 March 2015) 
 <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/thai-intelligence-chief-jailed-on-
 corruption-charges-owned-rolex-watches-and-vintage-wine-costing-10089115.html> 
 accessed 6 March 2015 
Gilbert N, Researching Social Life (3rd edn, Sage Publications 2008) 
Goldsmith J A, ‗Complaints against the Police: A ‗Community Policing‘ Perspective‘ in 
 McKillop S and Vernon J (eds), The Police and the Community in the 1990s 
 (Australian Institute of Criminology 1991) 
 
 
Page 352 of 367 
 
−− ‗External Review and Self-Regulation: Police Accountability and the Dialectice of 
 Complaints Procedures‘ in Goldsmith A J (ed), Complaints against the Police: The 
 Trend to External Review (Clarendon Press 1991) 
−− Gøtze M, ‗The Danish Ombudsman: A National Watchdog with Selected Preferences‘ 
 (2010) 6 Utrecht L. Rev. 33 
Government Strategic Information Center, ‗ ―The Patients of Drug Addiction‖: The Life 
 Needing to Reintegrate into the Society‘ (National Statistical Office, Thailand 2013) 
 [in Thai] 
Haanstad E J, ‗Constructing Order through Chaos: A State Ethnography of the Thai Police‘ 
 (PhD thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison 2008) 
−− ‗Thai Police in Refractive Cultural Practice‘ in Garriott W (ed), Policing and 
 Contemporary Governance: The Anthropology of Police in Practice (Palgrave 
 Macmillan 2013) 
Hakim C, Research Design: Successful Designs for Social and Economic Research (2nd 
 edn, Routledge 2000) 
Harding A, ‗Thailand‘s Reforms: Human Rights and the National Commission‘ (2006) 1 
 JCL 88 
−− and Leyland P, The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual Analysis  (Hart 
 Publishing 2011) 
Harlow C and Rawling R, Law and Administration (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1984) 
Harrison J and Cragg S, Police Misconduct: Legal Remedies (3rd edn, Legal Action 
 Group 1995) 
Harrison J and Cunneen M, ‗An Independent Police Complaints Commission‘ (Liberty 
 2000) 
Harvey P, Shepherd S and Magill T, Public Confidence in the Police Complaints System 
 (Ipsos MORI 2014) 
Hayashi K, Small W, Csete J, Hattirat S and Kerr T, ‗Reports of Police Beating and 
 Associated Harms among People who Inject Drugs in Bangkok, Thailand: A Serial 
 Cross-Sectional Study‘ (2013) 13 BMC Public Health 733 
Hayes M, A Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland? A review of the police complaints 
 system in Northern Ireland (The Stationery Office Ltd 1997) 
Henn M, Weinstein M and Foard N, A Critical Introduction to Social Science Research 
 (2nd edn, Sage Publications 2009) 
 
 
Page 353 of 367 
 
Hibberd M, ‗Survey of the Attitudes of the Police Officers of the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland to the Office of the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland‘ (2008) 
Social and Market Strategic Research 1 
Hodal K, ‗Thailand Army Chief Confirms Military Coup and Suspends Constitution‘ The 
 Guardian (Bangkok, 22 May 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/ 
 may/22/ thailand-army-chief-announces-military-coup> accessed 19 July 2014 
Home Affairs Committee, Independent Police Complaints Commission (HC 2012-2013, 
 494-XI) 
−− The Work of Independence Police Complaints Commission (HC 366, 2009-2010)  
Home Office, Report of an Inquiry on the Brixton Disorders 10-12 April 1981 (Cmnd 
 8427, 1981) 
Hopkins T, An Effective System for Investigating Complaints against Police: A Study of 
 Human Rights Compliance in Police Complaint Models in the US, Canada, UK, 
 Northern Ireland and Australia (Grants Publications Education 2009) 
Hsieh HF, and Shannon S E, ‗Three Approaches to Qualitative Content Analysis‘ (2005) 
 15 Qualitative Health Analysis 1277 
Human Rights Watch, ‗Thailand‘s 'War on Drugs'‘ (HRW, 12 March 2008) 
 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/03/12/thailand-s-war-drugs> accessed 3 September 
 2014 
−− ‗Thailand: Lawyer‘s ‗Disappearance‘ Unsolved 10 Years On – Shoddy Investigations, 
 Cover-Up Undermine Justice for Somchai Neelapaijit‘ (HRW,  11 March 2014) 
 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/11/thailand-lawyer-s-disappearance-unsolved-10-
 years> accessed 10 September 2014 
Huntington S P, ‗The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the 
 Public Interest‘ (1952) 61 YLJ 171 
Independent Police Complaints Commission, ‗Stockwell One: Investigation into the 
 Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell Underground Station on 22 July 
 2005‘ (IPCC 2007) 
−− ‗IPCC Investigations: A Survey Seeking  Feedback from Complainants and Police 
 Personnel‘ (IPCC 2009) 
−− ‗Independent Investigation into the Death of Ian Tomlinson on 1 April 2009‘ (IPCC 
 2010) 
 
 
Page 354 of 367 
 
−− ‗IPCC Independent Investigation into the Death of Sean Rigg whilst in the Custody of 
Brixton Police and Complaints made by Mr Wayne Rigg and Ms Angela Wood‘ (IPCC 
2008) 
−− ‗A Guide to the Police Complaints System‘ (IPCC 2013) 
−− ‗New IPCC Commissioner for Wales Appointed by Home Secretary‘ (IPCC, 1 August 
 2013) <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/new-ipcc-commissioner-wales-appointed-
 home-secretary> accessed 10 May 2015 
−− ‗Police Witness Policy‘ (IPCC, March 2013) <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/policy-
 documents> accessed 20 January 2015 
−− ‗Review of the IPCC‘s Work in Investigating Deaths: Progressive Report‘ (IPCC 
 2013) 
−− ‗Review of the IPCC‘s Work in Investigating Deaths: Final Report‘ (IPCC 2014) 
−− ‗Statutory Guidance to the Police Service on the Handling of Complaints‘ (IPCC 2015) 
−− ‗Improving Police Integrity: Reforming the Police Complaints and Disciplinary 
 Systems‘ (IPCC 2015) 
−− ‗Chair and Commissioners‘ (IPCC) <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/chair-and-
 commissioners> accessed 10 May 2015 
INQUEST, ‗IPCC Investigation into Death of Olaseni Lewis Ruled to be Unlawful and 
 Quashed by the High Court‘ (4 September 2013) <http://inquest.org.uk/media/pr/ipcc-
 investigation-into-death-of-olaseni-lewis> accessed 9 October 2014 
Institution of Occupational Safety and Health, ‗Responsible Research – Managing Health 
 and Safety in Research: Guidance for the Not-For-Profit Sector‘ (IOSH 2012) 
Intarathawon S, ‗An Examination of State Power: A Study on the Fact-Finding 
 Examination Process to Proceed in Cases against Government Officials according to 
 the Act Accompanying the Constitution of Countering Corruption B.E.2542‘ (LLM 
 Thesis, Ramkhamheang University 2006) [in Thai] 
International Commission of Jurists, ‗Thailand: Effective Investigation of Enforced 
 Disappearance of Somchai Neelapaijit Needed after Supreme Court Ruling‘ (ICJ, 21 
 May 2014) <www.icj.org/thailand-effective-investigation-of-enforced-disappearance-
 of-somchai-neelapaijit-needed-after-supreme-court-ruling/> accessed 12 September 
 2014 
International Coordinating Committee for National Human Rights Institutions Sub-
 Committee on Accreditation, ‗Report and Recommendation of the Session of the Sub-
 Committee on Accreditation‘ (ICC, SCA October 2014)  
 
 
Page 355 of 367 
 
Jackson J and Bradford B, ‗Crime, Policing and Social Order: On the Expressive Nature 
 of Public Confidence in Policing‘ (2009) 60 BJS 493 
Johnson H H, ‗Direct Complaints: A Survey Seeking Feedback from People who 
 Complain Directly to the IPCC‘ (IPCC 2010) 
−− ‗Kaewsan will File a Partition to the Administrative Court to Take Back the Books on 
 ‗Stop the Thaksin Regime‘ Tomorrow‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 20 March 2006) 
 <http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9490000037949> 
 accessed 10 September 2014 
Kankaew K, ‗Thailand‘s Witness Protection Programme‘ (Fourth Regional Seminar on 
 Good Governance for Southeast Asian Countries: Securing Protection and 
 Cooperation of Witness and Whistle-Blowers, Manila, 6-9 December 2010) 
 <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/pages  /Fourth_GGSeminar_Report.htm> accessed 
 31 December 2013 
Kanoknak P, ‗Structural Change in the Appeal System of the Court of Justice in Thailand‘ 
 (2005) 2 Research Journal 168 [in Thai] 
Kanyajit S, Sinloyma P and Sanitpod P, The Attitudes of Police Officers on Law 
 Enforcement and the Protection of People’s Rights in the Criminal Justice System 
 (Stage 1) (NHRC 2011) [in Thai] 
Keyes C, Democracy Thwarted: The Crisis of Political Authority in Thailand (Trends in 
 Southeast Asia) (ISEAS Publishing 2015) 
Kittayarak K, ‗The Thai Constitution of 1997 and its Implication on Criminal Justice 
 Reform‘ (120th International Senior Seminar: Effective Administration of the Police 
 and the Prosecution in Criminal Justice, Tokyo, February 2003) 
 <http://www.unafei.or.jp/english/ pages/RMS/No60.htm> accessed 31 December 
 2013 
−− A Seminar Report on Police and the Expectation of Thai Society (the Secretariat of the 
 Commission of Police Administration Development 2007) 
−− A Seminar Report on Police Reform – What Will the People Obtain (the Secretariat
 of the Commission of Police Administration Development 2007) 
Kwak J, ‗Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis‘ in Carpenter D and Moss D A, 
 Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Influence and How to Limit It (CUP 
 2014) 
 
 
 
Page 356 of 367 
 
Lefevre A S and Thepgumpanat P, ‗Thai Junta Picks Panel to Write Constitution after 
 Draft Rejected‘ Reuters (Bangkok, 5 October 2015) 
 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/05/ us-thailand-politics-
 idUSKCN0RZ0EB20151005> accessed 15 October 2015 
Lertmaneerat B, ‗The Performance within the Jurisdiction of the NCCC in Inquiring and 
 Determining the Case of the State Official Excused of Committing an Offence  
 Accordance with Discipline‘ (LLM Thesis, Ramkhamheang University 2001) [in  
 Thai] 
Leyland P, ‗Droit Administratif Thai Style: A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative 
 Courts in Thailand‘ (2006) 8 AJAL 121 
−− ‗The Ombudsman Principles in Thailand‘ (2007) 2 JCL 137 
−− ‗Thailand‘s Constitutional Watchdogs: Dobermans, Bloodhounds or Lapdogs‘ 
 (2007) 2 JCL 151 
−− ‗Politics and the Rule of Law in Thailand‘ (17 January 2011) 
 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fDTHHSE9GUs> accessed 10 August 2015 
Liow J C and Pathan D, Confronting Ghosts: Thailand Shapeless Southern Insurgency 
 (Lowy Institute for International Policy 2010) 
Loftus B, ‗Police Occupation Culture: Classic Themes, Altered Times‘ (2010) 20 Policing 
 and Society 1 
Lohmann L, ‗Gas, Waqf and Barclays Capital: A Decade of Resistance in Southern 
 Thailand‘ (2008) 50 Race and Class 89 
Lortrakul S, ‗Problems of Personal Witness Protection in a Criminal Case under the 
 Witness Protection Act, B.E. 2546‘ (2010) 2 RMU J 47 [in Thai] 
Lustgarten L, The Governance of Police (Sweet and Maxwell 1986) 
MacKinnon I, ‗Former Thai PM Thaksin Found Guilty of Corruption‘ The Guardian 
 (London, 21 October 2008) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/oct/21/thaksin-
 thailand-corruption> accessed 5 April 2015 
Maguire M and Corbett C, A Study of the Police Complaints System (HMSO 1991) 
−− Police Misconduct: Legal Remedies (3rd edn, Legal Action Group 1995) 
Marshall A, ‗The curse of the blue diamond‘ Thomson Reuters Foundation (22 September 
 2010) <http://www.trust.org/item/20100922171500-nipvs/?source=search> accessed 
 5 February 2014 
 
 
Page 357 of 367 
 
Mason J, ‗How Many Qualitative Interviews is Enough: Expert Voices and Early Career 
 Reflection on Sampling and Cases in Qualitative Research‘ in Baker S E and Edwards 
 R (eds) NCRM Review Paper 2012 <http://eprints.ncrm.ac.uk/2273/> accessed 26 
 January 2013 
Mawby R C and Wright A, ‗The Police Organisation‘ in Newburn T (ed), Handbook of 
 Policing (2nd edn, Willan Publishing 2008) 
McCarthy T, ‗Saudi Gems Theft Leaves Deadly Trail in Thailand‘ Independent (Tokyo, 
 22 October 2011) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/saudi-gems-theft-
 leaves-deadly-trail-in-thailand-1450865.html> accessed 5 February 2014 
McClincy M A, ‗A Blue Thai Affair: The Blue Diamond Affair‘s Illustration of the Royal 
 Thai Police Force‘s Standards of Corruption‘ (2012) 1 Penn St JL & Int'l Aff 182  
McLaughlin E and Johansen A, ‗A Force for Change: The Prospects for Applying 
 Restorative Justice to Citizen Complaints against the Police in England and Wales‘ 
 (2002) 42 Br J Criminol 635 
Mertens D M and Hesse-Biber S, ‗Triangulation and Mixed Methods Research: 
 Provocative Positions‘ (2012) 6 JMMR 75 
Montlake S, ‗Thai Insurgency Takes Toll on Locals‘ BBC (London, 19 July 2005) 
 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4696829.stm> accessed 20 May 2015  
Moore J M, The Thai Way of Counterinsurgency (A Muir Analytics Book 2013) 
−− ‗MoU on witness protection measures signed‘ The Nation (Bangkok, 10 July 2013) 
 <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/MoU-on-witness-protection-
 measures-signed-30210091.html> accessed 26 May 2015 
National Anti-Corruption Commission, ‗Memorandum of Understanding between the 
 National Anti-Corruption Commission and the Royal Thai Police on the Cooperation 
 from Police Investigators in accordance with the Organic Act on Counter Corruption 
 1999‘ (25 March 2001) 
−− ‗Annual Report 2012‘ (NACC 2012) 
−− ‗Advice on Making a Complaint‘ (NACC) 
 <http://www.nacc.go.th/nacc_accuse_suggest.php> accessed 20 April 2015 
−− ‗A Leaflet on Increasing Public Involvement in the NACC‘s New Legislation (1)‘ 
 (NACC) <https://www.nacc.go.th/more_news.php?cid=95&filename=index> 
 accessed 20 April 2015 
−− ‗NACC Annual Reports‘ <http://www.nacc.go.th/more_news.php?ci 
 d=234&filename=index> accessed 31 March 2015 
 
 
Page 358 of 367 
 
National Human Rights Commission, ‗The Clarification of the National Human Rights 
 Commission on the Violent Incident in relation to the Trans Thai-Malaysian Gas 
 Pipeline Project‘ (NHRC, June 2003) http://www.nhrc.or.th/2012/wb/img_contentpag
 e_attachment/554_file_name_1408.pdf> accessed 30 July 2013 
−− ‗Open Letter to the Prime Minister regarding General Recommendations on the 
 Suppression of Drug Trafficking Policy‘ (NHRC, 25 November 2003) 
 <http://www.nhrc.or.th/2012/wb/th/contentpage.php?id =46&menu_id=1> accessed 
 on 17 January 2015 
−− ‗Open Letter to the Prime Minister regarding General Recommendations on a State of 
 Emergency Decree‘ (NHRC, 3 December 2004) 
 <http://www.nhrc.or.th/2012/wb/th/contentpage.php?id=46&menu_id=1> 
 accessed on 17 January 2015 
−− Reports on the Appraisal of Human Rights Situations in Thailand and on the 
 Performance of NHRC 2012 (NHRC 2013)  
−− ‗NHRC Annual Reports‘ (NHRC) <http://www.nhrc.or.th/2012/wb/th/contentpage  
 .php?id=4&menu_id=1&groupID=4&subID=9> accessed 31 March 2015 
−− ‗The National Human Rights Commission of Thailand (2009 - 2015)‘ (NHRC) 
 <http://www.nhrc.or.th/en/Commissioners.php> accessed 11 August 2014 
Neuman W L, Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches (7th 
 edn, Pearson Education Limited 2014) 
‗NIDA Poll Showed the People Agreed with the Proposal for Police Reforms‘ (as cited in 
 Daily News (Bangkok 21 December 2014) ) 
 <http://www.dailynews.co.th/politics/288853> accessed 9 January 2015 
Office of the Ombudsman, ‗Annual Report 2011‘ (Thai Ombudsman 2011) [in Thai] 
−− ‗Annual Report 2013‘ (Thai Ombudsman 2013) [in Thai] 
−− ‗12 Years on: Thai Ombudsman‘ (Thai Ombudsman 2013) 
−− ‗Report‘ <http://www.ombudsman.go.th/10/index1.asp> accessed 31 March 2015 
−− ‗The Directory of the Ombudsmen‘ <http://www.ombudsman.go.th/10/eng/3_2.asp> 
 accessed 11 August 2014 
−− ‗Opinion Survey on Public Satisfaction of Public Services and the Performance of 
Public Organisations‘ (KPI& National statistical office, Thailand 2012) [in Thai] 
−− O‘Brien N, ‗Ombudsmen and Social Rights Adjudication‘ (2009) P. L. 466 
 
 
Page 359 of 367 
 
−− O‘Neil M and Singh A M, ‗Introduction‘ in O‘Neil M, Marks M and Singh A M (eds.),
  Police Occupational Culture: New Debates and Directions (Elsevier 2007) 
Owers D A, Chair of the IPCC, ‗Independent Oversight of Police Complaints: The IPCC 
 Eight Years On‘ (Speech at the Annual John Harris Memorial Lecture, London, 3 July 
 2012) <https://www.ipcc.gov.uk/page/speeches> accessed 12 April 2013 
Pathmanand U, ‗Thaksin‘s Achilles‘ Heel: The Failure of Hawkish Approaches in the 
 Thai South‘ (2007) 38 Critical Asian Studies 73 
Pemberton S, ‗Demystifying Deaths in Police Custody: Challenging State Talk‘ (2008) 17 
 Social and Legal Studies 237 
Perry R A, ‗Mission Failure: Civilian Review of Policing in New York City 1994-2006‘ 
 (NYCLU 2007) 
Phattanaphong C, ‗Power and Duties of the Inquiry Sub-Committee According to the 
 Organic Act on Counter Corruption, B.E.2542 (1999): A Case Study of the Issues and 
 Obstacles of the Fact Inquiry Process‘ (LLM Thesis, Ramkhamhaeng University 2004) 
 [in Thai] 
Phillips D A, Thailand (Gritzner C F ed, Chelsea House Publisher 2007) 
Phillips T, ‗Three 'Attackers' involved in Thai Island Murders, Police Say‘ The Telegraph 
 (14 September 2014) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/thailand/ 
 11108188/ Three-attackers-involved-in-Thai-island-murders-police-say.html> 
 accessed 10 January 2015 
Phongpaichit P and Piriyarangsan S, Corruption and Democracy in Thailand (Silkworm 
 Books 1994) 
−− and Treerat N, Guns, Girls, Gambling, Ganja: Thailand’s Illegal Economy and Public 
 Policy (Silkworm Books 1998) 
−− and Baker C, Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (NIAS 2004) 
−− Thaksin (2nd edn, Silkworm Books 2009) 
Phothong B, ‗Legal Problems regarding the Prosecutorial Power in relation to Section 47 
 of the Act on Administrative Measures for Anti-Corruption 2008‘ (LLM Thesis, 
 Ramkhamheang University 2010) [in Thai] 
Pinthong J, ‗The Police in the Thaksin Regime‘ Naewna  (Bangkok, 2013) 
 <http://www.naewna.com politic/columnist/10323> accessed 10 September 2014  
 [in Thai] 
 
 
Page 360 of 367 
 
Pinthong P, ‗Excessive Force of Police Power in Thailand: The Effect upon Human 
 Rights Violations‘ (2012) 2 Thai Journal of Public Administration 135 [in Thai] 
Pitiyasak S, ‗National Corporate Governance Committee: Three Disciplines for Good 
 Corporate Governance in Thailand‘ in Leong H K (ed), Reforming Corporate 
 Governance in Southeast Asia: Economics, Politics and Regulations (ISEAS 2005) 
Plate T, Conversations with Thaksin (Giants of Asia Series) From Exile to Deliverance: 
  Thailand’s Populist Tycoon Tells His Story (KWF Printing 2011) 
Police Action Lawyer Group, ‗Submissions to the Independent Police Complaints 
 Commission regarding its Work in Cases involving a Death‘ (PALG, February 2013) 
 <http://www.palg.org.uk/documents/> accessed 20 June 2015 
−− ‗Police Gang Gets Jail for Robbery-Rape‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok 2013) 
 <www.bangkokpost.com./news/local/385279/woman-robbed-and-raped-by-police-
 gang> accessed 1 September 2014 
−− ‗Pongsapat Sorry for Shooting Mistake‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 3 August 2014) 
 <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/423862/pongsapat-sorry-for-shooting-
 mistake> accessed 30 October 2014 
Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, ‗Police Officer Satisfaction Survey 2009/2010‘ 
(OPONI 2010) 
Pongsudhirak T, ‗Thailand: Democratic Authoritarianism‘ [2003] Southeast Asian Affairs 
 277 
Poothakool K, ‗The Royal Thai Police, 2006-2011: Five Years without Reform‘ (PhD 
 thesis, University of Aberdeen 2012) 
−− and Glendinning T, ‗Police Reform in Thailand Post-2006‘ (2013) 2 IJCST 371, 371-
 384 
−− Porter L E and Prenzler T, ‗Police Oversight in the United Kingdom: The Balance of 
 Independence and Collaboration‘ (2012) International Journal of Law, Crime and 
 Justice 152 
Posner A R, ‗The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious History‘ in 
 Carpenter D and Moss D A, Preventing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest 
 Influence and How to Limit It (CUP 2014) 
Powell C, ‗Intelligence Reform‘ (Speech at the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, 
 Washington DC, 13 September 2004) <http://fas.org/irp/congress/2004_hr/091304 
 powell.html> accessed 11 February 2015 
 
 
Page 361 of 367 
 
Prasirtpum P, ‗A Study on Administrators‘ Attitude toward Restructuring of the Royal 
 Thai Police‘ (MBA thesis, Ramkhamheang University 1999) [in Thai] 
Preznler T, ‗Civilian Oversight of Police: A Test of Capture Theory‘ (2000) 40 BJC 659 
−− Police Corruption: Preventing Misconduct and Maintaining Integrity (CRC Press 
2009) 
−− and Ronken C, ‗Models of Police Oversight: A Critique‘ (2001) 11 Policing and 
 Society 151  
Prison Reform Trust, ‗Private Punishment: Who Profits‘ (PRT 2005) 
 <http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/Publications/AZ> accessed 10 April 2015 
−− ‗Profile: Thaksin Shinawatra‘ BBC (London, 2011) 
 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13891650> accessed 1 September 
 2014 
Punch M, Police Corruption: Deviance, Accountability and Reform in Policing (Willan 
Publishing 2009) 
Øyen E, ‗Some Basic Issues in the Comparative Methodology of Cross-national Social 
 Research‘ (Research Symposium on: The International Comparisons of Social 
 Security Policies and Systems, Paris, 13-15 June 1990) 
 <http://bora.uib.no/handle/1956/3381> accessed 29 September 2014   
Ragin C C, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative 
 Strategies (UC Press 1987) 
Reif L C, ‗Building Democratic Institutions: The Role of National Human Rights 
 Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights Protection‘ (2000) 13 Harv Hum 
 Rts J 1  
Reiner R, The Politics of the Police (4th edn, OUP 2010) 
Restorative Justice Council, ‗What is ‗Restorative Justice‘ (RJC) 
 <http://www.restorativejustice.org.uk/what_is_restorative_justice/> accessed 10 
 December 2014 
Royal Thai Police, ‗Internal Agencies‘ (RTP) <http://www.royalthaipolice.go.th/ 
 agencies_under.php> accessed 10 March 2014 
−− ‗The Total Number of Serving Officers‘ (RTP) 
 <http://pdd.police.go.th/page/data_page.htm> accessed 10 March 2013 
 
 
Page 362 of 367 
 
Rukhamate P and Thananithichote S, ‗The Ombudsman‘ in Thananithichote S (ed), 
 Constitutional Organisations: Foundation Knowledge and Lessons for Reforms (KPI 
 2015) [in Thai] 
Sanders A, Young R and Burton M, Criminal Justice (4th edn, OUP 2010) 
Sangiamsak S, ‗The Patronage System in Thai Society: A Case Study in Appointing and 
 Transferring Commissioned Police Officers‘ (MA Thesis, Ramkhamheang University 
 2001) [in Thai] 
−− ‗Saudis 'Disappointed' in Blue Diamond Verdict‘ Bangkok Post (Bangkok, 31 March 
 2014) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/lite/topstories/402740/saudis-disappointed-in-
 blue-diamond-verdict> accessed 20 June 2014 
Savage S P, ‗Seeking Civilianness: Police Complaints and the Civilian Control Model of 
 Oversight‘ (2013) 53 BJC 886 
−− ‗Thinking Independence: Calling the Police to Account through the Independent 
 Investigation of Police Complaints‘ (2013) 53 BJC 94 
−− ‗Independent Minded: The Role and Status of ―Independence‖ in the Investigation of 
 Police Complaints‘ in Prenzler T and Heyer G D (eds.), Civilian Oversight of Police: 
 Advancing Accountability in Law Enforcement (CRC Press 2016) 
Schedler A, ‗Conceptualizing Accountability‘ in Schedler A, Diamond L and Plattner F M
  (eds), The Self-Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies 
 (Lynne Rienner Publisher 1999) 
Scott J C, ‗Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia‘ (1972) 66 Am 
 Polit Sci Rev 91  
Shay C, ‗Thailand's Blue Diamond Heist: Still a Sore Point‘ Time (7 March 2010) 
 <http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1969920,00.html> accessed 5 
 February 2014 
Sherwell P, ‗Suspect in British Backpacker Murder Trial Describes Thai 'Police Torture'‘ 
 The Telegraph (Koh Samui, 2 September 2015) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/  
 worldnews/asia/thailand/11838501/Suspect-in-British-backpacker-murder-trial-
 describes-police-torture.html> accessed 12 October 2015 
Shinn R S, ‗Government and Politics‘ in LePoer B L (ed), Thailand: A Country Study 
 (Library of Congress 1987) 
Sim J, ‗―One Thousand Days of Degradation‖: New Labour and Old Compromises at the 
 Turn of the Century‘ (2000) 27 Social Justice 168 
 
 
Page 363 of 367 
 
Singkaneti B, ‗Only Suspension in the Case of a Hit-and-Run Millionaire, the Cell is for 
 Incarcerating the Poor‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 5 September 2012) 
 <http://www.manager.co.th/daily/viewnews.aspx?NewsID=9550000109547> 
 accessed 1 October 2014 [in Thai] 
Smith G, ‗Actions for Damages against the Police and the Attitudes of Claimants‘ (2003) 
 13 Policing and Society 413 
−− ‗A Most Enduring Problem: Police Complaints Reform in England and Wales‘ 
 (2005) 35 J Soc Pol 121 
−− ‗Citizen Oversight of Independence Police Service: Bifurcated Accountability, 
 Regulation Creep, and Lesson Learning‘ (2009) 3 Regulation and Governance 421 
−− ‗Why Don‘t More People Complain against the Police‘ (2009) 6 European Journal of 
 Criminology 249 
−− ‗Every Complaint Matters: Human Rights Commissioner‘s Opinion concerning 
 Independent and Effective Determination of Complaints against the Police‘ (2010) 32 
 Int‘l JLC Just 59 
−− ‗Oversight of the Police and Residual Complaints Dilemmas: Independence, 
 Effectiveness and Accountability Deficits in the United Kingdom‘ (2013) 14 Police 
 Practice and Research 92 
−− ‗The Interface between Human Rights and Police Complaints in Europe‘ in Prenzler T 
 and Heyer G D (eds.), Civilian Oversight of Police: Advancing Accountability in Law
 Enforcement (CRC Press 2016)  
−− ‗The Tripartite Police Complaints System of Hong Kong‘ (2015) 15 Asia Pac  JHR & 
 L 119 
Smith J D and Gray J, Police and People in London (Gower Publishing 1985) 
−− ‗Somyot Gets National Police Chief Job in Unanimous Vote‘ The Nation (Bangkok, 
 21 August 2014) <http://www.nationmultimedia.com/politics/Somyot-gets-national-
 police-chief-job-in-unanimous-30241396.html> accessed 20 May 2015 
−− ‗Sonthi Severely Attacked the Government in Colluding to Twist the Facts and 
 Charge him with Lese-Majesty‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 29 March 2006) 
 <http://www.manager.co.th/Home/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=9490000042097> 
 accessed 10 September 2014 
Social Research Association, ‗Ethical Guidelines‘ (SAR 2003) 
 
 
Page 364 of 367 
 
Sriprasert P, ‗The Problems Relating to the Procedures of Investigation of Human Rights 
 Violations by the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand‘ (LLM Thesis, 
 Thammasat University 2008) [in Thai] 
Stohr M K, Self R L and Lovrich N P, ‗Staff Turnover in New Generation Jails: An 
 Investigation of its Causes and Prevention‘ (1992) 20 Journal of Criminal Justice 455 
Suvarnajata U, ‗The Role of the Office of Ombudsman in Dispute Resolution in Thailand‘ 
 (MA Thesis, Mahidol University 2007) [in Thai] 
Swanson G E, ‗Frameworks for Comparative Research: Structural Anthropology and the  
 Theory of Action‘ in Vallier I (ed), Comparative Methods in Sociology: Essays on 
 Trends and Applications (UC Press 1971) 
Temchavala P and Kirdvichai R, ‗The Reform in the Organisational Structure and 
 Working System of the Thai Police‘ (The Secretariat of the Senate 2005) [in Thai] 
−− ‗Thailand's Controversial Draft Constitution Explained‘ BBC (6 September 2015) 
 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-34149522> accessed 19 November 2015 
−− ‗Thailand: Country at a Glance‘ (The World Bank) 
 <http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/thailand> accessed 10 October 2015 
−− ‗Thailand Country Profile‘ BBC (London, 28 August 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk  
 /news/world-asia-15581957> accessed 30 December 2015 
Thaniyaphol P, ‗Thai police: The Guardian of the Land, the King and the People‘ (2006) 
 3 RUJ 13 [in Thai] 
Thanyasiri P, ‗The Public Participation in Police Administration‘ (DPhil thesis, Mahidol 
 University 2002) [in Thai] 
−− The Idea of Establishing the Organisation Responsible for Controlling and 
 Inspecting the Performance of the Police by Receiving Complaints (Kittayarak K ed, 
 the Commission of Police Administration Development 2007) [in Thai] 
−− ‗The Massage Palour Owner Shows Evidence How ‗Adul-Pongsapat‘ Need to Be 
 Responsible for the Scandalous Police Stations Project‘ Manager Online (Bangkok 15 
 February 2013) <http://www.manager.co.th/daily/ViewNews.aspx?
 NewsID=9560000019413> accessed 30 October 2014> accessed 30 October 2014 
−− ‗The Met Deputy Commander Revealed the Police Is Going to Send the Investigation 
 Report to the Public Prosecutor This Afternoon‘ Independent News Network (INN) 
 (Bangkok, 2 September 2013) <http://www.innnews.co.th/shownews 
 /show?newscode=476770> accessed 30 April 2014 
 
 
Page 365 of 367 
 
−− ‗The NACC Reveals the Police Commission Resolution Must be Interpreted by the 
 Constitutional Court‘ <http://www.bangkokbiznews.com/home/detail/politics/politics/ 
 20100115/95686/> 15 January 2010 
−− ‗The NACC Tabled a Resolution to Bring the Case of the Somchai Administration 
 Dispersed the PAD to the Supreme Court‘s Criminal Division for Person Holding 
 Political Positions‘ Matichon Online (Bangkok, 10 October 2008) 
 <http://www.matichon.co.th/news_ detail.php?newsid=1349863225> accessed 10 
 September 2014 
−− ‗The Ombudsman Opposed the Amalgamation with the NHRC‘ Prachatai (Bangkok, 
 17 April 2015) <http://www.prachatai.com/journal/2015/04/58872> accessed  20 May 
 2015 
−− ‗The Police Committee of the House of the Representatives Concluded that the Police 
 Planted Illicit Drugs and Murdered the Innocent‘ Manager Online (Bangkok, 14 
 March 2012) <http://www.manager.co.th/Daily/ViewNews.aspx?NewsID=955  
 0000033297> accessed 5 October 2014 
−− ‗The Thai Police: A Law unto Themselves‘ Economist (London, 17 April 2008) 
 <http://www.economist.com/node/11058580> accessed 20 May 2015 
−− Thio L. A, ‗Implementing Human Rights in ASEAN Countries: ―Promises to Keep and 
 Miles to Go before I Sleep‖‘ (1999) 2 Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. L. J. 1 
Thomas G, How to Do Your Research Project: A Guide for Students in Education and 
 Applied Social Sciences (2nd edn, Sage Publications 2013) 
Uglow S, Criminal Justice (2nd edn, Sweet and Maxwell 2002) 
UNGA ‗Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
 Executions‘ UNCHR (28 May 2010) 14th Session UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.8 
−− ‗Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions (The Paris Principles)‘ Res 
 48/134 (20 December 1993) 48th Session UN Doc A/RES/48/134 
UN OHCHR, National Human Rights Institutions: A Handbook on the Establishment and 
 Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
 Rights (Centre for Human Rights, UN 1995) 
−− ‗Thailand: 10 Years after Somchai‘s Disappearance, Family Still Awaiting Truth and 
 Justice‘ (11 March 2014) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
 DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=14353&> accessed 18 July 2014   
 
 
Page 366 of 367 
 
−− ‗Status of Ratification Indicative Dashboard: Convention against Torture and Other 
 Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)‘ 
 <http://indicators.ohchr.org/> accessed 19 July 2015 
UNODC, ‗Handbook on Justice for Victims on the Use and Application of the 
 Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power‘ 
 (Centre for International Crime Prevention 1999) 
−− ‗Good Practices for the Protection of Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings 
 involving Organized Crime‘ (UNODC 2008) 
−− Handbook on Police Accountability, Oversight and Integrity (UN 2011) 
University of Birmingham, ‗University of Birmingham: Codes of Practice for Research‘ 
 <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/university/governance/Legislation/codes-of-practice-
 policies-and-guidance.aspx> accessed 30 December 2013 
US Department of State, United States, ‗Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 
 2012‘ 
−− ‗Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2013‘ 
−− ‗Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2014‘ 
−− ‗Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015‘ 
Vaus de D, Research Design in Social Research (Sage Publications 2001) 
Vaz K, ‗2012-2013 HAC Report on the IPCC‘ (1 February 2013) 
 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPQL6laYr7A> accessed 15 August 2015 
Waiyakarn S, The Survey of Complainants’ Satisfaction towards the Service of the Office 
 of the Ombudsman in relation to the Handling of Complaints (as cited in
 Rukhamate P. and Thananithichote S, ‗The Ombudsman‘ in Thananithichote  S. (ed), 
 Constitutional Organisations: Foundation Knowledge and Lessons for Reforms (KPI 
 April 2015) ) [in Thai] 
Wake R, Simpson C, Homes A and Ballantyne J, Public Perceptions of the Police 
 Complaints System (Ipsos MORI 2007) 
Walker P, ‗Burmese Men Accused of Koh Tao Murders ‗Confessed after Death Threats‘‘ 
 The Guardian (24 October 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/24 
 /burmese-men-koh-tao-murders-confessed-death-threats-thai-police-torture-claims> 
 accessed 20 January 2015 
 
 
 
Page 367 of 367 
 
−− ‗Koh Tao‘s Dark Side: Dangers of Island Where Britons Were Murdered‘ 
 Guardian (23 November 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/uk- news/2014/nov/23/
 briton-thailand-murder-hannah-witheridge-david-miller-mystery-mafia-fear> 
 accessed 2 February 2015 
Wangkiat P and Ngamkham W, ‗Police refuse to answer 'torture' claim‘ Bangkok Post (4 
 November 2014) <http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/general/441255/police-refuse-
 to-answer-torture-claim> accessed 10 January 2015 
Wanichwiwatana A, ‗The 1998 Thai Police Reform: A Study of the Persistence of 
 Institutional Corruption‘ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford 2004) 
Waters I and Brown, ‗Police Complaints and the Complainants‘ Experience‘ (2000) 40 
 BJC 617 
Weaver K and Olson J K, ‗Understanding Paradigms Used for Nursing Research‘ (2005) 
JAN 459 
Weber M, ‗Some Categories of Interpretative Sociology‘ (1981) 22 Sociological Quarterly 
 151 
Wells W and Schafer J A, ‗Police Skepticism of Citizen Oversight: Officers‘ Attitudes 
toward Specific Functions, Processes, and Outcomes‘ (2007) Journal of Crime and Justice 
1 
Win T L, ‗Interview: Muslim Women in Southern Thailand Face Discrimination by Civil 
 and Religious Law‘ Thomson Reuters Foundation (Bangkok, 14 March 2014) 
 <http://www.trust.org/item/?map=activist-angkhana-neelapaijit-says-muslim-women-
 in-southern-thailand-face-discrimination-by-civil-and-religious-law> accessed 18 July 
 2015 
Young R, Hoyle C, Cooper K and Hill R, ‗Informal Resolution of Police Complaints: A 
 Quasi-Experimental Test of Restorative Justice‘ (2005) 5 Criminal Justice 279 
Yin R K, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (3rd edn, Sage Publications 2003) 
